Algeria - Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training

184 Pages·2012·1.15 MB·English

ALGERIA

COUNTRY READER
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Thomas S. Estes 1942-1943 Political Advisor, Algiers

William R. Tyler 1943-1944 Chief of Press Wireless Bureau, USIS,
Algiers

George F. Bogardus 1948-1950 Vice Consul, Algiers

Laurent E. Morin 1948-1950 Economic Officer, Algiers

Elden B. Erickson 1950-1954 Economic Officer, Algiers

Archer K. Blood 1953 Consular Officer, Algiers

Wendell W. Woodbury 1955-1957 Economic Officer, Algiers

Merritt N. Cootes 1955-1958 Deputy Principal Officer, Algiers

Bertha Potts 1959-1961 Assistant Public Affairs Officer, USIS,
Algiers

Woodward Romine 1959-1965 Political Officer/Ambassador’s Aide Paris,
France

Frank G. Wisner 1962-1964 Junior Officer, Algiers

Walter L. Cutler 1962-1965 Political Officer, Algiers

Philip Birnbaum 1963-1964 Project Officer, USAID, Algiers

William A. Stoltzfus, Jr. 1963-1965 Algeria Desk Officer, Washington, DC

Robert B Duncan 1965-1967 Economic/Commercial Officer, Algiers

Lewis Hoffacker 1965-1969 Deputy Chief of Mission, Algiers

Donald S. Brown 1966-1967 USAID Representative, Algiers

Richard E. Undeland 1966-1967 Information Officer, Algiers

Michael E.C. Ely 1966-1968 Economic Officer, Algiers
Fernando E. Rondon 1966-1967 Principal Officer, Constantine
1967-1968 Consular Officer, Algiers

Edward L. Peck 1966-1969 Principal Officer, Oran

Laurent E. Morin 1967-1970 Economic Officer, Algiers

Arthur L. Lowrie 1968-1972 Algeria Desk Officer, Washington, DC

Allen C. Davis 1970-1973 Political Officer, Algiers

Howard R. Simpson 1972-1974 Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Algiers

Charles Higginson 1973-1975 Economic Counselor (US Interests Section)
Algiers

Larry Colbert 1973-1976 Consul, Officer in Charge Oran, Algeria

Ronald D. Flack 1974-1976 Commercial Attaché, Algiers

Richard B. Parker 1974-1977 Ambassador, Algeria

Lambert Heyniger 1976-1978 Principal Officer, Oran, Algeria

Ulric Hayners, Jr. 1977-1981 Ambassador, Algeria

Richard Sackett Thompson 1980-1982 Political Counselor, Algiers

Edmund James Hull 1980-1982 Algeria Desk Officer, Washington, DC

Barbara H. Nielsen 1981-1983 Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Algiers

Michael Newlin 1981-1985 Ambassador, Algeria

Ann B. Sides 1985-1987 Consular Officer, Oran, Algeria

Haywood Rankin 1992-1994 Deputy Chief of Mission, Algiers

Nancy E. Johnson 1994-1996 Political Officer, Algiers

Donald F. McHenry 1998 Participant, Eminent Persons Group for the
Secretary General of the UN, Algeria
THOMAS S. ESTES
Political Advisor
Algiers (1942-1943)

Thomas Estes was posted to Greece, Washington, DC, and the Upper Volta as a
Foreign Service officer. He was interviewed in 1988 by Ambassador Dwight
Dickinson.

ESTES: I was off to Algiers. It was there, incidentally, that I was commissioned an FSO, having
passed the oral examination while in the Department. Allied Force Headquarters, of course, was
a totally military organization with no previous experience in dealing with a civilian section (We
became known as POLAD -- Political Adviser). Fortunately, Ambassador Robert Murphy was
General Eisenhower's political adviser and he arranged for us to have places to live and to draw
rations. If you want me to go on with this a bit...

Q: Yes, tell us something about...

ESTES: In Algiers we were bombed by the Germans and the Italians. In Bangkok we'd been
bombed by the British -- a unique experience, being bombed by both sides. I shared an apartment
with J. Holbrooke Chapman, an FSO who had been my immediate supervisor in Bangkok, and at
night during an air raid we would get up and go to a shelter across the street. Aside from these
raids it was fairly routine work for me as the junior officer. As you can recall, the junior officer
did all the administrative work in those days.

WILLIAM R. TYLER
Chief of Press Wireless Bureau, USIS
Algiers (1943-1944)

William Tyler was born in Paris, France in 1920. He served with the United
States Information Agency in France and Washington, DC. He then entered the
Foreign Service and served in Washington, DC, the Netherlands, France, and
Germany. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1987.

TYLER: John Houseman called me up and said you are going to Allied Force Head Quarters in
Algiers in charge of Radio. He said "I was going but that has been indefinitely postponed." I
said, "Why did you pick me?" He said, "well I'll tell you, there were 3 or 4 people on the short
list, anyone of whom might have gone, but we wanted somebody that had qualities, somebody
who we thought not only well qualified but also a son-of-a-bitch." He used those words. I said
thanks for the compliment. He said, "well you know what I mean." And I said, "alright, I'll do
what I can." Then he said, "get your uniform and don't talk, don't tell anyone where you are
going", and I said I wouldn't. I didn't even tell my wife. She was in Boston, we were living in
Dedham. Houseman said that when the time comes, you will have at the most 36 hours notice
before you leave. That will give you a chance to see your wife if she doesn't come down to see
you before you go. I was staying at the Seymore hotel on 44th street.
Q: When you went to Africa, you were stationed in Oran?

TYLER: No, I arrived in Oran. I was there for a couple of days then was flown to Algiers.

Q: What was your position in Algiers?

TYLER: Well, in charge of the Radio Division. The Radio Division was the psychological
branch of the Allied Forces Head Quarters.

Q: Was there a difference in the type of work you were doing there than what you were doing in
New York? Was the radio work in Algiers tactical more than strategic?

TYLER: No, the same issues. It was continuing the same work.

Q: Was it also aimed at the same Western European countries, say Spain, Italy and France?

TYLER: It was the Western Mediterranean area, which included Spain, Italy, France, but not
Greece. But the record is fuzzy in my recollection, whatever the programing was, it was aimed
immediately at two targets, one the local population in the country and another, the German
troops, anything that could effect their morale and diminish their fighting spirit.

Q: So in this regard you were performing more of a tactical type of radio as opposed to talking
to the populace at large?

TYLER: I was in the theater of operations. I was being bombed in Algiers, until after the Sicilian
landings when the German airbases had to withdraw. But until July-August 1943, when I arrived
in Algiers, we were under wartime, blackout conditions.

Q: What type of people did you have working for you there.

TYLER: A lot of former colleagues from the OWI. And there were people who I thought were
simply devoted heart and soul to the Allied cause in support of our positions and our policies. I
myself never concealed the fact that I was very strongly in support of de Gaulle, not as a political
figure but as the one rallying point in France for resistance that could have in due course a
determining effect on French opinion. Bob Murphy was there, and he was a friend, my father
knew him when he was consul in Paris. Bob Murphy naturally was an official of the State
Department, and I was OWI. There were the OSS people, Ridgway Knight, Julius Holmes, Harry
Woodraw, Selden Chapin and Robert McBride, people like them. I was not with the OSS. They
were civil affairs officers. We were all for the government but they were in the government
framework. I was OWI, but I was not responsible to them.

Q: What about the coordination, you were in the military command, we have an overall, sort of a
dual political structure with MacMillan and Murphy, Harold MacMillan being the British
administrator, Murphy being the U.S. advisor. Who gave you orders?
TYLER: That's a very good question. The answer is I can't remember. I tell you, by the time we
got our directives from the OWI in Washington, very often those directives were no longer
topical. After a delay of several days, so in a sense, I was in charge of radio, I broadcast myself a
few times but my administrative responsibility was for script writing, so I gave up broadcasting
in French. Actually looking back on it its staggering the latitude I had.

Q: I think this is true in any wartime situation, it happens. Did you attend staff meetings?

TYLER: I had my own meetings in the building, the Maison de l'Agriculture in the Bulevard
Bourbon in Algiers. I had the Radio Office staff meetings, but small meetings of the people in
charge of units. But, I don't remember there being any conflict in policy except that I knew Bob
Murphy where he stood was somebody who was naturally carrying out very closely and rightly
the President's policy after all he was our President. I never conflicted with his policy but I
always insisted on emphasizing as much as possible, not de Gaulle's military roles but the
importance of supporting de Gaulle as the spirit of France.

Q: What about Giraud?

TYLER: Well, that of course, I saw Giraud in Algiers I was present at the first meeting with him
and de Gaulle with the press present.

Q: The wonderful handshake picture.

TYLER: I was there. Well, Giraud was made mincemeat of by de Gaulle. Giraud I think is an
honorable and patriotic man who just didn't have what it took to create a position of leadership, a
rallying point. In a way I was too close to it all to have a true perspective on it. But it is quite
clear that Giraud would not be able to rally enough support to withstand the strong and
increasing role of de Gaulle.

Q: Then in Algiers, dealing with German or Italian troops...

TYLER: We had interrogation teams.

Q: You would get information from them?

TYLER: Oh Yes.

Q: It is always difficult in broadcasting, where you're sending out, you dream things up in your
head and you try to use your knowledge of the country and all that but how did you measure
your effectiveness?

TYLER: I had no means.

Q: How about prisoner interrogation did you get anything from them?

TYLER: Yes, occasionally we received reports. What we were doing in North Africa was
peanuts compared with what BBC was doing and Voice of America was doing from the states.
But we did have the advantage of broadcasting from these two antennae, they were balloon
rigged antennas, there was Hippo and I forget the other name, rigged up outside of Algiers. So,
our medium wave broadcasting from Algiers only had the advantage that it was a voice coming
from nearer than from across the Atlantic, but it was a very small beer compared to the mass of
information coming from Britain and the United States.

Q: With the BBC, was there was much cooperation, did you feel it was a role model or a rival?

TYLER: Oh I never felt it was a rival. I never felt any competition. BBC was so infinitely better,
covering the whole of Europe.

Q: To go back a bit, was the Voice Of America under the OWI?

TYLER: Yes.

Q: Were you called the Voice Of America?

TYLER: No. We called ourselves the Voice of the United Nations Radio Allied Force Head
Quarters in Algiers.

Q: But when you were in New York you called yourself Voice Of America?

TYLER: Yes. Until December 1943, I was in charge of Radio Allied Force Headquarters, and I
used to go regularly go to AFHQ, I forgot the name of the hotel in Algiers where General
Eisenhower was. But then of course, he moved to London, AFHQ moved to London for
preparations for Overlord (the invasion of Northern France). The void created by the move was
immediately taken over by Seventh Army Planning HQ for "Operation Anvil", which was to take
place in the south of France following (the landing of Salerno). Salerno followed after the
conquest of Sicily.

General McChristal was the US army officer in charge of psychological warfare branch of the
HQ; he succeeded Colonel Hazeltine. And General McChristal called me up and said, "I'd like to
see you", and I said, "General I'm on my way." And he said, "I'm taking you up to Bouzarea,
above Algiers to the west and I'm going to introduce you to the officers and staff in planning HQ
for these landings in Southern France." Later on I met General Patch the Seventh Army
commander and his senior staff. My particular military anchor was then Colonel Quinn, who
later became a lieutenant general, and a mighty fine Irishman. Under him was his deputy, Bob
Bruskin. General McChristal said to all the people, he made me stand up there with him and said,
"I want you all to know Bill Tyler, because he will be working under Colonel Quinn and Colonel
Bruskin for the public affairs, psychological warfare side of the preparation of the landings and
for the landings themselves." I got the fullest cooperation. There I was, a measly civilian, but
they gave me full cooperation. I was in charge in drawing up the plan for the press, radio and
leaflet side of the preparation of the landings.
Q: Was this the landing at Salerno?

TYLER: No, the main landing in Southern France.

Q: Oh, this was Dragoon?

TYLER: Well, it started out by being Anvil then ended up being Dragoon. From January 1944
until our operations which followed of course much later than Overlord, the final landing was
August 15.

Q: After the landings did you go into France?

TYLER: Yes, but much after the landings. It was a great disappointment to me being the fellow
in charge of the whole thing I had the enormous interest and responsibility of planning the
preparations, I had been given the fine sounding title of Chief Psychological Warfare, West
Mediterranean. I was in charge of leaflets as well as radio, and also the plans for the public
affairs side of the landing. All the hardware, the number of men, all the people of the press side,
the radio side that had to go in following the landing. I worked on them of course, then I went to
Caserta [outside Naples] where the Headquarters was and I saw General de Lattre de Tassigny,
we had become friends. Eve Curie, the daughter of the Curies, was on his staff. Its incredible
looking back on it, I can hardly believe it all happened. I went to see General de Lattre de
Tassigny, in Naples. I also had to arrange work with the French commissioner for information
who was Henri Bonnet in the provisional government in Algiers. Henri Bonnet was in charge of
the whole press and special relations side. Again, my odd background helped because Bonnet
knew my father. I knew Rene Massigli, the commissioner of the interior, I had contacts, easy
contact, between their headquarters and its successor, the planning headquarters of the French on
nonmilitary matters.

GEORGE F. BOGARDUS
Vice Consul
Algiers (1948-1950)

George F. Bogardus was born in Iowa in 1917 and graduated from Harvard
University in 1939. He served in the U.S. Army in 1941 and joined the Foreign
Service in 1941. In addition to Algeria, Mr. Bogardus served in Canada, Kenya,
Czechoslovakia, Algeria, Germany, and Vietnam. He was interviewed on April
10, 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: This would have still been 1948?

BOGARDUS: That's right. It was still a French regime at that point. In fact, Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia were -- Algeria was technically part of France. Morocco was a kingdom and Tunisia
a republic. My stay there in Algiers was very -- We spoke French with everybody, of course,
whereas we had been speaking mainly German or English in Prague. My stay there was cut
short, less than two years until 1950 for the following reasons. Following general instructions
from the Department, USAID was a potential around the world, especially in an underdeveloped
country. They had encouraged us, not only for that reason, but just in general, to make contact
with the opposition. The opposition in North Africa were the Arab and the Muslim potential
rebels. The French in charge were the very right wing pieds noirs. Consul General George Tait
authorized me to meet twice with the most moderate of the Muslim opposition, Ferhat Abbas,
who had a French wife. He was also a dentist with a French education. So, he wasn't really rabid.
There were several others who were really rabid about pushing the French into the ocean. But I
had a couple of talks with his aide in my home next to the St. George Hotel regarding USAID
potential and how it might be used and that sort of thing, very innocuous and never a
commitment. Then, however, finally, there was a small notice in Le Monde newspaper in Paris
about "What's going on with this secret meeting of this American Vice Consul in Algiers?" Elim
O'Shaughnessy, who was the desk officer at that point, was hyper-sensitive about it, I thought,
but he told me later that it came across his desk that they were looking for people for economic
training, and I had indicated an eventual interest. So, he put me in for that.

The other thing that happened was that I had scored what I thought was a real intelligence coup
regarding foreign cryptography of another government and bucked that in with the label "top
secret." I thought top secret was the absolute top. Well, it turned out that there were more copies
of top secret things going around Washington than you might think. It never possibly occurred to
me at that point that going as high as that there was really no danger at all. The word came back,
"Leave that to the CIA." We did have a CIA man there and I turned it over to him. I won't be any
more precise than that, but when I got back, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who was Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State, sent for me. He chewed me out for doing that, of all things. He said,
"Never ever mention this again." Well, I haven't mentioned the core of it, not really even told
you. But that's what it was. I haven't said anything to anybody all these years. It wouldn't matter
at all now.

LAURENT E. MORIN
Economic Officer
Algiers (1948-1950)

Laurent Morin was born in Augusta, Maine in 1920. As a Foreign Service officer,
he served in France, Japan, Washington, DC, and Iraq. He was interviewed in
1992 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Q: Your first assignment was to Algiers. Was that right?

MORIN: Yes.

Q: From 1948-50?

MORIN: Yes. I might introduce that by saying that at the commencement exercise we had before
we graduated from the basic officers course, General Marshall, who was then Secretary of State,
was the speaker. He also gave out the diplomas. As I went through the line, he shook my hand,
gave me my diploma, and said, "Son, where are you going?"

I said, "I've been assigned to Algiers, sir."

And he said, "Algiers hey, that's the St. George Hotel. Good luck to you." Well it was for me
because I ended up living there. The St. George had been the headquarters for the American
military in North Africa...Eisenhower's headquarters, etc.

I must say it was a fancy hotel but difficult because we were quite poor in those days. We didn't
have many of the allowances that you have now. We had a little girl at that time and we couldn't
go downtown for supper because it was too late for her, but we couldn't afford to eat in the
dining hall at the St. George, as it was just too expensive for us. But we developed a scheme. We
would order room service and the waiter would come up, bring in his table (we had a suite), and
lay out the linens, plates, etc. and then he would ask, "Madam, are you going to have the soup
tonight?" We always ordered the menu fixe, just one meal every night for the two of us. That was
all we could afford. And the waiter would dish it out, very formally, one course, to Ann and the
next to me.

We found Algiers was a real colony in those days. This was a complete French society on the
backs of the native population. The French had everything. It was not like in many of the other
colonies I have been to. The French had all the jobs all the way down. You found the garage
mechanics, the waiters, the ushers, all those little jobs, were all taken over by French. The
Algerians, themselves, had nothing but jobs as day laborers, maids, street car conductors, and
taxi drivers. Everything else was French.

I found that my first few days confirmed my expectations that I was getting into an interesting
kind of life. We hadn't been there more than three or four days when we were invited to a big
gala. The whole consular corps was going to this theater. I was told to go, get myself a tux and
get your wife dressed up. Off we went in a consulate car. The theater was lit up like a Hollywood
premier. The Spahis, mounted Algerian troops in colorful uniforms, were there. We got out of
the car onto a red carpet which went up into the theater. The theater had sweeping stairways like
an opera house. On the way out it was the same way. Your car was called by loudspeaker.
Algiers in those days was great for photographs of officialdom and flash bulbs were flashing
everywhere.

The next weekend or so, the political officer, George Bogardus, who was a red head, called me
in and asked if I would go down to a nationalist party meeting at a theater across town and
observe what was happening. He couldn't go, he would be too conspicuous. He thought maybe I
would be dark enough not to stand out. Thinking of every spy movie I had ever seen, I put on a
nondescript suit, didn't shave that day, and hopped on a street car and went down to Bab el Oued,
a workers quarter on the other side of the Casbah from the St. George. I was a little early and
walked around observing people trying to be as inconspicuous as possible. Finally to use up
time, I went to a bar. There was a pinball machine by the window, and I started playing it
looking out all the time waiting for the meeting to start. While looking out whom do I see
walking by, looking very nondescript, slinking along trying to be inconspicuous, but the British
vice consul!

My first early experiences sort of bore out the feeling that I was really into something.

Q: I can't remember the exact time when the situation turned around, but were you there then?

MORIN: No, that was later. I was there during the middle period, a lull. There had been a very
bad situation there in Setif in 1945 on VE Day when the French bombed a demonstration that
seemed to be getting out of hand and killed anywhere, depending on whom you read, from 10 to
40 thousand people. The Algerians were very quiet in the period I was there, 1948-50. There
were two major opposition movements but they were not terrorists but just held meetings. In fact
those two movements, later on during the rebellion were considered rather friendly compared to
the FLN. But at that time the French were very suspicious of it all, and they were suspicious of
us, the US government. They had the idea that we were pushing this. The story in Algiers was
that Roosevelt at the summit meeting at the Hotel Anfa in Casablanca had obtained a promise
that Algeria would be given to the States. This was completely nonsense, but that is what people
thought. The French were most unhappy with the thought that we were sympathetic to the
natives and feared we might be doing something for them. For instance, our phones were tapped
by our great allies by using equipment left behind by the US Army.

I attended Arab movies occasionally, and one day the consul general called a couple of us in and
said, "Cut it out. We're getting complaints from the government about you guys showing up in
Arab movie theaters."

I remember my local secretary was approached...some young fellow made up to her at a dance,
and she got to like him. After a time he said, "Look, why don't you tell us what's is going on at
the consulate?" She said, "What do you mean?" He said, "Oh, nothing much. Just who does
what, what do they talk about and so forth?" She said, "Oh, I wouldn't do that." He got very
pushy and proved to be an agent, a deuxième bureau agent.

Q: The deuxième bureau is their intelligence.

MORIN: So he said, "If you don't cooperate with us, you won't get your passport. We know you
have an application to go to Italy on a trip this summer, and you are not going to get it." And she
didn't get it either.

Q: At the time the French authorities really looked with great suspicion on our consular
establishment?

MORIN: Oh, yes, very much so. We were blasted in the Paris papers. I remember one period
when there were headlines in the French press...the tabloids...saying "the American consulate at
Algiers is promoting the nationalist movement."

Our political officer got caught in the middle of this. He had asked for permission to talk to one
of the opposition leaders. The French government reluctantly gave him permission to go meet
with these people, but they almost PNGed [persona non grata] him at the same time.