Alternative Action Theory: Simultaneously a Critique of Georg Henrik von Wright’s Practical Philosophy

330 Pages·1998·6.589 MB·English

by  Ota Weinberger (auth.)

ALTERNATIVE ACTION THEORY
THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY
General Editors: W. Leinfellner (Vienna) and G. Eberlein (Munich)
Series A: Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences
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SERIES A: PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
VOLUME 26
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ALTERNATIVE ACTION
THEORY
Simultaneously a Critique of
Georg Henrik von Wright's Practical Philosophy
by
OTA WEINBERGER
Karl-Franzens-Universität, Institut für Rechtsphilosophie,
Rechtssoziologie und Rechtsinformatik,
Graz, Austria
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A CLP. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-94-010-6489-7 ISBN 978-94-011-5062-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-5062-0
Printed on acid-free paper
English translation of Ota Weinberger, Alternative Handlungstheorie:
gleichzeitig eine Auseinandersetzung mit
Georg Henrik von Wrights praktischen Philosophie,
Bühlau Verlag, Wien-Köln-Weimar, Austria, 1996. 310 S.
Translator: Jacques Zwart
Published with the support of the Austrian Federal Ministry for
Science and Traffic and of the Alfred Schachner Memorial Foundation.
All Rights Reserved
© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1998
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1998
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner
v
Contents
Foreword XI
1. The Nature of Logic and the Concept of the Logic
of Norms 1
1.1. Take Jorgen Jorgensen seriously! ....................... 2
1.2. General preconditions of logical theories ................ 6
1.3. Can norms (norm-sentences) be regarded as objects
of logic? .............................................. 8
1.4. Main types of substitute theories ...................... 11
2. Once More: Is and Ought. The action-theoretical
approach 37
2.1. Dichotomous semantics as basis of practical philosophy 37
2.2. Two remarks on the traditional contrasting of Is and
Ought ................................................ 41
2.3. Differentiation of Ought ............................... 43
2.4. Two Types of Ought? ................................. 45
2.5. A third kind of Ought: the technical Ought? .......... 50
3. Practical Rationality 53
3.1. The relationship between thought, knowledge and action 54
3.2. The ambiguity of "rational" ........................... 56
3.3. The ratio is not a reservoir of material-aprioristic truths 57
3.4. Philosophy of the sources of logical rationality ......... 59
3.5. Excursion on discursive rationality .................... 61
3.6. Action and justification ............................... 73
3.7. The characteristics of practical rationality ............. 74
VI CONTENTS
4. Design of an Alternative Action Theory 77
4.1. The ontological basis of the action theory .............. 77
4.2. The information-theoretical approach to action theory . 87
4.3. The semantic basis of action theory ................... 88
4.4. Action theory as a structure theory .................... 89
4.5. Action deliberation and motive interpretation .......... 91
4.6. Summary of the basic features of the alternative
formal-finalistic action theory ......................... 92
5. Fundamental Concepts and Theses of the Formal-
Finalistic Action Theory 95
5.1. Introduction ......................................... 95
5.2. The definition of the concept of action ................ 96
5.3. Two kinds of information as a basis for action ........ 96
5.4. Scope for action ..................................... 98
5.5. Optimization analysis as basis for action decisions .... 99
5.6. The admissibility of means (of modes of action) ..... 102
5.7. The agent (Subject of the action) ................... 103
5.8. Action and program ................................ 104
5.9. Action deliberation and motive interpretation ....... 105
5.10. The justification of actions .......................... 107
5.11. The institutionalist aspect of actions ................ 108
5.12. The theories of practical thinking ................... 109
5.13. The practical system ................................ 110
5.14. Non-derivability postulates .......................... 111
5.15. On formal teleology ................................. 111
5.16. The weighting of the ends ........................... 114
5.17. System of ends and logical consistency .............. 115
5.18. Possible and permissible means ..................... 117
5.19. Remarks on formal axiology ......................... 118
5.20. On logic of preferences .............................. 121
5.21. Ordinal and cardinal preference ..................... 123
CONTENTS VII
6. On the Idea of Practical Inference. Simultaneously
a study on the relationship between mental opera-
tions and actions 125
6.1. The concept of practical inference .................... 125
6.2. Comparison of practical inference with
conclusions in descriptive language ................... 127
6.3. G. H. von Wright's contribution to the theory
of Practical Inference ................................ 128
6.4. Practical inference and formal teleology .............. 136
6.5. The system of ends and logical consistency ........... 141
6.6. Some conclusions on practical inferences and on the
relationship between mental operations and actions ... 141
7. From Deontic Logic to the Genuine Logic of Norms 145
7.1. The concept 'Deontic Logic' ......................... 145
7.2. A valuation of the importance of deontic logic ....... 149
7.3. The generalization of the deduction concept ......... 151
7.4. The extensionality of the norm content .............. 154
7.5. The deontic operators and the problem of their
mutual definability ................................. 156
7.6. Note on the iteration of deontic operators ........... 159
7.7. The problem of permission. Nature and function
of permissive norms ................................. 160
7~8. The conditional norm-sentence in deontic logic ...... 164
7.9. The interpretation of the deontic logics and the
possibilities of their application in the normative
disciplines .......................................... 166
7.10. The path toward a genuine logic of norms ........... 167
7.11. Ought and May. Negation in the genuine logic
of norms ........................................... 170
7.12. The norm-logical consistency postulate .............. 175
7.13. Norm-giving and deduction ......................... 176
7.14. The conditional norm-sentence ...................... 178
7.15. Quantifiers in norm-sentences ....................... 181
VIII CONTENTS
7.16. Norm-logical inference .............................. 182
8. Is Willing Liberum Arbitrium? 189
8.1. The concept of the freedom of will and the sources
of the problems of the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae 189
8.2. Freedom of will from the point of view of the informa-
tion-theoretically founded action theory ............... 192
8.3. Excursion on the recognition of causality and
on causal explication ................................. 199
8.4. Excursion about the structure of the nomological
causal proposition ................................... 205
8.5. Fact-transcendence of the recognition of causality
as a rational basis of disposition propositions and
contrafactual conditionals ............................ 214
8.6. Remark on Chisholm's Problem ...................... 222
8.7. Possible social influences on action, and the dispute
around the freedom of will ........................... 222
8.8. Norm-giving in the deterministic worldview ........... 223
8.9. Responsibility in the deterministic world view ......... 225
9. Action and Institution 229
9.1. Anthropological basis of the institutions .............. 229
9.2. The classical conception of the institutions according
to Maurice Hauriou .................................. 231
9.3. The normativistic ontology of the institutions ........ 236
9.4. Attempt at a classification of institutions ............. 242
9.5. Methodological implications of neo-institutionalism ... 249
10. The Democracy Problem from a Neo-Institutio-
nalistic Point of View 261
10.1. Against romantic conceptions of democracy ......... 262
10.2. Some explanatory models of democracy ............. 263
10.3. Democratic will-formation and the guiding ideas
of democracy ...................................... 267
CONTENTS IX
10.4. The idea of a discursive democracy. Democracy as
an open society ..................................... 274
10.5. Theory of political argumentation. Chances and
dangers of the information society ................... 279
Appendix:
Homage to Georg Henrik von Wright 287
1. Philosophical analysis and philosophical cognition ...... 290
2. Countertheses against Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy ... 291
3. Does philosophy deal with linguistic problems
or with material ones? ................................. 292
4. The source of philosophical argumentation ............. 296
5. Are there genuine philosophical problems? ............. 302
6. Concluding remark .................................... 304
Appendix (written in 1995) ......................... 304
Index of Proper Names ................................. 311
Index of Subjects ....................................... 313
XI
Foreword
This book has both a short and a long 'case history'. It was directly
occasioned, first, by the recent appearance in the German language of
two books by G. H. von Wright: "Normen, Werte und Handlungen"
(Norms, Values and Actions), Frankfurt (Main) 1994, and "Erkenntnis
als Lebensform. Zeitgenossische Wanderungen eines philosophischen
Logikers" (Knowledge as a Mode of Life. Contemporary wanderings of
a philosophical logician), Vienna/Cologne/Weimar 1995; and, second,
by the decision of his friends, professors Meggle, Krawietz and Valdes,
to stage a two-day discussion in April 1996 at the Bielefeld, Germany,
Center for Interdisciplinary Research ("Zentrum ftir interdisziplinare
Forschung", or ZiF) on von Wright's book, "Normen, Werte und
Handlungen" (Norms, Values and Actions) with its author. I had the
very special honor and pleasure of being invited to this symposium.
In anticipation of that discussion I prepared a small compendium of
theses, which eventually took the form of this book.
My more fundamental motive for writing this book has, on the
other hand, a long 'case history'. In my life and thinking, G. H. von
Wright has played a very important part, even though I can neither
count myself among his pupils, nor among his scholarly companions
on life's path. Like probably anyone interested in logical analysis as
an instrument of practical philosophy, I am indebted to von Wright for
a great many suggestions and stimulations, but it was not primarily
by him that my path was determined.
Rather, it was my famous teacher Frantisek (Franz) Weyr - a close
friend and Czech collaborator of Hans Kelsen - who, through a remark
in a lecture on legal philosophy, opened my eyes to the problem field