Alison Nash & Giordana Grossi

24 Pages·2013·0.39 MB·English

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June 2007
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Alison Nash
Department of Psychology at the State University of New York at New Paltz, New York,
[email protected]
Giordana Grossi
Department of Psychology at the State University of New York at New Paltz, New York.,
[email protected]
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Nash, Alison and Grossi, Giordana (2007) "Picking Barbie™’s Brain: Inherent Sex Differences in Scientific
Ability?," Journal of Interdisciplinary Feminist Thought: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.salve.edu/jift/vol2/iss1/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Salve Regina. It has been accepted
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Nash and Grossi: Picking Barbie™’s Brain: Inherent Sex Differences in Scientific A
Picking Barbie’s ™ Brain: Inherent Sex Differences in Scientific Ability?
Alison Nash & Giordana Grossi*
State University of New York at New Paltz
Contact authors: Giordana Grossi & Alison Nash
Department of Psychology
State University of New York at New Paltz
New Paltz, NY 12561

Acknowledgments. We wish to thank Amy Kesselman, Heather Hewitt, Elaine Kolitch, and
Constance Schoenberg for their invaluable insights and comments on earlier versions of this
manuscript.

*The order of authorship was determined randomly, as both authors made equal contributions.
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Journal of Interdisciplinary Feminist Thought, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5
INTRODUCTION
“Therewas anenormous bodyofmasculineopiniontotheeffect that nothingcouldbeexpected
ofwomenintellectually. Evenifher fatherdidnot readout loudtheseopinions, anygirl could
readthem forherself; andthereading, eveninthe nineteenthcentury,must haveloweredher
vitality,andtoldprofoundlyuponherwork.There wouldalways havebeen that assertion—you
cannot dothis,youareincapableofdoingthat—toprotest against,toovercome.”
VirginiaWoolf(ARoom of One’s Own)
Whiletheideathat womenarenot endowed withmen’s logical andrational skills has beena
recurrent refraininthehistoryofscience(Gould, 1981),theclaim that thereexist inherent sex1
differences inmathematical andscientificabilities has recentlyre-emerged inthefieldofpsychology
(e.g.,Baron-Cohen,2003; Geary,1996) andinthe popularculture (afamous exampleis the1994
Mattel’s versionofBarbieTMwhoproclaimed“Mathis hard”).Indeed,this claim has beentheobject
ofoneofthemost heated scholarlydebates ofthe last fortyyears (see Gallagher& Kaufman,2005,
forarecent review). Last year,it was brought backtotheattentionofthegeneral publicbyHarvard
president LarrySummers,whodiscussedtheunderrepresentationofwomeninscience and
engineeringinterms ofsexdifferences in“intrinsicaptitude”forhardsciences,withsocializationand
continuingdiscriminationconsidered “lesser factors”(Summers,2005).
Summers’comments promptedalargenumberof magazine articles,editorials,andpublic
debates.Inthese,muchattentionwas paidtoscientificstudies purportingtohavedemonstrated
biological sexdifferences inscientificaptitude.Catchphrases like‘brainhardwiring’ enteredpublic
discourse.Thepopularmedia,however,oftenmisrepresent complexscientificfindings,and
furthermore,readily accept thesefindings at face value. Feminist scholars havelongrecognizedthe
cloakoflegitimacythat sciencedrapes overthestatus quo(Bleier,1991; Millet,1970; Weisstein,
1 Weconsidergenderasocial construct.However,throughout this paper, weusetheterm ‘sex’ rather
than‘gender’as weareaddressingbiological theories about differences infemales’andmales’
abilities.
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Nash and Grossi: Picking Barbie™’s Brain: Inherent Sex Differences in Scientific A
1970; 1997).Thealleged scientificdiscoverythat particular areas ofwomen’s andmen’s brains are
‘hardwired’differentlyserves toreifyandconsolidatethebeliefinwomen’s natural limitations in
scientificcompetence.
Ourowntrainingand researchinthefields ofcognitiveneuroscienceanddevelopmental
psychologyenableus to criticallyevaluatethestudies onwhichthis claim is based. Wetherefore
providean overviewoftheresearchonbiological sexdifferences inscientificability. Weshowthat
findings ofdifferences in mathandscienceperformancearenot reliableanddependonthemeasures
used,andfurthermore,that thekeyevidence forbiological predispositions comes from poorly
designedstudies withequivocal findings. Indeed, thescientificestablishment itselfdistorts the
researchfindings.
Theargument that women’s underrepresentationinsciencestems from inherent sex
differences inaptitude rests ontwoclaims: 1)Therearemeasurablesexdifferences in
scientific/mathematical aptitude(PsychometricClaim),and2)thesedifferences stem from underlying
biological predispositions (Biological Difference Claim). Wearguethat theseclaims arenot justified
eithertheoreticallyorempirically. Theyarebased onassumptions that are neverfullytestedorare
contradictedby empirical results.Weanalyze each claim separately.
PSYCHOMETRIC CLAIM
Mathematical andscientificabilities havebeenassessedwitharangeofmeasures,including
standardizedtests,cognitivetasks,andperformanceinschool.The central measureofadvanced
mathematical skills intheUnitedStates is themathematical scaleoftheSAT(SAT-M).Halpern,
Wai,andSaw (2005)notethat males outperform females ontheSAT-M by about 40points andthe
differenceinscores has remainedstableoverthelast 25years.This supposedlyintractablegap
provides keyevidence forclaims ofinherent sexdifferences inabilities. But is thegapuniversal?
International assessments haveprovidedvaluable dataonwhetherthesexdifferenceobserved
intheUnitedStates is present inothercountries.TheProgrammeforInternational Student
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Assessment (PISA)assesses literacy,mathematics,andproblem-solvingin15-year-olds everythree
years (Organisation forEconomicCooperationandDevelopment,OECD, 2004).Inits 2003
assessment of250,000students from 41countries, males scoredhigherthan females inmathematical
tests in27countries out of40.Inonecountry,Iceland,girls outperformed boys; indeed,girls in
Iceland evenoutperformedboys intheU.S.Furthermore,the results forproblem-solvingtests
indicatedvery fewsexdifferences and,whenpresent,theyfavoredgirls.
Therefore,it appears that amaleadvantageinmathematics andproblem-solvingis not universal
andvaries greatlyacross countries.Basedonthese findings,thereport concludes that “Thewide
variationingendergaps amongcountries suggests that thecurrent differences arenot theinevitable
outcomes ofdifferences betweenyoungmales andfemales andthat effectivepolicies andpractices
canovercomewhat were longtakentobetheinevitableoutcomes ofdifferences betweenmales and
females ininterests,learningstyles and,even,inunderlyingcapacities [italics added]”(OECD,2004,
p.97).
Furthermore,incontrast tostandardizedmeasures, females tendtohavebettergrades than
males inall subjects,includingadvancedmathematical courses (Kimball,1989). Indeed, researchhas
shownthat theSAT-M scores underpredict theperformanceof females relativetomales incollege
mathematical courses,bothintroductoryandadvanced(Chipman,2005).Forexample, Wainer&
Steinberg(1992)foundthat females who received thesamegrades as males inthesameuniversity
mathcourses had receivedscores nearly50points lowerontheSATexam.
Thus,thedatademonstratethat amaleadvantageinmathematics is not asolidfinding,with
different measures yieldingdifferent outcomes.Therefore,it is not clearthat sexdifferences in
standardizedtest scores indicatedifferences inaptitude.Indeed,the creators oftheSATexam
themselves aremystifiedabout exactlywhat theSATmeasures.Whenit first debutedin1901,SAT
stoodforScholasticAchievement Test.In1941,it was renamedbytheCollegeBoard as the
ScholasticAptitudeTest.In1990,when“facedwiththefact that atest that canbeverysuccessfully
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preparedforis not atrue test ofability”(PrepMe© 2001-2005,HistoryofSAT),theSATwas
renamedtheScholasticAssessment Test. Finally,in1994,since‘assessment test’is redundant,the
test becamesimplytheSAT.TheCollegeBoard explained“Pleasenotethat SATis not aninitialism.
It does not standforanything” (PrepMe©2001-2005,HistoryofSAT).Giventhat it is not clear,even
tothedevelopers themselves,what the‘A’stands for,what canbesaidabout what thetest measures?
Furthermore,becausesexdifferences onstandardizedmathtests first emergein late
adolescence(seeSpelke, 2005,forarecent review),thesedifferences canreflect theinfluenceofa
varietyofexperiential factors,suchas academiccurricula,stereotypethreat,andsocialization:
AcademicCurricula
In manycountries,boys andgirls attenddifferent secondaryschools andhavediversified
curricula from theageof 14.Becauseboys tendto enroll inscientificcourses morefrequentlythan
girls,theytakemore advancedmath classes than girls,whichcouldenhancetheirperformanceon
standardizedtests.Similarly,intheU.S.,manymoreboys thangirls takeAP classes incalculus,
chemistry,physics,andcomputerscience(U.S.Census Bureau,2004-2005),whichcouldexplainthe
sexdifferences inSAT-M scores.It is noteworthythat inIceland,wheregirls outperform boys in
mathandproblem-solving,boys andgirls takethe sameclasses until theageof16(Ministryof
Education,Science,and CultureinIsland,2005).
StereotypeThreat
Performanceonstandardizedtests is sensitivetoapsychological pressuretermed“stereotype
threat”(Aronson,Lustina,Good,& Keough,1999),inwhichmembers of astereotypedgroup(e.g.,
African-Americans,the elderly,andwomen)underperform insituations inwhichtheyareawarethat
theirbehavior canconfirm theirnegativereputation(Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; Levy,1996;
Spencer,Steele,& Quinn,1999; Steele& Aronson,1995). Specifically,if womenareevensubtly
remindedthat mathis hard,as Barbie™declared,they tendtoperform poorlyonmathtests.
Importantly,sexdifferences disappearwhenthestereotypethreat is removedorminimized.For
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example,sexdifferences inperformanceonthequantitativeGREwereeliminatedwhenstudents
wereinformedbeforehandthat womenandmenperformedequallywell onthetest (Spenceret al.,
1999). Usingthesametest,Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev (2000)showedthat womenexperienced
performancedeficits ina test-takingenvironment inwhichmenoutnumberedthem,andthat
performanceimprovedlinearlywhenthenumber ofmales testedinthesameroom decreased.By
simplytestingstudents inaroom withmoregirls thanboys,girls perform better–thefewertheboys,
thebettergirls do.These datashowthat test performanceis influencedbysocial factors that are
unrelatedtothe abilitythat is beingmeasured.
Socialization
Finally,sexdifferences instandardizedtest scores donot appearuntil childrenhave
experiencedyears ofsocializationthat mayhave affectedperformance. There arewell-documented
sexdifferences insocialization–i.e.,differential expectations,treatment,andenvironments forgirls
andboys.Beginningat birth,parents’perceptions ofdaughters andsons differ.Despitesimilarities in
physical size,daughters aredescribedas daintyandsoft whereas boys aredescribed as sturdyand
tough (Rubin,Provenzano,& Luria,1974).Parents (e.g.,Witt,1997),peers (e.g.,Maccoby,1990),
andteachers (e.g.,Dickman,1993)continuetotreat girls andboys differently.Additionally,very
different environments areprovidedforgirls andboys. Studies spanningmanyyears (Nash&
Krawcyzk,1994; Pomerleau,Bolduc,Malcuit,& Cossette,1990; Rheingold& Cook,1975)indicate
that girls playwithtoys representingthehome,suchas dolls andkitchenappliances,whileboys’toys
represent thewider world,suchas transportationvehicles and construction materials (which enhance
spatial skills; Baenninger& Newcombe,1989).Similarly,children’s media depict different roles for
girls andboys,withmalecharacters still dominatingandinactiveroles,andthesubstantiallyfewer
female characters insubordinateroles (Nash& Burckle,1997; Thompson & Zerbinos,1995).It is
thus clearthat cultural expectations about genderarecommunicatedtochildrenfrom birth,andthat
thesedifferential expectations andexperiences canaffect children’s interest and abilities.
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In summary,it appears that findings ofsexdifferences inscientific abilities arenot as robust,
reliable,anduniversal as theyareoftenportrayed, andwhenthey exist,maybeexplainedby
socializationandcontextual factors. Next,we examineresearchthat attempts to eliminatenurture
from theequation,and claims tohavediscoveredthepresenceofinherent sexdifferences before
socializationbegins.
BIOLOGICALDIFFERENCECLAIM
Support forthis claim is providedbystudies ofnewborns andstudies ontheeffects of
prenatal testosteroneon brainorganization.We revieweachofthese areas ofresearchinturn.
Newborns
As wehavediscussed,sexdifferences inmathand science abilities canbeduetobiological
and/orexperiential factors: natureandnurtureare always confounded. By studyingveryyoung
children,experiential factors canbe reducedoreliminated.Becausestudies indicatethat evenduring
infancy,male andfemale infants receivedifferential treatment (reviewedbyGolombok& Hines,
2002),theonlywaytoidentifybiological sexdifferences is byeliminatingexperience entirelyand
focusingonnewborns.Thereis onlyonestudythat examines sexdifferences inrelevant behaviors in
newborns (Connellan,Baron-Cohen,Wheelright, Batki,& Ahluwalia,2000),andthis studyhas
becomethe cornerstone oftheargument forinnatepredispositions.AccordingtoStevenPinker,a
leadingscholaron cognitionandlanguage, “SimonBaron-Cohenhas given us someofthemost
sophisticatedresearchon thenature andoriginof sexdifferences incognition”(Pinker,2005). We
thereforefocus onthis study,carefullyexamining its theoretical rationale, methodology,and
conclusions indetail.
Theoretical Rationale
Thetheoretical rationale stems from SimonBaron-Cohen’s workon autism (Baron-Cohen,
Knickmeyer,& Belmonte,2005),a conditioncharacterizedbysocial impairment andheightened
interest inthephysical world. Baron-Cohenviews autism,morecommoninmales thaninfemales, as
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amanifestationof an“extrememalebrain”. Hefurtherposits that,ingeneral,malecognitionreflects
anemphasis onanalysis andmechanical understanding–what Baron-Cohenterms ‘systemizing.’
Systemizingabilities,inturn,wouldprovidethebasis forscientific reasoning.Incontrast,female
cognitionreflects anemphasis onsocial understanding--what Baron-Cohenterms ‘empathizing.’
AccordingtoBaron-Cohen(2003; Baron-Cohen et al.,2005),thesesexdifferences in‘systemizing’
and‘empathizing’ capacities stem from prenatal ‘hardwiring’inthebrainandarepresent at birth.
Strongsupport forthis theorywouldbeprovided bydemonstratingthat sexdifferences in
thesecapacities doindeedbeginat birth. Unfortunately,althoughnewborns provideanopportunity
toexaminebiological predispositions priortoexperience,theyareinfact verydifficult tostudy.They
drift amongvarious states ofconsciousness inan unpredictablemanner,goingfrom analert stateto
cryingtosleepingwithinaveryshort time.Theirattentionspans areextremelyvariable (Fogel,
2001).Toaddress someofthesedifficulties,standardmethodologies aretypicallyused.However,
despiteanexistingbodyofresearchonnewbornperceptual preferences,ConnellanandBaron-
Cohen’s newbornstudy does not usethis methodology,oraddress the findings from this bodyof
research. Wenext address theseconcerns inanin-depthcritiqueofConnellanet al.’s (2000)study.
Methodology
Connellanet al.assume that sexdifferences ininfants’interest in‘social’versus ‘mechanical’
stimuli areprecursors tofuturesexdifferences in empathizingandsystemizingabilities. They
thereforecomparedone-day-oldgirls’andboys’interest in‘social’versus ‘mechanical’stimuli.The
social stimulus was thereal,live,faceofthefirst authorofthestudy,JenniferConnellan.The
mechanical stimulus was amobile–aface-sizedball composedofvarious facial features that were
haphazardlyarranged.Thestimuli werepresentedsequentiallytoinfants whoweretestedat their
mothers’bedsides or intheneonatal nursery,lyingontheirbacks intheir cribs or heldintheir
parents’laps.Differences intimespent lookingatthefaceorthemobilewere consideredindices of
preferences.
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This studyis fraught withmethodological problems:
1)Validity: Theinvestigators assumedthat one-day-oldnewborns’preferences for faces or
mobiles reflect social versus mechanical intelligence.However,it is not clearthat lookingat afaceor
amobiledoes,infact, reflect latersocial ormechanical abilities.Furthermore,eveninnewborns,it is
unclearthat aface represents a‘social’stimulus. Recent studies suggest that newbornpreferences for
facepatterns comparedtootherpatterns represent aperceptual bias fortop-heavypatterns,ratherthan
preferences for faces per se(Macchi-Cassia,Turati,& Simion,2004).Indeed,otherstudies indicate
that newborns actuallypreferlookingat thesekinds ofpatterns tolookingat real faces (Simion,
Macchi-Cassia,Turati,& Valenza,2001).It is not until 3months ofagethat infants preferreal faces
toface-like(topheavy)patterns (Turati, Valenza, Leo,& Simion,2005).
2)Confounds/lackof control: Theface andmobiledifferedonseveral crucial variables. The
faceinfact consists ofseveral properties. It consists ofmovement andexpressions,andis attachedto
alivepersonwho exudes warmthandodors.As all ofthesevarytogether,it is impossibletoknow
whichofthesedimensions underlieanypreferences forthe‘face.’Again,it is not clearthe
preferences fortheface canbeattributedtoits ‘social’dimension.Furthermore,infants weretested in
different settings.Slightchanges inthesettings couldleadtodifferences intheperceptionofthetwo
stimuli,makingthem appearmoreorless topheavyunderdifferent conditions.Preferences forone
stimulus ortheothercouldsimplyreflect thesedifferent perspectives.
3)Experimenter expectancies: Astrikingdesignflawis that thefacestimulus was that ofthe
researcherherself.Experimenterandsubject expectancies arewell-documented,andrequirestringent
controls.Inthis case,the researchercouldunconsciouslymoveherfaceortilt herheadinways that
increaseits salience,whichis particularproblematicgiventhat inmanycases shewas awareofthe
newborn’s sex (Edge,2005,SimonBaron-Cohen).
4)Operational definitionof thedependent variable: Curiously,thedependent variableitself
was incorrectlydefined. Theauthors report that “lookingtimewas calculatedas aproportionoftotal
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