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Colloquium Brief U.S. Army War College, Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and Duke University AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY AFTER WAR Complied by Ionut C. Popescu Duke University and Dr. Dallas D. Owens Strategic Studies Institute KEY INSIGHTS: • Since World War II, each American war has been followed by a period of grand strategy reassessment. • The degree to which the Nation’s leaders have felt the need to revise grand strategy has depended in part upon the degree to which the preceding conflict led to adverse consequences and in part upon the level of perceived danger in the new strategic environment. • The locus for grand strategy reassessment is the U.S. President; presidents have varied in their perception of the need for reassessment and in their effectiveness in conducting and implementing reassessments. • It is difficult to apply lessons gained from previous reassessments to the post-Iraq period without know- ing the strategic environment of that future period. • President Obama has not previously been involved in the formulation of grand strategy, making it difficult to predict either what his grand strategy will be or the likelihood of its success; we get some hints of its content from campaign statements and subsequent policies. The Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), the Duke University Program in American Grand Strat- egy, and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) conducted a colloquium and recognition of TISS’s 50th anniversary at the Duke University and University of North Carolina campuses on February 26-28, 2009. The colloquium, entitled “American Grand Strategy after War,” was attended by over 130 government officials, academic experts, think-tank members, U.S. military, and U.S. and international students and faculty. Dr. John Gaddis of Yale University gave the keynote talk at Duke University. Five historians and political scientists presented summaries of their papers at the University of North Carolina and ten academi- cians responded. Revised papers are to be published as articles in Orbis (Fall 2009). The conference examined debates over grand strategy after World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War, and grand strategies likely to follow U.S. involvement in Iraq. A panel was devoted to each period and consisted of summarization of a draft paper by its author and a critique by two panelists who had received the paper at an earlier date. Panel I: Post-World II. Panel II: Post-Korean War. The first panel examined the period after World War The second panel addressed the post-Korean War II. The author’s paper, entitled “Franklin Roosevelt’s period. The author concluded from his paper, “Reas- [Partially] Flawed Paradigm: Postwar Planning Dur- sessing U.S. Strategy in the Aftermath of the Korean ing World War II,” concluded that American grand War,” that the grand strategy reassessment conduct- strategy towards the end of the war was character- ed by the Eisenhower administration had limited ized by a certain utopian quality. FDR ‘s vision for impact, and that its outcome was not much different the postwar period was based on close cooperation from the containment strategy formulated during the with Stalin and the USSR; he hoped that by building Truman administration. The more significant shift a strong personal relationship with the Soviet lead- was at the level of military strategy: a growing em- er he would be able to “domesticate” the USSR and phasis on nuclear weapons led to a decrease in the integrate it into his plans for a global liberal world level of resources allocated to the conventional force. order. The speaker argued that Harry Truman was The presenter also offered some possible parallels be- the one who had to face the unpleasant reality of the tween the Eisenhower administration and the Obama emerging global ideological conflict with Moscow. administration. Both came into office facing the need Consequently, Truman shifted American grand strat- to put defense spending on a more sustainable path egy significantly by assuming international commit- for the long run, and Obama, like Eisenhower, is a ments far beyond what Roosevelt would have consid- vocal proponent of American “soft power” as a cru- ered, and by adopting a more realistic understanding cial element of grand strategy. of the nature of the international system. The main The responses from the panelists and several of lessons for current strategists are that wartime plan- the questions from the audience addressed the im- ning and grand strategy formulation for the postwar portance of process in strategic planning. Eisenhow- world need to be constantly reassessed to make cer- er’s Project Solarium is currently considered one of tain they are still appropriate for the real-world cir- the most successful exercises of its kind by the Wash- cumstances present at the end of a conflict. ington think-tank community, and the presenter of The first commentator on the panel argued that this panel also implied that the Obama administra- after World War II the United States pursued a grand tion should pay particular attention to this aspect of strategy characterized by incrementalism and “lock- grand strategy development. One controversial issue in.” There was no clear ex-ante plan, but instead a remained unresolved: whether successful changes in process of formulating and reformulating strategy grand strategy are helped or hindered by an elabo- based on new developments; once the Marshall Plan rate planning process. A few questioners argued that and NATO were created, however, a “lock-in” phe- formal bureaucratic processes could stifle innovation nomenon occurred and the grand strategy of contain- or that these formal processes often come to resemble ment became adopted for the long term. The second Kabuki Theater in that they merely serve to provide panelist partially disagreed with the author on the support for the preferred strategy of the president; role of Churchill: he argued that Churchill offered other participants considered that a disciplined for- Stalin more concessions, particularly in Eastern Eur- mal planning process is key to a solid strategic per- ope, than Roosevelt did; therefore it would be incor- formance. rect to portray FDR as too soft on Stalin. Both review- ers agreed that there are some very important differ- Panel III: Post-Vietnam War. ences between the post-World War II strategic environment and that of today. For example, they men- tioned the emergence of nonstate actors intent on The third panel examined the period following the acquiring WMDs, and the challenge of finding ways Vietnam War. In his paper, “American Grand Strat- to assist weak and failed states in their transition egy after Vietnam,” the author concluded that the to a more stable and prosperous future. debate over the appropriate grand strategy hinged on the “intent” of the Soviets and the perception of 2 intent was highly correlated with the very polarized of democracy and of free markets everywhere, but political ideology of the period. The two ideological he failed to prioritize among various objectives. Fur- camps, conservatives and neoconservatives against thermore, little serious discussion occurred about the liberals and leftists, favored containment verses dé- capabilities needed to implement such a strategy. tente, respectively. Today there is a similar polariza- Clinton’s uneasy relation with the military may have tion that threatens, as it did after Vietnam, to make contributed to a lack of understanding of how best to the debate over grand strategy less logical and the use military force. The author concluded that Bush resulting reassessment less pragmatic. The panelists had process without purpose, while Clinton had responded by highlighting the difficulty of achieving purpose without process; both of these combinations consensus on American grand strategy other than hurt America’s strategic performance over this era. at the “bumper sticker” level. The policy fights and The first panelist pointed out that it is not clear the competition over scarce resources often involve how a better grand strategic performance on the parochial political interests and are thus detrimental part of either Bush or Clinton could have prevented to the pursuit of a coherent grand strategy, but they 9/11. He also discussed an issue that plagued both are nevertheless an essential element of the Ameri- administrations, i.e., the lack of strategic integration can system of government. One panelist called U.S. between grand strategy, operational art, and military democracy “anti-strategic” for this particular reason. tactics. The new allegedly “low-cost” military means Another important issue, according to one of the pan- made available by the Revolution in Military Affairs elists, is the prevalent notion that external constraints were mainly related to stand-off precision warfare, are competing against domestic political interests in and they could not bear the costs that the grand strat- the formulation of grand strategy. These two factors egy put on them in places like Kosovo. One needs to should not be viewed as separate influences. Rather, understand in detail the workings of the military in- almost all policymakers believe that they act in such strument to be able to talk meaningfully about grand a way as to advance the U.S. national interest; their strategy, and the academic world should do more to divergent conceptions of these interests and of the educate policymakers on what our military forces can proper ways to achieve them lie at the heart of the and cannot do. The second commentator agreed with debate on which grand strategic course to follow. the author’s conclusion that the lack of a grand strategy caused “indiscipline” in the way policymakers thought about the U.S. role in the world, but he per- Panel IV: Post-Cold War. ceived a stronger difference between the quality of the strategic thinking of Bush and Clinton. The Bush The fourth panel addressed the period following national security team was well on its way to develop the end of the Cold War. The paper presented was en- a new U.S. grand strategy of primacy, as evidenced titled “Clear Skies over the Hudson: The Promise and by the Pentagon’s 1992 Defense Planning Guidance. Failure of American Grand Strategy from the End of This strategy would have focused on the prevention the Cold War to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks.” of the rise of a peer competitor, and on the provision The author argued that neither George H. W. Bush of global public goods to make the role of hegemon nor William Jefferson Clinton succeeded in formulat- more acceptable to others. The Clinton team, on the ing a new grand strategy for the post-Cold War era, other hand, believed that the process of globalization despite their conscious efforts to do so. Bush and his was fairly self-sustaining and thought that not much national security team proved competent in dealing effort was needed on the part of the United States to with tactical decisions and managing the end of the maintain the current liberal world order. The ques- Cold War, but they failed in their effort to move to a tions addressed to the panelists from the audience new paradigm. They showed an inability to organ- raised a couple of important issues: first, the diffi- ize U.S. priorities and to decide what U.S. interests culty of achieving objective measures of evaluating should be in the new strategic environment. Clinton success in grand strategy, and, second, the need to came into office determined to implement a vision of better integrate the effects of domestic politics in the “enlargement.” His strategy argued for the spread study of U.S. foreign policy. 3 Panel V: Post Iraq. “grand strategic deficit” that has plagued U.S. foreign policy for the past 20 years. The participants generally agreed that a solid grand strategy needs to articulate The final panel addressed the period from 2003 to U.S. national interests and threats to those interests, the present. In “American Grand Strategy after Iraq,” prioritize among threats and opportunities, and ad- the author concluded that the United States pursued dress much more seriously the connection between a strategy of primacy before 2006, and then switched “ends” and “means.” A sophisticated discussion of to a “liberal internationalist” grand strategy which is capabilities and available resources unfortunately likely to be continued by the Obama administration. has been lacking in recent debates on American grand The author showed that despite the perception of de- strategy. The present economic environment and the cline, the United States continues to remain the num- challenges facing the federal budget over the next ber one military and economic power in the world. couple of decades make it all the more important to She also examined how the possible “strategic con- better integrate economic considerations into grand straints” of the international distribution of power, of strategic planning. bureaucratic friction within the government, and of Even if the war in Iraq continues on a favorable U.S. public opinion could limit the range of possible trajectory and the U.S. military proves able to dis- grand strategies for current policymakers. The first engage in a successful manner, the ongoing conflict commentator argued that in the current environment in Afghanistan will force the Obama administration it is hard to maintain any coherent grand strategy for to forge a new grand strategy in a wartime environ- three reasons. First, there is no major threat to U.S. ment. It is important to remember, as one participant national security; terrorism could only qualify if it noted, that the most crucial grand strategic priority in were combined with nuclear weapons, which is un- wartime is to win the war you’re currently fighting. likely. Second, the roots of the current security prob- Hence, the adoption of a new grand strategy needs lems lie in the domestic politics of other states, and to account for this fact and ensure the necessary re- the United States does not know how to effectively sources are allocated to defeat the threat most imme- promote “democratization.” Third, the present status diate to American national interest. One of the most of American politics is one of intense ideological and important challenges for the Obama administration partisan polarization; such a political environment is will be to achieve this delicate balance between the inauspicious to the conduct of a coherent bipartisan short-term requirements of present conflicts and the grand strategy. The second commentator argued that medium- and long-term demands of any new grand the biggest threat to U.S. power in the medium term strategy they may adopt. is the economic debt to China and the threats of ris- ing federal and current account deficits. Therefore, policymakers should focus on managing China’s rise ***** more so than on any other grand strategic problem. The views expressed in this brief are those of the Conclusion: The Way Ahead. authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This This colloquium demonstrated that academic colloquium brief is cleared for public release; distri- grand strategists are very much aware of the impor- bution is unlimited. tance of, the need for, and situational determinants of grand strategy after a change in the strategic environment, typified by a hot or cold war. It also dem- ***** onstrated the difficulty of predicting the time, impor- tance, or response to the next “significant” period requiring a substantial change in American grand More information on the Strategic Studies In- strategy. stitute’s programs may be found on the Institute’s homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. The Obama administration will surely attempt to answer the keynote speaker’s call for a remedy to the 4