Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics

144 Pages·2002·9.758 MB·English

by  Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad

ADVAITA
EPISTEMOLO GY
AND METAPHYSICS
AN OUTLINE OF INDIAN
NON—REALISM
‘ CHAKRAVARTHI RAM—I’RA SA D
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In memory of Bimal Krishna Matilal
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Contents
Acknowledgements
Prefaa’
Chronology ofphilosophers
Introduction
5FCTION l: éANKARA: EXTERNAH'I'Y
1 finiLAm And Eh: phllusnphiual tunnuun'k u? ‘\\\1‘\.\i:«x vI.IL
3 SAI'IL; a \Kliulmndhn and the idealist use (If drcnmmg w5:
3 Sunkma. dreaming and nonircalism xC
SECTION II: VACASI’ATI: DETERIVIINACY
l Vficaspati 0n 1771171111111llij’xltl,'(l
SECTION III: SR? HARfiA: EXISTENCE
1 Knowledge and Existence
2 The nonirealist critique of Existence
Discursive Appendix: Reading Sri Hama through 20th-century
anti—sceptical naturalism 201
SECTION IV: APPLYING NON—REALISM
1 Causal connections, cognition and regularity: comparativist
remarks on David Hume and Sri Harsn 213
\‘li
2 Immediacy and the direct theory of perception: problems
from Sri Harsa 236
Acknowledgements
Bibliography 262
Index 267
This book is largely an extensively re-wrinen version of previously
published papers. I wish to thank the following for giving permission
for these papers to be used in [his book.
1. 1993 ‘Knowledgc and the ‘rcal‘ world: Sri Harga and thepmmdmzs‘,
journaloflndian Philosophy,junc. F Kluwer Acadcmic Publishers.
2. 1993 ‘Dreflms and Reality: r\ éahkarite Critique of Viifiinm{1&1le
Philosophy East L’I7L{ “77051, jul}. 4054455 I Umxcrsity uf Huwnn
Press.
u. 1994 ‘Is thc experienced wm‘ld g1 determinate [()m]it‘\'3‘, jum'mll 0/"
L {lyeIndian Comm!an/Jilusupbiml Reward}, Septcmbeerccmnbct
|07‘132 ( Indian Council uf Philosophica‘ Research
4. 1995 ‘The provisional world: Emstcnrlmod, causahry And Sr]
Harsa',]mtmal oflna'imz I’bzlosafl/Jy‘ klul‘clL 1797211 <' Klu\\cr
Academic Publishers
'4'. cIr9i9ti5quDerferaommsclaasnsdicatlheIndcioahnerpehnicleosoopfhyc"x.peArimcmn'cci:umanPl)uin[roisiui[d2/c2uil<i'sai/
Quarterly, july: 225—239. 1 American Philosophical Quarterly.
6. 1996 ‘Causal Connections~ cognition and regularity: Some compnr
ativisr remarks on David Hume and éri Harsa‘, in _].N. Mnhanty

and P. Billimoria (eds) Relativity, Suffering and Beyond: bssays In
Memory of Bimal Martial, Oxford Unwcrsiry Press, Deth
164—186. < Oxford University Press, India.
7. 1996 ‘lmmediacy and the Direct Theory of Perception: Problems
from SriHar52’, in A. Chakmbarti (ed), Studies in Humanities and
Social Sciences (Special Issue), December. 33—56. C Indian
Institute of Advanced Study.
viii
Chronology of philosophers
Preface
This book is dcdlmtcd m Binial Matilai, with whom I first studied Advaita
Indian philosophy, and who saw me through to the completion of a
doctorate whilc he was in the last stages of a fatal illness. (Mayor) Upanigads: 1 1th—7th Centuries BCE
This book has a long ancestr): David Charles, Phyllis Granoff. B&darfiyana: 2nd cent. BCE
Cecilia Lim, Dom Lopes, Guy Padfield, Leanne Piggott, Timothy §ai‘ikara: 8th cent. CF.
Sprigge, Hcemnmn 'l'iwnri and john Williams at various times hclpcd Vicaspari: 10th cent. (IE
With [his pi’oicrt, in J .zH'iz’ry of ways. Over thc years. Arindam Sr? Harsn: 12th u-nr ( I-
(:hakmlmrtL [uluia 1 mm": Raj: l’srretL Stephcn Phillips (ind Nhrk
Sidcrits have dl§(!l\*t\‘i 1nd. gwmmcnred on man}: LISPCCIS 0f rh; pjpc: \ \ogdcara/Viififinavédfi
that non: mm thix hunk: Two annnymous readers improved both rhc
structure uml thc umrcm of the book with their commcms and \r'asulmndhu: 4th can (1E
suggestions. (Tollmgum Jr the Department of Religious Studio Jr Dii'iufig'“ §[h cent. (717,
Lancaster haw prm mind a \xelcmning and >upportive environment in Dlmrmnkirri: 6th CCnt. (I1;
which to finish [his book.
As ever, JuditiL Krishnnn. my parents, m_v hmther, and my fathcr Nyixya
invlaw have made mnm' things possible.
(iaumnm: 2nd cent. (IL
Vfiisyfiyana: 5th cent. CF

Udayana: 11th cent. Cl:
Gangcsa: 14th ccnt. CE
Mimémsé
Kumériia Bhina: 7th cent. CE
xi
CHRONOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHERS

Western Philosophers
René Descartes: 1596—1650 Introduction.
John Locke: 1632—1704
George Berkeley: 16854753
David Hume: 1711—76
Immanuel Kant: 1724—1804
Franz Brentano: 1838—1917
Ludwig Wittgenstein: 1889—1951
Contemporary philosophers
Peter Strawson: l9l9~
Michael Dummett: l925~ Advaita is the system or school (the dars’ana) that is committed to the
,Iitendranath Mohauty: 1927— view that, ultimately, there is only a state of universal being, called
Bimal Krishna Matilal: 1935—1991 brahman, to which all other states of existence — mental and physical
— arc reducible. This commitment is derived from a reading of the
Upmzisads, in which there are reports on and teachings about states of
consciousness that intimate such a radical truth about reality; radical
because ordinary experience, experience as any human can sensibly
understands seems to present 21 reality that is nnthmg like what these
[CXES assert according to the Aanltins,
l The sacred texts, what they report and their significance
The religious significance of the assertions nhnut reality cunmined m
the Upamsads is that that state of being, i.c.. ln’abnztm, is said to be, in
some ultimate way, the State of human beings too. The nature of this
identity, of course, is not evident in the complex, manifold and plural
experiences of human beings but that there is such identity renders
what would be only a description of reality something of pressing
concern to humans. To be hrabman is to be free of the fundamental
misunderstanding and consequent suffering that afflicts the conscious~
nc ‘ 0f the individual human being, according to these assertions.
There is some sort of identity between the misunderstanding,
suffering human consciousness and the ultimate bralvman, and the
realisation of that identity would mean the cessation of the problems
that hcset human consciousness. The ultimate state is therefore also
the supreme good. Encounter with the assertions of these texts is not
a mere matter of gaining knowledge about the way things ultimately
xii
INTRODUCHON
INTRODUCHON
are; it is a matter of being liberated from the way things non- tt(h)eC(8)rt1h‘clcaetnctuhriys.regaadniknagraofitshpersitmaartielmyenCtosnwcietrhnetdh,e ienxptlhiicsitcotemamcehnitnagsryo.f
ultimately are. ‘the Upanisads themselves. In this commentary, he is often more
As mentioned, the reality of ordinary experience is nothing like concerned with the demonstration of an exegetical ground to his
what the sacred texts assert is ultimately the case; but even the views than a philosophical defence of those Views, (which he develops
simplicity of this general formulation is only apparent The ultimacy directly in his commentaries on various Upanisads themselves). But
0f the ultimate consists in its transcendence, for otherwise, the even here, he does attempt to show what is defensible about his
wulhteirmeaatse dweosuclridptiboenssoomfetbhmibngmaancceismspibllye tthoatotrhdeinaurlytimeaxtpeeriisenncoct, creoandcienrgneodf,thhee Udpaome'ssaednsg,agaend,pumroerlye tpohitlhoesoppohiinctalwlhyerweitthhissbyostoekmsI,S
accessible in ordinary experience. But if the ultimate is the ultimate in especially the Buddhist schools, thgt do not have anything, to do with
its transcendence of all that is accessible in ()rdinary experience, what the Upanisads. To the extent that Sankara places Advaita on the map
tishetyhedesptlaOt)u‘s?oTfhtihseitsextthse,waenldLtWhuerlnanpgniu‘atgueluxth0ety iuisieetfaanhidlittyh,ewchoencreepttso otfheInbdeigainnntihnogu.ghStu,bspheiqluoesnotphAidcvalaiitniqnusireyngpalgayes ian reovleerinmoAdrveaictoampflreoxm
understand that something is ineffahle is to understand that it cannut discussions of the conditions ofordinary experience — the requirements
be understood. The Upanisadic seers were acutely aware of this, and for knowledge, the objects of knowledge including the external world
initiated a tradition of negative ‘theology’ (for want ofa better word) in general, the modes of attaining knowledge, the nature of language
tphhaitlosfolpouhryisthoesthiisn dIanydiTahner(eanadre lmnadniyandnneflguaetinvceeds’t)ratreeglieisgiounsedanidn tahnedhmieghaensitnggo,alloagincd, tahneduslotiomna.teWshtaytesihsoaunldineAfdfvaabiltea,triafnistcehnodldesnctehaotf
ttahlekseofs(ttrhaetetgriaensscebnudtenwcietohf) oInlmelmpzaarnt,icbuultarI acmoncsonecqeurennecdenootfwitthhe atlhlethmaatteirsicaulrsreonftltyhaatccevsesriybltey,peengoafgeexiinstaecntcievittyhadtirIesctSeudppatosaendd (u0sinlng-
tmnscendenec ol bmhman. it is of grent relevance to the Advznm transcended? There are two motivatiuns.
philosophers. The first and more doctrinally impurmm mmimfion is that all [l.is
Now, the supreme good is iiiettnhle pi‘et‘i, ' because that gtth philosuphy trains consciousness and brings it to Cl maturity in which
wbehiincgh iosfth[e7rtam/nmsufmo,rnimsti:1onIr0atonelnitnlnernycehuomfanallcotnhseciocuosndnietsisoinnstothtahte t.hienalrvea'lsisaantdioCnriotficailtsriedfelnetcittiyonwitrtahinIczomnlsmcuimousisneasttsairneabmloev.eAmrigsuummelneti,:
constitute ()rtliniir} hnnmn couscmusncss, If that is SO, then what l‘OlL’ standing, and cultivate intellectual virtues that are prerequisite lot
can any intellectual activity, namely, philosophical inquiry, play? After regaining brabman-c0nsciousness. This hook does not have either an
all‘ everything that Could possibly l‘t: reached in such inquiry is explication or a defence of this claim, but it should be recognised as
supposed to be bound by the limits of ordinary consciousness, while relevant to the Advaitii: urge to do philosophy.I
rtheeposrutspre(mase einndteorfpreextiesdtenbcye ttrhaensAcdenmdistitnhso)se alrimeitsa,utihfotrhietaUtpiavne.isaTdhiec inteTlhleectsueaclocnodhVeraenndceosotfentshieblAydvaleistsicimupnodretrasnttanodniengisofttoheesUtapbalniisshadtsh.e
response to this query defines the nature of Advaitic philosophy. This involves both arguing for positions compatible with the Advaitie
view of brahman and reality, and ruling out views incompatible with
Z The motivation for philosophy such an understanding. Why is this motivation relevant? After all7
does it not reveal just that orientation to the world of ordinary
Advaita ostensibly starts from the Brahma Slitra text, a body of brief experience that is supposed to be transcended in the ultimate state of
gsrteaatteemrentdestatihlatincolnatragienlythoeralcordeiscoufssiidoena.s Tmheeasnet Stfiotrbaes eaxrpeloornedthien tlhiibsereaxtpioenr?ieTnhcee.aOnsnwetrhereovneealshatnhde,amybesi,vaallelntthisstamtuusstofbtehitsrwaonrslcdenadnedd
tceoamcmheinngtsaroifestheoUnpanthiissads(,praonbdabwlhyil2entdherceenptruorbyablByCEw)erebowdryitteonf avenrdythaeprperfooarechalltothlisibheraastinoon uilstitmhartoeugvhaluaen.dOnbythmeeaonthserofhawnhda,tthies
statements, the first extant commentary is éankara’s from around
3
INTRODUCTION INIRODUC‘I'ION
available in this world and to this experience; therefore, it has, at from what these Advaitins argued for. I leave open tl‘lL‘ quesmm )f
least, penultimate, instrumental value.2 whether all Advaita Can he understood in this way, but th
This world is to be taken seriously, for the language and concepts philosophers I study here are deliberately chosen to hrcak with the
ofthe sacred texts that provideguidance forliberation (and to a lesser traditional division of Advaitic sub—schools. Sankara, of CoursC L
and contested extent, the ritual actions that they prescribe), are in virtually the founder of Advaita, and his philosophieal arguments ”lb
and of it. Taking this world seriously in this (of course, provisional) underdeveloped and therefore rich in interpretative potentiali Trim:
sense does require treating experience of it as coherent, for it it were Vz’icaspati is seen as the founder of one of the twu sulrschonls 0;:
incoherent, then no liberating knowledge would be possible (and this Advaita, called the Bhamati tradition, after his gloss 0n Sankamx
is so even though liberation itself is a transcendence of anything that commentary on the Brahma Sgtms; and true that my interpretatiunioi'
could he called knowledge). In that case, how can what the Advaita is sympathetic to him and often implicitly opposed to th)
Uparzisads say be coherent, when they assert that ultimately there is ideas of the other sub—school, the Vivarana, with Which I do not def]
nothing but [mz/mmn even while experience stubbornly presents at all in this book. But that is not to say that my interpretation is}
infinite diversity and difference? In order to treat the texts as guides specifically partisan one; and themost important evidence for this i;
to liberation and in order to live a life that aims for the realisation the way I attempt to harmonise Sahkara’s and Vacuspati‘s ideas Wmi
of liberation, those texts and the existence theyenjoin must be shown those of Sri Harsa. He, at any rate, has never been identified with ani
to be coherent. Sense must be made of the apparent incompatibility particular cmnmentarial tradition, being seen as an ii‘idepender‘)t
between what the texts say and what experience delivers. The only dialectician‘ So, I study three Advaitins with very differs.“ Places in
way to do this is to show that, in fact, nothing the texts say about the history of the school, in an attempt to find a C(‘hfirent
what ultimately is the case is incompatible with (indeed, alone is philosophical position. This is a task of philosophical rcconstruc
Finn,
compatible with) ordinary experience. The way to do this is to not of hismricistiphilological exegesis.
analyse experience and the world with the texts in mind. Nimunall); This philosophical reconstruction stands free (it the sotcriulogic,”
it should be shown that nothing in experience and the world rules out framework that I‘llflVL’ described in § 2. Although in \\ 4 I present 11;,
that the ultimate is just what the texts say it is hI-aximally, it should features of that soteriology in order to explain pre isely \Vhy [hi
be shown that experience and the world can he the way they are only philosophy develops the way it does, the hook itself is not concému’]
it the ultimate is the way the texts say it is. The philosophical issues with either that soterinlogy or the connection between it Lind (1“.
and arguments studied in this book are part (if this proieet of philosophy. It is a purely philosophical work, concentrating on [ht
reconciling, the teachings of the texts with experience. Let us nmv see development ofa certain metaphysicsofexperience and world and m:
exactly how relevance of that metaphysics to certain epistemological issuQS_
Not only is this a purely philosophical work, it is also a work it
3 Interpretation and its aims: statement on method crossecultutal exploration of philosophical problems. I have rangcli
freely across modern Western philosophy, where I have found botl
According to the Advaitin, then, ultimately, reality is other than material [0 help in my reading of the Indian texts and problems d“:
ordinary experience would have it. The purely philosophical challenge can be treated by bringing the Indian discussion to hear on [ht’nL Th >
for the Advaitin is to account for the world ofsuch experience in such book as a whole is firmly situated in the Indian tradition. hut it is fl
a way as to show how the reality asserted by the sacred texts may he tradition that is now open to globalisation. I simply assert here What
the case‘ This is the accuunt I call ‘non-realist’. seems the selficvident truth. that the intellectual traditions ofdifferel:1t
‘Non-realism’ is the term I give to my interpretation of some cultures can not only illuminate each other but can become the Varied
Advaita philosophers. This is not the claim that these Advaitins sources of an emergent global tradition. Those of us who do Such
specifically argued for a position that] term non<realism. Rather, it is philosophy stand witness to it in a way thatsimply cannot be gainsaid
the claim that I can reasonably and usefully derive such a position by those of a more parochial persuasion.
INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
supporting state of selfand world and all things in it‘ The film, then, is
4 Cosmogony and metaphysics to he understood as merely one particular manifestation of zitman;
The role of philosophical arguments in the soteriological imperative and dlman is, in the ultimate analysis, brahmmz‘ To de-individuate the
of Advaita can best be explicated in terms of a telationship between [iua is to realise its nature as fitman, and to realise that nature is to
three (or four) cuncepts: [Jrabmmz, self (as dtman, and as film — hence regain [?rahman. This is liberation, the liberation of individuated
‘three (or four)’) and world (jagaz). consciousness from the conditions of its individuation, hack into its
Let us start With the self, as Advaita insists we must; for there is a universal, yer singular general and supportingC(inSCiOUSHCSS‘ [Imlamam
self that cannot be denied, for that which denies is itself the self.; But (Of course, I am setting aside here all the problems attendant upon
this is nut any obvious use of ‘self‘, and the failure to detect the this picture, especially the questions concerning why [n‘almmn should
admittedly unobviuus, 0n the part of both later Advaitins and be individuated as film in the first place.) The re~attainmem of thc
contemporary writers, has led to much confusion. $ai’ilmra‘s undeni~ deqndividuated state is the soteriological goal of the [\dvaitin. and
able Self is the dlmtm, but it is not the individual, nunvphysical, yet that is why he embarks 0n the philosophical task, so as to prepare his
unified entity that is denied, say, by the Buddhists; it is not a ‘suul‘. It is consciousness for that state of mature reflection that somehow,
merely reflexive consciousness ‘Self‘ is used to indicate this reflexivity, eventually triggers de«individuation. -
as ‘self-aware’ is really ‘auttraware’, an awareness of awareness. This Now, this brahman, as I have said, is the irreducible, ultimate and
undeniable reflexivity is also the ‘self’ of all beings because it is supporting state ofselfand world: bmhman is the ultimate state ofthe
intrinsic to or constitutive of them. There is thus a double use of ‘self’ — self; but what of the world? It is the Advaitic view of the world VlS—ki-
as refl AC and as constitutive (Sanskrit has precisely the same use of vis brabmrm that is of relevance to us, since the arguments examined
‘dtrmi-,<‘ that ‘selfex‘ has in English. And even Yogéczim Buddhists who in this book are directly in support of that view.
deny a memph) simlly unified self use ‘self‘ in this \r'ayfl) This self‘s (Zosnmgonically, the Advaitins are committed to the ultimne'
being the self (if all also indicates its transvindividual nature: it is [Irahn/Ian: not only the individual consciousness hut alsn the world ~r
Conscmusness 41s such. a type of occurrence in all beings Let, all _ is In‘abmam The question is. in What ‘v’tLiY is the world
There is R more imliwduzil use of ‘self’ in Advaita as well, but this is lmz/mmn? Differences in the reading of this Upamsndie ' ssertmn led
not the undeniable startingepoint of all inquiry. lt is consciousness as to the devclupntent 0f the schools of Vedanta. The earliest reading
individual to and individtmtetl by a particular ph} lCill and psychw that we have is Sahkara's, and he takes the world being ln'dbnnm 21s
logical complex with an identity: it is 171% It is not consciousness as the reducihility 0f the world to bmhman, so that, in some ultimate
type (which is 42mm“) hut as individual; and the normal or ordinary analys’ there is only bmhman. Thereafter, this reading is central to
reach of reflexivity is, of course, confined hy the patmneters 0f the all Advaita. But how are we to understand the Claim that the world IS
physical—psychological complex (Le, ‘my’ consciousness is not bmbrmm in the Advaitic way? Before answering that question, we
‘yours‘li Advaim does not deny that there is a state of individuated must clarify the sense of realism about the physical world that is
consciousness extending to all of but not more than one physical- relevant to us. Naturally, it must be admitted that there are other ways
psyclmlogical complex. In this it does differ from Buddhism, which in which ‘realism’ can be used. (One, highly general way that is not
analytically reduces each individual consciousness down to each relevant to me, will take realism to be the commitment to there being
Occurrence within that complex. But, crucially, Advaita does deny that something, anything, independent of how cognition takes (0r
that individuated consciousness is an ultimate metaphysical entity. For constructs or interprets) things to be. It is hard to see any non,
the [il'a is, by virtue of being a particular cxemplifieation of dtman, solipsistic metaphysics being other than realist on this highly general
ultimately not an irreducible entity but simply an individual use of the word.)
occurrence of consciousness itself. When the constitution of the world has been anal} ed, there is a
That consciousness itself is ultimately all—consciousness, as a point at which ever~finer discrimination exhausts all physical
general being. called bmbman. That is the irreducible, ultimate and explanation. Then metaphysics is needed to provide an account of
7
INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
how things are that accommodates the conclusions ofphysics. Realist cosmogenic understanding of this is that the world is a virtual effect
metaphysics about the world does this by saying that the world of of bmbman, in that it has discernible features characteristic of it, but
physics simply is constituent of reality; i.e., the account of how things it is not constituent of reality (Lew the world is not a ‘real’ effect of
are accommodates the world as given in physical explanation simply causal bmhmanl. This formulation, however, does not say anything
as it is. Of course, a theistic realist may include God within the total about the account of the world itself. In what sense is the world
reality, above and beyond the physical world; and many non virtually real, such that the objects of which it consists can
materialist realists will also include a variety of other elements (like explanatorily be reduced to bmbman? The post~§atikara divide
numbers or universals or, as with Nyfiya, even absences) as part of between Bhamati and Vivaraijia sub-schools, while brought about by
that reality. But they (lo not overhaul the physical account of the many otherimportant intra-Advaitic differences, alsoopens upon this
world; they preserve it as elementary to'reality. Realist metaphysicians one. The former suh-school, broadly holds that the reducibility of the
are conservative metaphysicians about the world. world to bmhmmz should not lead to an account ofphysical objects in
Other metaphysicians, in contrast, offer accounts in which the terms of cognitive construction. The latter, broadly, thinks that some
physical is interpreted as requiring something beyond and radically sort of idealistic account must be given of the world, so that objects
different from what it is taken to be. That is to say, they maintain that are interpreted as cognitive products. Then, since cognition [5 not
the physical has to be reduced — in explanation of how it occurs the ultimately anything other than brahmanvconsciousness, the reduction
way it does — to metaphysical entities, in order to arrive atan account of the world to cognition is also reduction of the world to brabmml.
of reality. Thus‘ phenomenalists reduce objects to the way perceptual The specifically idealist rendition of this school is the ‘doctrine of
states register them; idealists reduce objects to mental constructs. The ptoduction—through—envisioning’ldrsgisrsti udda). However, this is by
Viifiaiiavada or Yogacara Buddhists, to the extent they are idealists, no means the invariant standard of the Vivarana. Citsukha and
also reduce objects to cognitions, although as part of a larger project Madhusfidana Sarasvati, who together with St} Harsa form tht’
in which they also reduce away the subject of cognitions until only Advaitic ttiumvimte of analytic dialecticmns, ate tmditionall;
non~classihahle and therefore uneharacterisnble, unique. particular counted as belonging to this suh-sehool, but their main metaphysical
states ofconsciousness-content (sz'tlla/zstmas or the ‘auto-characteretl‘) views do not always cohere with that of others such as l’admapflda.
remain The Xindhyamika seem to do this as well, but also point out Suresvara and Prakaéfitmnn who are more sympathetic to the idea of
that the very parodoxicality of such states makes them incoherent so objects being cognitive constructs}? That is why I am reluctant to
that ultimately, there is nothing that can be considered ultimate. (T his present my interpretation as ;\ Bhamati one.
logical extension of analysis opens up troubhng/inttiguing questions The basic distinction in which I am interested cuts across the
about what is soteriologieally Buddhist about Madhyamika (as l have Advaitins. All assert that the world is ultimately reducible to bmhman.
introduced it here), but I Cannot do more than mention this in But the more overtly idealist amongst them take this to require a
passing.) All these are anthrealist metaphysics (although, in some metaphysical argument that explains obiects in terms of cognitive
sense, Madhyamika is also anti—metaphysics, if its urging of the constructs. Others maintain that that reduction is purely cosmogonic,
paradoxicality of reductive explanation is held to amount to a i.e., purely a matter of how reality is asserted to be in the Upanisads.
suspension of all such explanation). Antivrealist metaphysics is They are the non-realistsi It is the non»tealist interpretation of the
revisionary metaphysics, because it calls for an account ofhow things world with which this hook is concerned.
are that revises the conclusion that there is nothing beyond physical
Constituents to the world. Advaita too is rcvisionary — but in a
5 Non«realism: what it is and what it is for
different sense. We now approach the core of the matter.
Advaitins are committed, through faith in their interpretation of Let us take stock of the situation. The Upanisads, according to the
the Upanisadic assertion that all (including the world) is bralaman, to Advaitins, assert that not only the self but also the world is brahman.
the view that the world is reducible ultimately to bmhman. The This non-duality (avduaita) between brahmtm and the rest transcends