Alienation from Nature and Early German Romanticism Alison Stone PDF
Preview Alienation from Nature and Early German Romanticism Alison Stone
Alienation from Nature and Early German Romanticism Alison Stone Ethical Theory and Moral Practice An International Forum ISSN 1386-2820 Ethic Theory Moral Prac DOI 10.1007/s10677-013-9467-7 1 23 Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be self- archived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com”. 1 23 Author's personal copy EthicTheoryMoralPrac DOI10.1007/s10677-013-9467-7 Alienation from Nature and Early German Romanticism AlisonStone Accepted:15July2013 #SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2013 Abstract InthisarticleIaskhowfruitfultheconceptofalienationcanbeforthinkingcritically aboutthenatureandcausesofthecontemporaryenvironmentalcrisis.Theconceptofalienation enablesustoclaimthatmodernhumanbeingshavebecomealienatedorestrangedfromnature andneedtobecomereconciledwithit.Yetreconciliationhasoftenbeenunderstood—notably byHegelandMarx—asthestateofbeing‘at-home-with-oneself-in-the-world’,inthenameof whichweareentitled,perhapsevenobliged,toovercomeanythinginnaturethatisalientothe humanmind.ThisapproachtoalienationderivesultimatelyfromtheGermanIdealistphilos- opher J. G. Fichte. I explore an alternative conception of alienation and reconciliation to be foundintheworkoftheEarlyGermanRomantics,especiallyFriedrichSchlegelandNovalis. TheRomanticsthinkofreconciliationasincludingadimensionofalienation,intheformofan awarenessthatnatureisgreaterthanandexceedstheunderstandingofhumanbeings,insofaras wearemerelylimitedpartsoftheall-encompassingwholethatisnature.Iarguethatthisisa morefruitfulapproachtoalienationandreconciliationthanthatpursuedbyFichte,Hegel,and Marx. Keywords Alienation.Environment.Fichte.Hegel.Marx.Novalis.Nature.Romanticism. Schlegel 1Introduction InthisarticleIaskhowfruitfultheconceptofalienationcanbeforthinkingcriticallyaboutthe natureandcausesofthecontemporaryenvironmentalcrisis.Ononelevel,thiscrisis—problems ofglobal warming,deforestation,degradation ofthe oceans, species loss, and so on—is the unintendedby-productofindustrialdevelopment.Butformanyenvironmentalphilosophers, the crisis is at a deeper level ‘caused by our intellectual relationship with the world and the practices that stem from it’ (Dobson 1995: 39)—by our having, in modernity, adopted an intellectualrelationshipwiththeworldthatisproblematic.Thisproblematicrelationshipcanbe characterisedinvariousways:forHeidegger[1954](1993)andthoseinformedbyhim,interms of the technological view of the world as a stock of resources; for some self-professed postmodernenvironmentalethicists,intermsofthe‘modernist’convictionthatnaturecanbe completely known through and practically appropriated through science and technology A.Stone(*) CountySouth,LancasterUniversity,Bailrigg,Lancaster,UKLA14YL e-mail:[email protected] Author's personal copy A.Stone (Oelschlager1995:3);or,forsomeecofeminists(e.g.Salleh1984;Plumwood1993),interms ofaworldviewthatsharplydividesculturefromnature,humansfromworld.Theconceptof alienationcanpotentiallyhelpustoarticulatethenatureofthismodernintellectualdivisionof humanity from the world, as a division by virtue of which we have become alienated or estrangedfromnaturewithdamagingpracticalconsequences.1 However, according to the elaboration of the concept of alienation by Hegel and Marx—arguably the central figures to articulate the concept—we can only overcome our alienation from nature by thoroughly humanising the natural world, transforming it by our labour so that it entirely reflects the human self. Here, far from challenging the conceptual oppositionbetweenhumanityandnature,theconceptofalienationseemstopresupposethat veryopposition,presumingthatnatureisthematerial‘other’thatissubordinatetoandmustbe continually overcome by the human ‘self’—a view that for ecofeminist Val Plumwood undergirdstheWesternnotionofprogressandwithit‘theproblematicfeaturesofthewest’s treatmentofnaturewhichunderlietheenvironmentalcrisis’(Plumwood1993:3).However,in thesameperiodinpost-KantianGermanphilosophywhenHegelwasarticulatinghisconceptof alienation, an alternative conception of it was developed by the Early German Romantics, particularly Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich von Hardenberg (better known under his pen- nameNovalis).ThewritingsofSchlegelandNovaliswereuntilrecentlylargelyneglectedby philosophers:theywerelongregardedasratherdreamy,mysticalandnotintellectuallyserious thinkers.ButanextensivebodyofrecentscholarshiphasestablishedthatSchlegelandNovalis actuallydevelopedanoriginal,coherentandimportantphilosophicalorientationoftheirown, which repays investigation today (see, amongst others, Beiser 2002; Frank [1997] 2004; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy [1978] 1988; Larmore 2000; Kompridis 2006; Millan-Zaibert 2007).Centraltothisorientationistheideathathumanbeingsaredependentupontheworldas a unified whole, that is, upon nature—an idea that Schlegel and Novalis developed in oppositiontotheidealofcompletehumanautonomyandmasteryovernaturethenadvanced bytheGermanIdealistphilosopherJ.G.Fichte.Yetalthoughhuman/naturerelationsholdthis centralplacewithinRomanticism,theoutlookhassofarreceivedlittleattentionfromenviron- mentalphilosophers.2 HereIwanttohelptocorrectthisoversightbyreturningtotheEarlyGermanRomantic conceptionofalienation.SchlegelandNovalissuggestthathumanbeingsinmodernityhave become estranged from nature, and that ideally we are to overcome this condition of alienationbyacceptingthathumanitydependsuponandispartofnatureratherthanstanding outsideit.Inthusacceptingthatwedependonandarepartofnature,wearetoacceptthat natureisawholegreaterthanus,thatexceedsus—suchthatasmerelyfinitebeingswecan never fully comprehend nature asa whole. For theRomantics, then, the ideal condition of being reconciled with nature would include, amongst its integral elements, a level of alienation from nature—in the form of appreciation that nature is and must remain other 1Surprisingly,though,therehasbeenrelativelylittleexplicit,thematicdiscussionofalienationbyenviron- mentalphilosophers.AnexceptionisBiro(2005).Birodistinguishesbetweenbasichumanalienationfrom nature,whichheregardsasnecessaryforhumansocialandproductivelife,andsurplusalienation,whichfor himisaconcomitantofsocialrelationsofdomination.ThispositionhasaffinitieswiththeRomanticviewthat I will be exploring here, which distinguishes between a damaging form of alienation (where humanity is conceivedasseparatefromnature)andapositiveformofalienation(whichispartoftheacknowledgementof humandependencyonandbelongingtonature).Whilsttherehasbeenlittlesustaineddiscussionofalienation inenvironmentalphilosophy,therehas,ofcourse,beenconsiderablediscussion—muchofitnowrelatively old—ofMarx’sconceptofalienationandwhetheritisboundupwithadvocacyofhumandominationover nature(asBalbus(1982)contended). 2However,forexceptions,seeBeckerandManstetten2004;Bowie1995.Therehas,ontheotherhand,been considerablediscussionoftheecologicaldimensionsofEnglishRomanticism;see,forexample,Bate1991. Author's personal copy AlienationfromNatureandEarlyGermanRomanticism toandprofoundlyunlikeus.Sothisisaconceptionofreconciliationwithnatureasincluding a level of alienation—but a kind of alienation that the Romantics valorise positively, as stemming from our acknowledgement that we belong within and depend upon nature, far from existing ‘“outside” nature’ (Plumwood 1993: 3). This Romantic conception of alien- ation, I will argue, unlike that of Hegel and Marx, goes some way to challenging the human/natureoppositionthatisamajorsourceofecologicalcrisis. 2AdvantagesandDisadvantagesoftheConceptofAlienation Let me begin by expanding on the potential advantages of the concept of alienation for reflectingonthesourcesoftheenvironmentalcrisis.Theconceptofalienationenablesusto maintainthatinmodernityhumanbeingshavebecomealienatedorestrangedfromthenatural world:thatwehavecometounderstandandexperiencethenaturalworldassomethingalienor strange to us as human beings, and reciprocally to understand and experience ourselves as strangers to—disembedded from—our natural surroundings. On this view, modern human beingshavecometounderstandandexperiencethemselvestobeseparatefromandopposed to nature. Plausibly, this understanding derives from Cartesian and Enlightenment contrasts between mind and matter, reason and nature, with human autonomy opposed to nature as a realm of causal determination (a contrast drawn by Kant, for instance). The effect of these contrastshasbeento‘makeimpossiblethenotionofarelational,ecologicalself…[a]self[that] isnotanisolated,immaterialCartesianego…butisconstitutedbyitsrelationshipswithothers’ (Warren2009:231). Insofarasweadheretothismodernunderstandingofourselvesasseparatefromnature, such a view plausibly disposes us to behave towards our natural environments in heedless anddestructiveways.Heedless,becausewefeeltoofarremovedfromthenaturalenviron- ment to attend to, anticipate or imagine the potential consequences of our actions upon it. Sincewedonotregardourselvesaspartofnature,westruggletoappreciatehowouractions and practices are embedded in ecological processes and causal chains. And destructive, because the conceptual contrasts that generate and express our alienation (those of mind/body,humanity/nature,etc.)aregenerallyhierarchical,encouragingustoseeourselves assuperiortonaturejustinsofaraswethinkthatweareseparatefromandstandapartfrom nature. This primes us to think that we are entitled to use natural beings and processes howevertheybestsuitus—superiortonatureasweare,wearethusitsrightfulmasters. Arguably,then,ouralienationfromnatureisamajorsourceoftheenvironmentalcrisis, andovercomingthatcrisisrequiresouralienationtobeovercome:thatis,requiresthatwe achievereconciliationwithnature.Reconciliation—whichHegelconceivesastheantithesis of alienation—normally means both the state of non-alienation to be achieved and the processofachievingthatstate.Tosupposeourselvesalienatedfromnatureisthustosuppose that,ideally,wewouldinhabitacontrastingstateofbeingreconciledwithnature,atoneorat peacewithit. Thisconceptofreconciliation(Versöhnung)hasbeenarticulatedphilosophicallybyHegel above all. As Michael Hardimon points out, reconciliation is the ‘main goal and central organizing category of Hegel’s philosophy as a whole’ (Hardimon 1994: 3). For Hegel, the overarching aim of philosophical reason (Vernunft) is to reconcile opposed categories of thought—mind and body, reason and emotion—and opposed dimensions of practical social life—individualityandcommunitymembership,self-interestandcommitmenttothecommon good(see Taylor1975: ch.1).Hegel’s goal is tobring us to reconceivethesecategories and aspectsoflifeasintertwined,notopposedtooneanother.Reason,hesays,‘showsthattheterms Author's personal copy A.Stone thatappearinitiallytobeboundtogetherarenotinfactalien[fremd]tooneanother;instead, theyareonlymomentsofonewhole,eachofwhich,beingrelatedtotheother,isathomewith itself,andgoestogetherwithitself’(Hegel[1830]1991a:§158A,232).Amodeofsociallife that embodied this reconception would be one of reconciliation. Unlike many after him including Marx, Hegel does not believe that achieving reconciliation requires radical social transformation.ForHegel,modernEuropeansociety,stratifiedintothespheresoffamily,civil societyandstate,isalreadysoorganisedthatinprinciple,givensomeliberalreforms,wecanbe reconciledwithit.Unfortunately,ourpotentialforreconciliationisblockedbyourentrenched habits of thinking in terms of opposed categories—what Hegel calls Verstand, abstract understanding—and living in ways imbued with this abstract understanding. The result is a widespreadmodernexperienceofalienationorEntfremdung(Hardimon1994:20,121).3 ForHegel,thereconciliationthatweareideallytoachieve,throughphilosophicalreason, iswithnotmerelymodernsocietybuttheworldatitsbroadest,thetotalityofallthatis.This totality encompasses several regions for Hegel: non-humannature; human culture, history, andsociety;andthebasicontologicalformsandstructures(suchascausality,negativity,and difference) that are instantiated within nature and culture.4 Ultimately, we are to be recon- ciled with all these dimensions of existence, and thereby come to be in der Beziehung auf dasanderebeisichselbst—withoneself,orathomewithoneself,withintherelationtothe other(Hegel[1830]1991a:§158A,232).Theworldthatinitiallyappearstobeoutsideus, other to us, would cease to seem alien just in case we found ourselves reflected back to ourselveseverywherewithinit,asifinlookingoutattheworldwewerelookinginamirror. For Hegel, our ideal condition is constant presence-with-self, reflection-back-to-oneself fromtheother. What of reconciliation with nature, for Hegel? We are to be-with-ourselves within nature, experiencingnatureasmirroringustransparentlybacktoourselves.Inpart,forHegel,weattain thisbycomprehendingtheoreticallythatnatureisnotalientous.Heaimsinhisphilosophyof nature to demonstrate that nature (as empirical scientists understand it) comprises a rationally orderedwholewhich,assuch,reflectsbacktousourownnaturequarationallyorganisedbeings (seeHegel1970:§246A,9–10).Inparttoo,forHegel,weachievereconciliationwithnatureby practicallymakingnatureintoourhome,transformingittoreflectusbacktoourselves.Indoing so we simultaneously‘externalise’ ourselves within the world: by practically transforming the 3Hegel’stermEntfremdung,derivingfromtheGermanwordfremd,‘alien’,isalsosometimestranslatedas ‘estrangement’,forexamplebyJ.B.Baillieinhis1910/1931translationofHegel’s1807Phenomenologyof Mind(seeHegel1967).Whetherrenderedas‘alienation’or‘estrangement’,EntfremdungisforHegeldistinct fromEntäusserung,which,derivingfromthewordausser(‘outer’or‘external’),canbetranslatedeitheras (again) ‘alienation’ or as ‘externalisation’—the latter the usual preference of A. V. Miller in his 1977 translationofthePhenomenology(seeHegel1977).EntäusserungisnotcommonlyusedinGerman;more usual is Veräusserung, meaning the action of relinquishing ownership of some thing or power through a contract,suchasasale.HegelusesEntäusserungtomeantheembodimentoftheselfinsomeexternalobject orexistent(see,especially,Hegel1977:294–313).ForHegelthisactivityofself-externalisationneednotper seinvolvealienationorestrangement,aslongasonelearnstorecogniseoneselfinone’sexternalembodiment. In contrast, Marx, writing on alienated labour (entfremdete Arbeit) in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscriptsof1844,takesitthatEntäusserung(externalisationoftheselfintheproductoflabour)does involveEntfremdung,thealienationofthatselfinitsproductandinitsproductiveactivity(seeMarx[1844] 1977:77–87).Inhistoryhitherto,labouringhasgenerallybeencarriedoutundersocialconditionsofclass division,thereforeinaformthatinflictsalienationuponthelabourer.ThereforeMarxusesEntäusserungand Entfremdunginterchangeably,distinguishingthembothfromwhathetreatsastheirvalue-neutralcounterpart, objectification:Vergegenständlichung(fromGegenstand,‘object’).SeeArthur1986:147–9. 4These divisions correspond to the three volumes of Hegel’s outline Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences,firstpublishedin1817,andrepublishedwithrevisionsin1827,1830.ItsvolumesaretheLogic (dealingwithontology),PhilosophyofNature,andPhilosophyofMind. Author's personal copy AlienationfromNatureandEarlyGermanRomanticism naturalitemsaroundus,weimposeuponthemourplansandmoregenerallyourrationality,which theynowmirrorbacktous.ForHegel,theconcreteformthatthispracticalmodificationofnature takesisthatofourappropriation,useandtransformationofnaturalobjectsasindividualprivate property—hencehisconvictionthatreconciliationispossiblewithinliberalsociety.5 ForHegel,theidealofreconciliationwithnaturelicenses,indeedprescribes,humanactivity tore-maketheworld.TheearlyMarxadoptsasimilarstancewhenhere-appropriatesHegel’s conceptofalienationforadistinctlyanti-Hegelianpurpose:criticisingcapitalismforinflicting alienationuponthelabouringclass(and,albeitlessso,uponthenon-labourers).Enumerating theaspectsofalienatedlabour,Marxincludesamongstthemalienationfromnature.Thefactof havingtoundertakealienatedlabour,hesays,makesnaturealientous—‘dieentfremdeteArbeit demMenschen…dieNaturentfremdet’(MarxandEngels[1844]1968:516).6Innon-alienated productive activity, the human being lives from nature, which is the ‘inorganic body’ (unorganische Leib) of the human individual, the extended body upon which I depend for mysurvival.ButnatureisnotonlythesourcethroughwhichIsurvive.Itisalso‘thematter [Stoff]inwhichlabourrealisesitself,inwhichmylabourisactive,outofwhichandthrough whichitproduces’(Marx1977:79).Thus,ideally,natureismyextendedbodybecausethrough myworkuponitnaturecomestoembodyandprovideanexternalrealisationofmyproductive activity(justasmyindividualbodyisthematerialvehiclethroughwhichIexercisemyagency). Moreover,sinceintheidealnon-alienatedconditionIimagine,choose,andplanthecharacter (andintendedproduct)ofmyproductiveactivity,naturealsoprovidesanexternalembodiment ofmyselfquachoosing,creative,andconscious.Natureis,ideally,theouterbodyofthehuman individual asa free producer. To be reconciled with naturewould be to experience it as my externalembodimentinthisway,duetomyproductiveactivitybeingnon-alienatedandunder mycontrolanddirection.Inconditionsofalienatedlabour,though,Ilosecontrolovermyown productiveactivity.Intheseconditions,IexperiencethepartsofnatureuponwhichIworkas embodyingnotmyagencybutthatofthepowersexternaltomewhichcontrolmywork—the powersofcapitalists,managers,andmarketforces.Naturebecomesanembodimentofalien forcesratherthanavehicleofmyself-realisation. LikeHegel,then,Marxenvisionsreconciliationwithnatureasaconditioninwhichwe practically transform and remodel nature so that it reflects us back to ourselves.7 In this Hegelian-Marxian articulation, the concepts of alienation and reconciliation suggest that thereshouldbenolimitstooureffortstore-maketheworldafterourownmodel.Adorno makesanimportantobjectiontothispositioninNegativeDialectics: Eventhetheoryofalienation(Entfremdung)…confusestheneedtocomeneartothe …irrationalworld—tobe‘athomeeverywhere’asNovalisputit(«überallzuHause zusein»)—withthearchaicbarbarismthatitisbeyondthe…subjecttolovethealien (Fremde),thatwhichisother;withthecravingforincorporation(Einverleibung)and persecution.(Adorno[1966]1973:172)8 5See‘Property’,§§41–71ofElementsofthePhilosophyofRight(Hegel1991b). 6In English: ‘alienated labour alienates … nature from man’ (Marx [1844] 1977: 81); here McLellan translates Entfremdungas alienation and Entäusserung as externalisation. Others translate Entfremdungin MarxasestrangementandEntäusserungasalienation:forexample,BentoninMarx1975. 7Isaac Balbus made the even stronger claim that Marx’s notion of production is the ‘ultimate possible expression’of‘thehubrisofdomination’overnature(Balbus1982:269).Incontrast,forsomeotherMarx scholars,Marxrightlyemphasisesthathumanbeingsdependuponnature—sothat,forMarx,ratherthanthe selfbeingseparatefromnature,theselfisintrinsicallyconstitutedbyitslocationinandrelationswithnature (see,e.g.,Ollman1977:27–28).Nonetheless,IbelievethatMarx’sidealisforusprogressivelytorestructure theserelationssothatnaturebecomesshapedbyhumanlabour. 8TranslationsfromAdorno1973areamendedinlightofAdorno1966. Author's personal copy A.Stone Here Adorno points out the double-edged sword that is the ‘theory’ of alienation. Positively, this ‘theory’suggests that we should not set ourselves apart from or above the non-rational(thatis,natural)world,butshouldembraceourproximitytoandembeddedness within this world,thereby becomingreconciled with it. Negatively, though,the concept of alienationsuggeststhatwearetoachievethisstateofreconciliationbyfirstmakingnaturea vehiclefortheexpressionofthehumanself—therebyincorporatingnatureintoourselves(or making it into our extended body), stripping it of its otherness so that we can find it unthreateningandhomely.Adornoobjectsthatthisembodiesaprofoundlyunethical,even barbaric,urgetoincorporatewhatisdifferentintotheself. Yet Adorno does not want to abandon all reference to alienation. Rather, he goes on to say—apparentlyparadoxically—that:‘Ifthealienwerenolongerostracised,therewouldbe nomorealienation’(172).Hemeansthat,ideally,weneedtoachieveakindofreconciliation with nature—a state in which there is ‘no more alienation’—which includes positive acceptanceandnotostracismofthealienasalien,positiveacceptanceofnature’sotherness tous.Hemakesthisexplicitlater:‘Thereconciledcondition[derversöhnteZustand]would notannexthealienwithphilosophicalimperialism,butwouldfindhappinessinthefactthat the alien remains that which is distant [das Ferne] and different [Verschiedene] in the nearnessgrantedtoit’(191). Is this idea of a reconciled condition that includes alienation coherent? Or is it the incoherentidealofanabsenceofalienationinwhichsomealienationyetremains present? Thereisawaytoarticulatereconciliation-with-alienationasacoherentideal,awaytakenby theEarlyGermanRomantics. 3RomanticismandAlienation EarlyGermanRomanticism(Frühromantik)flourishedinJenaandBerlinbetween1794and 1802,amongstagroupthatincludedF.W.J.vonSchelling,Novalis,FriedrichSchlegeland his brother August, and F. D. E. Schleiermacher; the poet and theoretician Friedrich Hölderlin had connections with the group. They developed their particular philosophical orientation out of a concern to overcome the conceptual oppositions that had become entrenchedinthoughtandpracticewiththeEnlightenment(Taylor1975:ch.1).Thesewere oppositions between individual and society, mind and matter, soul and body, reason and intuition,andbetweenfreehumanityandcausallydeterminednature.TheRomanticsfound these oppositions problematic partly on theoretical grounds, as leaving the intellect in a divided and uncomfortable position, but also partly on practical grounds—for in everyday life adherence to these oppositions causes us to experience mind and body, individual and society,etc.,asopposed.Thisconditionisoneofalienationfromoneorothersideofeach opposition (or from both sides at different times): alienation from our own bodies experi- encedasburdensorencumbrances,orfromoursocietiesexperiencedashostileorindifferent toourneeds. Thelastoftheseoppositions—betweenhumanagentswhodeterminetheiractionsaccording torationalprinciples,andnaturalobjectsthebehaviourofwhichiscausallydetermined—tookon particularimportancefortheRomantics(andothersoftheirtimesuchasHegel)becauseofits central place in Kant’s Critical philosophy. To be sure, according to Kant in his theoretical philosophy,weareobligedtothinkofourselvesasfreesubjects,butwecannotknowwhether wereallyareso.Equally,wecannotknowthatwearenot.ThisignorancecreatesspaceforKantto argueinhispracticalphilosophythat,giventhefactofoursubjectiontomoralobligations,weare justifiedinassuming(annehmen)thatwereallyarefree,rationalsubjects(Kant[1788]1997:79). Author's personal copy AlienationfromNatureandEarlyGermanRomanticism Underthisassumption—whichwemustmakeasamatterofpracticalnecessity—humanagents are ultimately separate from nature, as free agents who stand out from the realm of causal determination. Overcoming this belief in human separateness from nature was central to the GermanRomanticprojectofovercomingentrenchedconceptualoppositions. Thereweretwoprincipalroutesalongwhichthehumanity/natureoppositioncouldbebroken down(Gardner2011:90).First,humanitycouldbeabsorbedbackintonature,asitwasinwhat becamethedominantapproachinthelaternineteenthcentury:scientificmaterialism,accordingto whichnatureisavastcausalchainandhumanbeingsarecausally—biologically,psychologically, socially—determinedlinksinthischain.Secondandalternatively,naturecouldbere-absorbed into,orderivedfrom,freeandautonomoushumansubjectivity,asitwasindifferentwaysbythe GermanIdealists.AfirstversionofthislatterprogrammewasannouncedbyFichteinhis1797 FirstIntroductiontotheWissenschaftslehre.Hereherejected‘dogmatism’,thebeliefindetermi- nate things (Sachen) given independently of the intellect and by which the intellect is to be oriented—an approach that anticipates scientific materialism. Against that approach, Fichte advocated idealism, centred on faith in the autonomy of the human intellect (Fichte [1797] 1994:11).Buthowcouldidealistsderivenaturefromautonomoushumansubjectivity? Let us look at Fichte’s endeavour to make that derivation in his political philosophy, specifically his 1796/7 Foundations of Natural Right. Here he offers us an elaborate transcendentalargument:itisanecessaryconditionforthepossibilityofconsciousexperi- ence that the subject perform various activities; but since we do in fact have conscious experience,theconditionmustbemetandthesubjectmustperformtheseactivities.9These activitiesincludethatoftransformingthenaturalworldinourownimage. Fichte begins as follows. With Kant, Fichte holds that we are active in knowing and experiencing,activelyunifyingthematerialsofsensationunderconcepts(a‘rationalbeing’, Fichteinsists,isonethatacts[1796/7]2000:3).Itisthereforeaconditionofpossibilityof experiencethatweimposeitsorganisationuponit.Butitisaconditionofpossibilityofour imposingthisorganisationthatweascribetoourselvesthestatusofagentswhoimposeit:‘a rational being … must ascribe to itself an activity whose ultimate ground lies purely and simplywithinitself’(18).Thisisbecause,toperformanyactionasanintelligent,intentional action,onemusttacitlytakeoneselftobedoingso,andthusmaketacitreferencetooneself astheonedoingthisperformance.10Alevelofself-consciousnessisthereforethenecessary conditionofconsciousexperience. Fichtefurtherreasonsthatwecanonlybeself-consciousifweareconsciousofourselves asfinite,determinate,boundedandindividuatedselves.Fortoascribemyselfthestatusofan agent(to‘positmyself’)whoimposesunifiedorderonsensation,Imustascribemyselfthe status of a unified agent. But I cannot ascribe unity to myself unless I distinguish myself fromsomethingelsethatIidentifyasnot-I.Therefore,consciousexperiencepresupposesmy self-awareness as a finite self: ‘The rational being presented here is a finite rational being’ (18). To ascribe myself finite status, I must identify an external world outside me (19). Is Fichte claiming merely that I must frame the thought of a world external to me? No; for Fichte,ifImerelythoughtofanexternalworld,itwouldexistmerelyinmyrepresentation andwouldprovidenoreallimitorcontrasttomyself.Toascribemyselffinitestatusasaself 9‘Thephilosopher’staskistoshowthat[acertain]determinateactionisaconditionofself-consciousness, andshowingthisconstitutesthe[transcendental]deductionofthatconcept’—its necessityandapplication (Fichte[1976/7]2000:9). 10AsRobertPippinreconstructsthisreasoning:‘consciousnessofobjectsisimplicitlyreflexivebecause… wheneverIamconsciousofanyobject,Icanalsobesaidto“apperceive”implicitlymybeingthusconscious. Inanyremembering,thinkingorimagining,…IamalsopotentiallyawareasIintendthatwhatIamdoingis anactofremembering,thinking,orimagining’(Pippin1989:21). Author's personal copy A.Stone againsttheouterworld,Imust,morestrongly,apprehend—or‘intuit’(anschauen)—aworld outsideme;Imustfeelthisouterworldcheckingorlimitingme.11Forthistobepossiblethe worldmustbethere,outsideme,toexertthischeck(5).12 Amongstthepreconditionsofconsciousexperience,then,arethatImustascribemyself the status of a free, self-determining agent and that I must always-already inhabit a world outsideme,whichlimitsorchecksmyfreedom,imposinguponmesensationsthatIdonot choosetohave.Yetfortheworldtolimitmyfreedominthiswaybutnotdestroyit,Imust practically act back upon this world to transform it. If my agency is not to be swamped, I mustreassertitagainstthecheckimposedbytheworld. But the activity we are seeking can [only] be posited by the rational being in opposition to the world, which would then limit the activity; and the rational being canproducethisactivityinordertobeabletoposititinoppositiontotheworld.(19) Sinceobjectsintheworldmustcontinuetolimitouragency,though,ourpracticalactivity canneverdefinitivelytransformthemintomerevehiclesoftheself.Forthenthelimitsthat they impose, and with them the possibility of conscious experience, would evaporate. Consequently, our practical activity upon objects must be something that we undertake endlessly,withoutcompletion.Moreover,Fichteestablishesamoralorpracticalimperative here.Sinceconstantworkonnaturalthingsisaconditionofthepossibilityoftheexperience thatwedoinfacthave,wemustundertakethisworkonrationalgrounds;reasonobligesit. Further, reason obliges us to undertake this work without restraining ourselves, since the transformation of nature must continue ad infinitum. Impelling our work is an ideal of removing the check that nature imposes and converting it into our vehicle. The ideal can neverberealised; but, for thesamereason, itcanneverceasetoinform our efforts. Fichte expressesthisidealinhispopularessayTheVocationofMan: Nature must gradually enter a condition which … keeps its force steady in a definite relationwiththepowerwhichisdestinedtocontrolit—thepowerofman.…Cultivated landsshall animateandmoderatetheinertandhostile atmosphereofprimeval forests, deserts,andswamps.…natureistobecomeevermoretransparenttousuntilwecansee into its most secret core, and human power … shall control it without effort and peacefullymaintainanyconquestonceitismade.Fichte[1800](1987:83) The Early German Romantics pitted themselves against this position. Representative of their stance are the objections made to Fichte by Schelling (who belonged to the Jena and BerlinRomanticcirclesbetween1798and1800): Iamthoroughlyawareofhowsmallaregionofconsciousnessnaturemustfallinto, accordingtoyourconceptofit.Foryounaturehasnospeculativesignificanceatall, butonlyateleologicalone[thatis,itistheretoservehumanpurposes].Butareyou really of the opinion, for example, that light is only there so that rational beings can alsoseeeachotherwhentheytalktoeachother,andthatairistheresothatwhenthey 11As Fichte puts it: ‘Its activity in intuiting the world [in der Weltanschauung] cannot be posited by the rationalbeingassuch,forthisworld-intuitingactivity,byitsveryconcept,isnotsupposedtorevertintothe intuiter;itisnotsupposedtohavetheintuiterasitsobject,butrathersomethingoutsideandopposedtothe intuiter;namely,aworld’(19). 12Thus,thetraditionalviewofFichte,accordingtowhichhebelievesthattheselfpositstheexternalworld merely to check and thereby enable its own thinking, is misguided. His point is rather that conscious experience is ultimately only possible because the self is already embedded within a given world that it apprehends.Thus,GünterZöllerrightlypointsoutthatFichte’sidealismincludesameasureofrealism(Zöller 2000:201–3).
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