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\Ll} ^^ S. Hrg. 103-57 ADEQUACT OF NUCLEAR POWERPLANT SECURIH M.P 96/ lO.S. HRG, 103-57 idequacy of Huclear Poucrplant Secu... HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAE REGULATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MARCH 19, 1993 Printed for the use of the Clommittee on Environment and Public Works '= w.;n. m ^"t ^ ? U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 66-197^ WASHINGTON 1993 : Forsalebythe U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice SuperintendentofDocuments. Congressional SalesOffice,Washington,DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-040883-0 j^ S. Hrg. 103-57 ADEQUACY OF NUCLEAR POWERPLANT SECURITY 4.P 96/10: S. HRG. 103-57 equ3C5i of Huclear Poucrplant Secu... HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON r CLEAN AIE AND NUCLEAE REGULATION OF THE COmflTTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MARCH 19, 1993 Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works ^«>?trti*V. ji-rV JUL ? , U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 66-197*5 WASHINGTON 1993 : Forsale by ihe U.S. Government PrintingOffice Superintendent ofDocuments. Congressional SalesOffice, Washington, DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-0A0883-0 COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS MAX BAUCUS, Montana, Chairman DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island GEORGE J. MITCHELL, Maine ALAN K. SIMPSON, Wyoming FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAVE DURENBERGER, Minnesota HARRY REID, Nevada JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia BOB GRAHAM, Florida ROBERT SMITH, New Hampshire JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North Carolina HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Idaho HARRIS WOFFORD, Pennsylvania BARBARA BOXER, California Peter L. Scher, StaffDirector Steven J. Shimberg, Minority StaffDirector and ChiefCounsel Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York ALAN K. SIMPSON, Wyoming BOB GRAHAM, Florida LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North Caroline HOWARD METZENBAUM, Ohio DIRK KEMPTHRONE, Idaho (ID CONTENTS OPENING STATEMENTS Page Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the of State Connecticut 1 Simpson, Hon. Alan K., U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming 17 WITNESSES Brandon, Harry B. Ill, Deputy Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation 4 Prepared statement 53 Colvin, Joe F., President and Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear Management and Resources Council 40 Prepared statement 70 Greenberg, Eldon V.C, on behalf ofthe Nuclear Control Institute 39 Prepared statement 64 Hoffman, Bruce, Rand Corporation 43 Prepared statement 88 Selin, Hon. Ivan, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 23 Prepared statement 61 ADDITIONAL MATERIAL Portzline, Scott D., statement of 102 United Plant Guard Workers ofAmerica, letter from 113 (III) ADEQUACY OF NUCLEAR POWERPLANT SECURITY FRIDAY, MARCH 19, 1993 U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:09 a.m. in room 406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Senators Lieberman, Baucus, Kempthorne, and Simp- son. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Senator Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. Good morning, and welcome to this hearing of the subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation. This morning, with the normal uncertainties of Senate scheduling, I want to indicate that there's a vote set to go off in about five minutes, and we have about 20 minutes. Senator Baucus and I, to get over there and come back. So I think we'd like to start and give our opening statements, at least, and then see where we are. We may have to recess for a few moments. Today this subcommittee is going to look at the adequacy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's rules and regulations to protect nuclear powerplants from terrorism and sabotage. On February 7th of this year, an intruder drove through the gate at the Three Mile Island nuclear powerplant and proceeded into the protected area of the plant. He crashed his station wagon into the door of the turbine building and then ran inside the building, where it took four hours to find him. During that period, it was not known whether he was alone, whether he was armed, and what his intentions were. Fortunately, the intruder did no significant damage to the plant. Shortly after the incident, when I read about it, I wrote to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission asking for its own report on that incident. I asked the NRC to explain whether it would have been better, for instance, to shut the plant down rather than keep it running at full power while the intruder was inside the turbine building. I also noted the statement of one of the officials at the NRC that we need "not to worry much about terrorists," and I asked about the NRC's intentions with regard to security require- (1) NRC merits at nuclear powerplants. I hope that the can help us with the beginnings of answers to some of those questions today. After about three weeks passed from the time of the incident at Three Mile Island, and a week after the letter that I wrote to the NRC, as we all well know, a bomb was intentionally placed in the parking garage underneath the World Trade Center in New York City. The explosion that followed killed six people, injured hundreds more, and that horrible incident I think fundamentally changed Americans' perceptions about our vulnerability to terrorist attack. It was, after all, the most significant terrorist attack within this country in almost 17 years, since the bomb was placed at La Guardia Airport in 1975. Taken together, these two events raise this question: Are nuclear powerplants adequately protected against violent attack, either by sabotage or by terrorism? More specifically, in this case, are nuclear powerplants protected against people using vehicles to drive ex- NRC plosives right up to the plant? To date, the FBI and the have concluded that this type of attack on a nuclear powerplant is un- likely. They believe that current nuclear powerplant security requirements are adequate, and, in fact, there has never been an attack by a bomb-laden vehicle on an American nuclear powerplant. As a result, current NRC regulations do not require nuclear powerplant security systems to protect against truck bombs. In techni- cal terms, the use of vehicles as bombs or the use of vehicles to carry —explosives are not considered part of the design basis threat ^that's the term of art here—the design basis threat that nuclear powerplants must be able to protect against. However, this does not mean, of course, that such an event can never occur. That an attack has not yet happened obviously does not mean that it will never happen, and we hold this hearing this morning to do whatever we can, working with officials of the NRC and the FBI, to make sure that we in our Government are doing all we can to guarantee that such an attack will never occur. In doing so, this subcommittee is following the age-old wisdom We that it is better to be safe than to be s—orry. know, for instance, that as good as counterintelligence is and counterintelligence is an important part of our Counter Terrorism program in this coun- — try it's not perfect. We cannot know about every terrorist act in advance, particularly when carried out by groups that seem inde- We pendent, perhaps even amateurish. cannot prevent every terrorist act from occurring. Thus, fail-safe protective measures against terrorism, in my opinion, cannot be based on counterintelligence alone. So the plant security requirements are very, very important. I think they must be periodically reexamined to ensure that they're up to date and they're protecting against realistic threats. In fact, on March 1st of this year, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission an- nounced that it is reviewing the so-called design basis threat for nuclear powerplants, and that is reassuring news. This subcommittee has oversight of the NRC and its regulatory NRC programs. Therefore, we feel an obligation to ensure that the is properly considering the evidence presented by the intelligence community and by the nuclear power industry in developing their security requirements. Today we're going to consider the views of We intelligence experts on the nature of the terrorist threat. will also consider whether the NRC should require that nuclear powerplant security systems be upgraded to prevent incidents like the one at Three Mile Island or even more serious car or truck bomb- ings, and whether the NRC should, as some are petitioning it to do now, lower some of their internal security requirements that are currently in place. We obviously are very lucky that the intruder at Three Mile Island did not cause more damage. He carried no weapons and no bomb. But, obviously, he could have. The break-in at Three Mile Island was a warning bell, and what happened a month later in New York was really a warning earthquake. So we're asking today, isn't it time to respond to those warnings by taking additional steps to prevent intrusions onto the property of nuclear powerplants? The fact is that you can't drive a car near the garage in this building without going around a big number of cement blocks, through two gates, and past several security guards. If we do all that just to protect United States Senators, shouldn't we do even more to protect a nuclear powerplant? Now, because this is an open hearing, we don't want to discuss any classified information. In any democratic system of government, obviously, there's always a tension between maintaining se- crecy about security requirements and maintaining public review of governmental actions. However, there has been a good public debate on many of these issues over more than a decade without any compromise of plant security, and this hearing is intended to further that healthy debate. I would now yield to the Chairman of the full committee, the Senator from Montana, Senator Max Baucus. Senator Baucus. Thank you very much. Senator. I'm very pleased that you are holding this hearing this morning. I think it s obvious that the more this committee can get ahead of problems rather than behind them, the better off the country will be and the better off all of us in this committee will be. The warning signals are clear. Obviously, the incident at Three Mile Island where someone drove into the plant and was able to hide out for several hours indicates that we've got a problem. Com- bined with Three Mile Island, someone apparently drove into the parking garage at the World Trade Center, and we know the devas- tation that caused. We're also reminded of the Marine barracks tragedy in Lebanon. Although it occurred in another country, it was another incident where someone drove an explosive laden vehicle into an American facility, and caused severe damage. It creates questions of confidence as well. People who work in or live around a nuclear facility want to have peace of mind. They want to know that they can live and work and conduct their lives the same as most everybody in this country. They don't want to live with the possibility of a devastating incident occurring right where they live or work. I know that NRC means well, and I think this is an opportunity for us to dig down a little deeper and to do the very best possible job we can of making sure that we minimize the potential of a devastating occurrence. I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Senator Baucus. Thank you for We your support. appreciate that you, as the Chairman of the full committee, are taking the time to be with us this morning. The bell has just sounded for the vote, and with your indulgence, I'd like to recess the hearing so we can go and vote and—then come back and continue the hearing. We'v—e been guaranteed insofar as guarantees are worth anything here that there won't be another vote until 11:30. The hearing will recess. [Recess.] We Senator Lieberman. will resume the hearing, and I thank you for your patience. Our first panel is from the FBI. We have Harry Brandon, who is accompanied by William McGrath. We welcome you. STATEMENT OF HARRY B. BRANDON, III, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DI- RECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN- VESTIGATION, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM MCGRATH, UNIT CHIEF, COUNTER TERRORISM PLANNING UNIT Mr. Brandon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time, I will try and summarize my statement. Senator Lieberman. Without objection, all statements will be We printed in full in the record. appreciate your willingness to ab- breviate. Mr. Brandon. As you've noted, on February 26, 1993, the whole country stood riveted as events showed that an explosive device had caused extensive damage to the World Trade Center. Eventual- ly, we would all become aware that this criminal act had resulted in a tragic loss of life, as well as injuries to hundreds and hundreds of innocent persons, and extensive property damage. There has certainly been a lot of speculation that this bombing was the work of terrorists. We are conducting an investigation. We consider it as a suspected act of terrorism. I do need to stress that this investigation is still ongoing, and many questions remain to be resolved, and legal proceedings have not really begun. Accordingly, I'm really unable to discuss this particular case in any detail. I would like to observe, however, that whatever the motivation, we do not have a reason to believe that this incident is the forerun- ner of a wave of terrorism inside the United States. I think you're aware that since the Persism Gulf crisis, the terrorist threat level in the United States has actually been considered to be low. Per- haps even more significant, £is these charts will show, between 1982 and 1992 terrorist incidents within the United States, with few ex- ceptions, have shown a steady decline. I don't minimize the recent activity at Three Mile Island or the World Trade Center. It certainly does remind us we can't be com- We placent. have to continue to develop plans and initiatives to guard against this sort of either criminal act or act of terrorism.