i No. 18-15 In the Supreme Court of the United States JAMES L. KISOR, Petitioner, v. ROBERT L. WILKIE, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER RIDDHI DASGUPTA JOHN C. EASTMAN 13330 Ridgewood Drive ANTHONY T. CASO Ellicott City, MD 21042 Counsel of Record (703) 927-1148 Center for Constitutional [email protected] Jurisprudence c/o Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law One University Drive Orange, CA 92866 (877) 855-3330 [email protected] Counsel for Amicus Curiae i QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), should be overruled. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTION PRESENTED.......................................... i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE............................. 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 1 ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3 I. Separation of Powers Is One of the Most Important Structural Features of the Constitutional Design to Protect Liberty. .............. 3 II. Seminole Rock and Auer Deference Violate the Separation of Powers. .................................................. 7 III.Auer and Seminole Rock May be Overruled Consistent with Traditional Stare Decisis Principles. .................................................................... 14 CONCLUSION .......................................................... 17 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) ................................................ 16 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) ........................................ passim Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) ........................................ passim Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ...................................................... 7 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ................................ 2, 10, 12, 14 Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000) ................................................ 15 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 567 U.S. 2156 (2012) .......................................... 1, 15 Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497 (1840) .................................................. 15 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597 (2013) ...................................... 4, 14, 17 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015) .............................................. 1 FCC v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 439 U.S. 980 (1978) .................................................. 9 Garco Const., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S.Ct. 1052 (2018) ........................................... 1, 3 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) ................................................ 15 iv INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) .................................. 6, 7, 16, 17 Janus v. Am. Federation of State, Cty., and Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018) ....................................... 14, 15 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) .................................................. 7 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) ...................................... 2, 8, 11, 12 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) .................................................. 9 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) .......................................... 12, 15 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) .............................................. 7, 8 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) .............................................. 5, 9 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) .................................................. 11 National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) ................................................ 10 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) ................................................ 14 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) ................................................................ 1, 3, 4 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) .................................. 3, 5, 10, 16 v Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) ................................................ 15 Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928) .................................................. 8 Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50 (2011) .............................................. 4, 15 Turtle Island Restoration Network v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 878 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2017) ................................. 14 United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ................................ 11 United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872) .................................................. 9 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) ............................................ 8, 12 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S.Ct. 1607 (2016) ............................................... 3 Other Authorities Adams, John, Letter XLIX, 1 A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 3rd ed., 2001) ............................................................ 7 Blackstone, William, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (William S. Hein & Co. ed., 1992) ..... 5, 12 Brutus, Essay XV (1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed. 1981) ................................................................... 6 Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist 70, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS .................................................................... 10 vi Hamilton, Alexander, Federalist 9, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS ...................................................................... 5 Jefferson, Thomas, Jefferson to Adams, THE ADAMS- JEFFERSON LETTERS (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959) .. 5 Locke, John, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Peardon, ed.,1997)................................ 5 Madison James, Federalist 47, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS .................................................................. 2, 5 Madison, James, Federalist 48, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS ...................................................................... 6 Madison, James, Federalist 51, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS ........................................................ 5, 7, 8, 12 Manning, John F., “Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,” 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996) ..... 4, 8 Montesquieu, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Franz Neumann ed. & Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) ...... 5 Philip Hamburger, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 294 (2014) .......................................... 15 Rules Sup. Ct. Rule 37.3(a) ................................................... 1 Sup. Ct. Rule 37.6 ........................................................ 1 1 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 The Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence is the public interest law arm of the Claremont Institute, whose stated mission is to restore the principles of the American founding to their rightful and preeminent authority in our national life, including the funda- mental separation of powers principles implicated by this case. The Center has previously appeared before this Court as amicus curiae in several cases address- ing similar separation of powers issues, including Garco Const., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S.Ct. 1052 (2018) (cert. denied); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015); and Christopher v. SmithKline Bee- cham, 567 U.S. 2156 (2012). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT This case asks whether the Constitution’s text and structure, specifically its separation of powers princi- ples, require or permit courts to defer to a federal ad- ministrative agency’s interpretation of its own ambig- uous regulations. In fact, that interpretive authority belongs primarily to the judiciary because “the preser- vation of liberty requires that the three great depart- ments of power should be separate and distinct;” and because, concomitantly, the agencies’ interpretation of their own regulations is a usurpation of the judicial 1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.3(a), this amicus brief is filed with the consent of the parties. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amicus Curiae affirms that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person or entity other than Ami- cus Curiae, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contri- bution to fund the preparation and submission of this brief. 2 prerogative. James Madison, Federalist 47, THE FED- ERALIST PAPERS 298 (Charles R. Kesler and Clinton Rossiter, eds., 2003). The doctrine of deference to an agency’s interpre- tation of its own regulations, first announced in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), and ossified in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), violates standard separation of powers princi- ples. Those principles are derived from the three Vesting Clauses of the Constitution allocating the lim- ited national government’s powers to a Congress, a President, and a judiciary. Deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is no less inde- fensible than deferring to Congress about the mean- ing of statutes would be. It is also a recipe for post- hoc agency gamesmanship to ensure the regulator generally wins over the regulated, the governor over the governed. This is not the scheme of separated powers the Framers envisioned. Furthermore, by misallocating judicial power and thus threatening individual liberty, Auer exacerbates the extant problem of delegation of lawmaking powers to unelected executive officials. That delegation al- ready is at the constitutional breaking point under step two of the Chevron doctrine. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842- 43 (1984). Auer also deprives the judiciary of its con- stitutionally-ensconced and rightful authority to in- terpret the laws, an authority this Court has recog- nized for the past 215 years. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). Several members of this Court have in re- cent years acknowledged the constitutional problems 3 with the Auer deference doctrine, and the doctrine should now be overruled. ARGUMENT I. Separation of Powers Is One of the Most Im- portant Structural Features of the Consti- tutional Design to Protect Liberty. Essential for the preservation of individual liberty, the Constitution’s separation of powers is “a struc- tural safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (emphasis in original). It is “a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of inter- branch conflict.” Id. Several members of this Court have recognized that various doctrines of deference to the unelected, unaccountable, and largely-unknown federal bureau- cracy might be difficult to reconcile with the separa- tion of powers’ “high walls.” Id. In particular, mem- bers of this Court believe that Auer deference is on its “last gasp.” Garco Const., Inc., 138 S.Ct. at 1053 (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., dissenting from de- nial of certiorari); id. at 1052 (“Seminole Rock defer- ence is constitutionally suspect.”); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S.Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Even Auer’s author rejected the doctrine. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (announcing that he would be “abandoning” the holding in Auer that he himself authored); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568