An assessment of uncertainty due to adversary mobility

50 Pages·2015·4.84 MB·English

An Assessment of Uncertainty due to Adversary Mobility
By
Matthew T. Fulchino
B.S. Computer Systems Engineering
University of Massachusetts - Amherst, 2004
SUBMITTED TO THE SYSTEM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF SCIENCE IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT
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AT THE
A r Z~IT TT F
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
AUG 06 2015
FEBRUARY 2015
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0 2015 Matthew T. Fulchino. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper
and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now
known or hereafter created.
Signature redacted
Signature of Author
Matthew T. Fulchino
System Design and Management Fellow
Signature redacted
Certified by
James M. Utterback
Thesis Supervisor
David J. Mc rath Jr. (1959) fessor of Management and Innovation
Professof Eptineefing Systems
Signature redacted
Approved by __ __
Patrick Hale
Director, System Design and Management Fellows Program
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Abstract
Uncertainty related to an adversary's tactics, techniques, and procedures is often difficult
to characterize, particularly during the period immediately before a conflict, when planning
for a face-to-face confrontation with a combatant. Adversarial freedom of maneuver and
the fixed nature of asset defense leaves limited room for error or half-assessments, yet past
analysis of regional defendability presumes a static, symmetric adversary, rather than a
nimble, cunning one.
This thesis examines historical events to identify the source of uncertainty with respect to
defensive operations, and proposes that an alternative measure of performance be evaluated
to fully characterize the effectiveness and limitations of defensive elements in the face of
a determined peer.
Thesis Supervisor:
James M. Utterback
David J. McGrath Jr. (1959) Professor of Management and Innovation
Professor of Engineering Systems
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Contents
Characterization of Risk due to A dversarial M obility.........................................................
A bstract........................................................................................ ................ 3
List of Figures.................................................................................................... ........... 6
D isclaim er.......................................................................................................... .............. 7
N otice............................................................................................................. ........7
A cknow ledgem ents..........................................................................................................8
Lists of A cronym s and Abbreviations ............................................................................ 9
Introduction........................................................................................................................11
Part 1: A sym me try as a Strategy ................................................................................... 13
Asymmetry in Deterrence, Parity, Stability, and Uncertainty .................................... 16
D eterrence..................................................................................................................17
Parity..........................................................................................................................17
Stability......................................................................................................................17
U ncertainty ................................................................................................................ 18
Part 2: Legacy D eterrence - Ballistic M issiles ............................................................... 20
The U nited States & Russia - Stable & Certain............................................................22
Iraq & Iran, 1980-1990 - A symm etric D eterrence........................................................22
1990 and Beyond - M obility Drives Instability ........................................................ 26
Part 3: M odeling M obility Uncertainty ........................................................................ 30
Ballistic M issile System s........................................................................................... 31
M issiles......................................................................................................................32
M issile Launcher M obility ................................................................................... 34
A nti-Ballistic Mi ssile System s ................................................................................. 35
Part 4: M easuring M obility Uncertainty........................................................................ 37
Background....................................................................................................................37
D efended area ................................................................................................................ 37
Launch Ar ea D enied................................................................................................. 41
Conclusion.........................................................................................................................43
Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 45
Appendix A : Radar Range Equation (Fulchino, 2014) ............................................. 45
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Appendix B: Launch Area Denied vs. Defended Area: An Assessment.................46
R eferen ces..........................................................................................................................4 7
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - Systematic Effect of Uncertainty from the Defender's Perspective ............. 18
Figure 2 - Systematic Effect of Uncertainty from the Combatant's Perspective .......... 19
Figure 3 -Parity Difference over Time (US/Russia)................................................... 22
Figure 4 - Iran-Iraq War Missile Attacks (source: gire_3pich2005 [FAL], via Wikimedia
C om mo n s)..................................................................................................................23
Figure 5 -Parity Differential over Time - Iran-Iraq War ............................................ 24
Figure 6 - TEL Mobility (Isaacson & Vaughan, 1996) ................................................. 27
Figure 7 - April 18, 2001 Iranian Missile Attack, According to MKO Claims (Tarzi &
Parliam ent, 2001)................................................................................................... 28
Figure 8 -Ballistic Trajectory Phases (Fulchino, 2014)...............................................33
Figure 9 - SCUD TEL at the National Museum of History, Bulgaria (Holt, 2010)..........35
Figure 15 - CEP Table (Hildreth, Iran's Ballistic Missile and Space Launched Programs,
2 0 12 ) .......................................................................................................................... 4 0
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Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this academic thesis represent only those of the
author. All systems represented are notional unless otherwise stated. All historical
information originated from open, acknowledged sources.
Notice
An unpublished appendix is available upon request. Please contact the author for further
information or to review this material.
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Acknowledgements
These past several months have been some of the most rewarding and enlightening of my
life, yet the reality is that it would not have been possible without a network of wonderful
people who I wish to thank.
First and foremost, I owe a debt of gratitude to Nicholas Robertson for his steadfast support
during this past year, and his unwavering dedication to me during this program. He has
cooked for me, cleaned up after me, and tolerated my absence from life, while encouraging
me at every turn. For that, I am profoundly grateful.
My family and friends have celebrated and sustained me at every opportunity, especially
my mother and father, without whom this journey would have been impossible. I have
known few others whose sole mission it is to ensure the success of their kids in all that they
do. You both are amazing and wonderful people.
To my mentors, Dr. Joseph Chapa and Dr. Edward Taylor, without whom I would have
neither applied to the Advanced Study Program, nor been accepted, you have taught me
how to take a step back and see the bigger picture without losing sight of what is important.
And to my SDM peers, namely Joshua Williams and Kristopher Fosmoe, who have helped
to refocus me as I have darted from thought to thought, cost to lasers, and strategy to action.
You are all truly great Americans and will always be recognized as such in my mind.
I am profoundly grateful to all of the professors and administrators of the System Design
and Management program, most notably Pat Hale, who has given me tools in which to
build lifetime of success.
Finally, my perspicacious and philosophical adviser, Professor Jim Utterback, has
challenged me to dig deeper and question how the world has come to be. Jim inspired me
to think differently. He sees beyond the myopic, pixelated focus of others to the canvas on
which great ideas are imagined. In a way that few others have, Jim has transformed my
understanding of what it means to be innovative.
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Lists of Acronyms and Abbreviations
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile
COCOM Combatant Command
DoD Department of Defense
MOE Measure of Effectiveness
MOP Measure of Performance
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
TBM Tactical or Theatre Ballistic Missile
CEP Circular Engagement Probable (Probability)
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction
TEL Transporter Erector Launcher
TTTP Technology, Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
PBS Public Broadcasting System
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DAL Defended Asset List
IED Improvised Explosive Devices
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