Alexander of Aphrodisias on phantasia

247 Pages·2016·2.3 MB·English

Alexander of Aphrodisias on phantasia
An Aristotelian account of mental representation
in 2nd-3rd centuries CE

By
Attila Hangai

Submitted to
Central European University
Department of Philosophy

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
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Supervisor:
Dr. István Bodnár

Budapest, Hungary
2016
I hereby declare that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in
any other institution or materials previously written and/or published by another person, unless
otherwise noted

Budapest, 24-10-2016

……………………………………………
Attila Hangai

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Abstract
I discuss the account of phantasia of Alexander of Aphrodisias, a most prominent Late-Antique
Aristotelian. For Aristotle phantasia is a motion of the perceptive soul that makes possible a
great amount of activities and higher cognitions beyond sense-perception. Phantasia became a
fundamental psychological concept in the Hellenistic Era: in empiricist epistemology, in action
theory as perceptual representation of the external world; in aesthetics as creative imagination.
I argue that Alexander proceeds from an Aristotelian framework of parts and capacities of the
soul, but unlike Aristotle, he distinguishes a distinct capacity for phantasia. The main reason
for this comes from his polemic against the Stoics: they do not acknowledge an activity of
phantasia. A distinct activity requires a distinct object, which in turn a distinct capacity. The
distinct status of a phantasia-capacity in itself modifies the architecture of the soul in
comparison with Aristotle. But in addition Alexander makes important changes in the
framework: he makes capacities as basic (and rather modular), and parts and the soul as sets of
capacities.
The object of phantasia is the residue from perception in activity. The status of this as
internal object needs clarification. I show that it is internal on account of being a physical
process in the body. Again, I argue that it is the causal object of phantasia: it is the item that
provides content to the phantasia-activity by triggering it. But the residue is not an intentional
object: it is a representation of something else. I give a reconstruction of Alexander`s account
how the residue may be representation. Accordingly, it is a representation in virtue of
preserving fully a perceptual content (something that had been perceived); or in virtue of
functioning as an equivalent of a fully preserved residue insofar as phantasia completed an
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S. First, I show that it is implausible to construe simple cases of phantasia (or perception: for
perception has the same type of content as phantasia) as non-propositional, demonstrating that
the object reading of the content (x sees ‘white’) is inadequate in that at the best it reduces to
existential propositions (‘there is white’). Again, I analyse two positive evidences. (1)
Alexander`s account of the truth-conditions of phantasia implies propositional content:
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phantasia is about an existent thing, S; and it is such as the thing, P. (2) The account of
simultaneous perception (of several perceptibles) entails propositional content, and even uses
examples as ‘this is white’.
The phantasia-activity is said to be krisis, which I take to be judgement: primarily
because its content is propositional. I argue that it is a certain type of judgement, perceptual,
in contrast to conceptual judgements of the rational soul-part: esp. opinion. However,
phantasia-judgement may be distinguished from perceptual judgement only because they are
concerned with different objects: internal vs. external.

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Contents
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ viiii
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1
1.1. The importance of phantasia ........................................................................................... 1
1.2. Alexander`s place in the history of philosophy .............................................................. 2
1.3. Alexander`s account of phantasia in the history of the concept ..................................... 6
1.4. Methodology ................................................................................................................... 9
1.5. Alexander`s official treatment of phantasia: DA 66.9-73.7 .......................................... 11
1.6. The argument ................................................................................................................ 14
2. Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 17
2.1. phantasia, phantaston, phantastikē/phantastikon, phantasma ....................................... 17
2.2. typos, typōsis, prosanatypoun, anazōgraphēma, enkataleimma ................................... 20
3. Phantasia as distinct faculty ................................................................................................. 27
3.1. The Aristotelian background ......................................................................................... 28
3.1.1. Faculty psychology ................................................................................................ 30
3.1.2. The identity of a capacity: Object Criterion .......................................................... 36
3.1.3. Aristotle – no distinct object for phantasia ............................................................ 42
3.2. Alexander: phantasia as distinct faculty ....................................................................... 48
3.2.1. Distinct object for phantasia (phantaston) ............................................................. 48
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3.2.3. Alexander`s possible motivation............................................................................ 61
3.3. Reconsidering the division of soul ................................................................................ 66
3.3.1. Soul and parts ......................................................................................................... 68
3.3.2. Part and capacities – the case of the nutritive part ................................................. 70
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3.3.3. The perceptual part ................................................................................................ 72
3.4. Objections ..................................................................................................................... 74
3.4.1. Phantasia is a movement (kinēsis) caused by perception ....................................... 74
3.4.2. Phantasia and perception are one in hypokeimenon, different only in account ..... 75
3.4.3. Phantasia in the presence of the external object .................................................... 79
4. The object of phantasia ....................................................................................................... 82
4.1. Internal (en-) ................................................................................................................. 83
4.1.1. The primary sense-organ – the seat of residues ..................................................... 84
4.1.2. Bodily Change ....................................................................................................... 88
4.1.2.1. Not typos ......................................................................................................... 89
4.1.2.2. Assimilation in perception .............................................................................. 90
4.1.2.3. Four alternatives.............................................................................................. 98
4.2. Object (-leimma) ......................................................................................................... 102
4.2.1. Intentional vs. causal object ................................................................................. 103
4.2.2. Causal continuity ................................................................................................. 105
4.2.3. Preservation.......................................................................................................... 109
4.2.3.1. Preserving truthfully ..................................................................................... 110
4.2.3.2. Preserving faithfully...................................................................................... 115
4.2.3.3. Preserving fully ............................................................................................. 117
4.2.3.3.1. Impressing further – prosanatypoun ...................................................... 118
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4.3. The difference between the objects of phantasia and perception ............................... 132
5. The Activity of Phantasia................................................................................................... 134
5.1. The content of phantasia ............................................................................................. 135
5.1.1. Simple content (phantasia, perception) vs. complex content (doxa) ................... 136
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5.1.1.1. Argument from simple phantasia .................................................................. 137
5.1.1.2. Simple content as non-predicational ............................................................. 141
5.1.1.3. Arguments for propositional content in all mental states ............................. 148
5.1.2. Objects of perception (DA 40.20-42.3) ................................................................ 150
5.1.2.1. Intrinsic vs. accidental perceptibles .............................................................. 152
5.1.2.2. Proper vs. common perceptibles ................................................................... 157
5.1.3. Alexander: Truth conditions of phantasia ............................................................ 160
5.1.4. Simultaneous perception (SIM) ........................................................................... 167
5.1.4.1. The Problem of simultaneous perception ..................................................... 168
5.1.4.2. Simultaneous Perception of Heterogeneous Perceptibles – The Point Analogy
.................................................................................................................................... 171
5.1.4.3. The Problem of Opposites ............................................................................ 176
5.1.4.4. Purported non-material change ..................................................................... 177
5.1.4.5. Judgement – opposition in judgement .......................................................... 181
5.1.4.6. Material change and judgement .................................................................... 185
5.1.5. Perceptual content: complex and simple .............................................................. 191
5.1.5.1. The content of perception with regard to the different types of object ......... 191
5.1.5.2. Simple content .............................................................................................. 194
5.1.6. Non-conceptual propositional content ................................................................. 199
5.2. Judgement ................................................................................................................... 201
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5.2.1.1. The meaning of krisis.................................................................................... 201
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5.2.2. Judgemental faculties ........................................................................................... 209
5.2.3. Phantasia-judgement ............................................................................................ 215
5.2.4. The relation of judging to the phantasia-change, to the object ............................ 221
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 224
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Abbreviations
Works of Alexander of Aphrodisias
DA De Anima
Mant. Mantissa (Supplement to De Anima)
in Sens. On Aristotle`s De Sensu et Sensibilia
in Met. On Aristotle`s Metaphysics
De Fato On Fate
Mixt. De Mixtione
Q Questiones
in Top. On Aristotle`s Topics
Works of Aristotle
Cat. Categories
Int. De Interpretatione
AnPost. Posterior Analytics
Phys. Physics
GC De Generatione et Corruptione
DA De Anima (On the Soul)
PN Parva Naturalia
Sens. De Sensu et Sensibilia (On the Senses and Sensible Objects)
n DM De Memoria et Reminiscentia (On Memory and Recollection)
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EN Nicomachean Ethics
Rhet. Rhetorics
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Modern collections and works
[AD] Accattino P, Donini P (1996) Alessandro di Afrodisia: L’Anima. Laterza, Bari
[BD] Bergeron M, Dufour P (2008) Alexander of Aphrodisias: De l'âme. Vrin, Paris
[LS] Long A, Sedley D (1987) The Hellenistic Philosophers. CUP, Cambridge
SVF von Arnim I (ed) (1903-1905) Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. Teubner, Leipzig
LSJ Liddel HG, Scott R, Jones HS (eds) (1996) A Greek-English Lexicon. OUP

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1. Introduction
1.1. The importance of phantasia
Phantasia1 is a fundamental psychological concept in the Hellenistic Era.2 It is a focal term in
empiricist epistemology,3 in action theory,4 and also in discussions in aesthetics as creative
imagination.5 Due to the prevalence of epistemological debates in the Era we have evidence
for the controversies over phantasia mainly in its highest epistemic manifestation: as the
criterion of truth. Thus, phantasia has to cover sufficiently broad range of mental states to allow
for different paths to knowledge (through perception, or through rational reasoning) – it might
be called appearance. But there must be a specific kind of it that by being basic and infallible
may secure the validity of other states: this is the cognitive phantasia in Stoicism.
Further, phantasia has a central role in Aristotle’s philosophy too, as an activity of the
perceptive soul.6 It seems to be the link between perception and thinking. It makes possible a
great amount of activities and higher cognitions beyond sense-perception for humans and for
lower animals. These functions include remembering, dreaming, imagination, moving by
desire, experience, and it is also needed for thinking. In spite of its importance, Aristotle did
not give a full theory of the concept, his most detailed account in De Anima 3.3 being rather

1 Since the whole study is an investigation into the concept of phantasia in Alexander, I leave the word
transliterated, avoiding premature judgement on its meaning. Its translation into English is notoriously
difficult, due to the different connotations and the diverse application of the term in Alexander as well as
Aristotle and other Greek philosophical texts. See some further notes on translation in Sect. 3.1.
2 A history of the concept of phantasia from Plato to the Medieval Era can be found in Watson 1988. It is a good
n synopsis for the importance of phantasia and the main roles it plays in the different theories (Ch. 1 on Plato;
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40; Frede 1983 and 1999; Inwood 1985; Annas 1992. 71-85; Hankinson 2003, see Sect. 3.2.2.1 and 5.1.3. On
Skeptic objections the best source is SE M 7-8; cf. Striker 1997.
4 Phantasia is needed for action to represent that to which action is aimed, cf. Inwood 1985; [LS] Ch. 57; for a
debate with the Stoics see De Fato; DA 73.14-80.15.
5 Creative imagination is a central topic in rhetorical investigations. Our main source for the notion (perhaps in a
developed phase) is Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius of Tyana, esp. VI.19.
6 Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia is a highly controversial issue, which I shall investigate only in such detail that
is relevant for drawing a contrast to it in Alexander (see Sect. 3.1).
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