Americans and Asymmetric Conflict: Lebanon, Somalia, and Afghanistan PDF
Preview Americans and Asymmetric Conflict: Lebanon, Somalia, and Afghanistan
Americans and Asymmetric Conflict PraegerSecurityInternationalAdvisoryBoard BoardCochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, SchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairs,UniversityofGeorgia(U.S.A.) PaulWilkinson,ProfessorofInternationalRelations andChairmanofthe AdvisoryBoard,CentrefortheStudy ofTerrorismand PoliticalViolence, UniversityofSt.Andrews(U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for StrategicandInternationalStudies(U.S.A.) The´re`seDelpech,DirectorofStrategicAffairs,AtomicEnergyCommission, andSeniorResearchFellow,CERI(FondationNationaledesSciencesPoli- tiques),Paris(France) SirMichaelHoward,formerChicheleProfessoroftheHistoryofWarand Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. LovettProfessorofMilitaryandNavalHistory,YaleUniversity(U.K.) LieutenantGeneralClaudiaJ.Kennedy,USA(Ret.),formerDeputyChiefof StaffforIntelligence,DepartmentoftheArmy(U.S.A.) PaulM.Kennedy,J.RichardsonDilworthProfessorofHistoryandDirec- tor,InternationalSecurityStudies,YaleUniversity(U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All SoulsCollege,OxfordUniversity(Australia) ShibleyTelhami,AnwarSadatChairforPeaceand Development,Depart- mentofGovernmentandPolitics,UniversityofMaryland(U.S.A.) FareedZakaria,Editor,NewsweekInternational(U.S.A.) AMERICANS AND ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT LEBANON, SOMALIA, AND AFGHANISTAN Adam B. Lowther ForewordbyDonaldM.Snow PSIReports PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut London • LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Americansandasymmetricconflict:Lebanon,Somalia,andAfghanistan/AdamB.Lowther; forewordbyDonaldM.Snow. p.cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN-13:978–0–275–99635–2(alk.paper) 1. Asymmetricwarfare—UnitedStates.2. UnitedStates—Militarypolicy.3. Asymmetric warfare—Casestudies.4. Counterinsurgency—Casestudies.5. WaronTerrorism,2001– 6. Worldpolitics—1989–I.Title. U163.L692007 355.4’2—dc22 2007014362 BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationDataisavailable. Copyright©2007byAdamB.Lowther Allrightsreserved.Noportionofthisbookmaybe reproduced,byanyprocessortechnique,withoutthe expresswrittenconsentofthepublisher. LibraryofCongressCatalogCardNumber:2007014362 ISBN-13:978–0–275–99635–2 Firstpublishedin2007 PraegerSecurityInternational,88PostRoadWest,Westport,CT06881 AnimprintofGreenwoodPublishingGroup,Inc. www.praeger.com PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica Thepaperusedinthisbookcomplieswiththe PermanentPaperStandardissuedbytheNational InformationStandardsOrganization(Z39.48–1984). 10987654321 Contents ForewordbyDonaldM.Snow vii Preface xi Acknowledgments xiii Abbreviations xv Introduction 1 1MilitaryThoughtandAsymmetricConflict 14 2UnderstandingAsymmetryintheTwenty-FirstCentury:Strategy, 52 Tactics,andWeapons 3Lebanon(1982–1984):TheRiseofTerrorismandtheSuicide 82 Bombing 4Somalia(1992–1994):IntothePost-ColdWarEra 102 5Afghanistan(2001–2004):WinningWarsofAsymmetry 126 Conclusion:TheLessonsofWarandImplicationsforIraq 148 Notes 161 WorksCited 205 Index 231 Foreword Asymmetricalwarfare,thesubjectofthisbook,isandprobablyalwayshas beenanenigma,especiallytothoseagainstwhomitisemployed,butalsoto someextenttoitspractitioners.Forthoseagainstwhomasymmetricalwar- fareiswaged,theenigmainvolvesattemptingtocounterastyleofwarfare thatisalienandunfamiliartothemconductedbyanopponentthatwould not be able to compete if it fought the way the symmetrical warrior pre- ferred (which of course is the virtualdefinition of asymmetricalwarfare). Notonlyareasymmetricalmeansunfamiliarand,generallyspeaking,inad- equatelyencompassedindoctrineandstrategy,theyaregenerallyobjection- ableand,fromtheviewofthosesubjectedtothem,confusing,difficultto counterand,especially,difficulttocounteractinwaysthatleadtoconven- tionalnotionsofsuccess. For the asymmetrical warrior, the problem is different. In a very real sense,asymmetricalwarfareisnotsomuchamethodasitisawayofthink- ing about war.Certainly,thereareprinciplesofwar—thelessons of Sun- tzu,forinstance—thatcanbeandareappliedinmanyasymmetricalcircum- stances,butthereisnosetbodyofrulesofengagement,strategyandtactics, andgranddesignsavailabletotheasymmetricalwarrior.Weresuchabody ofinstructionsavailable,theenemiesofasymmetrywould havestudiedit andfiguredhowtodefeatit.Ifthereisanunderlyingfirstprincipleofasym- metricalwarfare,itisadaptation—findingandapplyingmethodsthatwill frustrateandfoilan enemythatcannotbedefeatedbystandardmethods. War fought where one side fights differently than the other (the heart of asymmetricalwarfare)isthusacat-and-mousegamewheretheasymmetri- calwarriorseekstoremainoneintellectualandphysicalstepaheadofhis symmetricalopponent.Forthesymmetricalopponent,thechallengeisget- tingaheadofthethinkingoftheasymmetricalwarrior,anticipatingwhat thatopponentwilldobeforehecandoitandactingeffectively.Applying viii Foreword JohnBoyd’sOODA(observe,orient,decide,react)Loopforfighterpilotsis alsothetaskofthesymmetricalwarrior—andnotabadmodelfortheanti- asymmetricalwarfarestrategisttoadopt. AstheIraqWardevolvesintothelikelyrecriminationsthatwillbeassoci- atedwithtryingtoassemblethe‘‘lessonslearned,’’theghostofasymmetri- calwarfarewillonceagainrearitshead.Whateverelsetheevaluationofthe Americanwareffortmayproduce,itwillalmostcertainlyhavetomaketwo points.Thefirstisthat,overaquartercenturyaftertheVietnamimbroglio, it is not at all clear that the mainstream of the American military has embracedsolvingtheproblemofasymmetricalwarfareasaproblemserious enough to devote its major energies. When itinvaded Iraq,the Armyand Marines were not prepared for the rear guard tactics they encountered (a formof asymmetricalwarfare),andtheirinability totame theIraqiresis- tanceduringtheoccupationwasfurthertestimonytothepovertyofAmeri- canunderstanding.Thefailuretopossessandapplyaviablestrategyofanti- asymmetricalwarfareisnottheonlyreasontheUnitedStatesdidnotprevail inIraq,butitiscertainlyoneofthem.Thesecondlessonwill,orshould,be that until the United States figures out how to solve this problem, all the technologicalsuperiorityintheworldthatitsforcespossesswillnotassure success when it is applied, at least as measured by attaining the political goalsforwhichthatforcewasapplied.AnAmericanmilitarycomparedat the turn of the millennium to Rome at the height of its power was, after all,stalematedbyabandofinsurgentsinIraq. There undoubtedly will be numerous lessons from the Iraq experience, but one should be especially clear. An asymmetrical approach to warfare worked against the United States in Iraq, and America’s future potential opponentsaregoingtostudythiswar,realizethatindeedtheUnitedStates canbeopposedsuccessfullyifthepropermethodsaredevisedandapplied, and will make adaptations to the Iraqmodel to fit their circumstances. If theUnitedStatesdoesnotrecognizethatcertaintyandengageinfurtive,sys- tematicstudy—ofafarmoreseriousandheartfeltqualitythanitdidafter Vietnam—ofhowtodealwiththeserealities,itwillhavenoonebutitself toblamefortheproblems,includingthefailures,itencountersinthefuture. Itisthedutyofthosewhofollowandreportonmilitaryaffairstomakesure theymaketheeffort. AdamLowther’sbookisagoodfirststepinthisprocess.Hedoesavery thoroughjoboflayingouttheasymmetricalproblemandapplyingittohis three cases, recognizing that they are exemplary of the processes through whichasymmetricalwarriorsgoratherthansomesetofrigidguidelinesor lineardevelopmentinasymmetricaltechniques.Asymmetricalwarfareby many of the names he discusses has been around for a long time, and although they share commonalities, most of the successful applications shareawillingnesstoadapttochangingcircumstancesandtopresenttheir foeswithproblemsthoseopponentshadnotanticipated. Foreword ix DuringtheColdWar,Sovietmilitaryliteraturewasfixatedwiththeprob- lemoftechnologicalsurprise—thefigurativedisasterofcomingoverthetop ofthehill,lookingdownandseeingtheAmericanmilitaryarmedwithsome weapontheyneitherunderstoodnorcouldovercome.Thetaskisparallelto- day.Theproblemisnottechnologicalbutintellectualsurprise.Onthenext Americanbattlefield,whattacticalandstrategicinnovationswillbewaiting overthetopofthehilltofrustrateus?Willwebeabletoanticipatethose innovationsandbewaitingforthem?Whatdoweneedtodonottobesur- prised next time? Reading the pages that follow is a good start toward approachingandhopefullyansweringthosequestions. DonaldM.Snow HiltonHeadIsland,SouthCarolina
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