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R Library ofthe Marine Corps R Am liiilililil m J 3000178459 ""- MANEUVER WARFARE 1 Martin van Creveld with Steven L. Canby and Kenneth Brower S. DIRECTORMARINECOHPSRESEARCHCENTER ATTNCOLLECTIONMANAGEMENT (C40RCL) MuLDC 2040BROADWAYST QUANTICOVA 22134-5107 Air Power and Maneuver Warfare Martin van Creveld for AirWar College ContributingAuthors Kenneth S. Brower and Steven L. Canby Air University Press 401 Chennault Circle MaxwellAir Force Base, Alabama 36112-6428 July 1994 MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY LIBRARY U LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData iiff vanCreveld,MartinL. Air power and maneuver warfare /by Martin van Creveld ; contributing authors, Kenneth S. BrowerandStevenL.Canby. p. cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. — 1. Maneuverwarfare. 2. Airpower. 3. Maneuverwarfare Casestudies. I. Brower, KennethS. II.Canby, SteveL.III.Title.U250.V26 1994 355.4'2—dc20 94-16884 CIP Disclaimer Thispublicationwas produced inthe Departmentof Defense school environmentin the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressedinthispublicationarethoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyorposition ofthe DepartmentofDefenseorthe United Statesgovernment. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and iscleared for publicrelease. Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER ii FOREWORD v ABOUT THE AUTHOR vii CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS ix PREFACE xi INTRODUCTION xiii Notes xvi THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 1 1 Notes 20 2 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION—EARLY GERMAN CAMPAIGNS 21 Notes 56 3 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION—THE GERMAN 1941 CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA 61 Notes 98 PHOTO SECTION 102 4 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION—THE SOVIET VERSION 109 Notes 148 5 ISRAEL: MANEUVER WARFARE, AIR POWER, AND LOGISTICS 153 Notes 189 6 MANEUVER WARFARE AND AIR POWER IN THE 1990s 193 Past Limitations on Air Power 193 Air Power and New Developments 196 Hardware 197 Situational 198 The Cordon Sanitaire ofReconstruction 200 Differences in Styles ofWar for Air Power .... 203 Notes 211 in Page APPENDIX 213 THE INSTITUTE RESPONDS 221 BIBLIOGRAPHY 251 INDEX 259 Illustrations Figure 1 The Campaign in Poland 35 2 The Campaign in the West 42 , 3 The Leningrad Campaign 73 4 German Operations, 1941 77 5 The Campaign in the Ukraine 79 . , 6 The Campaign ofArmy Group Center, June-August 1941 86 7 Moscow: The Battles ofVyazma-Bryansk 92 8 Battles ofEncirclement ofthe Eastern Campaign, 1941 95 9 The 1967 Campaign in the Sinai 164 10 The 1973 Campaign in the Sinai 178 11 The GulfCampaign, 1991 216 Table Expenditure ofTank Armies per 100 Kilometers ofAdvance 15 Divisional Estimated Requirement Rates Daily (Tons) 16 Rates ofAdvance ofTank Armies in the Third Period ofthe Great Patriotic War (GPW) 110 . . . The Soviet Principles ofWarfare at the Operational and Tactical Levels 118 Average Densities ofManpower and Weapons in Breakthrough Sectors during the Great Patriotic War 124 Average Aviation Densities on Axes ofAttack in the Fronts 141 IV Foreword An essential part of the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama, curriculum consists of the study of military history and specific campaigns. Distinguished military scholars often visit the college to discuss and explore issues with the faculty. Martin van Creveld was one of those distinguished scholars. He had previously been commissioned by the Air Staffto investigate the effects of the US Army's move toward a more maneuver-oriented kind of warfare and the effect that move will have on the US Air Force role on the battlefield. The Air Staff was concerned about a host of issues: logistic support for a highly mobile force; friendly force confusion on huge, rapidly changing battlefields; close air support with or without air base support; and a host of other issues. The bottom line for the Air Force concerned several issues of great impact. First, Must air combat change because land combat is changing? and, Is the decisiveness of air power increasing geometrically to the point where the twenty-first century will find it is as decisive as ground power was in the twentieth century? Our guest historian agrees that sophisticated, highly technical air and space developments may have made air power dominant on the conventional battlefield. The great exception, however, lies in the trend away from conventional to unconventional conflict. To Professor van Creveld, nation-states have lost the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. To prepare for a conventional scenario is to prepare for the last war, not the next one. The possibility of more "Lebanons" is much higher than the likelihood of future "Iraqs." The Airpower Research Institute (ARI) of the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), Maxwell AFB, Alabama, also became interested and wished to comment on the entire study. Regardless of the fact that the kinds of warfare may be changing, the experience of the Israelis, the Luftwaffe, and the Soviet air force in supporting fast-moving forces is instructive to an air force that promises to support a steadily faster-moving army. And so the discussion went, with both sides learning much. We invite your interest and dialogue, and invite you to visit Maxwell AFB, Alabama. As the Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s became central to developing air power theory and doctrine, so will that same role be adopted by the Air War College and the Airpower Research Institute in the 1990s. The Gulf War was a watershed for air power; there will never be another just like it, nor will there be an opportunity to fight it again. PETER ROBINSON D. Major General, USAF Commandant, Air War College VI About the Author Martin van Creveld Martin van Creveld was born in the Netherlands but raised and educated in Israel. After taking his master's degree at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, he read for a doctorate in history at the London School of Economics. Since 1971, he has been on the faculty of the history department at the Hebrew University, where he is now a full professor. At present, he is the first occupant of the Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia. His most important publications are Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: the Balkan Clue (1973); Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives (1975); Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1979); Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (1982); Command in War (1985); Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (1989); The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance (1990); The Transformation of War (1991); and Nuclear Proliferation and the Future ofConflict (forthcoming). Vll