A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies PDF
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Argumentation Library Leonard Nelson A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies Translated by Fernando Leal and David Carus A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies Argumentation Library VOLUME 26 Series Editor Frans H. van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Editorial Board Bart Garssen, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Scott Jacobs, University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign, USA Erik C.W. Krabbe, University of Groningen, The Netherlands John Woods, University of British Columbia, Canada More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5642 Leonard Nelson A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies 123 Leonard Nelson Göttingen Germany Translated byFernando Leal andDavidCarus Deceased—Leonard Nelson(1882–1927) ISSN 1566-7650 ISSN 2215-1907 (electronic) Argumentation Library ISBN978-3-319-20782-7 ISBN978-3-319-20783-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015945152 SpringerChamHeidelbergNewYorkDordrechtLondon ©SpringerInternationalPublishingSwitzerland2016 Main text translated from the German language edition: Typische Denkfehler in der Philosophie by LeonardNelson,©FelixMeinerVerlag2011.Allrightsreserved AppendixtranslatedfromtheGermanlanguageedition:“DiekritischeEthikbeiKant,SchillerundFries: eineRevisionihrerPrinzipien”,GesammelteSchrifteninneunBänden,vol.VIII,pp.27–192byLeonard Nelson,©FelixMeinerVerlag1971.Allrightsreserved Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpart of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission orinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilar methodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfrom therelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authorsortheeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinor foranyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade. Printedonacid-freepaper SpringerInternationalPublishingAGSwitzerlandispartofSpringerScience+BusinessMedia (www.springer.com) Contents Introduction by Fernando Leal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 What Is the Theory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Who Was Leonard Nelson? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Some Objections to the Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Note on the Translation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Lecture I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Lecture II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Reference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Lecture III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Lecture IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Lecture V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Lecture VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Lecture VII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Lecture VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 v vi Contents Lecture IX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Lecture X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Lecture XI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Lecture XII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Lecture XIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Lecture XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Lecture XV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 Lecture XVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Lecture XVII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Lecture XVIII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Lecture XIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 Lecture XX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Lecture XXI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 Lecture XXII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 Appendix: Seven Kantian Fallacies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 Introduction by Fernando Leal Abstract In 1921 Nelson presented what seems to be the first theory of philo- sophical argumentation, or at least of its negative or destructive part—a theory of philosophical fallacies. That theory says that the peculiar nature of philosophical thinkingrepeatedlyleadspeopletotakeordinaryconceptswithgreatphilosophical import,suchascausalityorduty,andreplacethemwithnew,made-upones,whose content is very different from that of the originally available ones. When the new conceptsusurptheplaceoftheoriginaloneswithinaphilosophicalargument,they invariably produce false results—on all sides of philosophical disputes. Many apparently irresolvable disputes in philosophy are the product of such fallacious concept-swapping. The relationship between philosophy and argumentation is, to say the least, pecu- liar. Philosophers argue all the time, that much we all know, even though quite often it is difficult, and sometimes exceedingly difficult, to make out what exactly theirargumentsare.Butevenconceding(forthesakeofargument)thatphilosophy is all about arguing, it is again a hard fact that philosophers, in sharp contrast to mathematicians or scientists, are rarely if ever convinced by each other’s argu- ments. Moreover, the favourite occupation of philosophers is to pick holes in the argumentsoftheirfellowphilosophers,therebyindicatingtotheoutsideworldthat there is something rotten with all philosophical arguments. None of this is controversial. A curious observer would therefore be readily excusedifheorshewoulddrawtheconclusionthat,surely,philosophersmusthave bynowdevelopedatheoryofphilosophicalargumentation.Thisishardlythecase. A careful inspection of the relevant literature reveals it to consist basically of two kindsofpublications.Ontheonehand,therearepractical‘textbooks’purportingto givestudentssomeanalytictoolstoanalyzeandevaluatephilosophicalargumentsor to construct and present their own. On the other hand, there are metaphilosophical texts presenting a certain view of the nature of philosophy with more or less loose ©SpringerInternationalPublishingSwitzerland2016 1 L.Nelson,ATheoryofPhilosophicalFallacies, ArgumentationLibrary26,DOI10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4_1 2 IntroductionbyFernandoLeal observationsabouttherolethatargumentsplayordonotplayinphilosophy.1None ofthesebooks,however,presentasystematictheoryofphilosophicalargumentation as such,a theoryof how philosophersactuallyargue or failto argue.2 This is the main reason why the book the reader is now holding in his or her hands merits attention. This book does present a theory of philosophical argu- mentation.Itisperhapstoosoontosaywhetherthetheoryiscorrect,entirelyorin part, but it is quite a clear theory, so that at the very least it might start a much needed discussion about what a theory of philosophical argumentation should be. InthefollowingIshallfirst brieflystatewhat thattheoryis, then Ishall present its author, for he is not well known, and finally I shall endeavour to meet some objections that can be raised against the theory. What Is the Theory? Nelson’s theory of philosophical argumentation, asset forth inthis book,is only a partial theory, for it only concerns those philosophical arguments that go wrong, that contain a fallacy, i.e. an error in reasoning. It does not say anything about philosophicalargumentsthatarecorrectandfallacy-free.Moreover,thetheorydoes not purport to cover all fallacies, but only the ‘typical’ ones, viz those that a philosopher will commit sooner or later because of the peculiar business he is in. Fallacies of such a typical sort are as it were an occupational hazard. Even the plural—fallacies—has to be taken with a pinch of salt, for at bottom there is, according to the theory, only one typical fallacy in philosophical argu- mentation, although it comes in many shapes and forms. This may not look very promising.Atheoryofphilosophicalargumentationthatisinfactaboutonefallacy? Forittoworkwemustassumethatinphilosophywewill,alwaysoratleastforthe 1Tothefirstgroupbelonge.g.Cornmanetal.(1992),Rosenberg(1996),Morton(2004),Cohen (2004), Martinich (2005), Baggini and Fosl (2010); to the second e.g. Stove (1991), Glymour (1992),Bouveresse (1996), Williamson (2007),Gutting (2009),Schnädelbach(2012).Iamnat- urallyexcludingfromconsiderationthosetextbookswrittenbyphilosophersaboutargumentation ingeneral(usuallyinviewofcoursesinlogicorcriticalthinking)aswellaspapersorbooksin whichparticularargumentsofparticularphilosophersaresubjectedtoscrutinyeitherforhistorical orsystematicpurposes.Theymaycontainvaluableremarksaboutphilosophicalargumentationbut belongtoadifferentballgamealtogether.AspecialcaseisNicholasRescher,whoinaseriesof papers and books (e.g. 2001, 2006, 2008) has made some interesting, albeit in my opinion somewhatrambling,attemptsatatheoryofphilosophicalargumentation. 2There seem to be two theories of philosophical argumentation apart from Nelson’s. Johnstone (1959, 1978), developed in a long and distinguished career a theory that is both profound and undeservedlyunderratedbyphilosophers,althoughithasfortunatelymetwithsomeattentionin thefieldofargumentationstudies(seee.g.thespecialissueinhishonourinInformalLogic,2001, as well as van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2007). I can see clear points of contact as well as undeniabledifferencesbetweenJohnstone’stheoryandNelson’s,andIcertainlyhopetotacklethe taskofcomparingtheminthefuture.Asfortheothertheory,seeFootnote7ofthischapter. WhatIstheTheory? 3 mostpart,reasoncorrectlyifonlyweavoidthatonefallacytowhosedescriptionand illustration this whole book isdevoted.Thatis exactly what Nelson assumes. But what exactly is this fallacy? The analysis that uncovers it is a two-step procedure. Step1 Nelsonstartswiththefactthataphilosophicalargumentisalwayspartofan ongoing, if not always fully explicit, discussion between philosophers each one of whom affirms something that appears to imply denying what the other holds. The logicalbuildingconstitutedbytheopposingargumentsNelsoncallsthe‘dialectics’ of the issue at hand—harking back to Plato, who invented the term to name the peculiar art of dialogue developed by his master, Socrates. Although such logical buildings—the sets of propositions and arguments pitted against each other all along the history of philosophy—can sometimes be abstruse and convoluted, Nelson’s analysis tries to reduce the basic opposition to its raw core, which he sometimes represents in the shape of elegant diagrams. The reader will find in this book five of those. Popper for one expressed his admiration for this analytical feat of reduction and tried to imitate it (see Popper 1979). Those diagrams show that the way philosophers arrive at their positive philo- sophicaldoctrinesisbywayofdenyingthepositivedoctrinesoftheiropponents.They managetobelievetheyhaveprovedsomething,sayP,becausetheyhaveshownthe oppositedoctrine,sayQ,tobefalse.Theiropponentsplayexactlythesamegame,so that the net result is the appearance of a relation of contradiction between P and Qwherethereisinfactnosuchcontradiction.Thegameisplayedagainandagainby philosophersonthestrength of acommon assumption,ausuallyhidden presuppo- sitionsharedbythetwoadversaries,vizthatPandQexhaustallpossibilitiesavailable tophilosophicalthought.YetifPandQexcludeeachother,theirnegationsdonot.In otherwords,ifPistrue,thenQhastobefalse,andifQistrue,thenPhastobefalse; butifPisfalse,Qdoesnothavetobetrue,andifQisfalse,Pdoesnothavetobetrue. Inthetraditionallogicaljargon,thetwophilosophicaldoctrinesarenotcontradictory butrathercontrarytoeachother—theycannotbothbetrueyettheymayverywell bothbefalse,vizifthecommonassumptionthattheyaretheonlyalternativesisitself false. The starting point of the discussion is then the choice between two options (eitherPorQ),alogicaldisjunctionwhichisunderstoodbybothdiscussionpartners asbeingbothexclusiveandexhaustive.Startingfromsuchadisjunctionthediscus- sionevolvesinapredictableway,whichNelson’sdiagramstrytorepresentinaterse, parsimonious manner. If we use arrows to indicate an inferential relation, then the followingwouldbethegeneralformofaNelsondiagram:
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