Adolf Hitler Bolshevik and Zionist Volume I Communism Second Edition

382 Pages·2022·3.749 MB·English

by  Christopher Jon Bjerknes

Christopher Jon Bjerknes
ADOLF HITLER
BOLSHEVIK
AND
ZIONIST
Volume I
Communism
Second edition. Revised, enlarged and illustrated.
Copyright © 2020. All Rights Reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-71658-492-3
1 Hitler Emerges
Adolf Hitler painted a fanciful portrait of himself as if an anti-Jewish and
anti-Marxist savior of Western Civilization from the twin plagues of
Bolshevism and Capitalism. In reality, Hitler and other top Nazi officials
were committed Zionists and closet Communists. Many of them were of
Jewish descent or partial Jewish descent.
            Hitler and Stalin ultimately transformed Eastern Europe into a
Communist Empire. They enabled the Zionists to take Palestine and create a
Jewish State. America and the Soviet Union became the sole superpowers
governing the earth. Zionism, Capitalism and Bolshevism triumphed in
Hitler's wake by design.
      Joseph Stalin wanted Adolf Hitler to provoke the Second World War in
order to create the chaotic conditions needed for a Communist world
revolution and the expansion of the Soviet Union across Eastern Europe.
Communist revolution thrives on war, discontent and disruption. The
Communists' plan was to create support among the Western Allies for the
Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe. Hitler would soften up Europe by
destroying it. He would make Stalin appear to be the savior of the Jews
from the Nazis. Stalin then followed in the footsteps of Hitler's retreat
across Eastern Europe to conquer nation after nation for Communism, as
was planned from the very beginning. The Communists committed
numerous genocides along the way and enslaved and terrorized all those
who fell into their hands.
      Viktor Suvorov explained in his book Icebreaker: Who Started the
Second World War? that the Soviets viewed Hitler as the "Icebreaker" for
Communist revolution and planned for him to clear the path for the Soviet
Union to conquer Eastern Europe,

"Even before the Nazis came to power, the Soviet leaders had given
Hitler the unofficial name of 'Icebreaker for the Revolution'. The
name is both apt and fitting. The communists understood that Europe
would be vulnerable only in the event of war and that the Icebreaker
for the Revolution could make it vulnerable. Unaware of this, Adolf
Hitler cleared the way for world communism by his actions. With his
Blitzkrieg wars, Hitler crushed the Western democracies, scattering
and dispersing his forces from Norway to Libya. This suited Stalin
admirably. The Icebreaker committed the greatest crimes against the
world and humanity, and, in doing so, placed in Stalin's hands the
moral right to declare himself the liberator of Europe at any time he
chose—while changing the concentration camps from brown to red.
[***]
Marx and Engels foretold a world war and lengthy international
conflicts which would last 'fifteen, twenty, fifty years'. The prospect
did not frighten them. The authors of The Communist Manifesto did
not call on the proletariat to prevent war; on the contrary, they saw it
as desirable. War was mother to the revolution. The result of a world
war, in Engels' words, would be 'general exhaustion and the creation
of conditions for the final victory of the working class'. (Karl Marx,
Friedrich Engels, Works, Ch. 21, p. 351)
Marx and Engels did not live to see the world war, but a successor in
their cause was found for them in Lenin. From the earliest days of the
First World War, Lenin's party came out in favour of the government
of their own country being defeated, so that the 'imperialist war might
be changed into a civil war'.
Lenin calculated that left-wing parties in other countries would also
come out against the governments of their own countries and the
imperialist world war would be transmuted into a world civil war.
This did not happen. Without abandoning hopes for a world
revolution, as early as autumn 1914 Lenin adopted a minimum
programme. If world revolution were not to result from world war,
everything possible had to be done to make a revolution happen in at
least one country; it did not matter which one. 'When the proletariat
has conquered that country, it will stand against all the rest of the
world,' fomenting disorders and uprisings in other countries, 'or
coming out against them directly with armed force.' (About the
Slogan of the 'United States of Europe')
For Lenin, as for Marx, world revolution remained the guiding star,
and he did not lose sight of this goal. But according to the minimum
programme, the First World War would only facilitate a revolution in
one country. How, then, would the world revolution take place
thereafter? Lenin gave a clear-cut answer to this question in 1916: as
a result of the second imperialist war. (The Military Programme for
the Proletarian Revolution)
Perhaps I am mistaken, but having read much of what Hitler wrote, I
have certainly found no indications that in 1916 Adolf
Schickelgruber was dreaming of the Second World War. But Lenin
was. What is more, he was laying down the need for such a war as
the theoretical base for the building of socialism throughout the
world.
Events developed apace. The revolution in Russia occurred the
following year. Lenin hastened there from exile. In the maelstrom of
confusion and a total absence of authority, he and his party, small but
militarily organized, seized power in a coup d'etat. In March 1918, he
concluded the Brest-Litovsk peace agreement with Germany and its
allies. At that time Germany's position was already hopeless. Lenin of
course understood this. The peace he signed therefore freed his hands
to strengthen, through civil conflict, the communist dictatorship
inside Russia, and gave Germany considerable resources and reserves
to continue the war in the West, which was exhausting both Germany
and the Western allies." 1
      The present author agrees with Suvorov that Stalin wanted Hitler to start
the Second World War, so that Stalin could then unleash a world revolution
and take Eastern Europe for the Communists. But I go a step further and
believe that Hitler was a willing player in this game. Hitler intended to lose
the war and turn over Eastern Europe to Stalin. Hitler was a Bolshevik
mole, who cut his Communist teeth during the Socialist Bavarian
Revolution at the end of World War I.
      Edvard Benes was the President of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to 1948.
His statements provide us with additional proof that the Second World War
was staged for the purpose of allowing Stalin to seize Eastern Europe for
the Soviet Union after Hitler had provided Stalin with the pretext roll over
nation after nation in pursuit of the Nazis. Edvard Benes knew in the mid-
1930's that Hitler would instigate the Second World War, lose it and give
Eastern Europe over to Stalin. The Second World War did not break out
until 1 September 1939 and Benes anticipated it and its outcome years
before it began. Benes was a freemason in the Ian Amos Komensky Lodge
No. 1 in Prague.
      Stalin hoped to trigger a world-wide Communist revolution after World
War II had sufficiently weakened humanity to the point where such a
revolution could commence and succeed in conquering a war-weary and
chaotic world. Hitler dutifully provided Stalin with the pretext he needed to
take of all Eastern Europe by fighting back the Nazis and to do so with the
full assistance of the Western Alliance. Hitler had spread his forces across
the region creating an unnecessarily vast theater of war for Stalin's advances
and conquests and this was done deliberately so that the entire region would
eventual fall into Stalin's hands. Before the war even started, Edvard Benes
hoped that Czechoslovakia would share a border with the expanded Soviet
Union, after Hitler provoked the war Benes knew Hitler would start, then
lose. Hitler rendered an even greater service to Stalin than Benes predicted,
by weakening Czechoslovakia, Poland and many other countries to the
point where they could no longer resist the Soviet Union. Poland had held
back the Bolshevik onslaught following World War I. Hitler ensured that
they would be unable to do so following World War II.
      Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein quoted Benes in their book The Munich
Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II,

"Benes' notes reveal the very core of Soviet strategic thinking at the
time. When Benes expressed his amazement at the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact, Maiski replied that war would definitely break out
'in two weeks' time'. 'My overall impression', noted Benes, is that 'the
Soviets want war, they prepared for it conscientiously and they
maintain that the war will take place—and that they have reserved
some freedom of action for themselves.' Benes added that originally
he considered this to be an exaggeration. But when he saw the text of
the Nazi-Soviet pact the next day he realized it was even worse than
what Maiski had outlined on 23 August 1939. He realized that
Moscow had slammed the door on any future negotiations with the
West. The pact was, Benes wrote and underlined, 'a rather rough
tactic to drive Hitler into war'. Benes wrote in his summary of the
meeting: 'the Soviets are convinced that the time has come for a final
struggle between capitalism, fascism and nazism and that there will
be a world revolution which they will trigger at an opportune moment
when others are exhausted by war'.93 On the eve of World War II,
Benes had no reason to fabricate or misinterpret Maiski's words.
Moreover, his record of the meeting echoes the proclamations of the
VIIth congress of the Comintern of 1935, Litvinov's declaration to
Heidrich in May 1938 in Geneva, and Zhdnov's speech in Prague in
August 1938.
Finally, there is an indication that the Kremlin deemed war desirable
even after it had started, in November 1939. A Soviet official told a
CPC delegation in Moscow that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was
justified because 'if the USSR had concluded a treaty with the
Western powers, Germany would never have unleashed a war from
which will develop world revolution, the revolution we have been
preparing for a long time. . . . A surrounded Germany would never
have entered into war.'94 This brief outline of the long-term Soviet
strategy is in harmony with all the other evidence presented so far:
Litvinov's statement to Heidrich in Geneva, Zhdanov's speech in
Prague, Maiski's conversation with Benes, and the declaration quoted
above are characterized by a remarkable degree of internal
consistency. That is what makes the message regarding the
revolutionary potential detected in the crisis of 1938-39 by Stalin
credible." 2
      This provides further proof that Hitler and Stalin were collaborating to
start the Second World War by agreeing to the Nazi-Soviet Pact so as to
embolden the Germans to invade Poland based on the false premise that
England would not attack a Germany which was allied with the Soviet
Union. Then, after instigating the Second World War, Hitler had an easier
time convincing his Generals to attack the Soviet Union, because there was
no longer the inhibiting risk that England would enter the war, because it
already had. This was all planned in advance and was the means by which
the German High Command and the German people were duped into
following Hitler into Eastern Europe.
      The fact that Stalin first formed an alliance with Hitler and not the
Western Powers so that Germany would not feel surrounded and refrain
from attacking its neighbors also demonstrates the thought process which
caused Stalin and Hitler to collaborate to put the Fascist Francisco Franco
in power in Spain. They wanted to surround France and England with
"Fascists", not openly Communist nations, so that England and France
would fight the Fascists of Italy, Germany and possibly Spain and not the
Communists of the Soviet Union, and thereby consume Western Europe in a
brothers' war leaving it easier pickings for the Soviets to attack from the
East after Hitler had done his work—that is until the United States
developed the atomic bomb. The success of the Fascists in Spain made it far
easier for the Western Allies to declare war on Germany and become allies
of the Soviets and supply the Soviets than would have been the case if the
Communists had won the Spanish Civil War and directly threatened France
and England by pushing the Soviet Union right up against their borders.
Had Soviet-sponsored Communism succeeded in Spain, France and Great
Britain might have felt obliged to join forces with Hitler against Stalin,
instead of Stalin against Hitler.
      Ivan Pfaff wrote,

"However, it was precisely Benes who, as early as February 1936,
indirectly invited the Soviets to Sovietize Central Europe by
declaring to the Prague Ambassador of the USSR that the Soviets
'must enter not only the Central European but also the Balkan theater,
but Central Europe only if their interests in this part of Europe are
evolving in a clear manner, . . . that they should not rush into it and
patiently wait for a clearer form of the practical question of the
organization of Central Europe'39. [***] [Benes said,] 'Russia will
have its say in Central Europe. . . Geographical law. . . Hitler helps us
to become Russia's neighbor. After the future disasters, the goal must
be that Russia will be in Užhorod, Presov in Russia. . . The border
with Russia as long as possible also with regard to Poland. . .
Withdraw the Polish border with Russia to the rear of Bardějov.'166
[***] Even before the outbreak of the Second World War, he was
firmly convinced that sooner or later the USSR would intervene in
the war with Germany and finally advance through Central Europe.
[***] The overestimation of the German post-war threat and the
illusion, that of all things the territorial expansion of the Soviet Union
though Central Europe would guarantee the safety of the future
Czechoslovak Republic, were fully shared by Benes's employees.
Thus Ripka wrote in April 1939 to Jan Masaryk: 'I hope that after the
war it will be possible for us to get closer to Russia, that it will be our
direct neighbor. . . If this happens, Russia will have direct interests in
Central Europe and will become a more effective counterweight to
Germany than heretofore.' [***] Already in December of 1939,
probably impressed by the Soviet invasion of Finland, Benes wrote
instructions to the Czechoslovakian envoy in Washington: 'Russia is
biding its time and just as soon as it has gained as strong a position as
possible on account of German warfare (the Baltic States, Poland,
Finland, Bessarabia, evidently Bulgaria and Northern Turkey and
Persia), it will do everything it can to overthrow present-day
Germany and, there as well as in Central Europe, to provoke a
revolution that will install Soviet regimes.'171" 3
      Vojtech Mastny wrote,

"The manifold developments set into motion by Hitler's attack against
Russia increased the exiled government's isolation from home but
brought it closer to Moscow. In planning for the future, Benes came
to regard future Russian predominance in east central Europe as not
only inevitable but also desirable. This meant political
preponderance, though not necessarily military conquest; as late as
January 1943, he estimated that the war might well end before the
Red Army would even reach Czecholslovakia.27 'After the war is
over,' the President confided to his associates, 'in Europe, only
Germany and Russia will be left. Germany will be disrupted, and in
the East, and, I hope, in central Europe as well, Russia will play the
decisive role. . . It will come together with Europe and after the war
Bolshevism will not even be remembered.'28
Surprisingly for a statesman reputed as 'one of the most astute and
devious politicians of Europe,'29 Benes was guided not so much by
sober calculation as by emotional disposition and wishful thinking.
Though without illusions about Communism, he discounted its role
as an instrument of Moscow's foreign policies. He liked to think of
Czechoslovakia's future position as that of a bridge between East and
West—a bridge, however, slanted eastwards. Despite his preference
for Western values, he envisaged the Western influences as mainly
economic, the Eastern political and military. Mesmerized by what he
viewed as a perennial German threat, and obsessed by his memory of
Munich, he hoped to earn for his country the status of Russia's
favorite protege. In pursuing that goal, he had no exaggerated ideas
about sovereignty, which he subordinated to security.
Benes did not wish the Czechs to be regarded as Moscow's vassals.
Yet they were slipping into that role by the summer of 1942. The
Czechoslovak diplomats in Russia struck their Western colleagues as
'spending a good deal of... their time in serving the interests of the
Soviet government.'30 Ambassador Zdeněk Fierlinger conceived of
his job as that of impressing the Russian viewpoint upon his London
superiors rather than vice versa. Czechoslovakia's apparent readiness
to offer itself as a Russian tool in east central Europe did not reflect a
coherent and consistent policy; it was rather suggestive of an
unwillingness to devise any policy." 4
      Stalin had foreknowledge of every important aspect of the German war
effort and planning from beginning to end. The Nazis from Hitler on down
dutifully provided him with that intelligence—much to the detriment of the
German soldiers and the German nation. Benes received intelligence reports
from Paul Thuemmel, who was working as a Soviet spy known as "Agent
A-54". Thuemmel was an Abwehr agent and was one of many Nazis who
gave the Soviets German State secrets and kept Stalin fully informed of
everything the Nazis had planned. Other such traitors included Adolf Hitler,
Martin Bormann, Heinrich "Gestapo" Mueller, Harro Schulze-Boysen of
the Rote Kapelle, and the Lucy Spy Ring. Friedrich Georg detailed the
Allies' advance knowledge of Hitler's plans, the many high-ranking Nazis
who worked as spies for the Soviets, and the treason of the Nazis against
the German war effort, in the following works: Verrat an der Ostfront: Der
verlorene Sieg 1941-42, Grabert, Tuebingen, (2012); Verrat an der Ostfront
II: Vergebliche Verteidigung Europas 1943-45, Grabert, Tuebingen, (2012);
and Verrat in der Normandie: Eisenhowers deutsche Helfer, Grabert,
Tuebingen, (2007).
      Edvard Benes told the Soviet Jew Ilya Ehrenburg,

"The only salvation lies in a close alliance with your country. The
Czechs may have different political opinions, but on one point we can
be sure. The Soviet Union will not only liberate us from the Germans.
It will also allow us to live without constant fear of the future." 5