An Economist’s Protest

454 Pages·1927·51.249 MB·English

by  Edwin Cannan

AN 'ECONOMIST'S
PROTEST
DY
EDWIN C·-ANNAN
EMERITUPSR OFES.;OORF POLITICEACLO NOMY
IN THE UNIVERSITOYF LONDON
LONDON
P. S. KING & SON, LTD.
ORCHARD HOUSE, WESTMINSTER
1027
PREFACE
WHATs houIla dn swiefar n yohnaedt hiem pertinence
toa smke ,"W hadti ydo ud oi nt hGer eWaatr 1 " It
woulbden ous et os atyh aitm mediaotnte hloeyu t­
breIao kff ermeyds ervaisca he asr vefsottreh rye,o ung
manw hot oomky n ameev idernetglayr mdeeas d f ar
toool (da 5t3 t,h irtleoenynge aargsIo ) a,n dn othing
evecra moef i t.I tw oulbden ob ettteosr a tyh aIt
safto qru iatl eo ntgi moens evecroammli ttbeeecsa,u se
everydoindea, n dn othienvgec ra moef t hatT.h e
besatn swIec ra nt hionfki s" I p rotested."
Hencteh tei tolfte h ibso owkh,i ccho nsoifsa st esl ec­
tiofnr oam c onsidelraarbgnleuyrm boefrl ettaenrds
articpluebsl,i sahnedud n publiwshhiecdIh, w rote
fro1m9 1t4o 1 926I.h avlee ftth eaml moesxta ctly
inc hronoloorgdieicrna slt oefar de -arratnhgeinmg
undseurb jheecatd ipnegcsa,Iu t shei tnkh atth ehya ve
runnitnhgro utghheo mn ltyw om ailni noefsp rotest,·
thoen aeg aiwnhsatmt a yb ec alelceodn onmaitci onalism
orn ationeacloinsotma incdts h,oe t haegra ienxpsetd i­
entwsh icohu ghttob er ejecwtheedt htehree c onomic
ideaailm eadt i sn ationoarlc iosstm opolAnidt an.
thetsweo a rseo i nterttwhianiteti d su ndesitroa ble
trtyo k eetph eamp arEtv.e tnh ceh oiacnedm anage­
menotf a natiocnuarlr einsic nye xtrimciaxbeuldpy
witihn ternarteiloantailo ns.
Ih adl onbge eanp rotesatgaanitnths cetu rriednetn ­
tificaotf"i t ohnce o un"t orry" t hnea ti"o (nt hiast,
thceo unotrrt yhn ea tiooftn h sep eaokrewr ri tewri)t h
thee cono"msiocc ieotry" "c ommuniRteya.d"e rs
oft hEe oonomicO utwliotrohek t enmteimvoer miaeys
recatlhlai tn 1 90I8 v aliatnrtilteyodp ersuatdhee
Irisnho tt ol ameonvte trh dee populoafIrt eiloann d,
V
vi
PREFACE
and that in 1909, equally valiantly and equally vainly,
I tried to persuade the Socialists to give up imagining
that they can safely aim at the internal re-organization
of each of the existing nations separately, and ignore
the greater Society which includes them all. In Wealth,
published seven months before the beginning of the
War, as well as long before in my oral teaching of
economics and public finance I had always tried to be
a mundane rather than a national economist. I refused
to pretend to think of each and every nation in turn
as of an honest and law-abiding householder surrounded
by burglars and murderers against whom he had to
arrange and pay for "defence," so that military and
naval exertions of all nations and all times were just
as legitimate and productive industry as that of the
medical profession, which does its best to defend us
against the attacks of disease. I had even complained
that although it was no longer thought right to eat the
foreigner or even to reduce him to slavery, it was gener­
ally thought quite legitimate to tax him (if possible)
and to prevent him immi ating to improve his con­
gr
dition, even when it was admitted that to obstruct his
movement was contrary to the good of the world as a
whole. Patriotism, I thought, like the egotism of
which it is a larger variety, was an excellent thing only
when kept within certain bounds by appropriate insti­
tutions. Still later, in May, 1914, I tried to show in
the first article reprinted in the present collection that
no permanent benefit could be won for the pure working
class of any particular nation by the most successful
war.
I had also been an almost life-long protestant against
the shallow habit-by no means confined to professed
socialists-of proposing remedies for economic pressure
without considering the question whether that pressure
may not be an integral part of the existing organization
which cannot be removed without causing disaster
unless some efficient substitute is provided. Modern
civilization, nearly all civilization, is based on the p:rin­
ciple of making things pleasant for those who please
vii
PREFACE
the market and unpleasant for those who fail to do so,
and whatever defects this principle may have, it is
better than none. Illustration will be found in the
second of the two pre-war articles below, where I com­
plain that the Liberal " Land Enquiry Committee "
proposed to do away with one of the principal regulators
of the distribution of population without the least
suggestion of putting anything else in its place.
Inter arma silent leges, as I remark below in 1915 IX,
is not to be translated " In time of war economic laws
don't work," and though, fl.s I suggest there, it may
sometimes be well to be silent about some of them,
this is not the general rule. The outbreak of the World
War in August, 1914, called for not less but more vigour
in the two lines of protest which I have indicated. That
catastrophe made it painfully evident that the system
of entirely independent states each with its own poli­
ticians and economists regarding it as Society at large
and treating the interest of all outside it as of no account
had become not only inconvenient, but absolutely
incompatible with the continuance of civilization. It
became very widely acknowledged that there must be
some cosmopolitan organization and authority to settle
international disputes and prevent recourse to inter­
national violence just as there is in each country a
national organization and authority to settle individual
disputes and prevent individual recourse to violence.
At first I had only to do my best to support this
change of opinion. I did so by pointing out (as in the
articles 1915 III and 1916 IV) that the supposed" eco­
nomic" causes of war, when carefully analysed, turn
out to be at bottom the result not of economic incom­
patibilities but of strategic jealousies and alarms. When
these are exorcised by the disappearance of separate
military forces and consequently of the possibility of
war, nationalism becomes contented with home rule,
and loses the bitterness usually given to it by fear.
But war, as Adam Smith said of a more respectable
trade, is " a brutal and an odious business." Under
its malign influence the noble aspirations with which
viii
PREFACE
the Great War opened soon wilted away: particularist and
anti-social nationalisms revived, and all the " mean and
malignant expedients " of mercantilism were resusci­
tated for use not only against enemies in the field but
also for permanent employment against both quondam
enemies and quondam allies after peace was made.
My attitude of protest had to be resumed, and many
of the items, from 1916 I, "Mercantile war to follow
military war 1 " down to 1923 II, " Professors and
Protection," are attempts to stem this reaction to
ideas and methods rightly discarded in the more
peaceful atmosphere of the nineteenth century.
Some friends of peace and goodwill for whom I had
the highest respect took a very gloomy view of the
probable results of a complete defeat of the Central
Powers. In spite of all my dissatisfaction with war
propaganda and its effects on public opinion, I was
more cheerful, and endeavoured to show in " A Plea
for Large Political Units" (1916 VII) that there was a
probability of the confederates against the Central
Powers becoming in the end the nucleus of a more com­
prehensive federation which would include the defeated
powers. Now, in 1927, when we have seen the Locarno
Pact and the admission of Germany to the Council of
the League of Nations, it looks as if perhaps I was not
far wrong.
With this idea in my mind I could do my best to
help in the war without being oppressed, as many good
men and women were, with the sickening thought that
it was all to no purpose and possibly actually harmful.
I made various practical suggestions of a positive kind,
some of which were adopted (I do not say in consequence
of my recommendation). But the greater part of my
effort was directed to combating some extraordinary
delusions which took possession of the minds of the
peo:r,le and their governors.
The earliest of these was the idea that there was
danger ''lf unemployment unless everyone continued to
spend as before. This gave rise to what I have call.ed
the first w� slogan, "Business as Usual" (see 1914 III).
PREFACE lX
It was short-lived, and soon gave way before a much
more dangerous delusion, the belief that everything
ought to be sold at the same price as before the war,
and that anyone who sold anything at a higher price
than that was an extortioner of so deep a dye that a
new word, "profiteer," had to be invented for him.
Regulation of prices, with the intention of keeping
them down, began to be undertaken by the Government,
and this of course soon led to what became known as
the queue system of distribution; when there was a
shortage of the supply of any article and the price was
prevented from rising by regulation, so that the demand
was not contracted as usual by a rise of price, the
would-be buyers stood in a queue for the commodity
in question, and those at the head of the queue got as
much as they wanted, and those at the other end got
none. The course of things showed a complete absence
of any general appreciation of the function of prices.
Hence the appearance in this collection of many pro­
tests, of which the most general is 1915 II, "Why
some prices should rise," or as it was originally entitled,
"The Good Side of Rising Prices."
The rise of prices which I defended was of course the
rise in the price of particular things which happened to
be in abnormally short supply or for which there hap­
pened to be an abnormally large demand. But it was
not long before a different kind of rise of price, little
thought of at first, the general rise of prices which is
synonymous with decline in the purchasing power of
money, began to force itself on the attention of the
public.
Part of the depreciation of the pound merely corre­
sponded with a depreciation of gold throughout the
world. Some hoards had been or were being thrown
on the market, and the usual demand of the mints for
currency purposes was entirely cut off, while the pro­
duction of gold proceeded with little diminution. The
natural result was that an ounce of gold would buy
les.s than formerly. Great Britain might, of course, by
sufficient limitation of the issue of paper money and
X PREFACE
clostihMineng t a ntdh Bean ko fEn glaangda itnshte
receptoifgo onlh da,vk ee ptthp eu rchpaoswioenfrg
thpeo uanbdo tvheao tft hoel gdo ledq uivoafal ent
poun(d1 2g3r¼a oifns st andoar1r 1do3 f p urgeo ld).
Thawto uhladv per evetnhtreei odsf ep r iwcietsah l l
itsa ttentdraonutab nlhdea sv,re e dutchenedo minal
cosotft hwea ern ormoauntsdhl reye caolss ut bstan­
tiatlhloyun gohnt e asrolm yu chB.u ittw ouhladv e
givreints oce o nsiddeirffiacbuallfettt iehewresa ra,n d
inf acnto boadsyk feodir t .
Altlh acto ublerd e asoenxapbelwcyat tseh da tth e
pousnhdo unlobdte r eduicnve adl bueel iotwgs o ld
equivalent.
Tot hvee tePrraonf eSshsioeNrli dc hoblesloonn gs
thcer eodfsi cte ndtainngigent r h Cuer reNnoctyie s sue
ase aralsty h fier msotn otfth h Wea rI.n t hSecotsma n
ofA ugus1t81 ,9 1h4es, u ggetshtatethnd eo tmeisg ht
becoimnec onveartnidtb hlaietfp, r iccaemste ob e
measuirnie ndc onvneorttteihsbe,lwr eoe u bledn o
limtiott h rei osfpe r iecxecsei pntt hm eo deraoft ion
thaeu thoirsistutyih nneog t (Weasr F inance, 191p7.,
179B)u.mt o sotfu sw erleu ltlose ldeb eytp hp er omise
oft hCeu rreanncBdya nNko tAecst1 ,9 1t4h,at th e
notsehso bulecd o nveirtnitgbool lcedo iantt hBea nk
ofE nglaWnedf .o rigwfoe te ,v kern etwh,aR ti cardo,
ah undyreeadbr esf ohraeod,b sertvhoo.ag to lcdo in
whiccohu nlodbt em eltoered x pocr+ovuebldedd e pre­
ciabteeldto hwve a loufie t wse igihnft r beuel ltioo n
al evseebltyt hpea pceurr reInt chyiI.no kn lbye gan
tob es uspiicn1i 9o1ua6sn a dl armien1d 9 17.
La�a st hiwsa si,tw ase arilfmy e asubryte hde
progorfge esnseo rpailno into hnse u bjeIctita s.l most
increndoiwbb,ul iteti saf atchta etv erywhmeorset
oft howsheow erree gabrydt ehpdeu balsim co netary
experretfusst eobd e litehvatethp ea piesrs oufte hse ir
ownp articcouulnahtrary ad n ythtiodn owg i tthh e
riosfep riicnet sh acto untTrhyeu. s ulailtn aek en
wast oal legteh atth lea rgaed dittioto hnpespa er
currweenrcety he eff eacntnd o tth cea sueo ft hre\5 e.
Thfea wcatns e rvf eactehdaun td etrh per e-gwoarl d
xi
PREFACE
standard this doctrine would have appeared palpably
absurd. Before the War it had become quite well
accepted in expert circles that the rise of prices which
had taken place since the nineties was due to the large
amount of gold forthcoming from the Tranavaal : no
one had ever thought of suggesting that the rise of
prices had called forth the gold from the mines in the
mysterious way in which it was now supposed that the
rise of prices was calling forth currency notes from the
press.
Of the few experts who admitted that the issue of
paper money ho.d been the cause of the rise of prices
many were angry with anyone who ventured to depre­
cate it, because, they said, the issue was necessary to
finance the enormous expense of the War. They com­
pletely overlooked the fact that this enormous expense
measured in money was largely due to the depreciation
of money, and that if money had not depreciated, it
would not have been nearly so large.
By 1918 I was thoroughly aroused, and in August of
that year I found some distraction from a recent almost
overwhelming private sorrow in devoting a strenuous
month's work to writing the first edition of Mone:y :
its connexion with rising and falling prices, an ele­
mentary exposition of which the oft-recurring refrain
is, " to maintain the value of a currency due limitation
of issue is necessary." My publishers, rather to my
surprise at that very difficult time, took the work in
hand at once and it came out at Christmas. My sanguine
hopes that it might make some difference were, like
most authors' hopes, disappointed, and to my infinite
dis t, the issue which had been defended as neces-
gus
sary to carry on the war continued on its evil
course at nearly as rapid a rate after the Armistice as
before it.
I continued protesting all through 1919, and jumped
at the proposal of my publishers, suggested, I believe,
by Mr. Samuel Evans, that I should edit a reprint of
t�e Bullion Report of 1810. This appeared in December
under the title of The Paper Pound o f 1797 to 1821—a
xii
PREFACE
title which was intended to help, and I think did help
a little, to make people think of the pound of 191 4-25
as a paper pound. But a more powerful engine was
set to work about the same time. In October I had
grumbled to a member of the Cunliffe Committee about
its inaction, and he admitted that it had " been in a
trance for a long time," but said it was just going to
meet again. It did so, and soon produced the Report
recommending what became known as " the Cunliffe
limit " on the issue of Currency Notes, and this was
adopted by the Government in the Treasury Minute of
December 15.
The battle, however, scarcely appeared to be won.
If the limit held, the currency could not be increased
unless its old par with gold was first restored, but there
was nothing to show that the existing currency would
be reduced in amount so as to bring that restoration
about in the early future. Moreover there was no
security that the Treasury Minute, made by one Chan­
cellor of the Exchequer, might not be varied by another
Minute, made by the same or a subsequent Chancellor.
The idea that the limit would hold was openly derided
by many of the foremost experts, and their contempt
for it seemed to be justified by the fact that during the
months from March to July the :fiduciary issue of Cur­
rency Notes rose faster and to higher lcve] than it had
done in the corresponding months of 1919, terrifying
the Treasury into the very pusillanimous action of
practically enlarging the limit by declaring a few millions
of notes forming the earliest issue to be "called in but
not yet �ancelled," and therefore not to be reckoned
as part of the total outstanding. In the same period
there was also a considerable increase in the Bank of
England notes outstanding.
But appearances were deceptive. The increase of
Bank of England notes was more than accounted for
by the fact that some were being locked away against
Currency Notes, which only meant that the public were
exchanging £5 notes for £l notes, and others were being
taken by the banks in exchange for gold coin surrendered
PREFACE xiii
atp atrot hBea nokfE nglaTnhdbe.a nksdi dn ot
leonudtt h ensoeta enmsyo rteh tahnhe ayld e ontu tth e
stoocfsk osv eraenhidagn lsf -swohvietcrhheeh iya d
gns
heilrnde sseirntvcheeee a rdlayoyt sfh Wea rWh.e ther
thetyh outghCheut n lliiffmweio tuh lodol drn otth,e y
wercea uteinogouhust oa ssutmheai ttw ouladn,d
toa cotn t haats sumwpitttihhoe enff eocfct a using
btitecro mplbayib notr rowwheosr tsi flolo lishly
wantteobd o rroonwt hea ssumpttihoapntr ices
wouglood n i ncreTa.shiaend go.p otfti hoCunleni ffe
litrub jyt hTer eadseurii yn f acstt otphh ea ndi
ng
ouotfa dditciuornrtaetolnh cpeyu bflrioDcme cember,
19,1a 9nsdt optpheredi o sfpe r ifcoremts h feo llow­
inAgp ril.
Ih abde erni dicbuyls eodme ex rptefsos ra yini ng
thper eftaotc hPeea p er Pound, "W hetnh sec aalte s
lafsatfl rlot mhe ey oefts h peeo polfEe u reog,pr oaning
undtehrre i osfpe r sit,ch eewyin loll o ncgretoyr t heir
govern'Hm aenntgth spe r ofi!t' eb eu'rtB s ur ny our
papmeorn eayn,gd o o nb urniinttgi i llwillt buasy
mucgho ladsi tu setdodo ! 'T"hpe e orpelmea ined
blibnudat,f tkeere ptihtneog tc aurlr einntc hyhe a nds
oft hpeu blnieca srtlayt itohnrgaohruoy1u 29t0 t,h e
Treyag souritn( btya xaatnibdoo nr roswiixtnyg-)s ix
milloiCfour nrseN noctyae nsbd u rtnhter me,d utchien g
amouonutt stfarnotdmhit enpo gp oionf£t6 3 70,06,000
to£ 0313,00,T0h0te0o .t caulr roeuntcsyta nwdasin g
furtrheedrub cyee ihdgt m illiionBn asn okfE ngland
notaensad t l eassetvm eillni oinnss i lcvoeinwr i th­
drafwrnoc mi rculIantt htiewo yone .a frrosmM arch,
1290t,oM arc1h29,3t ,h peo unrdso efr om7 0t o9 6
pecre notfi. tp sa gro lvda lue.
As thaer tinculmebse1 2r90eI dXa n1d29 1I IsIh ow,
Is alwi trtelateso co onm polfta hinpi osl biucstyo ,m e­
timien1 293i tw adsr opipnfe adv oofurt h"e wait
ansde "ep oloifck ye eptihnaegm ouonfct urre ncy
statiaonndhar oyp itnhgar te stoorfat thpeia openr
poutnogd o pldaw ro ublebd r ouagbhotbuty a f ainll
t:L-tvea loufge o lIdn.t hwinete ro f1 29-43 thMac-­e
dona.LIadb oGuro vernmetnotoo kffi caen,td h aret icle