Akalanka's Criticism of Dharmakirti's Philosophy

334 Pages·1965·43.948 MB·English

by  Nagin J. Shah

LalbhaDia lpatbShearii es
General Editors:
Dalsukh Malvania
Ambala�P� b
..iW!. _
11
No.
AKALANKA'S
CRITICISM
OF
DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY
A STUDY
'J3j.
Shall,
Dr.N aginJ .. M.A.P,h .D.
Dy. Director, L. D. Institute of Indology,
Ahmedabad-9
, .
L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOCY
AHMEDABAD-9
1967
A thesis appro�ed fort he Degree of
Doctoorf P hilosopihnyS anskrit
by the
Gujarat University
1965
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First Edition : 150 Copies March 1967
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FOREWORD
We haveg reatp leasurien publishitnhgi sS tudyo f Akalanka's
Criticiofs mDh armakirtPih'isl osopah yw,o rko fv aluabrlees eardcohn e
by Dr. t\agin Shah undert he esteemed guidance otD r. Pt. Sukhlalji
SanghavTih.e a uthohra sd onef uljlu stitcoe t hes ubjeactnd hasg iven
unmitsakableev idence ofa wide st-udnyo to nlyo f Buddhist andJ aina
worksb uta lsoo f Brahmanicwaolr ks.H e has selectseodm e main
problemosf metaphyss iacnd epistemol/)agnyd has compareda nd
contrastthee dt heorioef sD harmakirwtiit ht hosoef Akalakna int he
main. Dharmakirti is a Buddhist olfo ggriaectir aenp utaen d Akalanka
isa brilliJaanitn lao giciaSnu.c ha studyn o doutb helpsu si nu nder·
standicnlega rlyt hes tandpgints of differenstc hoolosf thought and in
additi-omna keuss aw�reo ft h� c<?�tr�iipounm adeb y.. o..n.e s chootlo t he
develompento ft heoriuepsh elbdy' 3;.ijQthers chool.D r. Shah rightly
deservoeusr congratulaftoirot nhse p resenstt udy.
I am suret hispu blai,ctiwoinl plr oveu sefutlo allt hosien terested
.
in thes tudoyf I ndiaPnh ilosop:h� y.
L. D. Institute of Indology
Dalsukh Malvania
Ahmedabad
Director
11-3-67
INTRODUCTION
This is au humble attempt at a study of Akalanka's criticism
of
Dharmakirtrs philosophy. This present study is a thesis which was
approved for Ph. D. degree in Sanskrit by Gujarat Uni\rersity in 1965.
Modern scholars have studied both-the Buddhist and the Jaina systems
in their various aspects. But no one, so far as I know, has attempted
a study of a particular philosopher of one system ill relation to
a
particular 1>hilosopher of :UlOther system even when there is clear
a
evidence of the fnct that one has vehemently criticised the other. Such
a study, I think, makes us aware of the interplay of the influence of
one system 0;1 tne other and helps us in understanding cle9rly tbe
standpoints of both the systems. And hence this study.
In prepari11g this work I have drawn UpOll the original Sanskrit
works of both the logicians. I haye also studied the Sanskrit commen­
taries on these works so that the ideas of the original works might
become clearer. In tracing the development of the two traditions I have
utilised Pali and rrakrt works also. For the understanding of the 'logic
of these two traditions I have consulted the works of modern scholars,
as for example, MookerH's 'The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal
i.' •.
Flux' and 'The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism', Th. Stcherbatsky's
Logic:, Tatia's 'Studies in Iaina Philosophy', etc. (cf. Biblio­
r?uddhist Dr.
graphy). In erder to bring out the contrast of these two standI�pints with
:·thers and to show the logical (not chronological) deyelopment of ideas
: have referred to the views of other systems as well on the problems
concerned. And for this I have mostly made use of the original Sanskrit
works of the respective systems.
I have selected Some main problems of metaphySics and epistemology
and keeping these problems in view I have studied Dharmakirti's pOSition
and Akalanka's refuta tion of it. I have also given Akalanka's own
position and at the end my observations on the two standpoints.
The work is devided into three parts. In the first part an attempt
has been ade to give a brief and general sketch of the development
m
of the two thought-currents reSpect of the problems concerned, of
in
course, upto Dharmakirti and AkalaIika.
In the second part some main problems of metaphysics have been
dis ussed with special reference to Dhartnakirti and Akalankn. This
c
part contain,s three chapters, the first on the criterion of reality and its
vi
application, the second on the problem of universals, and the third on
idealism vs. realism.
In the first chapter, at the outset, I have tried to show l10w gmdually
t'
man formulates clearly and precisely the right questiou- \Vhat is the
�
essence of r a1ity?"-.after having passed through a stage of mere catalogu�
ing and divisions and sub·divisions of reals. 'rhen I hnse explained fully
Dharmakirtj's view on the essence of Existence. J have demonstrated
how he pro'\'es that ouly momentary things can be causally efficient. I
have also studied the doctrine called }/irllclukavillasavada which is a
n:ecessary corollary of the doctrine of momentaris111. Then foll�ws
AkalaIika's refutation of Dharmaklrti's position. It brings out some
weak points of the doctrine of lllOU1entaris1ll. I have given Aktllmika's
own view on the problem under consideration. He is an advocate of
Parit{amitzi{yata.
the doctrine of At the end of the chapter I huYe tried
to show the strong and the weak points of both the theories.
The second chapter is on the problem of universals. This problem
comes before the philosopher when he raises the question 9S to bow one
can explain the cognition of identity or similarity in respect of different
individuals of a class. This necessitates acceptance of unhrersaJs. After
having stated the problem in this manner I have gh"eZl various views
expressed in the philosophies of India ill order that we may be able to
mark off the specialities of Dhannakirti's and Akalnnka's views on the
nature of universals. Then I have explajned at length Dharmakirtfs
positoin. I have demonstrated how Dharmakirti explains the cognition
of identity in, and applicatoifo no nen ame to many individuals even
without positing a positive real universal in them. I am afraid this
portion hasb ecome rather lengthy and therefore even tedious. But I
deem it necessary to explain Dharmakirti's position at length even
against my sense of proportion be�ause his is a peculiar view and
requires full expositioAnf.t er this comes AkaJanka's refutation of
Dharma.kirtpios'isito n I ha.ve supplemented this criticism with the one
.
by Prabha-canad inr order that we may have a completpeic ture of the
Jainac riticiosfm Dhramakifti's position. Thel1I, haye expalined
Akalr.Iiksa o�wn positiroeng arditnhge natuorfeu niversaanlds pointed
outt hatt herdeo esn ote xista ny discrepanbceyt weenth e views of
Samantabhadarnad A kalankaI .h avea lsoco nsiderpeodss ible objections
against Akalankap'oss tioin. At thee ndo ft hec hapter I have tried to
show,i nc onclusihoonw, the Jaitws avoid the two extrernes--one of
the Nyaya-Vais:�siykstae m andt he other of the Buddhisstys tem. For the
Jainatsh,e universal is nothing but similar qualities of things. Things
�
ook similar because they have similaqru aliteis. But they dee1l1 it
Impr,op er to askf urthears t o Why qualities look similar, The Nya-ya-
.1
Vll
Vaise�ikas go further and posit one self-identical impartite independent
entity in many things to explain the cognition of similarity in respect
of them. The Buddhist logicians think that there is nothing positive in
things that gives rise to the cognition of similarity in respect of them.
The things look similar only' because they possess exclusion-of-the·opposite
(atad-ifY'iiUftti) in common. Thus for them uuiversnl is nothing but the
exc1usion-of.the.opposite. The 1ainas do not consider the universal to be an
independent entity, nor do they regard it as merely of the nature of the
exc1usion-of·the·opposite; for them it is nothing but similar qualities.
In the third chapter the problem of idealism vs. realism has been
dealt with. The chapter opens with a general exposition of idealism,
realism and materialism, and their Indian forms Then, the possible
.
causes of the development of Vijiianavada idealism have been discussed
and a very short sketch of the literature of Vijiianavada upto Dharmakirti
has been given. This is followed by a rapid survey of the arguments for
Vijiianavada as presented in the systematic treatises, viz. Vljiiaptimatrata:.
siddhi of Vasubandhu and Alambauaparik�a: of DiIina:ga. On the basis of
this one will have a comparative idea of Dharmakirti's treatment of the
same. After this, Dharmaklrti's own version of Vijiiiinaviida has been
given. This is mainly based on his Pralllat;lava:rtika. Then follows
AkalaIika's refutation of Vijfianavada. have also felt it necessary to
I
give the arguments advance by others against Vijiianavada in order that
d
one may have an idea of what kind of arguments were generally adduced
against it. In conclusion, I have tried to show that Dharmakirti's idealism
does not prove that there are no external objects; it only tends to show
tha t we have no right to feel sure of existence.
their
In the third part the main problems of epistemology and logic have
beenc onsidered withs pecial reference to Dhartnnkirti and Akalanka.
It contains four chapter�, the first 011 the problems of knowledge in
general, the second on perceptioll, the third on inference and the fourth
on testimony.
In the first chapter I have discussed, in brief, the definitiolls of
vn1id knowledge} the nature of thes ourceosf valid knowledg,era,ri otls
views 011 how we know the validity of knowledge and prama1!a.sathjJ[atJtl
vs. pramul.la.uiplava, etc.
In the beginuinofg the seconcdh apte:arn attempta s hbeen made
tos how thei utimate re1atio1lship between metaphysics and epistemology
(especiatlhleyt heoroyf p erceptioTnh)en.f ollowads e tailed study of the
nature atnydp esof perpectioll according to DbanllnklrH. After this, I
hayc giveAnk nhn'lka'sr efutation of Dharmaklrti'g positioTnh.e refubtiOll
is elaborate and illuminatTihnigs.i sf oHowedb y the.s tatement of
viii
Aka1anka's own position. Next, after having given a briheifs torofy the
definition of perception in general, I have attempted a study of the history
of thec oncepnt ioof indeterminate perception. At this stage, I have
shown that AvibhAalkotcaar ecnoagn ised by Prasastapada comeS 'very near
to Nirllikparlpaaty arekcofgoni sed by Dharmaklrti. Of course, I have not
lost sight of a fine line of distinction between the two. Again I have
,
attempted a study of the old interpretations of the term ( aV)'apJaet.JesyI a ,
used by Gauta1lla, thea uthoorf the Nya:yasutra, in his definition of
perception. I have tried to understand the Vaise�ika, the Nyaya and the
Mimamsa views on the nature of indeterminate perception. At the end of
the chapter, I have arrived at the conclusion that Akalanka has taken
great pains for the establishment of the validity of the determinate
knowledge following in the wake of indeterminate cognition generated
by the external object. Furthermore, while concluding the chapter, r have
attempted to point out that we would be doing 110 justice to any
theory-Dharmaklrti's or Akalanka's if we were to view it apart from
its metaphysical back ground.
The third chapter 011 inference opens with theg enereaxlp lanatoifo n
whati nferenmceea nsT.h enf ollows the discussion on the .problem of
the probandum with special reference to the Buddhist and the Jaina
logicians. After this ('omes a study of the logical grounds of inference.
Here the problem of induction or the problem of the acquisition of the
knowledge of a necessary connection is considered in detail with special
reference to Dharmakirti and Akalanka. Next, the conditions of valid
0.
reason (hetu-ifailllapciaes) o,f reason (helvabanhd atyspaes) of reason
(hetaukarpar)ha ve been discussed. In this connection, I have generally
given the views of the Nyaya logicians also in order to understand the
logical development of the ideas. Under the heading of 'object and status
of inference' I have explained Dharmakirti's peculiar view that though
inference is blzarnat it is parma1J.a and stated also Akalanka's view on the
status of inference. At last, after having studied the differenvitew s on
the number of the members of a syllogism, I have arrived at the conclu­
sion that the Naiyayikas are the pioneers in the field of logic, that
Diilnaga and Dharmakirti have tried to improve upon the Naiyayikas and
that it is left to the Jaina logicians in general and Akalanka in particular
mostly to side with this or that party. But att imes the Jaina logicians
differ from the two on certain topics and they carry the Buddhist
position to its logical conclusion
.
Thel ast chapter on testimony begins with the discussion on the
necessity of testimony. Then the main controversy regarding tbe question
as to whetber testimony is an independent pramaorl} aa form of infer­
ence is stated andk eeping this controversy in view, I have discussed
the Nyaya , the VaiSesika the Buddhist and the Jaina views.S aTmhpaet hN_Eabioyoa:ks-
. ,
yikas are of the opinion that words are directly connected with things,
of course, through convention. They lL.aintain that as soon as we under­
stand the meaning of words we acquire the knowledge of facts and that
the process of understanding the meaning of words is not inferential. So,
they believe that the knowledge through testimony is not inferential. The
VaiSesikas , on the other hand, maintain that the process of understand-
.
ing the meaning of words is inferential. Moreover, though they, like the
Naiyayikas, accept that the words are conventionally connected with
things, they, unlike the Naiyayikas, are conscious of the implications of
this conventional character of the relation. Words are symbols and
not signs. Hence, they contend that words qua words enable us to infer
only the intention of the speaker and not the fact. But they state that
words qua utterances of a reliable person enable us to infer facts. This
view closely tallies with the view of Dharmakirti, except the fact that
Dharlnakirti goes even a step further and maintains that words are not
in any way connected with things. AkalaIika refutes Dharmakirti's
position that words could not directly lead to the knowledge of things.
I have also studied the Jaina refutation of the veiw that te�timony is a form
of inference. Here I have shown that all the differences pointed out by
the Jaina logicians between inference and testimony are trivial and do not
furnish a sufficient gound for their view that testimony is a source of
knowledge independent of inference. In conclusion., I have tried to point
out that the logic of Dharmakirti on this problem is very reasonable.
In this way, by putting forward, in this work, a study of the
criticism of Dharmnkirti, a Buddhist logician of great repute, by AkalaIika, a
brilliant J aina logician, and by keeping iltview the main problems of metaphy­
sics and epistemology in the course of my study, I have attempted to make
my humble contribution to the understanding of the two different view­
points on the problems of permanent philosophical value.
Words fail to express my deep sense of gratitude towards Dr. Pt.
Sukhlalji Sanghavi under whose able guidance this work was done. I
offer my grateful thanks to Pt. Dalsukhbhai 1'1a1vania, Director of L. D.
Institute of Iudology, for the constant help and encouragement I received
from him. It is a fact that whate'\er is good and commendable in this work
belongs to these two savants. And I own the faults that are there in the
work. My sincere thanks are also due to my friend and colleague
Dr. K. K. Dixit for his valuable suggestions. I must express my heart.feI�
thanks to the management of L. D. Institute of Indology for giving me an
opportunity to do researches in the field of my 'own choice and for the
provision it made for the publication of this work. I am thankful to all
!he lear�ed. scholars whose works I have consulted and acknowledged
111 the Blbhography.
L. D. Institute of Indology NagiJn. Shah
Ahmedabad-9
1-12-'66
TABLE OF CONrrENTS
PARTI
INTRODUCTORY
CHAPTER I
TWO TRADITIONS
Page
PhilosoaplhV iicew:s Substance view-Modal view-Syntbetic view ... l
From the Pitakas to Dharmaktrti :
Probleomf PermanenacnedC haneg: Bearing of Buddba's doctrine of
no-substance on his doctrine of change-No-substance tbeory traced
in SaIikbYIl
back tbe Katbopnni�ad-Tbe influence on Buddba's tbeory
of change-Was Buddha really an advocate of momentarism ?-The
Vaibha�ika, the Sautrantika, the Madhyamika, tbe Yogacara and tbe
Sautrantika-Yogacara
schools on the problem concerned. • •• 2
Probleomf UniversaCaltseg:o ry of samarrya unknown to tbe Pali
canon-The Vaibha�ika School's acceptance of the universals under the
name of sabhagata-Nature of universals according to tbis school-The
Sau trantika cri ticism of the Vaibha�ika conception of universals-Maturity
attained in the criticism of DiIinaga and Dharmakuti-Emergence
(Apoha)
of the theory of Negation as a result of tbe c�iticism
of tbe samanya.... ... 6
Vi'ijianavaIddae aml:iT sraced back to the Pali canon-Subjectivistic
tendency found in the canou-"Deviation of the Vaibhasika school
, .
from the spirit of the Master's words--'I'he Sautrantika school greatly
aware of the subjectivity of phenomena-Its theory of representative
perception
paved way for Vijiiannvada ... 8
On PerceptCioonnce:p tion of perception in the Pali canon-No
anthropomorphic way adopted for the uuderstanding of the process of
cognition-The Theravadins' partial abandonment cf the theory of
momentariness to object
make possible causal relation between an and
its perception-The Vaibha�ikas' acceptance of sahahlluhelll for the same
purpose-The Sautrantika utilised saifipya for the same-DiIinaga's and
'
Dharm, akirti's theory of Kalpal1apoif.lza prat.),ak-$a-This corresponds to
Vijfzana skandlza...
9
H"
xii
Sampath_Ebooks
On Inference: Buddba's unfavourable attitude towards tbe science of
debate-This underwent a cOl1sidernble cbange in the age of Abhidba­
mma-8eeds of the science in the Pa-Ii canon-Vinaya PHaka and Katha-·
vatthu show considerable development of the science-Independent
uiuada works-Earliest elaboration of the doctrine of syllogism and
prama1Jas in a section of one chapter of Yogacarya-bhullil sastra-Tarkasa:­
stra a link between a science of debate and a science of logic-Dinna-ga
evolved an independent Buddhist logic in consonance with its metaphy­
sical tenets - Dharmakirti a great expounder of Dinnaga's tradition ....... ll
On Testimony: Buddha's rationality and his emphasis 011 l11dhd­
dual realisation and conviction - His advice to Kalffmas and Ananda­
The same spirit echoed in BobhisattvabhuDli-Asanga and Maitreya accept
Agama as an independent pramaTJa Tucci's 'dew that pramaTJadva),a was
-
the general and mOre common view -Mutually exclusive and completely
exhaustive division of pratyalWI and anutnana done by Dinnaga and
Dharmakirti - Stcherbatsky connects this division with the mutually
exclusive division of Vijiiana skaTldha and Samjfla skandha recognised in
13
Pali canon... . .•
From to
the Agamas Akalaizka:
Problem of Permanence and Change: All' the elements of the doct­
rine of pari1Jama found in the Agamas but not elaborately explained
and put together to form a systematic tbeory of pari1Joma Tattvartha­
-
sutra explains all these elements -Analysis of pari1Jama and its identity
with reality (sat) -Rundakunda's derivation of the term dra�J'a-explana­
tion of mutual relation between draV}'a, gU1J.a and parfiiJ'a Siddhasena
-
Divakara's establisbment of the non-distinction of gll1Ja and pmfa.ya -
his analysis of paryaya into artlzaparyaya and U)'afljaTlapary'li)'a -Pujyapada's
explanation of cladblzava' as 'pratyablzijfla-lzeluta' Akalanka's explanation
-
of the contradiction tbat may be alleged against the three aspects of
reality Pujyapada's explanation of utpada, v)'a)'a and dltraul!Ja Akala­
- -
nka's attempt to pro\'e the identity and defference between draU)'a on
tbe one hand and utpada, V}'aya and dhrauV}'a on the other. Kunda­
kunda's application of this doctrine of pari1J.ama to Jzva, Pudgala,
and J(ala--pujyapa:da, Akalanka and later Jaina logicians attempt to
apply it to even Dharma, Adlzarma and Akasa ••• • .. 15
Problem of Universals: Term dral!Ja used in tbe sense of a universal
(tiryak-samurrya) in the Agamas-Notbing is said about its nature in the
Agamas - Umas'Vati, Kundakunda. Pujyapada, Samantabhadra and Jina-
bhadra on the nature of samaT!),a....
• •• 20
On Perception: Discussion in the Agamas on sense perception in
general - Umasvati's veiw-Jinabhadra and Siddhasena Divakara on the