Again Korea

183 Pages·1968·1.383 MB·English

by  Wilfred G. Burchett

AGAIN
KOREA
by Wilfred G. Burchett
CONTENTS

AUTHOR’S PREFACE 3
1. “FLYING DRAGON” 7
“Three Arrows,” 9; The Political Framework, 11.
2. PANMUNJOM 1967 15
Then and Now, 15; Demilitarized Zone, 17; Unfinished
Business, 18; President Johnson’s Visit, 22.
3. EYEWITNESS 26
First Trip to Kaesong, 26; Preliminaries at Kaesong, 28;
What Demarcation Line?, 30.
4. AUGUST 22, 1951 35
The “Investigation,” 36; Efforts to End Armistice
Talks, 41; Ridgway’s Bombers, 44; Move to Pan-
munjom, 47.
5. “FRATERNIZATION, CONSORTING,
TRAFFICKING” 50
Two Maps, 51; Battle of the Newsmen, 55;
Heartbreak Ridge, 56; Suppression of News, 59.
6. UNDER THE “UN” FLAG 64
Total Destruction, 64; “Strictly Military Objectives,”
66; Blot on UN, 68.
7. “FLYING HORSE” 70
Chollima, 70; Hwanghae Street Mill, 72; At Ham-
heung, 73; New Villages and Cities, 74; New Skilled
Workers, 76.
8. FACTORIES AND FIELDS 81
Industrial Growth, 82; Cooperative Agriculture, 83;
National Dignity, 84; Red Star Farm, 86; Toward
State Farms, 88.
9. KIM IL SUNG 92
Family Background, 92; The First Guerrilla Unit, 94;
Into Korea, 96; Anti-Japanese War, 98; Personal
Leader, 101; Style of Work, 103.
10. TWO-STYLE LIBERATION 106
Suppression of People’s Committees, 107; Soviet-Ameri-
can Joint Commission, 109; North Korean Reforms,
110; People’s Conference in Pyongyang, 114; The Seoul
Regime, 116; The Unification Conference, 118; Demo-
cratic People’s Republic, 121.
11. A BEGINNING AND AN END 124
Preparations for Invasion, 124; The Attack, 128; Rhee’s
Sabotage of Agreement, 133; U.S. Guarantees, 136.
12. JUCHE 139
Vynalon Saga, 139; Intellectuals and the Revolution,
142; The Korean War, 143; Patriotism and Inter-
nationalism, 145; Juche Tractors and Locomotives, 146.
13. REUNIFICATION 151
ROK Deserters from Vietnam, 152; The Police-Ridden
State, 155; North’s Unification Policy, 160; An Internal
Task, 164.
14. KOREA-VIETNAM 166
Parallel Wars, 166; Historical Parallels, 169; Vietnam
Yardstick, 170; Why New Provocations?, 172.
15. ABUNDANT FRUITFUL ORCHARD 174
A Throbbing Economy, 174; Education, 176; Growth
and Defense, 178.
AUTHOR’S PREFACE
In the Spring of 1967, I revisited North Korea. During 1951-54,
I had spent two and one-half years there as a journalist reporting
the ceasefire talks that ended the Korean War. Since then, I have
been covering Southeast Asia and the war in Vietnam in par-
ticular.
My visit was prompted by a number of reasons. Serious inci-
dents reported along the 38th parallel seemed ominously remi-
niscent of events on the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War in
June 1950. Furthermore, as in North Vietnam in the early 1960’s,
commando units from the South had been parachuted or landed
inside North Korea. Charges by the United States that North
Korean guerrillas were infiltrating the South recalled similar
charges used to justify direct U.S. military intervention
in Vietnam at the end of 1961. Vietnam had become a second
Korea. Was Korea, in turn, to become a second Vietnam? That
possibility in itself was reason enough for a visit–to probe the
situation on the spot, to learn how North Korea’s leaders evalu-
ated the prospects.
There were other reasons as well. Unless the Vietnam war
moved on to global, nuclear holocaust, it would be settled even-
tually by political negotiations. In the Western press, the cease-
fire talks which ended the Korean War were mentioned with
increasing frequency, either as a precedent for Vietnam or as
something to be avoided. All kinds of absurdities were spread
about the Panmunjom negotiations. To refresh my memory about
them, from official documents, also seemed a useful reason for my
visit.
When I last saw North Korea 13 years ago, it was a country
totally devastated–the prototype of devastation in North Vietnam
by the terrifying, indiscriminate and unrestricted use of U.S. air
power. Not a city, village, factory, school hospital or pagoda was
left intact. In the name of the United Nations, North Korea’s
populated areas had been reduced to wastelands of ashes and

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4 Again Korea

rubble, its factories to heaps of twisted scrap iron. How had the
Koreans solved the problems of reconstruction? How does any
underdeveloped people face up to calamity of such magnitude? In
the years to come, the Vietnamese people would have to contend
with problems such as these.
Still another question interested me. There were signs that the
North Korean Workers Party under Kim Il Sung was following a
line of its own in the international Communist controversy,
rejecting total adherence to the views of either Moscow or Peking,
while seeming to aim at reconciling what was fundamental in each
position. I was also interested in rumors of a “triangle” of ideas
between Pyongyang, Hanoi and Havana, a kind of “third line.”
Later, I might add–although this is outside the scope of this book–
I went on to Havana for the conference of the Organization of
Latin American Solidarity (OLAS), where it seemed to me that
such a coincidence of positions did in fact exist. It found its
clearest expression in their implacable opposition to U.S.
imperialism as the worst and most dangerous enemy of mankind,
to be opposed by every means, including armed struggle, where
conditions are appropriate. They were also agreed that the greatest
possible effort should be made to bring about unity in the world
Communist and progressive movements for a coordinated and
more effective struggle. Incidentally, the terms “third line” and,
even more, “third force” are rejected by the leaderships of North
Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba. But they do not deny that they
have a community of view, distinct from the views of either
Moscow or Peking. The Korean position is dealt with in detail in
this book.
The implications draws from the serious situation along the 38th
parallel and from plans to involve Japan in war in Korea may
seem over-pessimistic to some readers. However, let me point one
thing out, plans like “Flying Dragon” were drawn up under U.S.
sponsorship in expectation of a swift victory over the forces of the
National Liberation Front in Vietnam. When Saigon’s troops
proved incapable of this, the Pentagon planners certainly believed
that the great weight of the bombs in the North, coupled with the
Author’s Preface 5

enormous deployment of U.S. troops and equipment in the South,
would speedily wipe out the NLF and open up the North,
paralyzed by bombing, for invasion and occupation. If such
expectations had been realized, the opening of a second front in
North Korea must have made very real sense to the Pentagon
planners. Even today, when things have gone very, very wrong in
Vietnam, it might still make sense to some of them.
At the turn of the year, the removal of Robert S. McNamara, as
well as many resignations from the government posts and
increasing nervousness among Senators, indicate a growing
awareness by those “in the know” of new, dangerous measures of
escalation in prospect, not necessarily confined to Vietnam.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s remark about “a billion Chinese
with nuclear weapons” as the real threat to Southeast Asia and to
the United States, emphasizes the strategic aims of the
Washington “hawks,” which remain unchanged. As set forth in the
chapters that follow, Korea plays a key role in these plans.
January 1968 Wilfred G. Burchett

1
“FLYING DRAGON”
“Come and visit us again,” said my host. “Bring your wife and
have a good holiday here. But I advise you to come soon if you
want to see our country as it is now.” He waved his hand toward
the window which looked out on a broad, tree-lined boulevard of
shining new apartment houses and shops. “It is possible that all
this will be destroyed if war breaks out. I say to my comrades that
they should not think they can keep our nice theaters and things as
they are now; they must realize that as long as imperialism exists,
war may break out again. Especially as long as the unification of
our country has not been achieved, things may be destroyed
again.” My host was Premier Kim Il Sung of North Korea, the
place Pyongyang, the date May 20, 1967.

In the weeks prior to this conversation, Korea had occasionally
vied with Vietnam for the headlines. Just a week earlier, Soviet
and American warships literally jolted each other for two
successive days off the North Korean coast in the Sea of Japan,
which Koreans know as their East Sea. Shooting incidents in and
around the Demilitarized Zone which now separates North and
South Korea were making the headlines with ever-increasing
frequency. There were also many less dramatic happenings, news
of which went unnoticed, but which explained the chilling words
that accompanied Premier Kim’s invitation.
The incidents on May 10 and 11, in which the Soviet destroyer
bumped an American warship, took place during American-
Japanese joint naval maneuvers. The day after those maneuvers
ended, American-South Korean naval maneuvers started still
closer to the North Korean coast. These were in turned followed
by Japan-South Korean joint military maneuvers. All three
exercises were based on North Korea as the “imaginary enemy.”
On the day Premier Kim received me, Washington announced a
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8 Again Korea

new U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, William J. Porter, who a
few weeks previously had been assistant to U.S. Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon. A short time before, Washington
had also named as its new Ambassador to Japan, Alexis Johnson,
who had been deputy to General Maxwell Taylor, when he was the
U.S. Ambassador to Saigon. Johnson could be described as the po-
litical expert in the application of “special war” as waged by Gen-
eral Taylor in South Vietnam, Porter as the political expert in the
“limited war” waged there by General William Westmoreland.
Premier Kim referred to President Lyndon B. Johnson’s visit to
the Military Demarcation Line in October 1966, after the Manilla
Conference. He said, “It seems he gave special instructions to his
men on the spot in South Korea. Since that visit the Americans
have greatly stepped up their military provocations in and around
the Demilitarized Zone. They have created tension in this area.”
About the time Premier Kim was giving me his view, Admiral
Grant Sharp, who commands all U.S. forces in the Pacific area,
arrived in Tokyo and together with Ambassador Johnson, held a
closed conference with Japanese Defense Ministry officials.
There was a considerable scandal in the Japanese Diet in the
spring and summer of 1965 when Communist and Socialist
deputies pried out of the Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, the fact that
two plans under the code names “Three Arrows” and “Flying
Dragon” had been drawn up by the Japanese general staff officers
and their American counterparts. The plans called for U.S.
Japanese joint military operations against North Korea as a first
phase, to be subsequently extended against China. “Three Arrows”
was prepared in June 1963 and “Flying Dragon,” a much more
detailed version, a year later. A third variant, “Running Bull,” was
worked out.
“Flying Dragon” 9

“Three Arrows”
“Three Arrows” foresees the outbreak of the war between North
and South Korea, on July 19, 196–. The last figure is left blank. It
was drawn up by some 80 officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of
the Japanese “Self-Defense Forces,” aided by American senior
staff officers of colonel rank. The Japanese officers were headed
by Lieutenant-General Yoshio Tanaka, who clarified during a Diet
hearing that “This is not a study theme for a staff college discus-
sion; it is based on actual defense plans.”
On the basis of three plans, a number of laws, such as
“conscription and requisition,” “universal national mobilization,”
and others completing the militarization of Japanese life, have
already been drafted and could be promulgated overnight. These
laws are sufficiently drastic to crush any elements of Japanese
democracy still existing on July 19, 196–.
Each of the variants takes into account changes in the world
situation since “Three Arrows” was drawn up. The draft laws
provide for concentrating 60 per cent of the Japanese Army, Navy
and Air Force in the southern and western regions of Japan. This
would provide the operational and supply bases for military
operations carried out essentially by Japanese and South Korean
ground forces in one variant, with Taiwan-based Kuomintang
forces in another. South Korean forces would be under Japanese
command, but because of the special Korean situation they would
be operating under the United Nations flag. Kuomintang troops
would be under U.S. command from the operational and logistics
base at Okinawa, where the 5th U.S. Air Force has its
headquarters.
“Three Arrows,” the mother of all other plans, is spelled out in
1,419 pages. The overall drafting work was supervised by the then
U.S. Under-secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatrick. It provides
for the use of nuclear weapons against Korea and China, combined
with landing operations. And, presumably to stimulate Japanese