America, Pakistan, and the India Factor

265 Pages·2013·4.883 MB·English

by  Nirode Mohanty (auth.)

America , P akistan , and the
India Factor
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America, P akistan, and the
India Factor
Nirodee Mohanty
AMERCIA, PAKSITAN, ANDTHEINDIAFACTOR
Copyright © Nirode Mohanty, 2013.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-32386-6
All rights reserved.
First published in 2013 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world,
this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978-1-349-45886-8 ISBN 978-1-137-32387-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137323873
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the
Library of Congress.
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: May 2013
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Foreword vii
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xvii
List of Abbreviations xix
Introduction: The Volatile Strategic Partnership 1
1 The Cold War and Strategic Partners: 1947–1971 23
2 Eating Grass for Nuclear Bombs: 1971–1979 51
3 Strategic Assets and the Great Game: 1979–2001 67
4 The Jaws of Victory: 2001–2008 97
5 The Labyrinth: 2008–2012 143
Epilogue 181
Notes 197
Bibliography 223
Index 241
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Foreword
I
t is impossible to develop a healthy relationship when it is based on
expediency or enmity. The Pakistan’s relationship with the United
States falls in the first category, while with India, in the second.
The US relationship with Pakistan has always been stormy. In fact,
during the past six decades it has been a marriage of convenience.
As a result, both the nations find each other to be duplicitous and
self-serving. The United States could not wait to befriend the South
Asian nation when it needed to confront the Soviet Union or the
al-Qaeda terrorists yet, when the need was gone, the United States,
without an abiding strategic or economic interest in Pakistan or a
common set of values, left it with equal alacrity. From Pakistani point
of view, when it needed the US support during its wars with India,
its powerful ally was simply absent without leave (AWOL). Therefore,
the unhealthy relationship is not based on mutual admiration and
respect, but one of suppressed hostility and duplicitous talks designed
to mask an underlying feeling of reciprocal mistrust.
To be sure, Pakistan has been truly ill served by the all-consuming
strategic concerns of US strategic thinkers. From its very birth, the
young nation aligned itself with the Western coalition against the
Soviet Union, not out of ideological commitment but because it
saw the latter as a friend of its archenemy India. In return, Pakistan
received military and economic aid while it sold its soul. Successive
US administrations found a chaotic democratic system unreli-
able and therefore, supported dictatorial or authoritarian regimes.
Although in free elections—in rare o ccasions when they took place
in Pakistan—the religious parties could garner only 3–6 percent of
popular votes, the extremists have always dominated the politics of
Pakistan. Since the US policymakers saw the religious fundamental-
ists as the primary bulwark against the atheist communists during the
Cold War period, the liberal secularists and small “d” democrats were
viewed with suspicion. From their short-term strategic point of view,
the United States chose to ignore when Pakistan began pursuing its
nuclear program.
viii Foreword
This trend of supporting the Islamists by the United States
reached its zenith when a coalition of religious fundamentalist muja-
hideen, with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
the Pakistani military drove away the mighty Soviet military from
Afghanistan (al-Qaeda was established to support the mujahideen).
In the ensuing civil war, thanks to Pakistan and tacit approval from
the United States, the Taliban came to power. The Taliban rule was
least interested in developing the common concerns of any modern
society such as pursuing a stable monetary and fiscal policy, building
schools and roads, and was primarily devoted to the implementation
of the S hariaa laws, based on their own tribal tradition and conser-
vative Wahhabi interpretation. The state-sponsored misogyny and
brutal disregard of human rights of the regime horrified the West,
but these did not prompt military invasion. It took place when the
government in Afghanistan refused to hand over Osama bin Laden
and his band of terrorists, who plotted the 9/11 attacks from its soil.
In this quest, Pakistan was at best a reluctant ally, joining forces only
when bluntly told by the administration of George W. Bush, “you are
either with us, or against us.”
If the US strategic interest worked against the long-term welfare
of the Pakistani people, its leaders were far more responsible for its
current sorry state of affair. From the beginning, the Pakistani leaders
framed their peoples’ worldview through the rivalry with India. They
forgot that it is impossible to build a national identity solely on the
foundation of shared hatred of another country. Their all-consuming
obsession to “solve” the Kashmir issue—which only meant its total
annexation by Pakistan—destroyed it from inside. Pakistan does have
a legitimate claim on the debate over the future of the disputed land.
However, for it to make it the single most important national issue
does not make sense. Even if Kashmir were to magically be part of
Pakistan, its internal problems would not disappear.
Sen. John Kerry was correct in pointing out in an interview, “more
than Pakistan having a conflict with the US, it is having conflict
within itself.” Pakistan suffers from all the problems of a developing
nation trying to find its national identity. The problems only deep-
ened when its successive leaders cynically decided to stoke religious,
sectarian, and ethnic passion to divert attention from their corrupt
and incompetent rule. While the nation began a systematic disman-
tling of all its democratic institutions, the military was popped up
as the last remaining respectable organization. Yet, despite its image
the military was not immune from internal strife. It reflected the
large divisions of society along the lines of sectarianism, devotion to
Foreword ixx
religious fundamentalism, corruption, and the obsession with sup-
porting violent actions against its neighbors by actively supporting ter-
rorism. To be sure, Pakistan’s strategic goals have not often matched
the Western needs. When the United States made an about-turn in
the post-9/11 era and focused on the destruction of al-Qaeda and the
Islamic extremists, some in Pakistani administration began cherry
picking the “good terrorists” from the bad terrorists. Those who
would took their fight into India or would support the establish-
ment of a supplicant regime in Afghanistan were deemed as assets
by the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments, while those
who target Pakistan were deemed as the “bad terrorists.” These run
against the US policies in an altered world.
These are the root causes of the dynamics of a dysfunctional rela-
tionship that binds Pakistan with the United States and with India.
The extent of this dysfunctional relationship came to fore after the kill-
ing of bin Laden, living for years in the garrison town of Abbottabad.
While the current US administration debates the issues, both the
nations have to understand that a permanent relationship cannot be
built at times of urgent strategic needs. The long-term goals between
the United States and Pakistan will be best developed when it is built
without the urging of some external force, communism or terrorism;
the best chance of building a trust-based relationship would come
when both nations would look at each other’s interests and attempt
to find common grounds. This opportunity would not come till the
United States ends its military involvement in Afghanistan. It is only
when the United States would not need Pakistani military assistance
to protect the supply route to Afghanistan and to root out the Taliban
sanctuaries within Pakistan, there would be an honest assessment of
mutual understanding.
Similarly, the Pakistani relationship with India must look beyond
Kashmir. Internally, the country is being wracked by too many
internal forces, from ethnic rivalries to religious fundamentalism to
extreme corruption. This is being reflected in Pakistan being nearly
at the top of the list of nations heading toward state failure. To find a
way out of these intractable problems is not only in the best interest
of Pakistan, but also of the region, the United States, and in fact, the
entire world. A failed state, run by hostile religious fundamentalists,
armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons is the worst nightmare of
the world.
The understanding of this complex interrelation, therefore, is
essential for all of us. Nirode Mohanty has written a much-needed
text that systematically analyzes the salient issues. Mohanty provides