Amicus brief of Professor Thomas Merrill submitted.

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by  U.S. Supreme Court via USA TODAY's big_cases bot

No. 18-15
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

JAMES L. KISOR,
Petitioner,
v.

ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit

BRIEF FOR PROFESSOR THOMAS MERRILL
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING REVERSAL

THOMAS W. MERRILL WILLIAM M. JAY
435 W. 116th Street Counsel of Record
New York, NY 10027 LEVI W. SWANK
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
901 New York Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
[email protected]
[phone]

Counsel for Amicus Curiae
January 31, 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE .................... 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2 
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 6 
I.  The Court Has Never Considered Head-
On Whether To Apply A Different
Standard Of Review To An Agency’s
Interpretation Of Its Regulations. ................... 6 
II.  Applying The Reasonableness Standard
To Agency Interpretations Of Their
Regulations Is Incompatible With The
APA. ................................................................ 11 
A.  Section 706 ...................................................... 11 
1.  Chevron is compatible with Section
706. ............................................................. 12 
2.  The delegation argument does not
work in the context of regulations
rather than statutes. ................................. 14 
B.  Section 553 ...................................................... 16 
III.  The Court Should Adopt The
Persuasiveness Standard In Reviewing
An Agency’s Interpretation Of Its Own
Regulations. .................................................... 19 
IV.  Stare Decisis Is No Reason To Adhere To
The Reasonableness Standard. ...................... 25 
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 27
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452 (1997) .......................................... 9, 23
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410 (1945) ...................................... passim
Brown v. United States,
113 U.S. 568 (1885) .............................................. 22
Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy,
562 U.S. 195 (2011) ................................................ 8
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ...................................... passim
Christensen v. Harris Cty.,
529 U.S. 576 (2000) ............................................ 7, 8
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
567 U.S. 142 (2012) ........................................ 10, 20
City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC,
569 U.S. 290 (2013) ................................................ 8
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council,
557 U.S. 261 (2009) ................................................ 9
iii
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,
568 U.S. 597 (2013) ...................................... passim
Edward’s Lessee v. Darby,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827) ...................... 21, 22
Gardebring v. Jenkins,
485 U.S. 415 (1988) .............................................. 24
Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243 (2006) ........................................ 10, 20
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,
526 U.S. 415 (1999) .............................................. 14
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
544 U.S. 528 (2005) .............................................. 26
Maislin Indus. U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel,
Inc.,
497 U.S. 116 (1990) ................................................ 2
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n,
499 U.S. 144 (1991) .............................................. 10
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967 (2005) ................................................ 8
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) .................................. passim
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council,
490 U.S. 332 (1989) .......................................... 8, 25
iv
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp.,
514 U.S. 87 (1995) ................................................ 25
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1944) ...................................... passim
Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co.,
564 U.S. 50 ..................................................... 24, 25
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504 (1994) .................................... 9, 10, 23
Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1 (1965) .................................................... 9
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,
526 U.S. 380 (1999) .............................................. 15
United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218 (2001) ...................................... 7, 8, 13
United States v. Moore,
95 U.S. 760 (1877) ................................................ 22
United States v. Vowell,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368 (1809) ............................... 21
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible,
136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016) .......................................... 26
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
435 U.S. 519 (1978) .............................................. 19
Statutes
5 U.S.C. § 551 (13) ..................................................... 12
v
5 U.S.C. § 553 .................................................... passim
5 U.S.C. § 706 .................................................... passim
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) ............................................. 13, 14
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(e) .................................................... 14
Other Authorities
Annotation, Effect of Practical or
Administrative Construction of Statute
on Subsequent Judicial Construction, 73
L. Ed. 322 (1929) .................................................. 22
Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and
the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get
It, 10 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 1 (1996) ...................... 23
John F. Duffy, Administrative Common
Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex. L. Rev.
113 (1998) ....................................................... 13, 14
Kristen E. Hickman & Matthew D.
Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev.
1235 (2007) ........................................................... 21
John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure
and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996) ....................... 19, 23, 24
vi
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of
Law: The Original Convention, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 467 (2002) ........................................ 1
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833
(2001) ...................................................................... 1
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969
(1992) ...................................................................... 1
Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine:
Rules and Standards, Meta-rules and
Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 807
(2002) ...................................................................... 1
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and
Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev.
727 (2008) ............................................................... 1
Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of
Arlington, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 753
(2014) ...................................................................... 1
Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler,
Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1449 (2011) .............................................. 17
BRIEF FOR PROFESSOR THOMAS MERRILL
AS AMICUS CURIAE
SUPPORTING REVERSAL
________________________
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus curiae Thomas W. Merrill is the Charles
Evans Hughes Professor at Columbia Law School.1
He has devoted much of his professional life to prac-
ticing, teaching, and writing about administrative
law. His scholarly interests in this regard have cen-
tered on when and how much weight courts should
give administrative interpretations of law in differ-
ent contexts.2 He has filed or written several previ-
ous amicus briefs in the Court on these topics.3 His

1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No coun-
sel for a party authored any part of this brief; no party or par-
ty’s counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief; and no person other
than amicus curiae or his counsel made a monetary contribu-
tion to the brief’s preparation or submission.
2 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington,
83 Fordham L. Rev. 753 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption
and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727 (2008); Thom-
as W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the
Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467
(2002); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and
Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev.
807 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969 (1992).
3 Br. for the Nat’l Governors Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae, City of
Arlington v. FCC, Nos. 11-1545 & 11-1547; Br. for the Nat’l
Governors Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae, Cuomo v. Clearing
House Assn., L.L.C., No. 08-453; Br. for Ctr. for State Enforce-
ment of Antitrust & Consumer Protection Laws as Amicus Cu-
riae, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249; Br. for Ctr. for State En-
2
experience is also informed by his service as Deputy
Solicitor General of the United States from 1987-
1990, including in cases where agencies sought def-
erence to their legal interpretations. See, e.g.,
Maislin Indus. U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497
U.S. 116, 130-36 (1990).
This brief is submitted in the hope that it will as-
sist the Court in resolving the question presented.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. This Court has never collectively deliberated
about what standard of review should apply to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation. Instead, starting with Bowles v. Semi-
nole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), the Court
has assumed, without extensive analysis, that a
highly deferential standard should apply in the regu-
latory-interpretation context—that a court should
ask only whether the agency’s interpretation is one
that a reasonable interpreter could adopt.
In contrast, the Court has given extensive consid-
eration to the proper weight to give agency interpre-
tations of statutes they administer. In the statutory-
interpretation context, the Court has identified three
applicable standards: (i) de novo review (giving no
weight to the agency interpretation); (ii) a standard,
associated with Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944), that gives weight to an agency in-
terpretation to the extent it has the “power to per-

forcement of Antitrust & Consumer Protection Laws as Amicus
Curiae, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 05-1342; Br. for
Prof. Thomas W. Merrill as Amicus Curiae, United States v.
Mead Corp., No. 99-1434.
3
suade”; and (iii) a standard, associated with Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), that defers to the
agency interpretation if it is a reasonable one, even if
not the one the court thinks is best.
II. The selection of a standard of review should
begin with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The APA, in Section 706, instructs reviewing courts
to “decide all relevant questions of law,” including
“the meaning” of any applicable agency regulation. 5
U.S.C. § 706. That provision is difficult to square
with the reasonableness (Seminole Rock) standard
that courts currently apply.
Although agency interpretations of statutes re-
ceive deference under Chevron, even in APA litiga-
tion, that does not establish that deference is per se
consistent with Section 706. Rather, Chevron com-
ports with Section 706 for particular reasons that do
not carry over to the regulatory-interpretation con-
text. Chevron applies only when Congress vests an
agency with primary interpretive authority. When
Congress both creates a gap or ambiguity in a stat-
ute and delegates authority to the responsible agen-
cy to act with the force of law (through legislative
regulations or binding adjudicatory decisions), Con-
gress presumptively intends that the agency have
primary authority to fill the gap or resolve the ambi-
guity. Thus, a reviewing Court “decide[s]” under the
APA that Congress has delegated primary interpre-
tive authority to the agency, and defers to the agency
accordingly.
But this implied-delegation rationale does not ap-
ply to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations.