Admissibility of Shareholder Claims under Investment Treaties

348 Pages·2020·3.248 MB·English

by  Gabriel Bottini

ADMISSIBILITY OF SHAREHOLDER
CLAIMS UNDER INVESTMENT
TREATIES
Thisbookaddressesagrowingproblemininternationallaw:overlapping
claimsbeforenationalandinternationaljurisdictions.Itscontributionis,
first,torevisittwopillarsofinvestmentarbitration,thatis,shareholders’
standingtoclaimforharmtothecompany’sassetsandthecontract/treaty
claims distinction. These two ideas advance interrelated (and
questionable) notions of independence: first, independence of
shareholdertreaty rights in respectof the local company’s nationallaw
rightsand,second,independenceoftreatyclaimsinrespectofnational
law claims. By uncritically endorsing shareholder standing in indirect
claims and the distinctiveness of treaty claims, investment tribunals
have overlooked substantive overlaps between contract and treaty
claims. The book also proposes specific admissibility criteria. As
opposed to strictly jurisdictional approaches to claim overlap, the
admissibility approach allows the consideration of a broader range of
legal reasons, such as risks of multiple recovery and prejudice to third
parties.
Gabriel Bottini is Adjunct Professor of Public International Law,
University of Buenos Aires and Partner at Uría Menéndez. As
Argentina’s Director of International Disputes, Gabriel Bottini was
involved in over sixty investment arbitrations brought following the
country’s 2001 economic collapse. These cases mark a crucial, catalytic
moment in the history of investment arbitration. Bottini engages with
afundamentalnotionstemmingfromthesecases:shareholderstanding
underinvestmenttreaties.

A D M I S S I B I L I T Y
O F S H A R E H O L D E R
C L A I M S U N D E R
I N V E S T M E N T T R E A T I E S
GABRIEL BOTTINI
UniversityofBuenosAires
Partner,UríaMenéndez
UniversityPrintingHouse,CambridgeCB28BS,UnitedKingdom
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www.cambridge.org
Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108494526
DOI:10.1017/9781108658522
©GabrielBottini2020
Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception
andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,
noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten
permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.
Firstpublished2020
AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Names:Bottini,Gabriel,1976–author.
Title:Admissibilityofshareholderclaimsunderinvestmenttreaties/GabrielBottini.
Description:Cambridge,UnitedKingdom;NewYork,NY:CambridgeUniversityPress,
2019.|Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
Identifiers:LCCN2020031023(print)|LCCN2020031024(ebook)|ISBN9781108494526
(hardback)|ISBN9781108658522(ebook)
Subjects:LCSH:Investments,Foreign(Internationallaw)|Investments,Foreign–Lawand
legislation.|Stockholders–Legalstatus,laws,etc.|Internationalcommercialarbitration.|
Corporations–Investorrelations.
Classification:LCCK3830.B682019(print)|LCCK3830(ebook)|DDC346/.092–dc23
LCrecordavailableathttps://lccn.loc.gov/2020031023
LCebookrecordavailableathttps://lccn.loc.gov/2020031024
ISBN978-1-108-49452-6Hardback
CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof
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ToTeté,Simón,Ana,andLeón.
ToCristinaandGustavo.

CONTENTS
1 Introduction 1
1.1 ShareholderTreatyClaims:IndependenceandOverlap 5
1.1.1 ProtectionofAssetsunderIIAs 7
1.1.2 ProblemsDerivingfromConcurrentEntitlements 10
1.2 AddressingSubstantiveOverlaps 16
1.2.1 TheAdmissibilityApproach 16
1.2.2 OtherPossibleApproaches 22
1.3 Scope 38
2 AdmissibilityinInternationalInvestmentLaw 40
2.1 TheAdmissibilityConcept 43
2.1.1 Overview 43
2.1.2 DefinitionofAdmissibility 44
2.1.3 DelimitationofAdmissibilityvis-à-visJurisdictionand
Merits 49
2.1.4 InvestmentTribunals’PowersasRegardsAdmissibility
Decisions 57
2.2 AdmissibilityCriteriaRelatingtoStandingandtheCauseofActionin
ShareholderClaims 69
2.3 Conclusion 76
3 MixedClaimsCommissionsandtheOriginsofCentral
Concepts 79
3.1 MixedClaimsCommissions 82
3.1.1 MixedClaimsCommissionsinGeneral 83
3.1.2 TheVenezuelanandMexicanCommissions 84
3.2 ShareholderStanding,CausesofAction,andDamagesbeforeClaims
Commissions 95
3.2.1 ShareholderClaims 96
3.2.2 ContractClaimsandTreatyClaims 107
3.2.3 DamagesCorollaries 119
3.2.3.1 PrivateLossesandInternationalClaims 119
vii
viii contents
3.2.3.2 DoubleRecovery 121
3.3 Conclusion 122
4 AdmissibilityandShareholderStanding 125
4.1 ShareholderRightsandtheICJ 128
4.1.1 BarcelonaTraction 128
4.1.2 ELSI,Diallo,andtheBarcelonaTraction
principles 138
4.2 ShareholderStandingbeforeInvestmentTribunals 154
4.2.1 DevelopmentofthePrevailingConcepts 154
4.2.2 TheMeritsoftheClaims 163
4.3 Conclusion 171
5 DamagesinShareholderTreatyClaims 174
5.1 DamagesandShareholderStanding 177
5.1.1 Overview 177
5.1.2 RecoveryandtheCorporateStructure 189
5.1.3 Third-PartyInterests 195
5.2 DamagesandtheCauseofAction 200
5.2.1 ContractDamagesandTreatyDamages? 200
5.2.2 ClaimsfortheSameDamagebeforeDifferent
Jurisdictions 204
5.3 Conclusion 208
6 TheContract-TreatyDistinction 211
6.1 TheCauseofActioninInternationalInvestmentLaw 214
6.1.1 BreachofContractandBreachofTreaty 215
6.1.2 TheDistinctionbetweenContractandTreaty
Claims 218
6.2 FromJurisdictiontoAdmissibility 234
6.2.1 DecisionsonJurisdictionandtheFundamentalBasis
oftheClaim 235
6.2.2 TheImpactofContractualForumSelectionClauses
onAdmissibility 239
6.2.3 CompetingClaims 244
6.3 InteractionsbetweenTreatiesandContracts 249
6.3.1 TheRoleofContractsinTreatyClaims 249
6.3.2 UmbrellaClauses 254
6.3.3 PrivityWithoutObligations? 258
6.4 Conclusion 262