Agriculture's Ethical Horizon

295 Pages·2012·2.345 MB·English

by  Zimdahl, Robert (Auth.)

Agriculture’s Ethical Horizon
Agriculture’s Ethical Horizon
Second Edition
Robert L. Zimdahl
Professor Emeritus
Department of Bioagricultural Sciences and Pest Management
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, CO, USA
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Foreword—First Edition
In one sense, the current era of agricultural ethics began in the 1970s when Glenn
L. Johnson, an agricultural economist known for his work on asset fixity, took a
sabbatical at Oxford University to work with several philosophers there. The result
was a series of papers calling for a new area of explicit and logically critical exposi-
tion of the values underlying applied and problem-solving research in the agricul-
tural sciences (1976, 1982). One could also argue that there has been a continuous
and unbroken string of ethical and philosophical reflections on agriculture that can
be dated back at least to Xeonophon’s oeconomicus in the fourth century BC. Here,
one would trace a succession in the twentieth century that notes the writings of
Liberty Hyde Bailey, Louis Bromfield, and Wendell Berry. Bailey (1858–1954), best
known as a taxonomist and for his leadership as the Dean of Agriculture at Cornell
University, was almost certainly the leading agricultural scientist of his generation.
In addition to his many scientific publications, he contributed a number of reflec-
tive philosophical essays, including The Holy Earth and his work for the Theodore
Roosevelt administration’s Commission on Country Life.
Louis Bromfield (1896–1956) was a novelist and Hollywood screenwriter who
turned his pen to farming after returning to his Ohio homeland in the 1940s. During
the 1950s he became a potent spokesman for conservation and the values of rural
life, but his writings are little appreciated today. Wendell Berry (born 1934) is the
current generation’s Bromfield. The Kentucky poet and novelist has perhaps become
best known for his writings on farming and conservation. But Bailey was a leading
agricultural scientist in his own right, and Bromfield worked closely with agricul-
tural scientists such as Hugh Hammond Bennett (1881–1960), the father of soil con-
servation in the United States. Berry, in contrast, largely has been ostracized from
the agricultural science establishment. His trenchant critique of land-grant university
science and education in the 1977 book The Unsettling of America caused him to be
perceived as an enemy by those agricultural scientists who were aware of him. For
reasons that Robert Zimdahl makes clear in this volume, most faculty at agricultural
universities in the 1970s and 1980s simply ignored Berry.
The transition from Bailey to Berry is thus significant, and the neglect that post-
war agricultural science showed for ethics was a central point of analysis not only
for Johnson’s essays of the 1970s, but also for this extended and systematic study by
Zimdahl. Johnson and Zimdahl both emphasize the rise of positivism as a philoso-
phy of science within agricultural universities and research organizations. Positivism
can be succinctly defined as the view that agricultural scientists should confine
their activity to the collection of empirical data and to the analysis of quantifiable
x Foreword—First Edition
relationships among data. It is, on the one hand, clear that agricultural scientists
have never so confined themselves. If Norman Borlaug is the prototypical agricul-
tural scientist of the late twentieth century, one must note his tireless work to ensure
that modern maize, rice, and wheat varieties responsive to fertilizer would be sup-
ported by government and accepted by farmers, not to mention his public advocacy
on behalf of the green revolution (see Borlaug, 2000). On the other hand, it is unde-
niable that sustained, critical debate over the goals of agricultural science has been
exceedingly rare during Borlaug’s professional lifetime. Positivism is the philosophy
that holds that such debate has no place in science. To the extent that scientists such
as Borlaug campaign on behalf of their preferred vision of agriculture, it is consid-
ered to be an extra-scientific activity, a necessary evil, perhaps, but in no sense part
and parcel of the scientific process itself.
As I have argued elsewhere (Thompson, 2004), this brand of positivism had its
philosophical roots in a short-lived philosophical movement associated with the
Vienna Circle philosophers Morritz Schlick (1882–1936), Rudolph Carnap (1891–
1970), and Kurt Godel (1906–1978), among others. The Vienna Circle philosophers
were active in the 1920s and early 1930s, but this philosophical movement may have
had its greatest influence over post World War II through a single book, A.J. Ayer’s
Language, Truth and Logic, published in 1936. The key philosophical doctrine rests
on a theory of meaning that had been promulgated by Gottlob Frege (1848–1925),
according to which the “sense” of a word or sentence must be distinguished from the
thing or state of affairs to which it refers. As Ayer (1910–1989) expressed it, state-
ments are meaningful only if one of two conditions hold: they express purely con-
ceptual relationships that arise in virtue of definitions (the mental “sense”) given to
terms, or they correspond to (that is, describe) possible states of the world. Ayer pro-
posed a “verification principle” for determining whether sentences met the second,
empirical criterion for meaning, to wit, that all empirically meaningful sentences, in
principle, are capable of being determined true or false through the collection and
analysis of data. One consequence of this view was that sentences expressing norms
or values were deemed neither true nor false, but “meaningless.” The positivists den-
igrated such talk, labeling it as “metaphysics,” and implying that it was tantamount
to the outdated superstition of a bygone era.
This form of positivism has had a profound impact on the history of science since
World War II. It has vindicated countless decisions by journal editors, tenure, pro-
motion, and review committees, not to mention individual scientists, who rejected
and repressed themselves or their colleagues when they engaged in speculative,
philosophical, and reflective exercises on the grounds that such activities are “not
science.” In fact, the Vienna Circle philosophers who survived the war and enjoyed
distinguished careers in the United States had discovered a host of problems in the
verification principle by 1950. Each had significantly modified their views, adopt-
ing a form of pragmatism that recognizes the value-laden character of knowledge,
as did Ayer himself. Nevertheless, Language, Truth and Logic was assigned widely
in classrooms well into the 1980s, and undoubtedly had a profound influence on the
philosophical views of scientists who were educated in the 50-year period following
its original publication in the 1930s.
Foreword—First Edition xi
The other book of philosophy that was especially influential was Karl Popper’s
Logic of Scientific Discovery, published in 1935 and translated into English in 1959.
Here, Popper puts forth the view that science progresses not through verification, but
through falsification, by eliminating hypotheses that are inconsistent with data col-
lected through experiments. Popper’s characterization of scientific logic also yielded
the view that science properly is occupied with the formulation of hypotheses that
predict specific outcomes. Although such hypotheses are not “proven” when the pre-
dicted outcomes materialize, the failure of a prediction falsifies the hypothesis in
question. Crucially, hypotheses incapable of such falsifying tests cannot be charac-
terized as properly scientific on Popper’s view. Although the view that science prop-
erly is concerned with the collection of data and the analysis of relations among data
rests jointly on the positivist rejection of metaphysics and on Popper’s more sophis-
ticated characterization of progress through falsification, Popper was one of the most
severe critics of the verification principle from the very outset. In part, his criticism
focused on his view that proving false was more important than proving true, but he
also believed that one would never be able to actually conduct falsifying experiments
without also engaging in philosophical arguments intended to frame and contextual-
ize empirical research, including debates over which experiments to conduct and how
to conduct them. There is a world of difference between Popper’s belief that ethical
norms cannot be subjected to logically decisive falsifying tests and the belief that
they are wholly meaningless.
Popper was right. Science cannot be done without philosophy, and this philoso-
phy includes ethics. In fact, the statement that scientists should confine themselves
to the collection and analysis of data is an ethical norm, a norm for the conduct of
inquiry. Such norms cannot become widely established in scientific practice with-
out a significant amount of philosophical discussion and argument. Thus, in addition
to the value-laden campaigning for which Norman Borlaug is so well known, there
have been countless conversations and exchanges in which scientists have estab-
lished the positivist tenet as an ethical principle for inquiry in the agricultural sci-
ences. In fact, the journal editors and tenure committees who have imposed this norm
of practice have not succeeded in eliminating metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy
from scientific disciplines. They have succeeded only in expunging such philosophi-
cal reflection from the scientific record. The result is that a significant amount of the
work that was necessary to make science possible in the last half of the twentieth
century cannot be passed down to the present generation, nor can it be brought before
a public anxious to believe that science is conducted according to a discipline of
logic, honesty, and adherence to standards of rigor.
The actual philosophy of scientific practice for the period in which the agricul-
tural disciplines took their present shape is thus as ephemeral as the casual remarks
that the scientists who built these disciplines exchanged over coffee. Where are the
books and articles in which the scientists of the 1950s and 1960s articulated
the rationale for developing chemical pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers? Where
are the course syllabi in which instructors in the agricultural sciences discussed alter-
native approaches for understanding agriculture’s impact on the broader environ-
ment? Where is the evidence that this generation of scientists debated and perhaps
xii Foreword—First Edition
rejected the ideas of Albert Howard? The failure to record the considerations and
deliberations that led scientists to undertake the studies that led to the rise of chemi-
cal and molecular technologies in the plant sciences, and to a mechanical revolu-
tion in animal husbandry, has left the current generation vulnerable to the charge
that such developments were undertaken in secret by profit- and power-seeking indi-
viduals with little regard for farmers, farm animals, the environment, or the broader
public.
Even under assault from authors such as Rachel Carson or Wendell Berry, the
agricultural disciplines of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s displayed too little willing-
ness to articulate the reasons for, values behind, and logic of their science. I have
argued that an implicit and poorly articulated utilitarianism was integrated into the
rationale for agricultural science. According to this view, the rising productivity of
industrial agriculture leads to lower food costs for consumers (Thompson, 1995).
The argument runs like this: Because food is essential, because everyone eats, and
because expenditures for food are particularly critical for the poor, the net benefit
from lower consumer prices for food offsets any cost experienced in the form of
environmental impact, as well as farm bankruptcies and associated impacts on rural
communities that may occur as farms become larger and fewer. Although a few agri-
cultural economists, notably Luther Tweeten (1984), have accepted the importance
of articulating the utilitarian rationale of this argument explicitly, this view, if indeed
it is the view of mainstream agricultural scientists, remains wholly implicit within
the biologically oriented agricultural sciences. Does the current generation of scien-
tists see no reason to articulate the rationale for doing what they do, to engage in
self-reflection, or for defending what they do against mounting criticism?
Thankfully, the answer is, “Not entirely.” The movement to embrace ethics has
gone farthest and most quickly in the animal sciences, beginning not surprisingly with
entomology. The controversy sparked by Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 did indeed
result in substantive debate within this discipline. Robert Van Den Bosch offered a
book-length ethical critique of his discipline in 1978, and entomologists were among
the first faculty in agricultural science to publish in the journal Agriculture and
Human Values shortly after it was launched in 1982. However, it is fair to note that
this self-criticism within the discipline of entomology did not embrace the vocabu-
lary and conceptual resources available within philosophical ethics and the philoso-
phy of science. Livestock researchers, the last group of agricultural scientists I would
have expected to break with positivism when I began my own work on agricultural
ethics in 1980, were in fact the first to do so. In retrospect, it is not surprising that
this group would move first because no other area of the agricultural sciences has
been subjected to such sustained criticism from so many different directions. The
lead issue, of course, has been the welfare of livestock in concentrated animal feed-
ing operations, but the food animal industries have dealt with enormous issues with
respect to environment, food safety, and changes within farm structure, as well
(see Thompson, 2001). Here the charge has been led, perhaps, by my philosophical
colleague, Bernard Rollin (1995), who had at least a 10-year head start on me in his
work on ethical issues in agriculture. But many animal scientists have taken up the
task of articulating, critiquing, and refining the key norms for their discipline. Here,
Foreword—First Edition xiii
one must note papers by David Fraser (1997, 1999) and Keith Schillo (1998, 1999),
along with Ray Strickland’s efforts to establish a standing bioethics section at the
annual scientific meetings. Here also there are at least two book-length studies on
ethical issues by animal scientists: Peter Cheeke’s Contemporary Issues in Animal
Agriculture (1998) and H.O. Kunkel’s Human Issues in Animal Agriculture (2000).
Things are not as well developed on the plant side. There is, of course, Wes
Jackson, but Wes long ago forsook the agricultural university/experiment station
complex to become friends with Wendell Berry, and no one would take his ideas to
represent reflective self-criticism on the part of mainstream crop production science.
From the mainstream, the first hints of a call for ethics only now are being heard.
Writing for the centennial issue of The Journal of Agricultural Science, L.T. Evans
closes his reflections on the last 100 years by noting that “future agricultural scien-
tists will be called on not merely to enhance agricultural production, but also to con-
sider more explicitly the ethical as well as the environmental consequences of their
research” (2005, p. 10). Maarten Chrispeels (2003) has coauthored an article entitled
“Agricultural Ethics,” and included a series on the topic as editor of Plant Physiology.
But so far as I know, the volume that you hold in your hands is the first book-length
study to incorporate sustained ethical and philosophical reflections by a mainstream
agricultural scientist working with plants or crop production, at least since roughly
the time that Liberty Hyde Bailey published The Holy Earth, in 1915. Zimdahl has
also gone farther into the philosophical literature than any of the scientifically trained
authors listed earlier. The book you are reading now contains sophisticated exposi-
tions of philosophical concepts such as utilitarianism and positivism, and develops a
careful application of these concepts to the practice of agricultural science.
Some will read Zimdahl’s analysis and react in anger. In itself, that is fine. There
are certainly different philosophical positions that can be taken with respect to the
philosophy of the agricultural sciences than the one Zimdahl develops in the fol-
lowing pages. What must happen next, however, is the translation of that reaction
into words, then into arguments intended to show just where Zimdahl goes wrong
in the reader’s mind. These debates need to be aired at scientific meetings, and the
reactions to this book need to find their way into print, if not in the major scien-
tific journals then in outlets such as Agriculture and Human values or The Journal
of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics. Finally, there must be significant portions
of graduate education in the agricultural sciences given over to the philosophy of
agricultural science. Only then and by such means will the public record of values
and rationale for agricultural research be constructed and laid open to anyone who
cares to look. What is more likely is just what Zimdahl anticipates. Those who disa-
gree with his book will ignore it, just as they ignored Wendell Berry. Perhaps this
will arise from the mistaken and ultimately self-serving belief that to cite and discuss
literature that one disagrees with is to lend credibility to its conclusions; or perhaps
it just is the continuing legacy of positivism that prevents scientists from engaging in
the debate that so desperately needs to happen.
Even the brief and idiosyncratic list of works listed in this preface shows that
agriculture was not wholly without any philosophical reflection during the last half
of the twentieth century. The trouble is that this reflection was disjointed, each effort
xiv Foreword—First Edition
emerging de novo as if nothing had gone before. Here, too, Zimdahl’s approach is an
important departure from the norm. My challenge to the reader of Zimdahl’s book,
then, is to respond in kind. Even for those who are largely sympathetic with the main
thrust of Zimdahl’s argument, there is a responsibility to offer him the benefit of
engaged criticism. It is only through the give and take that occurs when philosophi-
cal ideas are batted about that a literature in the philosophy of agricultural science
can be built. It is only by authors being willing to articulate the reasons why they
see things one way rather than another that we can have a public record of the values
that underlie research and technology choices in agriculture. It is only through such
a public record that we can have the ability to sharpen, refine, and reevaluate those
choices from one generation to the next. And perhaps even more importantly, it is
only through such a public record that we can have any confidence that something
more than the most self-seeking and venal motives actually are guiding the key deci-
sions that are made when articles are published or rejected, scientists are tenured or
denied, grants are awarded, and technology is developed.
It is not in its emphasis on data, logic, rigor, or even quantification that positiv-
ist philosophy of science fails. All these values, perhaps better articulated by Popper
than by Ayer, should be cherished. The error came in establishing a practice of
silence among agricultural scientists when it comes to articulating, critiquing, and
then defending various reasons and rationales for doing things one way rather than
another. This practice is irresponsible because it fails future generations of scientists,
who are deprived of the ability to survey those rationales, examining their strengths
and possibly also finding places where they need to be adapted to changing circum-
stances. Silence is especially irresponsible within the land grant mission of public
science, where the public has a reasonable expectation that research choices be con-
sistent with a broad conception of the public interest. Because the public interest
itself is an open-ended, evolving, and revisable ideal, it is doubly critical that science
intended to serve the public interest be engaged in an ongoing and public process of
evaluation and debate. Zimdahl has taken giant steps in the direction of restoring a
practice nobly evident in the legacy of Liberty Hyde Bailey. Let us hope that his col-
leagues will not fail to honor both Zimdahl and Bailey with a considered response.
Paul B. Thompson
W.K. Kellogg Professor of Agricultural, Food, and Community Ethics
Michigan State University
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Foreword—First Edition xv
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