A Strategic Analysis of Al Shabaab

345 Pages·2017·1.688 MB·English

by  John Edward Maszka

A Strategic Analysis of Al Shabaab
John Edward Maszka

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for a PhD
Bournemouth University
February 2017
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This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is
understood to recognize that its copyright rests with its author and due
acknowledgement must always be made of the use of any material contained in, or
derived from, this thesis.
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A Strategic Analysis of Al Shabaab
John Edward Maszka
Abstract

This thesis makes an original contribution to the body of literature by applying
strategic theory to the Somali militant group al Shabaab. By tracing the line of
thinking of the organisation, I endeavour to more fully comprehend the group’s
strategic objective(s).
The U.S. State Department designated al Shabaab a terrorist organization in
February 2008 (Shinn 2011), but has the group been engaged in terrorism or should it
more accurately be labeled an insurgent group? The answer to this question is not as
straight forward as it may seem because the group has gone through a number of
transitions in which its ideology and tactical operations have changed considerably. In
fact, I argue that even its strategic goals appear to have changed. Therefore, we need
more than a superficial understanding of the organization and what it hopes to achieve
through violence.
The first order of business is to clearly define what we mean by “terrorism”
and what we understand an “insurgent” to be. While the definition of terrorism is a
hotly debated subject, this thesis employs the definition articulated by Neumann and
Smith.
According to Neumann and Smith (2005, p. 574), terrorism is “the deliberate
creation of fear, usually by the use or threat of the use of symbolic acts of physical
violence, to influence the behavior of a given target group.” Furthermore, while
conventional warfare seeks to conquer the enemy, terrorism merely seeks to
manipulate political change through terror (Ruby 2002; Neumann and Smith 2005).
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In the most generic sense, we can differentiate between conventional warfare
(which seeks to conquer the enemy) and terrorism (which aims to manipulate political
change through terror). However, because the decision to employ terrorist violence is
strategic, we can also distinguish between groups that employ terrorist violence as
simply part of an overall strategy and those that rely solely on terrorist violence to
achieve their goals. By employing this three-part typology, we are left with three
basic categories of militant violence: (1) military violence intended to overthrow a
regime, (2) terrorist violence employed along with a number of other tactics intended
to coerce political concessions from a regime, and (3) terrorist violence employed as
the sole means for obtaining political concessions. Neumann and Smith refer to this
third category of violence as strategic terrorism, and they define it as the attempt to
obtain political objectives through the use of primarily terrorist activity rather than
through some other means.
The main focus of this thesis is to determine al Shabaab’s strategic goal(s), and
therefore, whether it is an insurgent group or a terrorist organization. After tracing al
Shabaab’s ideological underpinnings back through its predecessors, I examine the
various phases the organization has passed through and attempt to determine what its
strategic objective is and whether it has changed from one phase to another. I
conclude that al Shabaab has passed through three phases and is currently in phase
four. While the organization began as an insurgent group, it has since altered its
strategic goal from overthrowing the Somali government to the use of violence to
coerce political concessions from foreign governments. It has also adopted strategic
terrorism.
A component of this analysis is the theory of perception of the other.
Perception plays a huge role in both the decision to engage in terrorist violence and in
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the way target governments respond. Strategy is the use of one’s resources towards
the attainment of one’s goals. Therefore, how an actor perceives its own resources
vis-a-vis the resources of another plays as large a role as the strategic goal itself.
Furthermore, because al Shabaab has adopted the takfiri doctrine―which
dramatically affects its tactical operations―perception of the other is indispensable
for understanding how to interpret the group’s actions as a means for obtaining its
respective goals. Perception of the other is also critical for comprehending both who
al Shabaab directs its acts of symbolic violence towards and why this audience has
changed over time.
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Table of Contents

Acknowledgement ..................................................................................................................... 9
Author’s Declaration ............................................................................................................... 10
List of Acronyms ...................................................................................................................... 11
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ 14
Foreword ................................................................................................................................. 15
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 25
Outline of Chapters ............................................................................................................. 31
Chapter One: The Fall
Strategic Studies since World War Two .................................................................................. 37
1:1: Introduction .................................................................................................................. 37
1:2: The Strategic Approach ................................................................................................ 37
1.3: Strategy ......................................................................................................................... 40
1.4: Strategic Studies since World War Two ...................................................................... 44
1.5: Terrorism ...................................................................................................................... 47
1.6: Strategic Terrorism ....................................................................................................... 49
1.7: The Takfiri Doctrine ..................................................................................................... 54
1.8: Perception of the Other................................................................................................. 55
1.9: Research Question ........................................................................................................ 58
1.10: Methodology .............................................................................................................. 58
Chapter Two: The Tower of Babel
Limitations of Theoretical Models in Terrorism Studies ......................................................... 69
2.1: Introduction .................................................................................................................. 69
2.2: Limitations of Systemic Levels of Analysis ................................................................. 69
2.2.1: The Big Bang? ....................................................................................................... 71
2.2.2: Weak States? ......................................................................................................... 74
2.3: Limitations of Lower Levels of Analysis ..................................................................... 76
2.3.1: The Psycho-pathological School ........................................................................... 77
2.3.2: The Psycho-sociological School............................................................................ 80
2.3.3: The Rational Approach ......................................................................................... 83
2.4: Limitations of Theoretical Models ............................................................................... 86
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2.5: Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 88
Chapter Three: Welcome to the Jungle
Definitions, Typologies, and Various Explanations for Terrorism ........................................... 91
3.1: Introduction .................................................................................................................. 91
3.2: Establishing a Working Definition of Terrorism .......................................................... 91
3.3: Welcome to the Jungle ................................................................................................. 93
3.3.1: Four Common Approaches to Defining Terrorism ............................................... 99
3.4: Traditionally Accepted Explanations of Terrorism .................................................... 114
3.4.1: Structural Explanations of Terrorism ................................................................. 121
3.4.2: Cultural Explanations of Terrorism .................................................................... 126
3.4.3: Institutional Explanations of Terrorism .............................................................. 134
3.4.4: Rational Explanations of Terrorism .................................................................... 141
3.5: Suggested Solutions to Terrorism .............................................................................. 146
3.5.1: Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism ................................................................... 147
3.5:2 Limitations of Tactical Counterterrorism and Antiterrorism ............................... 163
3.6: Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 166
Chapter Four: Somalia
The Teeth of a Lion ................................................................................................................ 168
4.1: Introduction ................................................................................................................ 168
4.2: History ........................................................................................................................ 175
4.2.1: Pre-colonial History ............................................................................................ 176
4.2.2: Colonial History .................................................................................................. 177
4.2.3: From Independence to the Islamic Union ........................................................... 179
4.2.4: From the Islamic Union to the Union of Islamic Courts ..................................... 183
4.2.5: From the ICU to al Shabaab ............................................................................... 193
4.2.6: From al Shabaab to the Present Day .................................................................. 200
Chapter Five: The Strategic Terrorism of al Shabaab ............................................................ 224
5.2: Militant Groups in Somalia ........................................................................................ 225
5.2.1: Al Ittihad al Islamiyya (AIAI) .............................................................................. 227
5.2.2: The Union of Islamic Courts (ICU) ..................................................................... 229
5.2.3: Al Qaeda .............................................................................................................. 231
5.2.4: Al Shabaab .......................................................................................................... 240
5.3: Does al Shabaab Employ Strategic Terrorism? .......................................................... 241
5.3.1: Stage One- Disorientation ................................................................................... 245
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5.3.2: Stage Two- Provoking a Response ...................................................................... 250
5.3.3: Stage Three- Gaining Legitimacy ....................................................................... 251
5.4: From Near to Far ........................................................................................................ 253
Chapter Six: The Future of Terror and the Role of Strategic Theory ..................................... 260
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 269
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Acknowledgement
I would like to acknowledge Professor Barry Richards and Dr. Roman
Gerodimos for their invaluable guidance in this research. As a political scientist
trained in the United States, I am very much a product of the empirical school.
However, I am very fortunate to have spent the past three years on a very different
epistemological journey. As a result, I feel uniquely qualified to approach this study
from both positivist and interpretivist perspectives (although the positivist approach
still tends to dominate at times).
I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Jan Lewis who has
been a constant source of assistance for the past three years and to Dr. Nait-Charif,
Dr. Sreedharan and Dr. McQueen for serving on my transfer panel. I am grateful to
Dr. Lyndsey Harris and Professor Jonathan Parker for their depth of expertise and
copious feedback on my first draft; and also to Dr. Dan Jackson for his role as chair in
the viva process.
Sometimes (if we are extremely fortunate), we not only get to stand on the
shoulders of giants, they give us a leg up. I am deeply honored to have received
positive and encouraging feedback from MLR Smith, without whose seminal work
this research would not be possible, and from the great Gus Martin, whose scholarship
has been a source of inspiration and guidance for terrorism and security professionals
alike. Last, but certainly not least, I am indebted to the legendary Arend Lijphart for
both his professional advice and his personal kindness. A friend is someone who is
there when you need them. I am both humbled and delighted to call Arend my friend.
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Author’s Declaration
I declare that all work presented in this research project is original and that I am the
sole contributor.