Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups

55 Pages·2014·1.09 MB·English

Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups:
Middle East and Africa
Carla E. Humud, Coordinator
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Alexis Arieff
Analyst in African Affairs
Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Specialist in African Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
October 10, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43756
Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa

Summary
After more than a decade of combating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States
now faces an increasingly diverse threat from Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa
and from emerging groups that have adopted aspects of Al Qaeda’s ideology but operate
relatively or completely autonomously from the group’s senior leadership.
U.S. counterterrorism debates have focused on “formal” Al Qaeda affiliates, and policymakers
increasingly are considering options for addressing the range of threats posed by the wider
spectrum of groups inspired by—or similar in goals and aspirations to—Al Qaeda. An additional
challenge is the fluid nature of the threat, given the apparent fragmentation of Al Qaeda, and
Ayman al Zawahiri’s struggle to assert leadership of the group in light of challengers such as
Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Finally, concerns regarding these issues might shape
ongoing reevaluations of the federal statutes that underpin current U.S. counterterrorism policy,
including the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40).
In addition to the AUMF, Congress has addressed the emergence of Al Qaeda affiliates through a
number of channels, including oversight of executive branch counterterrorism policies and
practices; authorization and appropriations of U.S. funds for counterterrorism operations; and
assistance for partner nations engaged in such operations.
Note: In addition to focusing on Al Qaeda affiliates, or groups that have publicly sworn
allegiance to Al Qaeda leadership and been formally accepted as affiliates, this report also profiles
a selection of other groups such as the Islamic State (formerly known as ISIL or ISIS) and Boko
Haram.

Congressional Research Service
Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa

Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Al Qaeda: Background and Ideology ........................................................................................ 2
Rise of Affiliate Groups ............................................................................................................. 3
Regional Context ....................................................................................................................... 5
U.S. Government Terminology.................................................................................................. 5
“Affiliates” as a Framework for U.S. Policy ............................................................................. 7
Jihadist Debates over Al Qaeda’s Future ................................................................................... 8
Comparing the Aspirations of Various Affiliates ....................................................................... 9
Sub-regional Profiles of Al Qaeda Involvement ............................................................................ 10
The Levant and Iraq ................................................................................................................. 10
Origins and evolution of Al Qaeda affiliate(s) .................................................................. 10
Yemen and the Horn of Africa ................................................................................................. 13
Yemen ................................................................................................................................ 13
Horn of Africa ................................................................................................................... 16
North and West Africa ............................................................................................................. 18
Origins and Evolution of Al Qaeda Affiliate(s) ................................................................. 18
Select Policy Debates..................................................................................................................... 24
Competing Views of the Al Qaeda Threat ............................................................................... 24
Al Qaeda Weakened .......................................................................................................... 24
Al Qaeda Expanding ......................................................................................................... 24
AUMF Reform .................................................................................................................. 25
Executive Branch Authorities and the Separation of War Powers ........................................... 27
Overlapping or Competing Interests........................................................................................ 28
Long-term Goals ...................................................................................................................... 29
Possible Tools for Congress ........................................................................................................... 30
Military Force .......................................................................................................................... 30
Building Partner Capacity ....................................................................................................... 31
Counter-Radicalization/Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programs .............................. 31
Development Aid ..................................................................................................................... 31
Democracy Promotion ............................................................................................................. 32
Terrorist Financing .................................................................................................................. 32
Intelligence Collection and Gaps ............................................................................................. 32
Multilateral Engagement ......................................................................................................... 32
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 33

Figures
Figure 1. Areas of conflict and/or Islamic State and Nusra Front Operations ............................... 13
Figure 2. Al Qaeda in Yemen and the Horn of Africa .................................................................... 15
Figure 3. Al Qaeda in North and West Africa ................................................................................ 23
Figure A-1.AQIM .......................................................................................................................... 36
Figure A-2.Al Shabaab .................................................................................................................. 38
Figure A-3.AQAP .......................................................................................................................... 40
Congressional Research Service
Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa

Figure A-4.Nusra Front .................................................................................................................. 42
Figure A-5.The Islamic State ......................................................................................................... 43
Figure A-6.Boko Haram ................................................................................................................ 45
Figure A-7.Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar bel Mokhtar ............................................................... 46
Figure A-8.Ansar al Sharia - Benghazi .......................................................................................... 48
Figure A-9.Ansar al Sharia - Tunisia ............................................................................................. 49
Figure A-10.Ansar Bayt al Maqdis ................................................................................................ 50

Tables
Table 1. FTO and SDGT Designations .......................................................................................... 34

Appendixes
Appendix. Group Profiles .............................................................................................................. 36

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 51

Congressional Research Service
Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa

Introduction
Since the 2001 attacks of September 11, groups espousing Al Qaeda’s ideology have proliferated
in the Middle East and Africa. Some of these groups have pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda leader
Ayman al Zawahiri, and others have not. Even among the groups that have formal alliances with
Al Qaeda, there is significant variation over the extent to which they are operationally integrated
with Al Qaeda’s senior leadership in practice. Some of these groups, despite the formal alliances,
emerged in the context of local conflicts and are self-sustaining. In a 2014 interview, Zawahiri
appeared to acknowledge a degree of decentralization, stating that “Al Qaeda is a message before
it is an organization.”1 President Obama in a speech at West Point in May 2014 stated, “Today’s
principal threat no longer comes from a centralized Al Qaeda leadership. Instead, it comes from
decentralized Al Qaeda affiliates and extremists, many with agendas focused in the countries
where they operate.” While the groups discussed in this report focus the majority of their attacks
on local targets, they have been identified by U.S. officials as posing a credible threat to the
United States or its allies, or to U.S. interests in the Middle East and Africa.
The rise and rapid expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has reignited a debate over the
type and scope of policies and legislation needed to provide the tools to fully address the threats
posed by such groups. In addition, the ongoing debates within Al Qaeda itself—over leadership
and tactics—may prompt a reexamination of previous understandings of the group, and the ways
in which it may have evolved since the September 11 attacks. This report will provide an
overview of select groups, and address the debates and evolution ongoing within Al Qaeda that
may change the nature of the problem U.S. policymakers will be confronting. Additionally, it will
discuss the tools Congress uses to address this problem, and the debates over policies and
legislation.
Scope and Sourcing Note: This report focuses on Al Qaeda affiliates, or groups that have
publicly sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda leadership and been formally accepted as affiliates. This
includes Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
the Nusrah Front, and Al Shabaab. This report also profiles a selection of other groups that are not
Al Qaeda affiliates but may have organizational links or ideological similarities with Al Qaeda or
its affiliates and pose a credible threat to the United States or to U.S. interests in their areas of
operation (see Appendix). These include the following:
• The Islamic State (formerly known as ISIL or ISIS). A successor to Al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI), which targeted U.S.-led forces. Al Qaeda leadership in February 2014
disavowed the group in response to its brutal tactics, infighting with other Sunni
groups, and a long-running dispute over limits to its areas of operation.
• Al Murabitoun. The group publicly swore allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2014, and
U.S. officials have described it as the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the Sahel.
Al Qaeda’s leadership to date has not publicly accepted Al Murabitoun as an
affiliate.
• Groups sometimes referred to as “affiliates of affiliates,” such as Boko Haram,
Ansar al Sharia, and Ansar Bayt al Maqdis. These groups are reported by some

1 Ayman al Zawahiri interview with Al-Sahab Establishment for Media Production, entitled “Reality between pain and
hope,” April 18, 2014.
Congressional Research Service 1
Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa

sources to have some operational ties to Al Qaeda affiliates, and Ansar al Sharia
has staged attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in the region.
This report draws from a variety of open sources, most of which CRS is not able to verify
independently.
Al Qaeda: Background and Ideology
In 1988, Osama bin Laden formally established Al Qaeda from a network of veterans of the
Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union. The group conducted a series of terrorist attacks
against U.S. and allied targets, including the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole docked in Aden, Yemen. After the attacks of
September 11, the United States redoubled its counterterrorism (CT) efforts, forcing the group’s
leadership to flee Afghanistan—where they had been hosted by the Taliban—and seek refuge in
the tribal belt of northwest Pakistan. U.S. forces in 2013 located and killed Bin Laden in Pakistan,
and Bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al Zawahiri assumed leadership of the group. U.S. intelligence
officials have argued in open testimony to Congress that persistent CT operations against Al
Qaeda since 2001 have significantly degraded the group’s ability to launch another major attack
in the United States.
Al Qaeda’s ideological agenda, which is shared in varying degrees by its affiliates and other
groups, focuses on the expulsion of foreign forces and influences from traditionally or
predominantly Islamic societies and the eventual creation of an Islamic state ruled by a system of
Islamic law (sharia). To achieve these goals, Al Qaeda reportedly calls upon its members to
pursue a range of measures, including
• Salafist2 Islamic reform. The group advocates for the enforcement of a strict
interpretation of sharia, although Al Qaeda leadership has differed on how
quickly sharia should be imposed on populations under the group’s control or that
of its affiliates.
• Defensive jihad. Adherents are called to pursue armed resistance to counter what
Al Qaeda describes as Western aggression. They are instructed to fight Western
encroachment, such as the presence of U.S. troops in the Arabian Peninsula or in
other areas they consider to be Muslim lands.3
• Attacks on the “far enemy.” The organization largely achieved its notoriety for
the series of fatal attacks it planned and implemented against symbolic targets,
including the September 11 attacks in the United States and subsequent attacks in
London, Madrid, and Istanbul. It justifies these attacks as part of its effort to
eradicate foreign influences.

2 “Salafism” refers to a broad subset of Sunni revivalist movements that seek to purify contemporary Islamic religious
practices and societies by encouraging the application of practices and views associated with the earliest days of the
Islamic faith. The world’s Salafist movements hold a range of positions on political, social, and theological questions
and include both politically quietist and violent extremist groups.
3 This is Bin Laden’s interpretation. Jihad literally means “striving” or “struggle” and can refer to either an internal or
external struggle. Defensive jihad in traditional Islamic thought refers to the obligation of Muslims to defend one
another from external attack.
Congressional Research Service 2
Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa

• Removal of apostate regimes. Al Qaeda calls for the removal of governments not
based on its interpretation of sharia law because it views such governments as
empowering human rulers and man-made legal systems over divine law. Al
Qaeda leaders have described democratic principles as un-Islamic and
tantamount to apostasy, which is punishable by death. They have also called for
the overthrow of regimes they judge to be insufficiently Islamic, such as the
Saudi monarchy.
• Economic warfare. Bin Laden and Zawahiri urged followers to attack economic
targets to weaken both the West and local regimes. In particular, they called on
supporters to conduct attacks on oil infrastructure in the region to deny the West
access to the region’s oil resources.
• Attacks on non-Sunni Muslim religious groups. Al Qaeda considers Shia Muslims
to be apostates, and some leaders have encouraged attacks against local Shia
populations. Other Al Qaeda leaders argue that such attacks should not be a
priority as they can alienate the broader Muslim population. Al Qaeda leaders
also regularly espouse anti-Israeli rhetoric, although there have been few, if any,
operational missions against Israel.4
In their advocacy and recruitment efforts, Al Qaeda leaders have expressed support for and
appealed to non-Arab Muslims—particularly those engaged in conflicts in Chechnya, Bosnia,
Kashmir, and the Philippines—emphasizing that Muslims constitute one global nation or ummah.
Rise of Affiliate Groups
Al Qaeda began as a hierarchical movement but began to decentralize after the American-led
invasion of Afghanistan overthrew the Taliban, eliminating Al Qaeda’s sanctuary in that country.5
Affiliate groups, many of which had existed in some form prior to 9/11 but without formal ties to
other groups, gradually began to formally align with Al Qaeda. Despite these alliances, most
affiliates continued to focus primarily on local grievances and did not adopt Al Qaeda’s call for
global jihad against the West as an immediate priority. While Bin Laden in 2004 referred to the
confrontation between the U.S. and its allies on one side and jihadist movements on the other as a
“Third World War,” open source data indicates that affiliate groups to date have remained focused
primarily on local disputes. AQAP, which has attempted at least two failed attacks on U.S. soil, is
a possible exception—although the overwhelming majority of its attacks target Yemeni military
and security forces.
Analysts disagree on the level of threat posed to the United States by affiliate groups relative to
the remnants of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Administration has drawn a sharp
distinction between groups that actively seek to target the United States and those that it believes
are focused on local attacks and/or lack the capability to launch a major strike on U.S. soil. At the
same time, some observers contend that Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and like-minded actors are
growing in strength and influence; they argue that these diverse groups—if considered as a single

4 “Zawahiri aims at Israel: behind al Qaeda’s pivot to the Levant,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February
2, 2014.
5 Joseph Felter et al, Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities, Combating
Terrorism Center, p. 709.
Congressional Research Service 3
Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa

entity—control more territory in the Middle East and Africa than at any previous time.6 Local
affiliates could eventually grow to pose a threat comparable to that of Al Qaeda senior leadership,
some argue. Even groups that start out with local aims may see themselves as part of an
international struggle and expand their areas of operation once resources permit—as was the case
with Somalia-based al Shabaab, which in 2013 attacked the Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya.7
Another point of debate is the amount of control that Al Qaeda leadership is able to exercise over
affiliate groups. At a press conference following the 2011 Abbottabad raid that killed Bin Laden,
a U.S. intelligence official noted that initial analyses of recovered documents “clearly show that
Bin Laden remained an active leader in Al Qaeda, providing strategic, operational and tactical
instructions to the group.”8 However, researchers at the Combatting Terrorism Center at West
Point used internal Al Qaeda documents released after the raid to assert that the organization’s
leadership was internally divided over how to deal with its affiliate groups and frustrated at its
inability to control some local fighters.9 Researchers studied the limited documents declassified
following the raid—including letters and other communications from Bin Laden and other Al
Qaeda leaders—and noted that, “far from being in control of the operational side of regional
jihadi groups, the tone in several letters authored by Bin Laden makes it clear that he was
struggling to exercise even a minimal influence over them.”10
A separate set of documents recovered by the Associated Press in Mali suggest that just as Al
Qaeda’s leadership may struggle to control its affiliate groups, those affiliates, in turn, may
struggle to control their own members. In one document, AQIM’s governing board censures a
local commander for his refusal to follow directives.11 The fighter in question later split from
AQIM to form Al Murabitoun. In the same set of documents, AQIM leaders also claim that there
is distance between themselves and Al Qaeda leaders, noting that AQIM had received little
communication from Bin Laden and Zawahiri since formally becoming an affiliate in 2006.
However, some observers who argue that Al Qaeda is expanding geographically contend that the
ability of Al Qaeda leaders to assert command and control is irrelevant if affiliate groups are
committed to the same objectives.12
Despite the tension captured in internal communications between Al Qaeda leadership and some
affiliate groups, leaders on both sides generally have maintained a public display of unity,
possibly calculating that this strengthens the image of both parties. However, the apparent unity
of objectives does not appear to be matched by a similarity of capabilities, and thus different
counterterrorism policies and programs might be more effective than one standard approach.
Policymakers may also calibrate responses to various groups based on the extent to which they
see the affiliates as integrated versus independent.

6 “Al Qaeda controls more territory than ever in Middle East,” CNN, January 7, 2014.
7 “The franchising of al Qaeda,” New York Times, January 25, 2014.
8 “Background Briefing with Senior Intelligence Official at the Pentagon on Intelligence Aspects of the U.S. Operation
Involving Osama Bin Laden,” Department of Defense News Transcript, May 7, 2011. http://www.defense.gov/
Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4820.
9 “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 3, 2012.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CTC_LtrsFromAbottabad_WEB_v2.pdf.
10 Ibid, p13.
11 “Rise of Al Qaida Sahara terrorist,” Associated Press, May 28, 2013.
12 “Report: Obama admin never defined Al Qaeda,” Washington Free Beacon, April 24, 2014.
Congressional Research Service 4
Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa

Regional Context
Some affiliates have refined their tactics as a result of Al Qaeda’s experience in past conflicts—
including against the United States—which may give them an advantage over other, newer groups
that lack access to similar institutional knowledge.
• U.S. CT policy. Effective counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda’s
leadership have made it difficult for those leaders to travel and communicate.
Their need to avoid detection may have hindered their ability to closely manage
groups or enforce directives. The U.S. factor thus presumably prompted affiliates
to become more self-reliant—even groups that may have preferred greater
direction and guidance from Al Qaeda’s senior leadership.
• Experience. Some leaders of affiliates and ideologically similar groups—
including those of AQAP, the Islamic State, and the Nusra Front—were able to
draw from their experiences fighting U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan to help inform their tactics as they expanded into new geographic
areas.
• Organization. The training, discipline, and structure provided by Al Qaeda
affiliated groups may have increased the appeal of these groups relative to
newer—and often more disorganized—armed groups. In Syria, for example, a
new recruit described the Al Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front as “professional,” and
said he decided to join them –rather than other armed groups—after observing
their skill in planning operations.13
U.S. Government Terminology
The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40) enacted by Congress in
September 2001 is the primary law authorizing U.S. operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
U.S. administrations later established categories of Al Qaeda-linked groups, each of which carries
potentially distinct legal and policy implications. The terms below do not appear in the original
AUMF text; rather, they have been delineated in a series of subsequent legal rulings and
executive branch strategy papers.
• Associated Forces: organized, armed groups that have entered the fight
alongside Al Qaeda or the Taliban, and are co-belligerents with Al Qaeda or the
Taliban in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.14 Once
established as co-belligerents, associated forces are considered legal targets of
U.S. military force per the laws of armed conflict—which are commonly
interpreted to permit a country at war to use force against those fighting
alongside its enemy.
• Affiliates: groups that have aligned with Al Qaeda. This includes associated
forces as well as groups and individuals against whom the Obama Administration
considers the United States is not authorized to use force based on the authorities

13 “Syrian rebels tied to Al Qaeda play key role in war,” New York Times, December 8, 2012.
14 Testimony of Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, May 21, 2014.
Congressional Research Service 5
Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle East and Africa

granted by the AUMF.15 The United States may use force against affiliates that
have been further classified as associated forces.
• Adherents: individuals who form collaborative relationships with Al Qaeda or
act on its behalf or in furtherance of its goals—including by engaging in
violence—regardless of whether such violence is directed at the United States.16
• Al Qaeda “Inspired”: Groups or individuals not affiliated with identified terror
organizations but inspired by the Al Qaeda narrative.17
U.S. officials occasionally use these terms interchangeably, with some mixing the category of Al
Qaeda affiliates—groups that have publicly sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda leadership and been
formally accepted as affiliates—with the category of groups considered “affiliates” under the
AUMF—groups aligned with Al Qaeda against which the United States is not authorized to use
force.18 The United States to date has not publicly categorized most individual groups into one of
the above designations, nor has it identified consistent criteria by which to do so. A Pentagon
spokesperson in mid-2013 stated that a list identifying which groups the Administration viewed
as associated forces should remain classified, arguing that its release would damage national
security by bolstering the groups’ credibility.19 Department of Defense General Counsel Stephen
Preston in a May 2014 hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated that he
could not speak publicly about which groups the Administration had determined it could target
under the AUMF.
Establishing Criteria for “Associated Forces”
In a 2008 court case, the Bush Administration argued that a group should be considered an “associated force” if 1) it
was part of a supporting force associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban and 2) that supporting force was engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. The court noted that, under this definition, a group’s
connection to Al Qaeda or the Taliban would need to be “considerably closer than the relationship suggested by the
usual meaning of the word ‘associated,’” a standard that the court found the government unable to meet in that case.
The Obama Administration in a 2009 brief declined to define “associated forces,” stating that the definition would
require further development through its “application to concrete facts in individual cases.” In habeas cases to date,
the term “associated forces” has generally covered only armed groups assisting the Taliban or Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan. However, the Obama Administration has suggested that it may apply the term to groups based in other
countries, and testimony by the Defense Department’s General Counsel in May 2014 referred to AQAP as “part of,
or at least an associated force of, Al Qaeda.”20 For more information on the AUMF, see CRS Report R42143,
Wartime Detention Provisions in Recent Defense Authorization Legislation, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.

15 2011 National Strategy for Couterterrorism. Note: previous versions of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism
were issued in 2003 and 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.
16 Ibid.
17 See for example, “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” Department of
Defense, February 2013. http://www.defense.gov/news/Homelanddefensestrategy.pdf.
18 See for example, Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
(SOLIC) Mike Lumpkin, and the Commander of Special Operations Command, Admiral Bill McRaven, before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, March 11, 2014. On page 12, Lumpkin states, “If it’s, again, one of those al Qaeda
affiliates, then the AUMF gives us the authority to act as necessary.” http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/14-17%20-%203-11-14.pdf. He later states, “I think that if there is an affiliate, an associate, and it’s been
recognized, regardless of what they call themselves in the relationship, I think that—of course we’d go to the lawyer’s
group, but my sense is that we would probably be in a good place to use the AUMF.”
19 “Who are we at war with? The answer is (still) classified,” The National Interest, July 26, 2013.
20 Testimony of Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, May 21, 2014.
Congressional Research Service 6