An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963.

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ff 853 July 65
AN ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY OF NASA
_1958,1963 .............
NASA SP-4101
AN ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY OF NASA,
1958-1963
ROBERT L. ROSHOLT
Prepared under the auspices of the
NASA Historical Staff
Scientific and Techni_d Information D_visi_u 1 9 6 6
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
lVasl_ington, D.C.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price $4.00
I_'braryof Con&r_rsCatalo&JVmber
FOREWORD
Thisadminlstm_e historoyfNASA fortheyears1958-1963 was _pax_
by Dr. Robert Rosholtundera contracttotheUniversityof Minnesota. This
is the first of a series of NASA histories and is based, to a considerable cxt_t, on
documcn ry
Even the most careful study of documents cannot give the full flavor of the
very difficult period covered by this history. NASA (a) was being organized
from components of govcrnrnent agencies already in cx_ncc, (b) was instituting
large new programs to increase our national capability in both aeronautics and
spaceand atthesame timewas carryingforwardthoscthathad been startedin
constituenutnits,and (c)was undertakingthelargcbuildupof thisNation's
manned space-flighctapabilitcyalledforby PresidentKennedy'smcssagetothe
Congressin May 1961. Dr.Rosholtrccognizedthisand conductedinterviews
with many participantsw,hich added grcatvalueto hisrcvicwof documents.
Hc hasfaithfullryccordedhisfindingsfrom both documents and intcrvicwsand
hiswork willundoubtedlyconstitutea milcstonein NASA's effortto provide
adequate historical materials for future assessment.
Dr. Rosholt'swork isof high qualityand speaksforitself.However, a
personalword astotheadministrativcelimateofthattirnct,heobjcctivcssought
and actionsjointltyakenbythclateDr.Hugh L.Dryden,Dr.RobertC.Scamaus,
and me may hclpingivingperspectiveand thatisthepurposcof thisforeword.
When IjoinedthcNationalAeronauticsand SpaceAdministratioansAdmin-
istratoirnFebruaryof 1961,Ifound thatthefirsAtdministrator,Dr.T. Kdth
Glcnnan,had Idta thoroughand completerecordof mattersimportanttomy
properdischargeoftheresponsibilitoifestheofficea,nd a number ofvaluable
studieswhich he had preparedforguidanceastheprogram ofthcagencydevel-
oped. Dr.Scamans hadjoinedtheagencyasAssociateAdminisu_or inSeptem-
berof1960,butthedcctionof PresidentKennedy two months laterhad lefthis
statusina stateofconsiderabluenccrtainty.Dr.Dryden, who had servedsince
theorganizationof theagencyasDeputy Administratorw,as servingasActing
Administratorbuthad rccdvcdno notificatioonfhisappointmentfrom thenew
administration.A report,quitecriticaolf theprogram and ccrtainaspectsof
the organizationof the agency,had bccn filedwith PrcsidcntKennedy by a
pand establishepdriortohisinauguration.Scriousqucstionswcrc beingraised,
iii
iv ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF NASA, 1958--1963
particularly by groups of scientists, as to the merit of manned space flight and of
continuing the Mercury program.
At the time I took the oath of office on February 14, 1961, I stated to the
assembled officials that Dr. Dryden would remain as Deputy, and that Dr. Seamans
would remain as Associate Administrator, with strong support to implement fully
his organizational position as general manager of operations. I stated that my
purpose would be to work toward creating an environment within which NASA
could be as innovative in the management of its programs as it was in aeronautics
and space science.
Dr. Dryden, Dr. Seamans, and 1immediately set to work to end uncertainty,
to make unmistakably clear our support for the manned space flight program,
to define necessary additions to the budget for Fiscal Year 1962 that had already
been sent to Congress by the outgoing administration, and to establish personal
and official relationships conducive to effective leadership. The three of us
decided together that the basis of our rdationship should be an understanding
that we would hammer out the hard decisions together and that each would
undertake those segments of responsibility for which he was best qualified. In
effect, we formed an informal partnership within which all major policies and
programs became our joint responsibility, but with the execution of each policy
and program undertaken by just one of us. This meant that everyone in and
out of the agency knew all three of us would be involved in all major decisions;
that with policy established, the orders for its execution could be issued by any
one of us; and that, while NASA had an Administrator as a single point of final
decifion, to the fullest extent possible we would act together. From my point
of view, and I believe also from that of Dr. Dryden and Dr. Seamans, this was a
most happy and productive relationship. In every major matter, we worked
intimately together to establish a sound foundation for our policies and actions.
Each of us helped to bring capable and valued associates into positions of respon-
sibility. When one of us found the burden of his work too heavy, the others
stepped forward toshare it.
It seems to me that there are several areas where the application of this
method of administrative leadership and the basis for and effects of the decisions
we made are not fully dear, either from the documentation in this history or
Dr. Rosholt's comments. I hope this foreword will suggest to interested scholars
that the importance of understanding our pattern of thought and action may
well justify further analysis and study to trace the development of NASA's
present competence in administration.
The first area to which I wish to call attention was our decision, after the
May 1961 expansion of space activity, to lay out our plan of organization and
administration for the initial period so as to enable Dr. Seamans to maintain a
dose control of the agency's resources and so thatxmajor personal contacts between
Headquarters and our center directors would run directly to his office. At that
time, it was important that his central position as general manager be dearly
lrOi_gWOgD V
understood and his effectiveness in that position assured. Since he, Dr. Dryden,
and I were in constant contact, the three of us viewed this arrangement as the
best way to provide a single focal point. This way we could take all actions
necessary to make sure that basic research and the resource base of the agency.
would keep step with the expanding development programs. This way the three
of us could participate directly (without an intervening layer of management)
to ensure a continuing evaluation of the performance and growth potential of
our senior personneL
An additional purpose was to create the kind of flexible organizational and
administrative framework within which the procedures used and the reslxamibili-
ties, even of quite senior officials, could be readjusted without embarrassment or
great difficulty. We wanted to begin our expansion in an enviroment within
which people would not befrozen into rigid assignments, and through which the
three of us could take action m foster an atmosphere at senior management levels
of readiness to accept change in organization and duties. Our initial purpose
was to maintain this status until we could form our judgments as to the capability
of the men on whom the major respomibilities would rest and had stabilized a
pattern that would enable us to make a proper division of the workload. We
wanted enough time, in a fluid state, to make a more permanent match of the
men with the work assignments.
Dr. Rosholt seems to fed that the immediate establishment of a pattern of
organization having a narrower span of control would have been better. In my
view, a deeper and more penetrating analysis will show the wisdom of the method
chosen. In any event, by November 1963 we were in a poakion to narrow the
span of control and fix a pattern that has proven effective and has steadily gained
engt
A second major area in which the reasons for our decisions and the results
of them are not fully reported relates to our determination to build a management
system that would emphasize the importance of first-dam performance and indi-
vidual competence at each level of organization. We attached high imlxa, tance
to the development of competence in all phases of administration as well as in
the scientific and engineering disciplines, and other specialties. Our poEcy was
to u_ze and emphasize the importance we attached to patterns of administration
that would foster a pervasive development of careful judgment as an almost
instinctive approach to important problems by all key personnel.
An illustration of this is in the field of procurement. Here, Dr. Dryden,
Dr. Seamans, and I determined that we would personally examine, in detail, the
results of the work of all source evaluation boards on competitively negotiated
contracts that amounted to 5 million dollars or more. We expected these boards
to appear before us personally in a formal setting and make a full and complete
presentation of (1) the method chosen to break down for evaluation the contractor
proposals, (2) the results achieved in the application of this method, and (3) the
judgment of the board on each of the categories of the breakdown. The effect
vi
ADMI/qISTRATIVE HISTORY OF NASA, 1958--1963
of this systematic approach to a continuous emphasis on the judgment/actor has
been that for five years, on innumerable occasions and for extended periods, the
three senior officials of NASA have sat side by side and personally examined in
detail, and tested by question and answer, the quality of the individual and
collective contributions of these boards to major decisions affecting the area where
ninety percent of our resources are expended. We thus formed our own personal
judgments, based on a great deal of personal involvement, as to the validity of
board findings. We deeply immersed ourselves on a daily basis in very complete
analyses of the main factors, within NASA and at the plants of our contractors,
on which our projects depend forsuccess, and the views, approaches, and analytical
judgment of our senior personnel. In this process we were able to observe and
evaluate how rapidly the organization and its contractors were developing their
capabilities, and how effective our effort to get nine-tenths of NASA's work done
by contractors was proving. We believe this constant and visible personal contact
among NASA's three senior officials and the other responsible personnd involved
in the hard problems and decisions in procurement provided a great deal of
stimulation, motivation, and innovation throughout the organization.
The fact that the three senior officers of the agency would take the time to
conduct what amounted to a thorough hearing and question-and-answer period
on each contractor selection action enabled all levels of management, in Head-
quarters and in our Centers, to get their questions out on the table before all
three of us for debate and clarification. Another important result was that when
the presentation to the three of us was over, everyone involved had a dear under-
standing of the dements basic to a proper decision and everyone in NASA con-
cerned with the matter was aware of this. The burden then passed to Dryden,
Seamans, and me to make the final decision, and the personnel of the boards
were in position to form their own judgments as to whether the three of us did
in fact arrive at the best decision as indicated by the facts and analysis. Further,
an important dement of a NASA-wide and pervasive self-policing system was
thereby established. This has had an important effect on maintaining high
standards throughout the agency.
One additional area of requirement for effective administrative leadership
that I would like to touch upon is the lack of recognition given in this history
to the difficulty we had in bringing high-level executive people in from various
backgrounds and fitting them into our organization, letting each serve in such a
way as to derive satisfaction while serving the organization, and then either
remaining or departing depending on performance. There is inadequate recog-
nition, I believe, of the consequences of our decision, at the time Dr. George E.
Mueller joined us, to create in our Office of Manned Space Flight a group of
men not only dedicated to NASA'g program, but also who could have the full
confidence of the Departrrfent of Defense and the Air Force. There is aLsolittle
of the flavor of the creation, in this period, of the managerial competence that
voazwo_ vii
put into effect the extremely difficult and complex an-up systems test concept
that is now showing its value in the successful flight program.
The management structure in NASA is still evolving and for a long time
will remain anything but static. The fact that contracts arc administered on a
decentralized basis from widely dispcrscd Civil Service contract administrative
organiamtions has introduced the req_ent that contract officers, supported by
profem/onal staffs of attorneys, accountants, auditors, and inspectors, must also
work with large numbers of scientific, engineering, and other technical specialists
not under their direct administrative controL Further, the necessity of operating
a wide variety of complex programs as a coherent whole with internal balance
in each has meant the establishment of thorough-going management systems for
financial, technical, and schedule reporting with critical-path analysis and con-
figuration controL These systems cover work being done by some 20,000 prime
and first- and second-tier subcontractors. The magnitude of this undertaking
and the significance of the methods by which the administrative problems have
been solved needs, it seems to me, to be more dearly spelled out than is done in
this administrative history.
Dr. Rosholt was able to obtain from his interviews and the documents much
that should underlie valid historical conclusions, but certainly not an. In fact,
many facets of the NASA administrative system are still so new that adequate
documentation was not available when Dr. Rosholt completed his contract, and
in some cases is still in a draft or experimental stage.
All d us in NASA genuinely appreciate the work of the University of
Minnesota and of Dr. Rosholt, which has produced this most important contri-
bution to the beginning of NASA's historical series. We will endeavor to deepen
and broaden this important beginning of a base for a fun and complete history
of NASA by cooperation with other interested institutions and scholar_
JAMEs E. WnB.
Febr_ 3, 1966.
FR ACE
This study focuses on NASA administrative matters, not on the specific
content of NASA's programs and policies. It has an historical framewvrk rather
than a topical one. The first five chapters cover the antecedents and fnst years
of the National Aeronautics and Space Adminiso_on. The remaining four chap-
ters deal with the change in political administrations and the acceleration of the
space program in 1961 and the organizational consequences through 1963.
Five administrative themes are emphasized: (1) organizational structure,
inducting intra-agency relationships; (2) administrative procedures, with emph_
on intra-agency coordination; (3) pe_onnd axtministrxtion; (4) finance admin-
istration; (5) procurement administratione,specially contracting.Other topics
such as NASA-DOD relationasnd nationalspacepolicyhave ncccssasilbyeen
woven infrom timetotime. Brid periodicmmmarics ofNASA's program have
beenincludedtohelprem£nthecontextwithinwhich administrativaectionswere
taken. Fora synopsmofthestudy'sscopeand content,thereaderisreferx_to
the highly detailed Table of Contents; the Index will _ specific queries.
Description and documentationratherthaninterpretation have been emphasized.
Research has been based primarily on public documents, internal NASA
documents, and interviews with most of the key people. Inasmuch as certain
documents are more accessible than others and some individuals are more avail-
able for interviews, there may be unevenness. Critique of an earlier comment
edition by NASA officiM_ eliminated some of the unevenness and dosed some of
the inevitable gaps.
The study was prepared in accordance with NASA research contract NASr-
148 between the University of Minnesota and NASA. The author was a research
associate in the university's Public Administration Center. In preparing the study
he worked closely with the NASA Historical Staff. Documents collected and
collated in this research project have been incorporated in the NASA Historical
Archives.
The study was conceived during 1961 when the author was a rammer em-
ployee in NASA's newly created Office of Programs. Theaccelerated space pro-
gram, including the manned lunar landing, had just been announced. The
author became convinced that NASA's administrative response to the lunar land-
ing challenge would make an important study in public administration. Employ-
merit o.n the NASA Historical Staff during the summer of 1962 opened up vistas
ix
X ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF NASA, 1958--1963
of NASA's early years. The project emerged in its present form in the fall of
1962; the first complete draft was completed in July 1964; some 90 select partici-
pants were asked to comment on this draft and their comments were assimilated
into the final manuscript by March 1965.
I am deeply indebted to two organizations, NASA and the University of
Minnesota, and scores of individuals.
Two University of Minnesota professors have been involved in the project
from its beginning. Prof. Lloyd Short of the Department of Political Science has
given advice on method and content and has read the en_fi_ first_,dr_aStof the
manuscript. Prof. George Warp, director of the Public Administration Center,
has handled the project's administrative details as well as rendering other
assistance.
The cooperation of NASA has been gratifying, and research freedom has
been complete. The NASA Historical Staff has served as a base of operations
and the Historical Archives has been the most important single source of data.
Dr. Eugene Emme, NASA Historian, and Dr. Frank Anderson, Deputy NASA
Historian, have given assistance in all phases of the project. The pitfalls they
have saved me from have been numerous. The help of Helen Walls and Sally
Holman of the NASA Historical Staff has been greatly appreciated.
It is impossible to name all the NASA offidals who made inputs into the
study. The list of interviews in the Bibliography reveals many of them. Don
Cadle, formerly of NASA and my supervisor during the summer of 1961, is
responsible for arousing my interest in NASA. Albert Siepert and John Young
gave me valuable data at a crudal time in my research and greatly contributed
toward whatever depth there might bein the study.
I mention these individuals only to acknowledge my debt to them. They
should not be thought of as sharing any blame for the study's defects. I take full
responsibility for those.
ROBERT L. ROSHOLT.
March 1965.
POSTSCRIPT
It is with personal as well as professional interest that I have read the Fore-
word by Mr. Webb, commenting on his portion of the period studied. His addi-
tion is invaluable for the light it casts on many decisions taken and for the under-
lying rationale. As indicated in the introduction to Chapter 8, my documen-
tation, levd of detail, and perspective dwindled steadily as I moved into the more
recent, very dynamic period after 1961. I believe that scholars will find special
value in having both text and a management commentary on it between the
same set of covers.
R. L. g.
February 15, 1966