Algorithmic Game Theory: Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Paphos, Cyprus, October 18-20, 2009. Proceedings PDF
Preview Algorithmic Game Theory: Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Paphos, Cyprus, October 18-20, 2009. Proceedings
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5814 CommencedPublicationin1973 FoundingandFormerSeriesEditors: GerhardGoos,JurisHartmanis,andJanvanLeeuwen EditorialBoard DavidHutchison LancasterUniversity,UK TakeoKanade CarnegieMellonUniversity,Pittsburgh,PA,USA JosefKittler UniversityofSurrey,Guildford,UK JonM.Kleinberg CornellUniversity,Ithaca,NY,USA AlfredKobsa UniversityofCalifornia,Irvine,CA,USA FriedemannMattern ETHZurich,Switzerland JohnC.Mitchell StanfordUniversity,CA,USA MoniNaor WeizmannInstituteofScience,Rehovot,Israel OscarNierstrasz UniversityofBern,Switzerland C.PanduRangan IndianInstituteofTechnology,Madras,India BernhardSteffen UniversityofDortmund,Germany MadhuSudan MicrosoftResearch,Cambridge,MA,USA DemetriTerzopoulos UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles,CA,USA DougTygar UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,CA,USA GerhardWeikum Max-PlanckInstituteofComputerScience,Saarbruecken,Germany Marios Mavronicolas Vicky G. Papadopoulou (Eds.) Algorithmic Game Theory Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009 Paphos, Cyprus, October 18-20, 2009 Proceedings 1 3 VolumeEditors MariosMavronicolas UniversityofCyprus DepartmentofComputerScience 75KallipoleosStr. P.O.Box20537 CY-1678Nicosia,Cyprus E-mail:[email protected] VickyG.Papadopoulou EuropeanUniversityCyprus DepartmentofComputerScienceandEngineering 6DiogenesStr. CY-1516Nicosia,Cyprus E-mail:[email protected] LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2009934790 CRSubjectClassification(1998):I.6,H.5.3,J.4,K.6.0,H.3.5,K.4.4,F.2.2 LNCSSublibrary:SL1–TheoreticalComputerScienceandGeneralIssues ISSN 0302-9743 ISBN-10 3-642-04644-4SpringerBerlinHeidelbergNewYork ISBN-13 978-3-642-04644-5SpringerBerlinHeidelbergNewYork Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.Allrightsarereserved,whetherthewholeorpartofthematerialis concerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,re-useofillustrations,recitation,broadcasting, reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherway,andstorageindatabanks.Duplicationofthispublication orpartsthereofispermittedonlyundertheprovisionsoftheGermanCopyrightLawofSeptember9,1965, initscurrentversion,andpermissionforusemustalwaysbeobtainedfromSpringer.Violationsareliable toprosecutionundertheGermanCopyrightLaw. springer.com ©Springer-VerlagBerlinHeidelberg2009 PrintedinGermany Typesetting:Camera-readybyauthor,dataconversionbyScientificPublishingServices,Chennai,India Printedonacid-freepaper SPIN:12764747 06/3180 543210 Preface This volume contains the papers presented at the Second International Sympo- sium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2009), which was held on October 18–20, 2009, in Paphos, Cyprus. This event followed the first, very successful SAGT symposium, which took place in Paderborn,Germany, last year. The purpose of SAGT is to bring together researchers from computer sci- ence,economicsandmathematicstopresentanddiscussoriginalresearchatthe intersection of algorithms and game theory. It has been intended to cover all importantareassuchassolutionconcepts,gameclasses,computationofequilib- riaandmarketequilibria,algorithmicmechanismdesign, automatedmechanism design,convergenceandlearningingames,complexityclassesingametheory,al- gorithmicaspectsoffixed-pointtheorems,mechanisms,incentivesandcoalitions, cost-sharingalgorithms,computationalproblemsineconomics,finance,decision theoryandpricing,computationalsocialchoice,auctionalgorithms,priceofan- archyanditsrelatives, representationsofgamesandtheircomplexity,economic aspects of distributed computing and the internet, congestion, routing and net- workdesignandformationgamesandgame-theoreticapproachesto networking problems. Approximately55submissionstoSAGT2009werereceived.Eachsubmission was reviewed by at least three Program Committee members. The Program Committee decided to accept 29 papers. Out of these, a small number will be invited to a Special Issue of the Theory of Computing Systems journal with selected papers from SAGT 2009. The program of SAGT 2009 featured three invited talks from three outstanding researchers in algorithmic game theory: EliasKoutsoupias,DovMondererandMihalis Yannakakis.We areverygrateful toElias,DovandMihalisforjoiningusinPaphosandfortheirexcellentlectures. Our sincere thanks go to all authors who submitted their research work to SAGT 2009.We would like to thank all ProgramCommittee members, and the externalreviewerswhoassistedthem,fortheirwonderfulwork.Weareindebted to all members of the Organization Committee for their hard work preparing SAGT 2009.Thedevelopersofthe EasyChairconferencesystem,whichassisted tremendouslyboththeProgramandtheOrganizationCommittees,deservespe- cial thanks. We also thank Alan Selman, the Editor-in-Chief of the Theory of Computing Systems journal, for making the Special Issue possible. We are very pleased to acknowledge financial support from the University of Cyprus, the Limassol Cooperative Savings Bank Ltd., IBM Cyprus and the IntegratedProjectAEOLUS (IST-015964)of the EuropeanUnion. We arehon- ored that SAGT is embraced under the auspices of the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science (EATCS). October 2009 Marios Mavronicolas Vicky G. Papadopoulou Organization Program Chair Marios Mavronicolas University of Cyprus, Cyprus Program Committee Petra Berenbrink Simon Fraser University, Canada Felix Brandt University of Munich, Germany Ioannis Caragiannis University of Patras Greece George Christodoulou Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Informatik Germany Constantinos Daskalakis MIT USA Xiaotie Deng CityUniversityofHongKongHongKongSAR Federico Echenique California Institute of Technology USA Edith Elkind Nanyang TechnologicalUniversity Singapore Michele Flammini University of L’Aquila Italy Martin Gairing University of Liverpool UK Ron Lavi The Technion – Israel Institute of Technology Israel Burkhard Monien University of Paderborn Germany Asu Ozdaglar MIT USA Giuseppe Persiano University of Salerno Italy Tuomas Sandholm Carnegie Mellon University USA Maria Serna Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya Spain Paul Spirakis RACTI & University of Patras Greece Shang-Hua Teng Boston University USA Takashi Ui Yokohama National University Japan Carmine Ventre University of Liverpool UK Bernhard von Stengel London School of Economics UK Steering Committee Elias Koutsoupias University of Athens Greece Marios Mavronicolas University of Cyprus Cyprus Dov Monderer The Technion – Israel Institute of Technology Israel Burkhard Monien University of Paderborn Germany Christos Papadimitriou UC Berkeley USA Giuseppe Persiano University of Salerno Italy VIII Organization Paul Spirakis RACTI & University of Patras Greece – Chair Berthold Vo¨cking RWTH Aachen Germany Local Organization Chryssis Georgiou University of Cyprus Cyprus Christos Kapoutsis University of Cyprus Cyprus Marios Mavronicolas University of Cyprus Cyprus Vicky G. Papadopoulou European University Cyprus Cyprus – Chair Anna Philippou University of Cyprus Cyprus External Reviewers Itai Ashlagi Ahuva Mu’alem Vincenzo Auletta Evdokia Nikolova Umang Bhaskar Abraham Othman Vittorio Bilo Mike Paterson Patrick Briest Paolo Penna Markus Brill James Pita Ning Chen Ariel Procaccia Vincent Conitzer Guido Proietti Nikhil Devanur Evangelia Pyrga Dominic Dumrauf Qi Qi Khaled Elbassioni Heiko Roeglin Angelo Fanelli Amir Ronen Michal Feldman Maher Said Rainer Feldmann Mahyar Salek Diodato Ferraioli Michael Schapira Felix Fischer Florian Schoppmann Dimitris Fotakis Ulf-Peter Schroeder Andrew Gilpin Alexander Skopalik Paul Harrenstein Troels Sorensen Nicole Immorlica Orestis Telelis Albert Jiang Tobias Tscheuschner Panagiotis Kanellopoulos Angelina Vidali Spyros Kontogiannis William Walsh Annamaria Kovacs Jiajin Yu Maria Kyropoulou Yingchao Zhao Aranyak Mehta Martin Zinkevich Luca Moscardelli Gianpiero Monaco Table of Contents Monotonicity in Mechanism Design................................. 1 Dov Monderer Computational Aspects of Equilibria ............................... 2 Mihalis Yannakakis A Modular Approach to Roberts’ Theorem ......................... 14 Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations ......... 24 Andr´e Berger, Rudolf Mu¨ller, and Seyed Hossein Naeemi Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-ParameterAgents ... 36 Clemens Thielen and Sven O. Krumke Partition Equilibrium............................................. 48 Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms ............ 60 Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm On the Planner’s Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design ............................................... 72 Jos´e R. Correa and Nicola´s Figueroa Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project Problems ........... 85 Krzysztof R. Apt and Arantza Est´evez-Ferna´ndez Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games ............................................... 97 Tobias Harks, Max Klimm, and Rolf H. Mo¨hring Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency................. 109 Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, and Noam Nisan The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games.......................... 122 Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii Pasechnik, Michael Zuckerman, Jo¨rg Rothe, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein Non-clairvoyantScheduling Games ................................. 135 Christoph Du¨rr and Kim Thang Nguyen X Table of Contents The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds .... 147 Hyunwoo Jung and Kyung-Yong Chwa Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings ............ 159 Elliot Anshelevich, Sanmay Das, and Yonatan Naamad Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing .............................. 171 Elliot Anshelevich and Satish Ukkusuri Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games............. 183 Christine Chung and Evangelia Pyrga Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games.......................................................... 196 Tanmoy Chakraborty and Sanjeev Khanna Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design ...................... 208 Elliot Anshelevich and Bugra Caskurlu Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities............................. 220 Andrew Byde, Maria Polukarov, and Nicholas R. Jennings A New Derandomization of Auctions ............................... 233 Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman, and Guy Wolfovitz The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles..................... 238 Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer, and Jan Hoffmann Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To...... 250 Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, and Kamesh Munagala Doing Good with Spam Is Hard ................................... 263 Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich, and Alexander Skopalik On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems ....................................................... 275 Khaled Elbassioni, Rajiv Raman, Saurabh Ray, and Ren´e Sitters On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games.......................................................... 287 Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer, and Paul Harrenstein Swap Bribery.................................................... 299 Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, and Arkadii Slinko Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion Games ....... 311 Vittorio Bilo`, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, and Luca Moscardelli Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows over Time......... 323 Ronald Koch and Martin Skutella Table of Contents XI BayesianAuctions with Friends and Foes ........................... 335 Po-An Chen and David Kempe On Equilibria for ADM Minimization Games ........................ 347 Leah Epstein and Asaf Levin Author Index.................................................. 359 Monotonicity in Mechanism Design Dov Monderer Technion–Israel Instituteof Technology [email protected] Abstract. Consider a model with a finite number of alternatives, and buyers with private values and quasi-linear utility functions. A domain of valuations for abuyeris amonotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable, in thesensethatthereexistsarandomizedtruth-tellingdirectmechanism, whichimplementsthisallocation rule.Thedomainisaweakmonotonic- itydomainifeverydeterministicmonotoneallocationruledefinedonitis implementable. I discuss theliterature on (weak) monotonicity domain, which includes the early mathematical literature as well as the recent CS/Economics literature. M.MavronicolasandV.G.Papadopoulou(Eds.):SAGT2009,LNCS5814,p.1,2009. (cid:2)c Springer-VerlagBerlinHeidelberg2009
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