Amber Sanchez thesis

54 Pages·2012·0.33 MB·English

by  Amber Sanchez

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

Effect of Psychological Distance on National Security Decisions
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of Master of Arts
in Psychology
by
Amber M. Sanchez

December 2012
The thesis of Amber M. Sanchez is approved:

___________________________________________ ___________
Andrew T. Ainsworth Date

___________________________________________ ___________
Jonathon P. Schuldt Date

___________________________________________ ___________
Abraham M. Rutchick , Chair Date

California State University, Northridge
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Signature page ii

Abstract v

Introduction 1
Resilience-focused Strategies 5
The Perception of Risk: Classic Theoretical Perspectives 7
Construal Level Theory 9
Pretest 16
Participants 16
Procedure 16
Results 17
Study 1 18
Participants 18
Procedure 18
Results 20
Study 2 21
Participants 21
Procedure 21
Results 22
Discussion 24
References 28
iii
Appendix A 36
Appendix B 41
Appendix C 42
iv
ABSTRACT

Effect of Psychological Distance on National Security Decisions
by

Amber M. Sanchez

Master of Arts in Psychology

Traditional approaches to national security emphasize preventing terrorist attacks.
However, many security experts argue that fail-safe security is unachievable, and instead
advocate emphasizing resilience, reducing the impact of attacks once they happen. The
current research applied Construal Level Theory to decision-making in the context of
national security. Study 1 examined the role of concrete and abstract construals on
decisions related to national security. Participants in the concrete condition indicated
greater preference for prevention-focused options, whereas those in the abstract condition
preferred resilience-focused options, F(10, 324) = 2.30, p = .013. Study 2 examined how
temporal distance impacts decision-making in a national security context. Increased
distance resulted in greater preferences for resilience-focused options relative to
prevention-focused options, though this difference was only marginally significant, F(1,
89) = 2.90, p = .092. These findings suggest that temporal and physical distance may
influence the way threats to national security are addressed.
v
Introduction
It is clear that the events of September 11th, 2001 had a profound economic and
psychological impact on The United States. This impact created a strong desire to
prevent additional attacks. Conventional methods of prevention emphasize intercepting
threats to national security at a point of entry (Flynn, 2000). Screening for hazardous
materials at security checkpoints is one way this is done. Other examples include
inspections at border crossings between countries and at seaports. Among other
objectives, these operations share the goal of preventing terrorist threats from entering the
country. However, since September 11th, approaches to security have come to create an
unrealistic expectation that all attacks can be prevented (Flynn, 2011). One weakness of
this prevention-focused approach is that responses to threats since the September 11th
attacks tend to be extreme and new technologies are, at times, inadequate (Flynn, 2011).
For example, after a plan to blow up several airliners with liquid explosives was
discovered, travelers can no longer pass security checkpoints with liquid containers over
3 ounces and are limited to a quart sized bag of liquids (Duffy, Thompson, Tumulty, Van
Dyk, & Yan, 2010). In the wake of September 11th, priority was given to developing
technology to screen for explosives because certain devices are difficult to detect with
standard scanners (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Although new
technology is highly visible in airports, its use is limited and still may not adequately
detect all hazardous substances (Duffy et al., 2010).
Moreover, prevention-focused strategies often result in inspections that seem
mysterious and intrusive, interrupting the flow of trade and travel. For example,
government officials remained vague about new security measures implemented in
1
response to a 2009 terrorist attempt, citing a need to keep the security experience
unpredictable (Maynard & Robbins, 2009). However, one unintended consequence of
this approach was a substantial number of delays and cancellations during the holiday
travel season. Current security measures require that randomly selected travelers either
pass through high-resolution body scanners or submit to a more thorough pat-down
process that some have compared to sexual assault (Smith-Mason, 2011). Such an
approach to national security also encourages the tacit assumption that only the
government can address the threat of terrorism (Flynn, 2004). Thus, preventative
methods do not merely attempt to create an impermeable border between the country and
a threat; prevention also gives rise to an impermeable border between ordinary citizens
and their government.
These reactions to national security threats are of particular concern because one
motivating factor behind terrorism is the assumption that Americans will embrace
extreme counterterrorism procedures that interfere with daily life and disrupt the
American economy, magnifying the impact of terrorist acts (Keeney & von Winterfeldt,
2010). Similar to the way an overactive immune system attacks healthy tissue, the
American approach to terrorism has come to emphasize aggressively addressing anything
potentially threatening in order to prevent the next attack (Flynn, 2004). Although these
tactics are often carried out with the intent of maintaining security and preventing further
attacks on American soil, recent perspectives insist that this goal is unattainable because a
fail-safe method of security does not exist (Flynn, 2004; National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks, 2004).
2
Security expert Stephen E. Flynn argues that prevention-focused approaches only
set an impossible standard that creates the illusion of guaranteed security (Flynn, 2011).
As evidenced by subsequent terrorist attempts in 2001 and 2009, even newly developed
measures at security checkpoints will not always intercept a threat. For example, in
2001, Richard Reid managed to board a flight with an explosive device concealed in his
shoe and attempted to detonate it mid-flight. This occurred in spite of heightened
security measures implemented in response to the September 11th attacks and resulted in
the screening procedure that requires travelers to remove their shoes at all airport security
checkpoints. (Cowell, 2001). Eight years later Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab concealed a
similar explosive and attempted to detonate it just before the aircraft approached its
destination (Chang, 2009). This second attempt left officials unclear as to how to
respond, given that the device was concealed in Abdulmutallab’s undergarments (Chang,
2009). Additionally, this attempt left officials particularly frustrated because, as one
member of the House Homeland Security Committee acknowledged, all the security
measures set in place to prevent this type of attack clearly failed (Bumiller, 2009;
Maynard & Robbins, 2009).
Both attempts were instances in which pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) based
devices were smuggled past security. Terrorists often favor PETN because it is
destructive in small amounts, easily concealed, and it is relatively stable in the absence of
a detonator (Fainberg, 1992). Early reports indicate that airport scanners and dogs
trained to detect explosives do not easily identify PETN because of low vapor pressure
(Waldrop, 1989). Though the technology for detecting PETN currently exists, its use is
limited because it is costly and time consuming (Hsu, 2009). Additionally, reports
3
indicate that even newly developed technology that tests the air for trace amounts of
explosives may not have detected the device Abdulmutallab smuggled aboard Flight 253
(Duffy et al., 2010). Detection of this particular substance involves more aggressive
tactics like chemical testing, which is usually reserved for travelers that prompt suspicion
(Hsu, 2009). Despite continued technological advancements, concern over the ever-
changing nature of terrorist threats remain (Bhattacharjee, 2008).
Likewise, increasing border security does not guarantee that terrorists will not
infiltrate the country’s border. In some instances border officials correctly identify
potential terrorists, as in the case of al-Qaeda member Ahmed Ressam (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). However, Flynn argues that the circumstances
surrounding Ressam’s capture are cause for alarm rather than celebration (2004). Flynn
attributes Ressam’s capture to luck, as he was allowed to board the ferry to Port Angeles
and was apprehended only because of an official’s unease with his behavior (2000,
2004). It is now known that two of the 9/11 hijackers arrived in California approximately
one month later and that these two individuals would later fly Flight 77 into the Pentagon
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Since September 11th, security at the
nation’s borders has increased but, as evidenced by subsequent attempts, terrorists will
often find a way past US borders. For example, terrorists will often claim amnesty or, as
in the case of the September 11th hijackers, simply falsify documents to get past border
officials (Flynn, 2004; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). In addition,
security measures are applied inconsistently around the world (Flynn, 2004). By
transferring from an Amsterdam flight, Abdulmutallab was able to board a Detroit-bound
flight with relatively little inspection (Duffy et al., 2010). Though Reid’s appearance and
4
inability to answer pertinent security questions aroused suspicion, he was re-issued a
ticket for a flight the next morning after being screened by the French National Police
(McNeil, 2001). Thus, simply allocating more resources to this aspect of national
security is insufficient. Flynn contends that a better strategy is to look beyond border
control and prevention-focused strategies by acknowledging the inevitability of an attack
and instead focusing on the country’s response to attacks. For that reason, a better
preparedness strategy would focus on resilience (Flynn, 2004, 2007, 2011).
Resilience-focused Strategies
Traditionally, resilience refers to an ability to recover quickly. For example,
economic resilience refers to an economic system’s ability to remain functional when
shocked (Rose, Oladosu, & Liao, 2007). The concept of resilience is similar to the idea
behind reactive approaches to medicine (National Institutes of Health, 2011). Just as
reactive approaches in a medical setting attempt to treat symptoms once they are present,
resilience-focused methods go beyond preventing a threat from materializing by
attempting to address the outcome in the event that an attack is successfully executed. By
acknowledging the inevitability of an attack, a resilience-focused approach promotes
faster recovery by addressing ways to effectively manage an outcome and avoid
disruption. One way to do this is to address threats to national security at the point of
origin instead of the point of entry. For instance, a resilient approach to port security
might include a program in which containers are inspected before they are shipped and
then tracked with sensors to prevent contamination while items are in transit (Flynn,
2004). By enhancing visibility for port officials, this method would allow secure
containers to pass, thus avoiding gridlock, while officials concentrate their efforts on
5