Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War

523 Pages·2004·8.4 MB·English

by  James H. Willbanks

Abandoning Vietnam
MODERN WAR STUDIES
Theodore A. Wilson
General Editor
Raymond A. Callahan
Jacob W. Kipp
Allan R. Millett
Carol Reardon
Dennis Showalter
David R. Stone
James H. Willbanks
Series Editors
Abandoning Vietnam
How America Left and
South Vietnam Lost Its War
James H. Willbanks
University Press of Kansas
© 2004, 2008 by the University Press of Kansas All rights reserved
Published by the University Press of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas 66045), which was organized by the
Kansas Board of Regents and is operated and funded by Emporia State University, Fort Hays State
University, Kansas State University, Pittsburg State University, the University of Kansas, and Wichita State
University Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Willbanks, James H., 1947– Abandoning
Vietnam : how America left and South Vietnam lost its war / James H. Willbanks p. cm. — (Modern war
studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7006-1331-1 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-7006-1623-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-
7006-2717-2 (ebook) 1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975. 2. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975—United
States. I. Title. II. Series.
DS557.7.W55 2004
959.704'3373—dc22
2004003407
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4
The paper used in the print publication is recycled and contains 30 percent postconsumer waste. It is acid
free and meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for
Printed Library Materials Z39.48–1992.
This book is dedicated to Lt. Col. William B. Nolde, U.S. Army, killed in
An Loc eleven hours before the cease-fire went into effect in January 1973;
Warrant Officer Anthony Dal Pozzo Jr., U.S. Army helicopter pilot from
the 1st Aviation Brigade, killed one hour and fifteen minutes after the
cease-fire; and Cpls. Darwin Judge and Charles McMahon Jr., U.S.
Marines, both killed during the U.S. evacuation of Saigon in April 1975. It
is also dedicated to my father, James E. Willbanks, U.S. Army (Ret.), a
great soldier who fought on the frozen battlefields of Korea as a member of
the 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division.
Contents
List of Illustrations
Preface to the Paperback Edition
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Vietnamization
2. Implementing the New Strategy
3. The RVNAF in Action
4. Raising the Stakes
5. Lam Son 719
6. The Ultimate Test of Vietnamization
7. Cease-Fire and “Peace with Honor”
8. The Fateful Year
9. Collapse in the North
10. The Fall of Saigon
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Photo Gallery
Illustrations
MAPS
1. RVN CTZs and major South Vietnamese units, 1972
2. RVNAF schools, 1969
3. Ho Chi Minh Trail
4. Attack into the Fishhook, May 1970
5. Attack into the Parrot’s Beak, May 1970
6. Communist sanctuaries and base areas in Laos, 1971
7. Operation Lam Son 719, February-March 1971
8. 1972 North Vietnamese Easter Offensive
9. 1972 North Vietnamese Invasion, I Corps
10. 1972 North Vietnamese Invasion, III Corps
11. 1972 North Vietnamese Invasion, II Corps
12. South Vietnam at cease-fire, January 1973
13. Battle of Phuoc Long Province, December 1974
14. President Thieu’s briefing map, 11 March 1975
15. Fall of the Central Highlands, March-April 1975
16. Fall of MR I, March-April 1975
17. Loss of the coast, March-April 1975
18. Battle of Xuan Loc, April 1975
19. Ho Chi Minh Campaign, April 1975
CHARTS
1. RVNAF military organization, 1966–67
2. Province advisory team, 1968
3. U.S. Advisory chain of command, 1969–70
TABLES
1. RVNAF, 1968
2. Evolution of RVNAF force structure plans
3. Approximate U.S. field advisory strength, 1969–70
4. Comparative military casualty figures
5. Redeployment of major U.S. Army units from Vietnam
6. U.S. troop redeployments from Vietnam
7. Materiel captured during Cambodian incursion, 1970
8. Fixed-wing strike sorties in South Vietnam, 1972
9. Operations Enhance and Enhance Plus
10. NVA strength in the South at cease-fire onset
11. RVNAF and Communist forces in South Vietnam, 1973
Preface to the Paperback Edition
When I began this book, there was no indication that the United States would
become involved in a war in Iraq. The purpose of the book was to look at the
long disengagement of the United States fromVietnam, focusing on
Vietnamization, the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and the aftermath of the
American departure from the war. The book sought to examine Vietnamization
as an exit strategy. Part of the impetus for the book was that I had personally
been involved in this process as an advisor with the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam in 1971–72.
Historians are reluctant to draw lessons learned from historical events. History
never repeats itself; there are just too many variables involved in situations that
are separated in time. This is particularly true when comparing the wars in
Vietnam and Iraq. There are more differences than similarities between the two
wars, and because they differ in so many important ways, attempting to apply
any lessons fromVietnam to the situation in Iraq is fraught with peril. That being
said, however, there are some broad, general lessons learned in Vietnam that can
inform U.S. actions, not only in Iraq, but in any contemporary situation in which
the government of the United States—or any other nation, for that matter—
contemplates intervention and the use of military force. In such cases, just as the
United States did in Vietnam, that government will eventually have to confront
the issue of extricating itself from the conflict situation.
Leaving aside the complex and much-debated issues of why forces were
committed to Iraq in the first place and how our effort there serves our national
security interests, the U.S. focus in the beginning was on major combat
operations: the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s regular forces. Once that was
accomplished, the focus of the American effort in Iraq shifted to building a
democratic Iraqi government and ensuring the presence of viable security forces
that could take on the burgeoning insurgency. President George Bush said that