Altruism in Humans

321 Pages·2011·1.9 MB·English

by  C. Daniel Batson

Altruism in Humans
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Batson, C. Daniel (Charles Daniel), 1943-Altruism in humans / C. Daniel Batson.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-534106-5 (hbk.: alk. paper) 1. Altruism. I. Title.
BF637.H4B387 2011
155.2'32—dc22 2010021456

ISBN-13: 978-0-19-534106-5

ISBN-10: 0-19-534106-6

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
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Contents

Introduction 3

Part I A Theory of Altruistic Motivation 9
1 The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis 11
2 Antecedents of Empathic Concern 33
3 Behavioral Consequences of Empathy-Induced Altruism 59

Part II Empirical Evidence 81
4 Turning to Experiments 83
5 Testing the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis 110
6 Two Further Challenges 135

Part III Altruism in Action 161
7 Benefits of Empathy-Induced Altruism 163
8 Liabilities 188
9 Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives—and a More Humane
Society 207

v
Summary and Conclusion 228
References 235
Appendix A Cross-cutting Independent Variable(s), Dependent
Variable(s), and Competing Predictions that Can Test the
Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis Against Each Egoistic
Alternative 269
Appendix B Tests of the Aversive-Arousal-Reduction Hypothesis 275
Appendix C Tests of the Social-Evaluation Version of the Empathy-
Specific-Punishment Hypothesis 281
Appendix D Tests of the Self-Evaluation Version of the Empathy-
Specific-Punishment Hypothesis 285
Appendix E Tests of the General Empathy-Specific-Reward Hypothesis
289
Appendix F Tests of the Empathic-Joy Version of the Empathy-Specific-
Reward Hypothesis 293
Appendix G Tests of the Negative-State-Relief Version of the Empathy-
Specific-Reward Hypothesis 297
Author Index 303
Subject Index 317

vi
Introduction

What is the role of altruism in human life? To answer this question, it is necessary first to
know whether altruism—a desire to benefit someone else for his or her sake rather than
one’s own—even exists in humans. The existence of altruism has been debated, often
hotly, for centuries. One reason for heated debate is that if altruism exists, it has profound
implications. Its existence speaks not only to how we should direct our energies but also
to a fundamental question about human nature: Is everything we humans do, no matter
how noble and seemingly selfless, actually directed toward benefiting ourselves?
Those who carefully ponder the human condition often conclude that self-interest
underlies all our actions. The wise and witty Duke de la Rochefoucauld did: “The most
disinterested love is, after all, but a kind of bargain, in which the dear love of our own
selves always proposes to be the gainer some way or other” (Maxim 82, 1691). Many
philosophers and scientists, both before and since, have reached similar conclusions. If
they are right, then it is important that we recognize this fact about human nature, lest
fanciful dreams of altruism seduce us into counterproductive sentimentality and doomed
efforts at social reform.
But there is reason to think that they are not right. I wish to make a case that altruism does
exist in humans. The case includes outlining a theory of altruistic motivation, reviewing
evidence obtained from direct tests of the central tenet of the theory, reviewing evidence
relevant to related issues, and considering the implications of the theory at both a
conceptual and a practical level.
Not only do I wish to make a case that altruism exists; I also wish to present evidence that
altruism is an important force in human affairs. Indeed, the evidence suggests that
altruism is far more pervasive and powerful than has been recognized. Failure to
appreciate its importance has handicapped attempts to understand why we humans act as
we do and wherein our happiness lies. This failure has also handicapped efforts to
promote better interpersonal relations and a more caring, humane society.
Many, especially within religious traditions, have said that we humans ought to be
altruistic. I shall not engage this issue, at least not directly. As a scientist, my concern is
with what is, not what ought to be. Philosophers would say my goal is descriptive, not
normative. Of course, “ought” and “is” are not totally unrelated. We can only be expected
to do what is within our capacity.

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Where to Look for Evidence
A second reason for heated debate over altruism is that clear evidence for its existence is
not easily found. Advocates of altruism typically appeal to dramatic examples of heroism,
rescue, and self-sacrifice to make their case. These examples highlight the possibility that
we can care for others, not simply for ourselves. But even the most stirring examples of
heroic helpfulness fail to provide clear and convincing evidence of altruism. As la
Rochefoucauld suggested, the possibility remains that the hero or saint acted to benefit the
self “some way or other.”
It may seem tasteless to scrutinize the motives of a person who risked his or her life to
shelter those trying to escape from the Holocaust, of firemen who died while directing
others to safety after the attack on the World Trade Center, or of a person who pulls an
injured child from shark-infested waters. But if we really want to know whether humans
can be altruistically motivated, such scrutiny is necessary. And under scrutiny, we must
admit that even heroes and saints may have done their good deeds for other than altruistic
reasons: Perhaps they felt compelled to act in order to avoid having to live with the
knowledge that they did nothing. Perhaps they were seeking the rewards of seeing
themselves—or being seen by others—as a good person. Perhaps they sought rewards in
an imagined life to come. Perhaps they were simply reacting to situational pressure
without any clear goal in mind. “What else could I do?” is a common response when
rescuers are asked why they risked life and limb to save a stranger. Although this
response may reflect modesty, it may also be an accurate depiction of what was seen as a
lack of other options at the time.
The altruistic motivation for which I wish to make a case is not the exclusive province of
heroes and saints. It is neither exceptional nor unnatural. Rather, I shall argue that
altruism is a motivational state that virtually all of us frequently visit. Although its origins
are not yet fully understood, I suspect they lie at least in part in the nurturant impulse of
human parents to care for their young. This impulse has been strongly selected for within
our evolutionary history. Without it, our species would have vanished long ago. Perhaps
because altruism based on nurturance is so thoroughly woven into the fabric of our lives,
is so commonplace and so natural, its importance has failed to be recognized. As long as
we assume that altruism, if it exists at all, is rare and unnatural, we are likely to seek it on
the edges of our experience in acts of extreme self-sacrifice. We are not likely to look at
the everyday experience of people like you and me. I wish to argue that it is in such
experience that we can find the clearest evidence of the role altruism plays in human life.
Yet we cannot see this evidence through simple observation.
Using Experiments
Evidence of the existence and importance of altruism can be most clearly seen, I believe,
by observing the responses of ordinary people in carefully contrived experiments
designed to tease apart possible motives for acting to benefit another. These experiments
come out
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of a tradition of laboratory research on the nature of human motives that has developed in
social psychology over the past seventy years. The artificiality and trickery of the social-
psychology laboratory may seem unlikely tools to use in the search for altruism.
However, once the issues are clearly laid out, I think it will become apparent that
contrived and deceptive laboratory experiments offer an ideal way to unearth evidence,
pro and con, regarding altruism. Such experiments have the potential to provide much
clearer evidence than is provided either by (a) natural observation—whether observation
of humans, even heroic humans, or of other species—or by (b) theoretical deduction—
even deduction from such powerful theories as the theory of natural selection or the
theory of rational choice.
Armchair speculation about the motives behind heroic acts or about theoretical
possibilities is both fun and popular. Over the past several decades, it has produced a
number of books and articles about altruism in humans. This speculation has not provided
satisfactory answers to our questions about the existence of altruism and about the role
altruism plays in human life. It has not because it cannot. Questions about the existence
and role of altruism are not questions about possibility; they are about reality. They are
not questions about what might be or what ought to be; they are about what is. A careful,
controlled look at what is—at when and, more importantly, at why people act to benefit
someone else—is the only way to provide satisfactory answers. Addressing these
questions by use of experiments is not the easiest way; it is not the most popular way. But
if we want to find answers that go beyond speculation and possibility, I think use of
experiments is the best way.
Before seeking answers, however, we must understand more clearly what we are looking
for. To this end, Part I of this book offers a theory of altruistic motivation. Then Part II
provides a summary of the empirical evidence for the existence of altruism. Finally, Part
III considers the role of altruism in human life.
Audience
When colleagues—or publishers—hear that you are writing a book, one of the first
questions is about audience. Given that this book is about altruism, I am embarrassed to
admit that I wrote it primarily for myself. Having read about, thought about, and
researched altruism for over thirty years, I wanted to record where my thinking and the
empirical evidence has led me, and to do so before drifting off into my dotage. My goal
was to provide as complete and accurate a record as possible. Of course, a detailed record
has the painful virtue of exposing gaps. I tried to resist hiding or glossing over these,
leaving them bare and exposed for future work.
In spite of writing mainly for myeslf, I very much hope others will be interested in
reading over my shoulder. To this end, I have tried to make the book accessible to a range
of readers—not only colleagues, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates in social
psychology but also those interested in altruism from other academic disciplines,
including philosophy, biology, economics, sociology, anthropology, and theology, as well
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as from applied fields such as business, law, nursing, medicine, and ministry. Of course,
one need not fit a disciplinary niche to have an interest in the role of altruism in human
life. So I have written with the nonprofessional reader in mind too. Altruism is not an easy
topic; there are many conceptual subtleties, inferential complexities, and empirical
challenges that cannot be usefully addressed by oversimplification. But neither can they
be usefully addressed by obfuscation. Throughout, I have tried to be as clear and direct as
possible, while not shying away from complexity.
One implication of writing for myself is that I have cited a lot of other people’s work to
remind me—and to inform readers—of sources I have found useful along the way. For
the most part, these citations are done parenthetically so as not to slow down the through-
reader who wishes to forego side trails. I have also tried to highlight points of difference
and disagreement where such points exist, and to state as clearly as possible why I favor
the position I do. As will be apparent, I have benefited greatly from the ideas and research
of those with whom I disagree. In turn, I hope they also may find some of my ideas and
research useful.
For readers familiar with my earlier book, The Altruism Question (1991), let me say how
this book relates to it. First, even though the two books share a focus on the empathy-
altruism hypothesis—the claim that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation—
there are important conceptual differences. The empathy-altruism hypothesis is explicated
in far more detail here, providing the basis for a more comprehensive theory of human
altruism (Chapters 1–3) that includes a revised formulation of the antecedents of empathic
concern (Chapter 2). Second, although the research designed to test the empathy-altruism
hypothesis available at the time of the earlier book is reviewed here as well, so is much
new research. Because the body of research testing this hypothesis is now quite large, it is
presented in summary form in Chapter 5 and in appendices to provide easy access and
assessment. Third, several important challenges to the empathy-altruism hypothesis have
come to the fore since the earlier book, and research relevant to these challenges is
reviewed here for the first time (Chapter 6). Fourth, in recent years, research has moved
beyond the question of the existence of empathy-induced altruism to consider theoretical
and practical implications of its existence. That research is reviewed in Chapters 7–9.
Finally, the earlier book was rather narrowly focused on research in experimental social
psychology designed to test the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Although that research is
central here as well, the broader theoretical perspective of this book includes attention to
recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, primatology, behavioral
economics, sociology, and anthropology.
Appreciation
Over the almost fifteen years I have worked on this book, many colleagues, students, and
friends provided valuable input, for which I am profoundly grateful. Naming them here
does not do justice to their various contributions. (Nor does naming them mean that they
agree with my conclusions.) And doubtless, I have failed to think of everyone who
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should be listed, for which I apologize. With those provisos, sincere thanks to: Nadia
Ahmad, Monica Biernat, James Blair, Jack Brehm, Sarah Brosnan, Stephanie Brown, Sue
Carter, Bob Cialdini, Nancy Collins, Mark Davis, Karen Dawson, Jean Decety, Frans de
Waal, Nancy Eisenberg, Jakob Eklund, Nick Epley, Ernst Fehr, Jim Fultz, Lowell
Gaertner, Adam Galinsky, Omri Gillath, Maria Guibert, Eddie Harmon-Jones, Grit Hein,
Tom Insel, Claus Lamm, Mel Lerner, David Lishner, Sam McFarland, Heidi Maibom,
Josh May, Mario Mikulincer, Jason Mitchell, Luis Oceja, Lou Penner, Alicia Pérez-
Albéniz, Jane Piliavin, Stephen Post, Daniel Povinelli, Stephanie Preston, Adam Powell,
Pete Richerson, Dave Schroeder, Phil Shaver, Laura Shaw, Joan Silk, Tania Singer,
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Elliott Sober, Steve Stich, Eric Stocks, Karsten Stueber,
Michael Tomasello, Jo-Ann Tsang, Felix Warneken, and Carolyn Zahn-Waxler.
Special thanks to Jack Dovidio, Martha Nussbaum, and Matthieu Ricard, each of whom
provided insightful and extremely helpful comments on the manuscript as a whole.
Special thanks also to Lori Handelman and Abby Gross of Oxford University Press for
their enthusiasm, encouragement, and support throughout the publication process. For
about ten years, my research on altruism benefited greatly from National Science
Foundation support. Speaking of support, this book probably would not be without Ben.
Finally, special thanks to my wife Judy for her involvement from start to finish—her
readiness to talk altruism over drinks again and again, her exceptional insight as a pilot
research participant, her care and dedication assisting with data collection, her comments
on chapter drafts, her editorial skill, and her overall patience, understanding, and support.
Who could ask for more?

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