Althusser and Aesthetic Ideology

28 Pages·2012·0.59 MB·English

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lulletindelaSociheAmericainedePhilosophiedeLangueFranfais
Volume 14, Number2, Fall2004
a
Donner voir l'ideologie:
Althusser and Aesthetic Ideology
Thomas Albrecht
Thepastseveralyearshave seenareinvigorated
interest in the work of Louis AIthusser. Even
though AIthusser has never been fully absent
from theintellectualdebates on theleft, he has
oftenbeenrelegatedintoaMarxistproblematic
deemedobsolescent.ButoEallthe1960sMarxist
theoristsheisundoubtedlytheonewhohasbest
withstood the fall of communism. New
generations of students are in the process of
learning about Althusser's writings, and the
publication of a great number of unpublished
texts from his posthumous papers makes it
possible for thosewho have longengagedwith
him to discover new aspects of bis thought.
There is surely still much we can learn from
AIthusser.
-ChantalMouffei
Evenacursorylookatrecentpublicationswillsubstantiate
ChantalMouffe'sclaimaboutarenewedinterestintheworkand
legacyofLouisAIthusser.Lastyearalonesawtheappearanceof
THOMAS ALBRECHT
twonewmonographs onAlthusser,alongsidethereleaseof The
HumanistControver-!y andOtherWritings, a translated collection of
posthumous essays originally from 1966-67, flrst published in
France in the mid-1990s.2 The return to Althusser and
'~thusserianism"insuchdiversefieldsasculturalstudies,literary
criticism, critical theory, social science, and philosophy testifies,
amongotherthings, to a sustainedinterestinAlthusser's theory
ofideologyasatoolforacriticalengagementthatwouldbeable
toaccountfortheideologicalandpoliticaldimensionofcultural
and literaryworks. In his new book onAlthusser, for instance,
WarrenMontagidentifiesthecurrenttaskforliteraryandcultural
studies as rejecting the notion of the author as origin, and as
analyzing"the historically specificways inwhichindividuals are
'recruited' and interpellated as authors by different ideological
andrepressiveapparatuses."3ComplementingMontag'semphasis
onideologicalinterpellation,IsoldeCharimhasarguedinarecent
book-length studyofAlthusser's famous essayonideologyand
ideological state apparatuses that the essaymust be appreciated
as one of the foundational works for the discipline of cultural
studies.
Insomeinstances,theapplicationsofAlthusser'swritings
onideologyasameanstoexamineliteraryworksandothercultural
artifacts operate on the assumption that those writings are not
themselves texts thatwould flrst need to be read (inAlthusser's
own strong sense of reading), but that their meaning is
transparent. Iwouldliketoputthisassumptionintoquestionby
returningtooneofAlthusser'sfoundationaltextsontherelation
betweenartandideology,his"Lettresurlaconnaissancedel'art;'
and submitting it to the same rigorous reading that it itself
exemplifies. I will argue thatthe success of applyingAlthusser's
n10delofideologycritiquetoliteraryandculturalartifactscannot
beassumedapriori,sincethatmodelitselfdemonstratesateach
point the difficulty for the critique to remain outside the very
ideologicalphenomenonitcriticizes.
The "Lettre sur la connaissance de l'art" ["Letter on the
I<nowledgeofArt'1,publishedin1966asacompanionpieceto
Pierre Macherey's A Theory of Iiterary Produclion, is Althusser's
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ALTHUSSERAND AESTHETIC IDEOLOGY
mosteategoricalstatementontherelationbetweenworks ofart
andideolog)T.4Inthe essay,Althusseroutlines thedistinetions as
wellastheparalleIsbetweenwhatheeallsart,seienee,andideology.
He argues that works of art are both produeed from, and
eontainedwithin,ideology,butthattheyarenotsimplyredueible
toideolog)T. He also draws aparallelbetweenartand seienee by
proposingthatbothgive the critic access to ideology; thoughin
different forms. In the essay's most well-known formulation,
Althussermaintainsthatwhileseience (i.e.,Marxisttheory)gives
knowledgeofideologybyeoneepts,the"speeifieityof[authentie]
art"(222)isthatitenablestheeritiesomehowto"see,""perceive,"
and"feeI"theideologythatprodueed,andisreproducedby;the
work of art. Althusser's referenee to the specificityof an authentie
art was routinely eritieized by the Marxist literary erities who
followed Althusser, in partieular by British Marxists writing in
thelate1970sandearly1980s,asunrefleetedformalism.Aeeording
toitseritics,Althusser'sessayprivilegeswhatiteallsauthentieart
ashavingaeritieal,andevenapotentiallytransformative,relation
to ideology.5 Mosdy as a result of this eritique of Althusser's
supposedformalistunderstandingofthe"specificityofart,"the
essayhas fallen into critiealdisrepute and even negleet.
In the following pages, I propose that while a formalist
understanding of what Althusser means by the "speeifieity of
art" is eertainly justified,itis byno means eertain thatthe form
in question is that of the artwork. Any eritieal eommentary on
the speeifieityof art has thus far focused almost exelusivelyon
art(as a supposedly privileged formal eategory). ForAlthusser,
however, the specificity of art seems to have less to do with the
formal properties of the art objeetitself, and more to do with
the formal effectarthas onitsreader,viewer,oreritie:theeffeet
Althusser eal1s a "pereeption" of ideology. This important
distinetion has been noted, for example, by Miehael Sprinker:
"The apparentprivilegegranted to art [inAlthusser's essay] ean
readily be miseonstrued. The basic coneeptual opposition
governing the logie of [the essay] is not art/ideology, but
pereeption/knowledge [i.e., art/seience]...The speeifieityof art
oraestheticpraeticeliesinitsperceptualfeatures,itspresentation
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THOMAS ALBRECHT
ofideologyinphenomenalforms."6Inthefollowingessay,Iwill
concentrate on the perceptual features of art, "its presentation
of ideologyin phenomenal forms." This critical shift of foeus
willhelp tounderlinetheongoingrelevanceofAlthusser'swork
toanytheorizationtodayoftherelationsbetweenculturalartifacts
andideolog~Atthesametime,itwillmakeexplicithowaccording
toAlthusser, anycriticalpracticeis potentiallysusceptibleto the
ideologicalphenomenaittheorizes.
1. Ideology and/as Ideological Effects
In the "Letter on Art," Althusser draws a distinction
betweenart and science onthe basis of theirrespective relation
to ideology: "The realdifference betweenartand sciencelies in
the specificform in which they give us the same object in quite
different ways: art in the form of 'seeing' and 'perceiving' or
'feeling', sciencein the form of knowledge (in the strict sense, by
eoncepts)" (223). Theobjectgivento us byartandbyscienceis
ideolog)'. Althussergoes on to specify that what art gives us in
theformof"seeing,""perceiving;'and"feeling,"andwhatscience
gives us in the form of knowledge and concepts, is never an
ideologyas such,butalways "thespontaneous 'livedexperience'
of ideology" (223). Asiswellknown to readers of the essayon
ideology and the state, Althusser argues against distinguishing
between an ideology as such and ideology in its lived, material
practiees.ThisisbecauseforAlthusser,ideologynecessarilytakes
the form of livedexperience, anddoes notexistexceptas such:
''Whenwespeakofideologyweshouldknowthatideologyslides
intoallhumanactivity;thatitisidenticalwiththe'lived'experience
of human existenceitself" (223).7
At the same time thatAlthusser equatesideologywith the
ideological lived experience of individuals, however, he also
distinguishes between the two, as in the following passage about
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,which ostensibly elaborates the formal
distinction betweenart and science:
If Solzhenitsyn does 'n1ake us see' the 'lived
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ALTHUSSERAND AESTHETIC IDEOLOGY
experience'...of the [Stalinist] 'cult of
personality' and its effects, in no way does he
give us a knowledge of them: this knowledge is
the conceptual knowledge of the complex
mechanismswhicheventuallyproducethe'lived
experience' that Solzhenitsyn's novel discusses.
IfIwantedtouseSpinoza'slanguageagainhere,
I could say that art makes us 'see' 'conclusions
without premisses', whereas knowledge makes
uspenetrateintothemechanismwhichproduces
the 'conclusion' out of the 'premisses'. This is
an important distinction, for it enables us to
understand that a novel on the 'cult', however
profound,maydrawattentiontoits'lived'effects,
butcannotgiveanunderstandingofit. (224)
According to AIthusser's defmition of ideology, an ideology's
'''lived'effects"(whichartmakesusseeandwhichscienceallows
us to know) arethatideology. However, the word "effects" not
onlydesignatestheideologicallivedhumanexperiencestowhich
Solzhenitsyn'snoveldrawsourattention.Understoodasthekind
of effectthatfollows anantecedentcause,italso sets upacausal
relationship betweenitself and aprior, distinctideology (the cultof
personality). The causalityin turn implies aseparation of cause
and effect. AIthussermakes such aseparation between a causal
ideologyandits'''lived'effects"inthefirstsentence,forinstance,
when he explicitly distinguishes the "cult" ofpersonality from
"its effects."The subsequentreference to Spinoza similarlysets
up a causal relation ("the mechanism wmch produces the
'conclusions' out of the 'premisses"'), which again separates
ideologyandideologicaleffects(intheanalogybetweenpremises
andideologies,conclusions andlivedeffects).Theclaimthatart
only shows us conclusions divorced from their premises, while
scientificknowledgeencompassesbothconclusionsandpremises,
reiterates this separation. At several moments, therefore, the
passage on Solzhenitsyn seems to contradict AIthusser's own
argument that ideology and its lived effects are conceptually
inseparableandpracticallyidentical.Itpositsalinearorexpressive
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THOMAS ALBRECHT
causalityinwhichthelivedeffectstowhichartdrawsourattention
are onlya secondaryeffectof apriorideology.8
Confronted with this apparent contradiction, Althusser
might respond that his separating ideology from its effects is
merely an expository necessit)T. This is the argument he makes,
for example, in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"
about having to present ideology and the interpellation of
individualsubjects(whichtohimarethesamething)intheform
ofa temporal succession:
Naturally for the convenience and clarity of
n1y little theoretical theatre I have had to
presentthingsintheform ofasequence,with
abefore and an after, and thus inthe form of
a temporal succession ... Butin reality these
things happen without any succession. The
existence of ideology and the hailing or
interpellationofindividualsassubjectsareone
and the same thing.9
Theword "naturally"is one clue thatwhatAlthussercalls an
expository necessity is also a symptom of an ideological
necessity, specifically of an ideological necessity proper to
Althusser's scientificproject.Inthelastinstance,Althusserian
science, qua science, wants to theorize ideology as such or an
ideologyas such, andnotmerely"see"or"know"ideological
effects.Thisisbecause scienceis forAlthusserbydefinitiona
knowledge ofideology.Anyknowledgeof ideologicaleffects
attained by science therefore implicitly and necessarilylooks
beyond those effects towards an ideological premise that
originally produced them and is reproduced by them. As a
scientific exposition, it cannot do otherwise, and so cannot
help reproducingthe expositoryseparationof ideology from
its effects, evenwhile italso denies the tenabilityof any such
separation.
While the splitting of ideology and ideological effects
testifies to an underlying scientific imperative, Althusser's
statements about sciencein the passage on Solzhenitsyn also
deny to science any conceptual knowledge of ideological
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ALTHUSSERAND AESTHETIC IDEOLOGY
premises as such, distinct from their effects. According to
those statements,what science allows us to knowis precisely
the production of ideologicaleffects: "[scientific] knowledge
is the conceptual knowledge of the complex mechanisms
which eventually produce the 'lived experience' that
Solzhenitsyn's noveldiscusses ... [It] makes us penetrateinto
the mechamsm which produces the 'conclusions' out of the
'premisses'" (224). AIthusser makes explicit that scientific
knowledgeisnotaknowledgeofideologyassuchorofpremises
as such, but of the mechanisms wmch produce "lived" effects
(i.e., "conclusions"). To the extent, therefore, that scientific
knowledge is a knowledge about the production of ideological
effects,itis aknowledgeof thoseproductions andthoseeffects
asideology.Inotherwords,theseformulationsimplythatideology
is not adistinct and priorpremise initself, butisalways already
theproductionoflivedeffectsinmaterialpracticessuchaswriting
andreading,aestheticsandcriticism. Consistentwithstatements
Althussermakes elsewhere,ideologyheredoes notexistdistinct
from the production of its effects.
ItseemsthenthatAlthusser'stextisdividedintostatements
that disavow any separation of ideology and effects, and
statementsthatmakepreciselysuchaseparation(sometimesthese
are the very same statements). I willbe arguinginwhat follows
thatthisinternalcontradictiontouchesontheideologicaldouble
bindinwmchAlthusseriansciencefmdsitself.Ontheonehand,
as a science of ideology, it wants to arrive at a knowledge of
ideologyas such. Ontheotherhand,the separationofideology
anditseffectsisnotonlyaphilosophicalerror,butisamoveinto
ideology, specificallyinto anideologyproperto Marxistscience.
This ideology is the scientific ideology that presupposes an
ideologythatcouldsomehowbeconceptuallyseparatedfromits
livedeffects.Sothejuxtapositionofthetwocontradictorystrands
inAlthusser's statementsisin fact closelylinked to the question
ofideologythatisalsoposedthematicallybythosestatements.I
will suggest that in the splitting of ideology and effects that is
promptedbyascientificimperativetoknowledgeaboutideology,
Althusser's essaytouches on the question of its ownideolog)T.
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THOMAS ALBRECHT
Ideologyisconceivedbyscienceasadistinctentitybecause
theconceptoE suchanentityis anideologicalknowledge-effect
of scientific texts like Althusser's essa)T. We can fmd a useful
example of one such knowledge-effect in the essay's English
translation. Privileging science over art and following science's
imperatives,Althusser'stranslatorBenBrewstermakestheerror
of separating an ideology from its effects in the following
sentence,alreadyquotedearlier,fromthepassageonSolzhenitsyn:
,canovelonthe 'cult',howeverprofound,maydrawattentionto
its 'lived' effects, but cannotgive an understanding oj it [nepeut en
donnerI'intelligence]" (224).BrewstertranslatestheFrenchpronoun
"en" in the phrase "ne peut en donner l'intelligence" as "it;'
indicatinghetakesittoreferexclusivelytothecultofpersonality.
His translation draws a definitive distinetion between the cult
anditslivedeffects.Thedistinetioninturnproducesaknowledge
effect. Itmakes possiblein the English translationa knowledge
of an"it" (theideologyof thecult) thatwouldbeseparatefrom
thecult'slivedeffects.IntheFrenchtext,however,thepronoun's
referentremains aITlbiguaus sincetheward"en"refers to either
or both "le culte" ("the cult'') and "les effets 'vecus' du culte"
("the cult's 'lived' effects").l0
Brewster'serror, framed hereas aproblemof translation,
is symptomaticof anideologythatAlthusser's essayitself both
denounces and also perpetuates. To posit an understanding of
anideologyas such,asBrewster'stranslationdoes,is toproduce
anideologJojcriticism,anideologyAlthusserimplicitlycriticizesin
the very text Brewster is translating and trying to help out.
BrewsterattributestoAlthusseranunderstandingofanideology
assuch,anunderstandingAlthusserknowstobeitselfideologieal.
In doing so, Brewster turns Althusser's text overinto ideolog)T.
His errot is a move into ideology not because the splitting of
ideologyandideology's lived effectsis contradicted by some oE
Althusser's statementsaboutideology.Rather,itisanideological
interpellation insofar as it reproduces an ideology Althusser
specificallyidentifieswiththe scienceof arte Itreproduceswhat
Althusser calls the aestheticeffect.
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ALTHUSSERAND AESTHETIC IDEOLOGY
2. The "Aesthetic Effect": Donneravoir
l'ideologie
Intheessayonideologyandideologicalstateapparatuses,
Althusser famously reminds us of the "material existence" of
ideologyin"materialpractices":"the'ideas'or'representations',
etc.,whichseemtomakeupideologydonothaveanideal(ideale
or ideelle) or spiritual existence, but a material existence ... An
ideologyalwaysexistsinanapparatus,anditspractice,orpractices.
This existence is material."ll In the realm of art and aesthetics,
ideology's material practices are the production by art of an
"aesthetic effect": "in order to answer most of the questions
posed for us bythe existence and specific nature of art, we are
forced to produce an adequate (scientific) knowledge of the
processeswhich.producethe 'aestheticeffect' of aworkof art"
(225). This statement does not mean that, for Althusser, art is
the samethingas theproductionofitsaestheticeffect.Rather,it
suggests thata scientific knowledge of art (which forAlthusser
isalways,inthelastinstance,aknowledgeoftherelationbetween
artandideology) wouldhaveto beaknowledgeof theaesthetic
effectartproduces.Therefore,ifideologyonlyexistsinitsmaterial
practices,andiftheobjectofascientificknowledgeofartisthe
production of art's aesthetic effect, then the material practices
of aesthetic ideologywould have to be the production of that
effect.
The word aestheticderives from the Greek aisthanesthai(to
perceive), so it would seem that the phrase "aesthetic effect"
designates the work's perceptual effect, the effecton the reader
of "perceiving" in works of literature the ideological lived
experiencesofhumanindividuals.AccordingtoAlthusser,such
a "perception" mayprovide readers with a criticalpointof view
on a particular ideology that is reproduced through those lived
experiences:"Balzac,despitehispersonalpoliticaloptions,'makes
a
us see' ['donne voir1 the 'livedexperience' of capitalistsociety
in a critical form" (224). Our criticalinsightinto lived capitalist
ideology is the aesthetic effect of Balzac's art on us, the effect
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THOMAS ALBRECHT
Althusser calls "donner avoir." By insisting it is precisely this
effect of which Marxist criticism is constrained to produce a
scientificknowledge,Althussersuggestsourcritical"perception"
ofideologicaleffectsisitselfaformofideologicalinterpellation.
If art is the occasion for a critical insight that is also an
ideological interpellation, this may be because it positions the
critic in avantage point that would be in some sense outside of
ideolo~Althusser defmes the aesthetic effect not only as the
reader's perception of ideology, but also as a spatial distance
betweentheworkandideology,adistancethatalternatelyplaces
thereaderortheworksomehowatavisibleremovefromideology:
Balzac and Solzhenitsyngive us a 'view' of the
ideology to which their work alludes and with
which it is constantly fed, a view which
presupposesaretrealjaninternaldistantiationfrom
the very ideology from which their novels
emerged.Theymakeus'perceive'(hutnotknow)
in some sense [en quelque sorte]from theinside}
byaninternaldistance} theveryideologyinwhich
theyareheld. (222-23)
The fact that the content of the work of
Balzac and Tolstoy is 'detached' from their
politicalideology andin some way [en quelque
sorte] makesus 'see'itfromtheoutside}makesus
'perceive'itbyadistantiationinsidethatideology,
presupposesthatideologyitse!f. (225)
In th'ese sentences, a distance or detachment becon1es visible
betweentheworkandthepoliticalideologyfromwruchthework
wasborn;trusdistancingenablesthecriticto"perceive"thegiven
ideologyasdiscerniblyseparatedfromthework,fromitscontent,
or from himor herself.12
Bothoftheabovecitationspresentuswithacriticaldouble
bindsimilartotheoneintheearlierpassagesabouttheseparability
andinseparabilityofideologyandideologicaleffects.Atthesame
time that Althusser posits the possibility of a detaching of the
umbilicalrelationbetweenideologyand theworkof art,healso
emphasizesthattheworkisalwaysstillinsideideolo~ continually
10