Amor fati, amor mundi

234 Pages·2007·1.17 MB·English

AMOR FATI, AMOR MUNDI: NIETZSCHE AND ARENDT ON
OVERCOMING MODERNITY

Vasti Roodt

Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Philosophy) at the
University of Stellenbosch

Promoter: Prof. P.J.M. van Tongeren
Co-promoter: Prof. W.P. Esterhuyse

April 2005
ii

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own
original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any
university for a degree.

Signature: ……………………….. Date: ……………...……
iii
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis twofold: first, to develop an account of modernity as a
“loss of the world” which also entails the “death” of the human as a meaningful
philosophical, political or moral category, and second, to explore the possibility of
recovering a sense of the world in us and with it, a sense of what it means to be human.
This argument is developed by way of a sustained engagement with the work of Friedrich
Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt, whose analogous critiques of modernity centre on the
problem of the connection between humanity and worldliness.
My argument consists of three parts, each of which spans two chapters. Part one of
the thesis sets out the most important aspects of Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s respective
critiques of modernity. Chapter one focuses on modernity as a rupture of a philosophical,
political and religious tradition within which existence in the world could be experienced
as unquestionably meaningful. Following arguments developed by Nietzsche and Arendt,
chapter two establishes that the loss of this tradition results in a general crisis of meaning,
evaluation and authority that can be designated as “modern nihilism”.
The second part of the thesis deals with what may be called the “anthropological
grounds” of the critique of modernity developed in part one. To this end, chapter three
focuses on Nietzsche’s portrayal of the human as “the as-yet undetermined animal” who is
neither the manifestation of a subjective essence nor the product of his own hands, but who
only exists in the unresolved tension between indeterminacy and determination. This is
followed in chapter four by an inquiry into Arendt’s conception of “the human condition”,
which in turn points to the conditionality of being human. What is clearly demonstrated in
both cases is that, in so far as the predicament of modernity is incarnate in modern human
beings themselves, any attempt at overcoming this predicament would somehow have to
involve re-thinking or transcending our present-day humanity.
The third part of the thesis examines the way in which the reconceptualisation of
the human as advocated by Nietzsche and Arendt transforms our understanding of “world”.
The more specific aim here is to demonstrate that both thinkers conceive of a
reconciliation between self and world as a form of redemption. In chapter five I explore
their respective attempts to resurrect the capacity for judgement in the aftermath of the
death of God as the first step in this redemptive project, before turning to a more in-depth
inquiry into the “soteriology” at work in Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s thinking in chapter six.
This inquiry ultimately makes clear that there is a conflict between the Nietzschean
conception of redemption as amor fati (love of fate) and Arendt’s notion of redemption as
amor mundi (love of the world). I conclude the thesis by arguing that what is at stake here
are two conflicting notions of reconciliation: a worldly – or political – notion of
iv
reconciliation (Arendt), and a much more radical, philosophical notion of reconciliation
(Nietzsche), which ultimately does away with any boundary between self and world.
However, my final conclusion is not that we face an inevitable choice between these two
alternatives, but rather that the struggle between these two dispositions is necessary for an
understanding of what it means to be human as well as for the world in which our
humanity is formed.
v
ABSTRAK

Hierdie proefskrif ontwikkel in die eerste plek ’n perspektief op moderniteit as ’n
“verlies aan die wêreld” wat terselfdertyd ook die “dood” van die mens as ’n
betekenisvolle filosofiese, politieke of morele kategorie impliseer. In die tweede plek word
die moontlikheid ondersoek om opnuut sin te maak van ons verhouding met die wêreld, en
daarmee saam die aard van ons menslikheid. Hierdie argument word ontwikkel by wyse
van ’n volgehoue gesprek met die filosowe Friedrich Nietzsche en Hannah Arendt, wie se
onderskeie kritiek op moderniteit inspeel op die onlosmaaklike verbintenis tussen
menslikheid en wêreldlikheid.
My argument bestaan uit drie dele, wat elkeen weer twee hoofstukke beslaan.
Deel een van die proefskrif hanteer die belangrikste aspekte van Nietzsche en Arendt se
kritiek op moderniteit. Hoofstuk een fokus op moderniteit as ’n breuk in ’n filosofiese,
politieke en religieuse tradisie in terme waarvan die menslike bestaan in die wêreld oor ’n
onbetwyfelbare betekenis beskik het. In navolging van argumente wat deur Nietzsche en
Arendt ontwikkel word, ondersoek ek in hoofstuk twee die wyse waarop die verlies aan
hierdie tradisie uitmond in ’n algemene krisis van betekenis, waarde-oordele en gesag wat
deur die term “moderne nihilisme” aangedui kan word.
Die tweede deel van die proefskrif ondersoek die “antropologiese gronde” vir die
kritiek wat in deel een ontwikkel word. Met dit ten doel, fokus hoofstuk drie op Nietzsche
se uitbeelding van die mens as ’n “nog nie vasgestelde dier” wat nòg die manifestasie is
van ’n subjektiewe essensie, nòg die produk van sy eie hande, maar wat slegs bestaan as ’n
onopgeloste spanning tussen bepaaldheid en onbepaaldheid. Hierdie bespreking word in
hoofstuk vier opgevolg deur ’n ondersoek na Arendt se opvatting van “die menslike
kondisie”, wat in die eerste plek wys na die kondisionaliteit van ons menswees. Wat
duidelik blyk uit beide gevalle is dat, in soverre die probleem van moderniteit in die mens
self gestalte kry, die poging om hierdie dilemma te oorkom ’n her-denke of oorstyging van
ons huidige menslikheid sal moet inhou.
Deel drie van die proefskrif ondersoek die wyse waarop die herkonseptualisering
van die mens soos deur Nietzsche en Arendt beoefen word ons verstaan van “wêreld”
transformeer. Die meer spesifieke doel hier is om te demonstreer dat beide denkers
gemoeid is met ’n versoening tussen self en wêreld wat as ’n soort verlossing getipeer kan
word. In hoofstuk vyf ondersoek ek hul onderskeie pogings om in die nadraai van die dood
van God ons oordeelsvermoë te laat herlewe as ’n eerste treë in hierdie verlossingsprojek.
Hierna verskuif die fokus in hoofstuk ses na die “soteriologie” in Nietzsche en Arendt se
denke. Hierdie ondersoek bring uiteindelik ’n konflik aan die lig tussen ’n Nietzscheaanse
opvatting van verlossing as amor fati (liefde vir ons lot) en Arendt se opvatting van
vi
verlossing as amor mundi (liefde vir die wêreld). Ek sluit die proefskrif af deur te
argumenteer dat dit hier gaan om twee konflikterende konsepsies van versoening: ’n
wêreldlike − of politieke − siening van versoening (Arendt), en meer radikale filosofiese
opvatting van versoening (Nietzsche), wat uiteindelik wegdoen met die grens tussen self en
wêreld. Die slotsom waartoe ek kom is egter nie dat ons ’n noodgedwonge keuse tussen
hierdie twee alternatiewe in die gesig staar nie, maar juis dat die konflik tussen hierdie
twee ingesteldhede noodsaaklik is vir ons verstaan van wat dit beteken om mens te wees
sowel as vir die wêreld waarin ons menslikheid gevorm word.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

AKCNOWLEDGEMENTS ix

INTRODUCTION 1

PART I: CRITIQUE

CHAPTER 1: MODERNITY AND THE RUPTURE OF TRADITION 11

Introduction
1. The time of modernity
2. Establishing the measure: the Greeks
3. The death of God and the rupture of tradition
4. History as substitute for tradition
4.1 Nietzsche: Against history as process
4.2 Arendt: Against history as fabrication

CHAPTER 2: MODERN NIHILISM AND THE UNMAKING OF THE HUMAN 35

Introduction
1. Three facets of nihilism
1.1 A crisis of meaning
1.2 A crisis of evaluation
1.2 A crisis of authority
2. The animalisation of the human
3. The rise of the social
3.1 The unnatural growth of the natural
3.2 The loss of plurality
3.3 Atomisation and mass society
4. The unmaking of the human
4.1 Modern science and the drive to universal mastery
4.2 Totalitarianism and the fabrication of the human

PART II: “GROUNDS”

CHAPTER 3: RETHINKING THE HUMAN: NIETZSCHE 84

Introduction
1. On human becoming
2. The as yet undetermined animal
3. Appearance and identity
4. The will to power
5. Becoming who / what one is
6. Fate, limitation, transcendence
viii
CHAPTER 4: RETHINKING THE HUMAN: ARENDT 118

Introduction
1. Appearance
2. The vita activa
2.1 Labour and work
2.2 Distinctions between labour, work and action
2.3 Action and character
3. The life of the mind
3.1 Thinking
3.2 Willing

PART III: REDEMPTION

CHAPTER 5: JUDGEMENT AND WORLDLINESS 159

Introduction
1. Nietzsche on judgement
1.1 Perspectivism
1.2 Perspectivism and historical judgement
2. Arendt on judgement
2.1 Reflective judgement
2.2 Historical judgement

CHAPTER 6: ON REDEMPTION 188

Introduction
1. Nietzsche’s redeeming thought
1.1 Metamorphosis and new beginning
1.2 Amor fati and eternal recurrence
2. Arendt’s messianism
2.1 A new beginning
2.2 Amor mundi
3. Thinking philosophically, thinking politically

BIBLIOGRAPHY 220
1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have appeared in the world without the encouragement,
support and critical input from a number of people, and it is only fitting that I acknowledge
them here.
To begin with, this work was conceived, written and completed under the
invaluable guidance of my promoter, Prof. Paul van Tongeren. I owe him a debt of
gratitude, not only for his help in thinking through the problem I attempt to address in the
following pages, but indeed for shaping my understanding of what it means to think at all.
These few words cannot adequately reflect my appreciation his unflagging academic
support, his insightful questioning of my efforts, his patience with my procrastinations, and
his role in refining my conception of and approach to philosophy.
My second word of thanks goes to my co-promoter, Prof. Willie Esterhuyse, who
first introduced me to the writings of Nietzsche and thereby set me on the path that has led
to the present thesis. Prof. Esterhuyse has unfailingly encouraged me in the seemingly
risky endeavour of a joint study of Nietzsche and Arendt, and for that, as well as for the
pivotal role he has played in directing my philosophical interests, I remain immensely
grateful.
Thank you to Prof. Anton van Niekerk, the internal examiner of the thesis, and
Prof. Danie Goosen, who acted as external examiner, whose detailed reports helped me to
clarify and improve my own argument on a number of key points. I would like to express
an additional thank you to Prof. van Niekerk for his assistance in facilitating some of the
practical arrangements between Prof. van Tongeren and the University of Stellenbosch.
Thank you to Prof. Willie van der Merwe, who found the time to read through the
whole of the thesis and to act as an informal sounding board in the midst of a busy
schedule as visiting professor in Leuven.
To all my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy at Stellenbosch: Thank you
for accommodating me when I shouldered less than a full workload while completing this
project, and for more generally for creating a vibrant and stimulating academic
environment in which to think and work.
To my parents: Thank you for your unwavering support throughout all my years of
study, and especially for your encouragement and practical assistance during the final
stages of writing up.
Finally, to Gareth and Rachel: Thank you for putting up with long absences and
temper outbursts for so many months. Thanks to Gareth for emotional and household
support far beyond the call of duty, and more importantly, thank you both for being in the
world.
2