Aesthetic Values

143 Pages·1989·10.368 MB·English

by  Tadeusz Pawlowski (auth.)

AESTHETIC VALUES
Nijhoff International Philosophy Series
VOLUME 31
General Editor: JAN T.I. SRZEDNICKI
Editor for volumes on Applying Philosophy: LYNNE M. BROUGHTON
Editor for volumes on Logic and Applying Logic: STANISLAW J. SURMA
Editor for volumes on Contributions to Philosophy: JAN T.I. SRZEDNICKI
Assistant to the General Editor: DAVID WOOD
Editorial Advisory Board:
RM. Chisholm, Brown University, Rhode Island. Mats Furberg, Goteborg University,
D.A.T. Gasking, University of Melbourne. H.L.A. Hart, University College, Oxford.
S. Komer, University of Bristol and Yale University. H.I. McCloskey, La Trobe
University, Bundoora, Melbourne. J. Passmore, Australian National University,
Canberra. A. Quinton, Trinity College, Oxford. Nathan Rotenstreich, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. Franco Spisani, Centro Superiore di Logica e Scienze
Comparate, Bologna. R Ziedins, Waikato University, New Zealand.
For a list of volumes in this series see final page of this volume.
Tadeusz Pawlowski
Institute of Philosophy,
University of Lodz, Poland
Aesthetic Values
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS
DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Pawlowski, Tadeusz.
Aesthetic values I by Tadeusz Pawlowski.
p. eN. -- (Nijhoff international philosophy series v. 31)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Aesthetics. 2. Values. I. Title. II. Series.
BH39.P32 1989
111'.85--dc20 89-36467
ISBN-13: 978-94-010-7606-7 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-2452-9
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-2452-9
Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates
the publishing programmes of
D. Reidel, Martinus Nijhoff, Dr W. Junk and MTP Press.
Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada
by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A.
In all other countries, sold and distributed
by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group,
P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
All Rights Reserved
© 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 18t edition 1989
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
Table of Contents
Preface VII
I. Subjectivism
II. Objectivism 33
III. Relationism 41
IV. Panaestheticism 45
V. Relativism and Universalism 63
VI. Monism and Pluralism 83
VII. Aesthetic Values in Avant-Garde Art 101
VIII. Performance 119
Selected Bibliography 137
Preface
What is aesthetic value? A property in an object? An experience of a perceiving person?
An ideal object existing in a mysterious sphere, inaccessible to normal cognition? Does it
appear in one form only, or in many forms, perhaps infinitely many? Is it something
constant, immutable, or rather something susceptible to change, depending on the
individual, the cultural milieu, or the epoch? Is a rational defence of aesthetic value
judgements possible, or is any discussion of this topic meaningless?
The above questions arise out of the most complicated philosophic problems.
Volumes have been written on each of them. The discussions which continue over the
centuries, the plurality of views and suggested solutions, indicate that all issues are
controversial and contestable. Each view can adduce some arguments supporting it; each
has some weaknesses. Another source of difficulty is the vagueness and ambiguity of the
language in which the problems are discussed. This makes it hard to understand the ideas
of particular thinkers and sometimes makes it impossible to decide whether different
formulations express the actual divergence of views or only the verbal preferences of
their authors. Let us add that this imperfection does not simply spring from inaccuracy on
the part of scholars, but also results from the complexity of the problems themselves. The
matter is further complicated by important factors of a social character. The need to
evaluate the surrounding objects and phenomena, rooted in biological and psycho-social
layers of human nature, should be mentioned here. It belongs to the fundamental
activities, and also prerogatives, of human beings. To surround oneself with objects of
special aesthetic value has always been regarded as a sign of prestige and of a high place
in the social hierarchy. In this respect, there are numerous ways in which art is connected
with religion, with social and political life, and with economic factors. Of course, all
these connections could not but influence the phenomena of evaluation, the views on
what is aesthetic value, what is art, what are its functions and rules.
The above considerations contribute to the continuing pertinence of disputes on the
essence of aesthetic value. It is not the purpose of the present book to tell that history;
rather, the book reflects on the basic theoretical problems of aesthetic value. It is,
however, a special kind of reflection. All the problems are discussed and commented
upon from a uniform viewpoint - my own vision of aesthetic value which I call
panaestheticism. .
Does it make sense to advance one's own conception of aesthetic values at the end
of the twentieth century? After all, everything seems to have been said already.
Nonetheless if I present this book to the reader, I am doing so in the conviction that the
problem of aesthetic value can and should be seen in a different way. The manner in
which I do this may raise controversy; all the same I consider it an adequate rendering of
the essence of aesthetic value. The following are the main, general features of my
conception: panaestheticism, objectivism, pluralism, and an empirical approach to the
problem of value.
According to the assumptions of panaestheticism and objectivism, an aesthetic value
of an object is an empirically testable set of its properties: a coloured surface, light,
motion, meaningful signs and texts, etc. This is its potential value. The processes by
which a potential value is transformed into an actual one are discussed in detail. I fully
realize that this element in my conception is the most likely to evoke objections. They
result from the old, traditional way of looking at the problem of aesthetic value. Beauty
was often connected with mysterious matters of religion, with the need to understand the
meaning of existence; also with politics, with the problem of power, with social prestige.
VII
viii
Against this background beauty could not be considered as something recognisable by
normal human cognition. For such cognition can only grasp objects and properties
accessible to everybody, but is not able to conceive of the ideal beauty - an equal partner
of those powers with which it was, and often still is, associated. That beauty might be
identical with sets of empirically testable properties could not, in this atmosphere, be
taken into consideration at all. A suggestion to this effect would be tactless.
I hope, however, that panaestheticism will gradually gain adherents. I even think
that it has already won many, e.g. among avant-garde artists and lovers of modern art;
even though they may not always fully realize their attitude. The experiences of Joseph
Kosuth are very telling here. He endeavoured, above all, to eliminate any aesthetic
operation of his conceptual realizations. To achieve this, he gave up presenting his
thoughts about art on carefully painted boards, and instead chose advertisements in daily
newspapers. However, he did not achieve the intended effect. After all, shabby paper,
sloppy print and layout also exert aesthetic influence; the very words "shabby" and
"sloppy" describe the character of this influence. Learning from his experiences, Kosuth
warned conceptual artists that the use of any materials necessarily results in
"aestheticising" .
Panaestheticism explains the problem of aesthetic values in avant-garde art.
Contrary to the postulates put forward by many artists, avant-garde art is not aesthetically
neutral. It produces aesthetic values, but they are often, although by no means always, of
a very different character. Sometimes they deviate dramatically from what was earlier
considered beautiful or aesthetic. Using all sorts of materials, even industrial refuse or
garbage, acting with the qualities of those materials upon the audience's perception,
avant-garde artists aim, for instance, to evoke disgust toward some received patterns of
behaviour or states of affairs; or endeavour to convince the percipient of the importance
of something and force him to do something about it.
Moderate pluralism, a variety distinguished in this book, is an essential supplement
to the assumption of panaestheticism. It assumes the existence of numerous variants of
aesthetic value. They are all subsumed under one concept whose extension is open. This
means that the set of discerned and accepted values can be enriched by new ones, e.g.
discovered or created in art. Today monism does not sustain comparison with pluralism in
the moderate version. The latter seems to be the only conception which is able to grasp
and adequately explain what is presently going on in the realm of art and aesthetic values.
Monism can be accounted for by the situation which existed at the time of its origin.
Centuries ago the adherents of monism undoubtedly faced an easier task. By reflection
they tried to discern and verbalize the aesthetic value of what then existed in art, above all
in the art of the cultural milieu where a given thinker lived and worked. The formulations
they put forward were, however, general. This is how monistic conceptions originated;
for instance, the view which identifies beauty with symmetry. Today we would stultify
ourselves should we choose to identify aesthetic value with symmetry; or with any other
particular value, for that matter.
Objectivism, a view seemingly not very much in vogue today, complements the
outline of the conception. It is, though, an objectivism of an empirical type; as a result all
basic theses of the conception are open to empirical control, broadly understood. There is
an essential difference between an objectivism so conceived and the traditional, abstract
objectivism, far removed from the ground of empirical facts. The latter conceives of
aesthetic value as a mysterious object, not open to intersubjectively testable cognition,
only to be grasped by a vague cognitive power possessed by a chosen few. As examples
one can mention "intentional objects" of phenomenology, or the ideal beauty of Plato,
which even today has its followers. Such an attitude sometimes brings to mind magic
practices - the belief that the very transfer of beauty in a mysterious, inaccessible sphere
ix
provides the explanation of its essence.
There is another feature of the book which I would particularly like to stress: the
subjects chosen, the way they are discussed and argued for, are all much influenced, and
informed, by developments in art, especially in the art of the twentieth century; in two
chapters - Performance (VIII) and Aesthetic Values in Avant-Garde Art (VII) - these
developments are the main subject of interest.
I think the panaesthetic conception has the greatest chance of constructing a theory
which will provide a full description and satisfactory explanation of all that is currently
considered to be art in the institutional (sociological) sense - i.e. earlier art, twentieth
century avant-garde art, and the latest post avant-garde art.
I take this opportunity to thank Mr. Roderick Mengham, who has edited the English
manuscript of the book.
An important part of the work on "Aesthetic Values" was made possible for me by
the University of MUnster where I spent the academic year 1988/89 at the invitation of the
Philosophical Seminar, Department of Philosophy.
MUnster and Lodz
T.P.
CHAPTER I
Subjectivism
According to an often encountered conviction, unbiased knowledge supported by
common sense and everyday experience speaks for objectivism. The supporters of this
belief claim that whenever we express an aesthetic judgement, we refer it to the evaluated
object while ascertaining the presence of value inherent in it. In contrast with this,
subjectivism is said to be the artificial invention of overwise a reflection. This is,
undoubtedly, a deceptive argument: common sense is a rich reservoir of evidence
supposed to corroborate very different, sometimes contradictory points of view. After all,
it is common sense which gives rise to the idea that the beauty is not in the object, but in
the eye of the perceiver, that the aesthetic value of a work of art cannot be proved - de
gustibus non est disputandum. These formulations are in fact common expressions of
subjectivism, which refutes, or at least questions, the belief that aesthetic judgement
refers to the object, and which links value with the sphere of the emotions and
experiences of the person pronouncing the judgement.
A much more systematic reflection is required to take up a rational stand in the
dispute about the nature of aesthetic value. It does not, however, preclude the
consideration of certain ideas which popular knowledge and common sense suggest.
The best way to understand subjectivism is perhaps to contrast it with the view it is
opposed to. Subjectivism emerged and developed in opposition to the classical,
objectivist conception of value. The latter maintains that aesthetic value - beauty, as it
was formerly called} - exists independently of the perceiving subject, and is everlasting,
invariable, and the same for everyone2• The cognition of aesthetic value is expressed in
judgements. If aesthetic value possessed the properties which the classical conception
ascribes to it, aesthetic judgements would be permanent, and universal - the same for
everyone. Facts, however, testify to something else: to a vast variety and variability of
judgements. Subjectivism ventures to apprehend the problem of aesthetic value in a new
way; it aims to eliminate and explain what it considers the incompatibility between the
objectivist conception and the variability of judgements.
In modern times, subjectivism gained relative ascendency over objectivism, which
dominated in antiquity. In both epochs, however, one can find prominent exponents of
both conceptions3• Subjectivists locate the main source of the arguments substantiating
their standpoint in miscellaneous forms of the variability of evaluations. These may
reveal themselves as changes in the judgements of the same person, or as diversity
between different people who, however, belong to the same cultural sphere, or else as
divergence resulting from cultural or historical differentiation. All these manifestations of
variability testify -in the eyes of subjectivists -to the correctness of their conception. Is
this really the case? What is subjectivism, strictly speaking? How does it substantiate its
thesis? Does the mode of substantiation withstand criticism? Can the subjectivist theory
of value explain satisfactorily the rich variety of phenomena concerning the production
and reception of aesthetic values?
2
1. The Variants of Subjectivism
The subjectivist view of the nature of aesthetic value happens to be formulated in a
variety of ways, some of which differ considerably from others. This is a result of the
changes which subjectivism has undergone throughout its history. As theoretical
reflection grew more sophisticated, it continued to reveal new aspects of the problem of
aesthetic value, thus producing a variety of ways to apprehend subjectivism each of
which corresponds to the actual understanding of the problem. A particular conception of
value would often be accompanied by a corresponding view of the nature and functions of
the aesthetic judgements used to express value. Both issues remain in a direct logical
connection. This calls for their joint treatment, all the more so in that the view of the
nature of value sometimes finds an indirect expression in a corresponding conception of
aesthetic judgement. I shall distinguish here five basic variants of subjectivism; I think
that other possible formulations are either modified versions of them, or depend on them
logically. The order in which I present the particular variants reflects the degree of their
radicalism.
1.1 Variant 1. The form of an aesthetic value judgement may be absolute, i.e. it does not
contain reference to any relativizing factor, e.g. "Object 0 is aesthetically valuable". The
relativized form, on the other hand, does contain such a reference, e.g. "Object 0 is
aesthetically valuable for the person P". There are different relativizing factors. In
discussions on the nature of value and aesthetic judgement, relativizations to a person, a
social or cultural group, or a historical period are usually used.
Those who advocate the conception of subjectivism under present discussion claim
that aesthetic value depends on the perceiving subject. They would also add a
requirement for aesthetic judgements to be formulated exclusively in a relativized way,
e.g. with reference to a person or a social group. Judgements without such a relativization
are inappropriate; according to a more radical view, they are even false, unless they are
abbreviations consciously used as substitutes for full judgements containing
relativization. It follows that one cannot simply state that a given object is, or is not,
aesthetically valuable. One has to point to a person or a social group with regard to whom
aesthetic value is ascribed to the object. It follows further that an object which is valuable
for a given person (group) may not be so with regard to another person (group). This
reveals the dependence of judgement and aesthetic value on a subjective factor, which is
here a person, or a social group.
Subjectivism in this sense does not maintain, however, that aesthetic value depends
exclusively on the subjective factor. This problem remains undecided. Of course, a
difficult question appears, as to how aesthetic value could depend on factors other than
subjective ones (e.g. on the object being evaluated) if aesthetic judgement is liable to
change with the change of a person or a group that accepts the judgement. The answer has
to be looked for in other conceptions of aesthetic value4• It is worth mentioning that the
subjective character of the conception now discussed becomes fully evident when
contrasted with the version of objectivism which claims that aesthetic value depends
entirely and exclusively on the valuable object.
The question as to what aesthetic value is in the conception discussed has been
answered only partially, in a way that defines value only in some respects. We know that
value depends on the subjective factor. Does it depend on other factors as well? The
conception here admits of various answers. There is similar latitude of alternative
solutions with regard to the character of the extra-objective factor, which co-determines
aesthetic value. For example, it may be a definite type of reaction in the perceiving