Action Theory and Social Science: Some Formal Models

146 Pages·1977·4.211 MB·English

by  Ingmar Pörn (auth.)

ACTION THEORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
MONOGRAPHS ON EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE,
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND OF KNOWLEDGE,
AND ON THE MATHEMATICAL METHODS OF
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
Managing Editor:
JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Academy of Finland and Stanford University
Editors:
ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University
DONALD DAVIDSON, University of Chicago
GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden
WESLEY C. SALMON, University ofA rizona
VOLUME 120
INGMAR PORN
ACTION THEORY
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
Some Formal Models
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
DORDRECHT·HOLLAND / BOSTON·U.S.A.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Porn, Ingmar.
Action theory and social science.
(Synthese library; v. 120)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Social sciences-Methodology. 2. Act (Philosophy)
3. Cybernetics. I. Title.
H62.P57 301'.01'8 77-12391
ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-1270-6 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-1268-3
DOl: IOJ 007/978-94-010-1268-3
Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,
P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland
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by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Inc.
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All Rights Reserved
Copyright © 1977 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
Softcover reprint of the hardcover I st edition 1977
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, r"cording or by any informational storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE IX
1. ACTION MODALITIES 1
1. Some Remarks on the Language L 1
2. On the Semantics of a First-Order Language 2
3. The Semantics for L 3
4. Necessity for something that an Agent does 4
5. Counteraction Conditionality 5
6. Some Dermed Action Concepts 6
7. On the Logic of L 10
8. Act Relations 11
9. Act Relations and N-Equality 13
10. Consequences of Action 16
2. INTENTIONS AND REASONS 18
11. Belief 18
12. Norms and Normative Positions 21
13. Singular Norms and Intentions to do 24
14. Sets and Systems of Norms 25
15. Intentional Action 28
16. Transmission ofIntention 31
17. Acting with a Further Intention 34
18. Reasons for Action and Wants 35
19. Valuations and Value Positions 38
20. Attitudes 40
3. ACTIVITIES AND PROCEEDINGS 43
21. Action Complexes 43
22. Structure of Activities: Two Examples 44
23. Finite Automata 45
24. Transmission of Agency 48
VI TABLE OF CONTENTS
25. Determinism and Agency 51
26. Intervention in Norm-Govemed Worlds 52
27. Grammars 54
28. Organizations 56
29. L-Grammars and L-Organizations 59
30. Role Structures 61
4. CONTROL, INFLUENCE AND INTERACTION 64
31. Control in Relation to an Agent 64
32. On the Power to Act 66
33. Influence and Social Power 67
34. On the Measurement of Influence 68
35. Control over an Agent 70
36. On Communication and Control 73
37. Action in Consequence Relations 76
38. Interaction 77
39. Social Groups and Social Systems 79
40. The Basis of Social Order 81
5. SOCIAL DYNAMICS 83
41. Information-Feedback Control: An Example 83
42. Elementary Information-Feedback Control Loops 86
43. A Dynamic System Model 89
44. Application of the Model to N-Agent Actions 90
45. Elementary Dynamics 91
46. Two-Agent Dynamic Action 93
47. Interdependent Decision 95
48. Interdependent Decision: Metagames 98
49. Metagames and Incomplete Information 100
50. Teleological Systems 102
6. ACTION-EX PLANA TlONS 105
51. Understanding and Knowledge of Facts 105
52. Understanding and Knowledge of Intentions and Actions 108
53. Meaning and Understanding 109
54. Essential Explanations 111
55. Counterfactuals and Causal Explanations 113
TABLE OF CONTENTS VII
56. Counterfactuals and Explanation of Actions 117
57. Functional Explanation 119
58. Laws and Explanation of Actions 121
59. Free Will and the Validity of Laws 122
60. Agents 123
BIBLIOGRAPHY 124
INDEX 126
PREFACE
This book is intended as a contribution to the foundations of the sciences of
man, especially the social sciences. It has been argued with increasing
frequency in recent years that the vocabulary of social science is to a large
extent an action vocabulary and that any attempt to systematize concepts
and establish bases for understanding in the field cannot, therefore, succeed
unless it is firmly built on action theory. I think that these claims are sub
stantially correct, but at the same time it seems to me that action theory, as
it is relevant to social science, still awaits vital contributions from logic and
philosophy. For example, it has often been said, rightly I believe, that situa
tions in which two or more agents interact constitute the subject-matter of
social science. But have we got an action theory which is rich enough or com
prehensive enough to allow us to characterize the interaction situation? I
think not. Once we have such a theory, however, we should be able to give an
accurate account of central social phenomena and to articulate our concep
tions about the nature of social reality.
The conceptual scheme advanced in this book consists, in the first instance,
of solutions to a number of characterization problems, i.e. problems which
may be expressed by questions of the form "What is the nature of ... ?" and
which require for their solutions the precise characterization of a class or a
concept. Problems of this sort abound in philosophy and those that are
attempted here include: What is the nature of an act, activity, and proceeding?
What is an intention? What is it to act intentionally? What is influence? What
is the nature of interaction? What is a social system?
The conceptual scheme generates, and it is reasonable to demand that it
should generate, questions about the relations between the categories con
cerned. Questions of this sort mayor may not be decidable a priori, in the
light of the solutions to the characterization problems. For example, it surely
is the case that if an agent acts in order to do something else, he does what he
does intentionally. By contrast, the question of the nature of the relation
between intention and action in intentional action is a more speculative
matter.
In the early stages of the enterprise the time-varying (dynamic) aspects
of human action receive little attention. It would be a mistake, however,
to think that a theory of action could be comprehensive without dealing with
x PREFACE
situations that change with time. In my attempt to treat this aspect I use the
basic tool of cybernetics, the notion of an information-feedback control
loop. In the concluding chapter the main results of the work inform some
topical issues concerning the explanation and understanding of human
action.
It may be said, quite generally, that it has been my concern to bring
together various theoretical approaches to social reality. My orientation in
this respect is of course based on the assumption that illumination of
problems of interest is to be found in a number of specialized disciplines. I
find it a challenging and worthwhile task to try to map out a middle way
between the detailed construction of theories in social science and the
philosopher's concern for the general case.
It will become evident that a large-scale or high-level theoretical attitude
dominates much of my detailed work. This is the conception of man as agent.
According to it, the human individual is an acting creature, i.e. a being
capable of taking or initiating action; and, secondly, a reacting creature, i.e.
a being capable of acting in the light of his knowledge of circumstances and
of the requirements made of the circumstances by the ends set by him. This
conception does not receive much attention as such. The reason is that I
think it is best established by implication and accretion of points and views
on diverse topics and themes.
I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Stig Kanger for his
encouragement and constructive intellectual support, and to Dr. lars Lindahl,
Dr. Lennart Nordenfelt, and Docent Soren Stenlund for helpful criticism. I
am also most grateful to my colleague Mr. A. J.1. Jones, whose observations
and comments have provided me with a test ground for many of the devices
employed in this book; the fmal typescript also benefited from his advice and
that of Mr. P. Morris. Finally, many thanks are due to my friend and com
panion Mrs. Margaret Cooper for her patience with me while writing the book.
I dedicate the book to my mother and to the memory of my father.
University of Birmingham I.P.
March 1977
CHAPTER 1
ACTION MODALITIES
In this chapter we lay the foundation of our action theory. Extensions and
elaborations of the theory will be given in subsequent chapters. As for
methodology, we proceed by defming a logically well-written language. This
is made comprehensive enough to serve as a general frame of our inquiry into
not only action concepts but also a number of other concepts which soon
arise in any fuller discussion of matters concerning action. We make the
language serve as such a frame by using it to formulate defmitions, classifi
cations, and propositions (if not theories properly so called) in terms of
which a volume of intuitive material can be marshalled and understood.
1. SOME REMARKS ON THE LANGUAGE L
The language L (Pr, X, Mo) or L, for short, is determined by a set Pr of
predicate letters or expressions, a set X of individual constants, and a set Mo
of symbols for modalities. L employs the symbols that determine it and in
addition symbols of the following categories: individual variables; the
symbols -, &, v, :>, and == called respectively the negation sign, the conjunc
tion sign, the disjunction sign, the (material) implication sign, and the
(material) equivalence sign; the symbols V and 3 called respectively the
universal and the existential quantifier; and, finally, punctuation symbols.
The class of well-formed formulas or wffs of L is defined inductively in the
same way as the class of wffs of (languages,of) modal predicate logic. Thus any
finite sequence of symbols of L, i.e. any fmite collection of symbols occur
ring in order, is a wff of L if and only if it is of one of the following forms:
1. P(al, a2, ... , ak) where Pis a k-place predicate letter and (alo a2, ... , ak)
is a sequence of symbols such that at (i = 1,2, ... , k) is either an individual
variable or an individual constant;
2. -p, (p & q), (P v q), (p :> q) or (p == q) where p and q are wffs of L;
3. Op where 0 E Mo and p is a wff of L;
4. 't/xp or 3 xp where p is a wff of L and x is an individual variable.
We think of L as a fragment of a second-order language .!L'. This is deter
mined by the categories which determine L, i.e. Pr, X, and Mo. It differs from