A History of the Peninsula War Vol 4 by Charles Oman

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Title: A History of the Peninsular War. Vol. IV.
Dec. 1810-Dec. 1811. Massena's Retreat, Fuentes de Oñoro,
Albuera, Tarragona

Author: Charles Oman

Release Date: March 22, 2018 [EBook #56812]

Language: English

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Transcriber's note
Table of Contents
List of Maps
List of Illustrations
Index

Major General Sir Thomas Picton

A HISTORY OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR

BY

CHARLES OMAN

M.A. Oxon., Hon. LL.D. Edin.

FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

CHICHELE PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY

FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE

CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE REAL ACADEMIA

DE LA HISTORIA OF MADRID, OF THE ACADEMY OF LISBON

AND THE ACADEMY OF SAN LUIS OF SARAGOSSA

VOL. IV

DEC. 1810-DEC. 1811

MASSÉNA’S RETREAT FUENTES DE OÑORO

ALBUERA TARRAGONA

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1911

[p. i]

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK

TORONTO AND MELBOURNE

[p. ii]

I

PREFACE

n this volume are contained the annals of all the many campaigns of 1811, with the exception of

those of Suchet’s Valencian expedition in the later months of the year, which for reasons of space
have to be relegated to Volume V. It was impossible to exceed the bulk of 660 pages, and the
operations on the Mediterranean coast of Spain can be dealt with separately without any grave
breach of continuity in the narrative, though this particular Valencian campaign affected the general
course of the war far more closely than any other series of operations on the Eastern side of the
Peninsula, as I have been careful to point out in the concluding chapters of Section XXIX.

The main interest of 1811, however, centres in the operations of Wellington and his opponents,

Masséna, Soult, and Marmont. In the previous year the tide of French conquest reached its high-
water mark, when Soult appeared before the walls of Cadiz, and Masséna forced his way to the foot
of the long chain of redoubts that formed the Lines of Torres Vedras. Already, before 1810 was
over, Masséna’s baffled army had fallen back a few miles, and this first short retreat to Santarem
marked the commencement of a never-ceasing ebb of the wave of conquest on the Western side of
the Peninsula. Matters went otherwise on the Eastern coast in 1811, but all Suchet’s campaigns
were, after all, a side issue. The decisive point lay not in Catalonia or Valencia, but in Portugal.

When Masséna finally evacuated Portugal in March 1811, forced out of his cantonments by

Wellington’s skilful use of the sword of famine, a new stage in the war began. The French had lost the
advantage of the offensive, and were never to regain it on the Western theatre of war. All through the
remainder of 1811 it was the British general who dealt the strokes, and the enemy who had to parry
them. The strokes were feeble, because of Wellington’s very limited resources, and for the most part
were warded off. Though Almeida fell in May, the siege of Badajoz in June, and the blockade of
Ciudad Rodrigo in August and September, were both brought to an end by the concentration of
French armies which Wellington was too weak to attack. But the masses of men which Soult and
Marmont gathered on the Guadiana in June, and Dorsenne and Marmont gathered on the Agueda in
September, had only been collected by a dangerous disgarnishing of the whole of those provinces of
Spain which lay beneath the French yoke. They could not remain long assembled, firstly because they
could not feed themselves, and secondly because of the peril to which their concentration exposed
the abandoned regions in their rear. Hence, in each case, the French commanders, satisfied with
having parried Wellington’s stroke for the moment, refused to attack him, and dispersed their armies.
That the spirit of the offensive was lost on the French side is sufficiently shown by the fact that when
their adversary stood on the defensive upon the Caya in June, and at Alfayates in September, they
refused to assail his positions.

We leave the allied and the French armies at the end of the autumn campaign of 1811 still in this

state of equipoise. Wellington had made two successive attempts to strike, and had failed, though
without any grave loss or disaster, because the forces opposed to him were still too great. His third
stroke in January 1812 was to be successful and decisive, but its history belongs to our next volume.

The main bulk of the seven sections herewith presented consists of a narrative of the successive

phases of the long deadlock between Wellington and his enemies along the Portuguese frontier: but I
have endeavoured to give as clear a narrative as I can compile of all the side-campaigns of the year,
in Andalusia, Murcia, Estremadura, Galicia, the Asturias, and Catalonia, and to show their bearings
on the general history of the great Peninsular struggle.

I must apologize for the long space of time—three years—that has elapsed between the

appearance of the third and the fourth volumes of this work. But it was impossible to produce these
sections till I had taken two more voyages over the more important fighting-grounds of 1811—one
round Catalonia, the other along the line of Masséna’s retreat from Portugal. It was only in the last
days of September 1910 that I was able to accomplish the latter journey. It was made under the
happiest conditions, for the government of King Manuel kindly lent me a motor-car, and put at my
disposition the services of Captain Teixeira Botelho, an admirable specialist on the artillery side of the
Peninsular War. Guided by him, and accompanied by my friend Mr. Rafael Reynolds of Barreiro, I
was able to study the topography of Pombal, Redinha, Condeixa, Casal Novo, and Foz do Arouce,
not to speak of many other picturesque spots of military interest. Hence my survey of the main
fighting-grounds of 1811 has been fairly complete—I spent long days at Fuentes de Oñoro and
Albuera, walked all round Badajoz and the field of the Gebora, and studied Tarragona and other
Catalan sites. Barrosa alone, I regret to say, I have not been able to visit.

I have to offer grateful thanks to many possessors of documents, who have been good enough to

place them at my disposition. The most important of all were the D’Urban papers, lent to me by Mr.
W. S. M. D’Urban, of Newport House, near Exeter; the diary and official correspondence of his
grandfather, Sir Benjamin D’Urban, Beresford’s Chief-of-the-staff during the Estremaduran
campaigns of 1811, were simply invaluable for the comprehension of those operations. I had already

[p. iii]

[p. iv]

[p. v]

[p. vi]

acknowledged my indebtedness to the D’Urban papers in my narrative of 1810; but in the following
year, when Beresford was acting as the leader of an independent army, they were even more
important—as my constant references to them in notes will show.

A new source of high value came to my knowledge last year, through the kindness of Mr. G.

Scovell, of Hove, who placed in my hands the papers of his grandfather, Major Scovell, who acted in
1811-12-13 as Wellington’s cipher-secretary. Not only was this officer’s personal diary of great use
to me, but the file of the intercepted French dispatches in cipher, with the interpretation of them
worked out with infinite pains, proved as valuable as it was interesting. Many of the originals, written
on small scraps of the thinnest paper, and folded into such minute shapes that they could be sewed on
to a button, or hidden in a coatseam, had evidently been taken on the persons of emissaries of the
French generals, who had been captured by the guerrilleros, and had probably in most cases cost the
bearers their lives. The ciphers were of two sorts: in the more complicated every word was in cipher;
in the less complicated only names of persons and places and the numbers of troops or dates were
disguised, the bulk of the dispatch being in plain French. In the key to these last there were several
hundred arbitrary numbers used, and it was Major Scovell’s task to make out from the context, or
the repetition of the same figures in many documents, what the individual numbers meant. By the end
of his researches he had identified four-fifths of the names, and those which he had not all belonged to
unimportant persons or places, infrequently mentioned.

A much shorter but quite interesting file of diary and letters placed at my disposal were those of

Cornet Francis Hall of the 14th Light Dragoons. They practically covered only the year 1811, but
were very full, and written in an animated descriptive style, very different from that of many dry and
short journals. They contained by far the best account of the cavalry part of the fighting at Fuentes de
Oñoro that I have ever seen, and I am exceedingly obliged to the writer’s granddaughter Miss E. G.
Hall for allowing me to utilize them.

I am still occasionally using notes of 1811 made from two collections of unpublished letters, of

which I had occasion to speak in my last preface, those of General Le Marchant, now in the hands of
Sir Henry Le Marchant of Chobham, and those of General John Wilson belonging to Commander
Bertram Chambers R.N. To both of the courteous possessors of these files of correspondence I owe
my best thanks.

I must mention, as in previous volumes, much kind help given me by those connected with the

military archives of Paris, Madrid, and Lisbon. Once more I must acknowledge the unfailing kindness
of M. Martinien at the French War Ministry, who did so much to make easy for me endless searches
through the overflowing cartons of its Library. At Madrid Commandant Juan Arzadun of the Artillery
Museum placed much suggestive material at my disposal, and found me one or two scarce books,
while Major Emilio Figueras at the War Ministry searched out and copied for me a number of
unpublished ‘morning states’ of the various Spanish Armies. I must also recur to the name of Captain
Teixeira Botelho of the Portuguese Artillery, my companion on the line of Masséna’s retreat, who
furnished me with a rich mine of information in his unpublished subsidios para a historia da
Artilheria Portugueza.

Among my English helpers I must give a special word of thanks to Major John Leslie, R.A., to

whose researches I owe all that I know about the British artillery in the Peninsular War. His ‘Dickson
Papers’ are always at my elbow, and I owe him particular gratitude for the Artillery Appendix XXIV,
which he has been good enough to compile for me. To the Hon. John Fortescue, the historian of the
British Army, whom we were proud to welcome at Oxford as Ford Lecturer this year, I am deeply
indebted for his answers to my queries on many dark points, and most especially for his notes as to
several suppressed parts of the Wellington Correspondence. Mr. Rafael Reynolds of Barreiro, who
shared in my September tour of last year, has obtained for me in Lisbon a number of rare Portuguese
volumes, most especially a complete set of Marshal Beresford’s Ordens do Dia for the whole
Peninsular War—an almost unprocurable collection, containing every general order, report of a court
martial, list of promotions, and statistical paper, which was issued to the Portuguese Army. It is
absolutely invaluable for identifying names and dates, and settling questions of organization. The Rev.
Alexander Craufurd, grandson of the famous commander of the Light Division, has continued, as in
previous years, to place his store of information concerning the campaigns of that hard fighting unit at
my disposal.

Lastly, the compiler of the index, a weary task executed under many difficulties, must receive my

heartfelt thanks for much loving labour.

I must apologize to readers for some occasional discrepancies in spelling which may be

discovered in the text and maps. They are mainly due to the fact that all along the Portuguese-Spanish
frontier every town and village is spelt differently by its own inhabitants and by its close neighbours of
the other nationality. I find it impossible to avoid the occasional intrusion of a Portuguese spelling of a
Spanish locality, and vice versa. Matters are made still more hard by the fact that the spelling of local
names in Portugal (less so in Spain) seems to have been much changed since 1811. It is difficult to

[p. vii]

[p. viii]

[p. ix]

avoid occasionally an archaic, or on the other hand a too-modern, form for a name. These slight
errors, or discrepancies between names as spelled in the text and in the maps, were nearly all caused
by alterations between the received spelling of 1811, followed in the maps I used, and that of 1911. I
do not think that they will cause any difficulty to the reader, who will not e. g. find it hard to recognize
that Foz do Arouce is the same as Foz de Arouce or Casal Novo as Cazal Novo.

In a few cases the critic may find a slight difference in the numbers of troops, or of killed and

wounded, which are given in the text and in the appendices. In almost all cases this results from the
fact that the official totals quoted in the text turned out not to work out in exact agreement with the
detailed list of items in the ‘morning states’ or the complete casualty lists. These errors, always trifling,
could not be discovered till the arithmetic of the appendices had been verified, sometimes when the
text had already been printed off. The most frequent discrepancies were found in comparing
Wellington’s totals of Portuguese strengths or casualties with the detailed official figures. In all
instances the differences are small, but the Appendices must be taken to give the more exact
numbers.

C. OMAN.

Oxford:

July 1, 1911.

[p. x]

CONTENTS

SECTION XXIII

The Winter Campaign of 1810-11

CHAPTER
PAGE

I. Masséna at Santarem. The deadlock on the Lower Tagus. December 1810-

January 1811
1

II. Soult’s Invasion of Estremadura. January-March 1811. The Battle of the

Gebora and the Fall of Badajoz
23

III. Masséna’s Last Weeks at Santarem. January-March 1811
64

IV. Events in the South of Spain. The Battle of Barrosa. January-March 1811
91

SECTION XXIV

Masséna’s Retreat from Portugal

I. Santarem to Celorico. March 9th-22nd, 1811
131

II. Guarda and Sabugal. March 22nd-April 12th, 1811
173

SECTION XXV

Events in Northern, Eastern, and Central Spain

I. King Joseph and his Troubles
206

II. Suchet on the Ebro. The Fall of Tortosa. December 1810-March 1811
227

SECTION XXVI

Fuentes de Oñoro and Albuera

I. Beresford’s Campaign in Estremadura. The First British Siege of Badajoz.

March-May 1811
247

II. Fuentes de Oñoro: Preliminary Operations. April 12th-May 3rd, 1811
288

III. The Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro. May 5th, 1811
315

IV. Brennier’s Escape from Almeida. May 1811
349

V. The Battle of Albuera. May 16th, 1811
363

SECTION XXVII

Wellington’s First Estremaduran Campaign

I. The Second British Siege of Badajoz. May-June 1811
404

II. Wellington on the Caya. June-July 1811
443

III. Events in the North of Spain during the concentration on the Caya. Dorsenne

and the Galicians. June-August 1811
461

IV. Soult’s Troubles in Andalusia, July-September 1811
475

SECTION XXVIII

Operations in Eastern Spain in the Spring, Summer, and Autumn of 1811

I. Figueras and Tarragona. April-May 1811
484

II. The Siege and Fall of Tarragona. May-June 1811
497

III. The Fall of Figueras and the Autumn Campaign in Catalonia. July-October

1811
528

SECTION XXIX

Wellington’s Autumn Campaign of 1811

I. Wellington’s Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. August-September 1811
542

II. El Bodon and Aldea da Ponte. September 1811
559

III. The End of Wellington’s Campaigns of 1811. Arroyo dos Molinos. September

1811
583

[p. xi]

[p. xii]

APPENDICES

I. The French Army in Portugal, Returns of January-April 1811
608

II. Soult’s Army in his First Expedition to Estremadura, January-March 1811
610

III. Spanish Troops in Estremadura, March 1811
610

IV. Graham’s Army at Barrosa, and its Losses
612

V. Victor’s Army at Barrosa, and its Losses
613

VI-VII. British Losses at Pombal, Redinha, Casal Novo, Foz do Arouce, and Sabugal,

March-April 1811
614-616

VIII. French Losses at Sabugal, April 3rd, 1811
617

IX. Force of Wellington’s Army at Fuentes de Oñoro, May 3-5, 1811
618

X. British and Portuguese Losses at Fuentes de Oñoro, First Day, May 3
622

XI. British and Portuguese Losses at Fuentes de Oñoro, Second Day, May 5th,

1811
623

XII. The French Army at Fuentes de Oñoro
625

XIII. Masséna’s Orders for Fuentes de Oñoro
629

XIV. French Losses at Fuentes de Oñoro
630

XV. The Allied Army at Albuera, and its Losses, May 16, 1811
631

XVI. Soult’s Army at Albuera, and its Losses
634

XVII. Strength of the Spanish Armies in the Summer of 1811
636

XVIII. Strength of the French Army in Spain, July 15, 1811
638

XIX. French and Spanish Forces at the Siege of Tarragona
643

XX. Wellington’s Army on the Beira Frontier, September 15
644

XXI. Allied Losses at the Combat of El Bodon
648

XXII. Allied Losses at the Combat of Aldea da Ponte
648

XXIII. Hill’s Force in Estremadura, September-October 1811
649

XXIV. The British Artillery in the Peninsula during the Campaign of 1811
650

INDEX
653

MAPS AND PLANS

PAGE

I. Badajoz and the Battle of the Gebora
To face
54

II. General Map of the Barrosa Campaign
”
104

III. The Battle of Barrosa
”
124

IV. Combat of Redinha
”
144

V. Combat of Casal Novo
”
152

VI. Combat of Foz do Arouce
”
158

VII. Masséna’s Retreat. Leiria to the Alva River
”
166

VIII. Combat of Sabugal
”
196

IX. Masséna’s Retreat. Celorico to Ciudad Rodrigo
”
200

X. Plan of the Siege of Tortosa
”
238

XI. The British Sieges of Badajoz in May and June 1811
”
286

XII. Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro (two plates)
”
316, 338

XIII. Battle of Albuera (two plates)
”
384, 394

XIV. General Map of Estremadura
”
452

XV. Plan of the Siege of Tarragona
”
524

XVI. General Map of Catalonia
”
538

ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

Portrait of General Picton
Frontispiece

Portrait of General Graham
To face
96

[p. xiii]

[p. xiv]

Portrait of Marshal Beresford
”
260

British Army crossing the Tagus at Villa Velha
”
408

Fort San Cristobal
”
424

SECTION XXIII

THE WINTER CAMPAIGN OF 1810-11

CHAPTER I

MASSÉNA AT SANTAREM. THE DEADLOCK ON THE LOWER

TAGUS. DECEMBER 1810-JANUARY 1811

On the 18th of November, 1810, Masséna had completed the movement to the rear which he

had commenced on the 14th. His army no longer threatened the Lines of Torres Vedras: he had
abandoned the offensive for the defensive. Concentrated in the triangle Santarem-Punhete-Thomar,
with his three corps so disposed that a march of twenty miles would suffice to concentrate everything
save outlying detachments, he waited to see whether his enemy would dare to attack him; for he still
hoped for a battle in the open field, and was prepared to accept its chances. At Bussaco, so he
reasoned, his defeat had been the result of an over-bold attack on a strong position. The event might
go otherwise if he threw the responsibility of the offensive on Wellington. He had secured for himself
an advantageous fighting-ground: his left flank was protected by the formidable entrenchments around
Santarem; his front was covered by the rain-sodden valley of the Rio Mayor, which during the winter
season could be crossed only at a few well-known points. His right wing could not be turned, unless
his adversary were ready to push a great force over villainous roads towards Alcanhede and the
upper course of the Rio Mayor. And if Wellington should risk a large detachment in this direction, it
might be possible to burst out from Santarem, against the containing force which he would be
compelled to leave on the banks of the Tagus, about Cartaxo, and to beat it back towards the Lines
—a movement which would almost certainly bring back the turning column from the North. For the
English general could not dare to leave Lisbon exposed to the chances of a sudden blow, when there
was little but Portuguese militia left to occupy the long chain of defensive works from Alhandra to
Torres Vedras. For some weeks after his retreat to his new position at Santarem, Masséna lived in
hopes that Wellington would either deliver an attack on his well-protected front, or undertake the
dangerous turning movement towards his left.

No such chance was granted him. His adversary had weighed all the arguments for and against

the offensive, and had made up his mind to rely rather on his old weapon—starvation—than on force.
In several of his December dispatches he sums up the situation with perfect clearness; on the 2nd he
wrote to Lord Liverpool, ‘It would still be impossible to make any movement of importance upon the
right flank of the enemy’s position at Santarem without exposing some divisions of troops to be
insulated and cut off. The enemy having concentrated their army about Torres Novas, &c., I do not
propose to make any movement by which I incur the risk of involving the army in a general action, on
ground less advantageous than that which I had fixed upon to bring this contest to an issue [i. e. the
Lines]. The enemy can be relieved from the difficulties of their situation only by the occurrence of
some misfortune to the allied army, and I should forward their views by placing the fate of the
campaign on the result of a general action on ground chosen by them, and not on that selected by me.
I therefore propose to continue the operation of light detachments on their flanks and rear, to confine
them as much as possible, but to engage in no serious affair on ground on which the result can be at
all doubtful[1].’ At the end of the month he simply restates his decision: ‘Having such an enemy to
contend with, and knowing (as I do) that there is no army in the Peninsula capable of contending with
the enemy, excepting that under my command; that there are no means of replacing any large losses I
might sustain; and that any success acquired by a large sacrifice of men would be followed by
disastrous consequence to the cause of the allies, I have determined to persevere in the system which
has hitherto saved all, and which will, I hope, end in the defeat of the enemy[2].’

Accordingly Wellington’s main army was kept for the three winter months of December, January,

and February almost precisely on the same ground on which it had been placed in the last week of
November. The three British cavalry brigades formed a line in front of the whole, reaching from Porto
de Mugem on the Tagus to São João de Ribiera on the upper Rio Mayor[3]. The infantry divisions
(save the 2nd) were arranged in successive lines of cantonment behind them, watching the course of
the Rio Mayor, while the reserves had retired as far as the Lines of Torres Vedras. Practically the
whole force could be concentrated in a single march—or a march and a half at most—in case
Masséna should take the improbable—but still conceivable—step of sallying out from Santarem to
resume the offensive. When the first French reinforcements began to come up—about the New Year
of 1810-11—such a sally seemed to Wellington quite worth guarding against[4]. The disposition of the
infantry was as follows: On the right, near the Tagus, lay the Light Division, immediately in front of

[p. 1]

[p. 2]

[p. 3]

Santarem, quartered in Valle and other villages. On the left the front line was formed by Pack’s
Portuguese, who lay at Almoster, on heights overlooking the middle course of the Rio Mayor. In
support of the Light Division, but five miles to the rear, at Cartaxo and other places, was the large
and powerful 1st Division, 7,000 bayonets. The 4th Division lay at an equal distance behind the 1st,
at Azambuja and Aveiras da Cima. Behind Pack, on the inland or Leiria road, Picton and his 3rd
Division were placed at Alcoentre. Their support was the 5th Division at Torres Vedras in the old
Lines, seventeen miles to the rear, from which a circuitous road led to Alcoentre. Finally the newly-
formed 6th Division was placed at the other end of the Lines, but just outside them, at Alemquer and
Arruda, with Le Cor’s Portuguese division immediately behind, at Alhandra.

In all the main army consisted of about 48,000 men of all arms; but this did not compose the

whole of Wellington’s available resources. He had transferred a considerable detachment to the
southern bank of the Tagus, to protect the Alemtejo against any possible descent by the French. It
will be remembered that as early as the beginning of November[5] he had sent across the river Fane’s
Portuguese cavalry and a battalion of Caçadores, who were directed to watch the road along the
further bank, to prevent any trifling force of French from crossing in search of provisions, and to keep
open the communications with Abrantes. As long as Masséna was threatening the Lines of Torres
Vedras, there was no danger that he would throw anything more than a raiding party across the
Tagus; he would want every man for the great assault. But when the Marshal gave up the offensive
and retired to Santarem, the aspect of affairs was changed; it was quite possible that, with his army in
a state of semi-starvation, he might venture to send a considerable detachment over the river, to
gather the food which was so necessary to him. Nor was it unlikely that he might have a still more
cogent reason for invading the Alemtejo. If, as Wellington thought probable[6], the army of Andalusia
were to be ordered up to assist the army of Portugal, it would be of great importance for the latter to
possess a footing on the left bank of the Tagus, as the communication with Soult’s troops must
certainly be made in this direction. Accordingly there was good reason for securing the line of the
river, and for cooping up Masséna in his limited sphere on its western bank. On the 19th-20th of
November, Hill and the 2nd Division, attended as usual by Hamilton’s two Portuguese brigades, and
with the 13th Light Dragoons attached, crossed the Tagus in boats a little to the north of Salvaterra,
to reinforce Fane’s detachment. This was a serious force—10,000 men—which Wellington could ill
spare, and he made elaborate arrangements to enable it to return in haste, in the event of Masséna’s
once more taking the offensive on the western bank of the Tagus. The flotilla of gunboats and river
craft, which had been guarding the river, was to be kept ready at Alhandra to bring back the 2nd
Division, at the first alarm of a movement of the French from Santarem. Meanwhile Hill moved up the
river and established his head quarters at Chamusca, a little north of Santarem, from which point he
could both observe the main body of the French and impede any attempt that they might make to
cross the river, and also could keep in touch with Abrantes, and reinforce it, supposing that Masséna
showed any signs of molesting it. The British brigades of the 2nd Division were distributed along the
river, William Stewart’s at Pinheiros and Tramagal most to the north, Hoghton’s at Chamusca,
Lumley’s at Almeirim, exactly facing Santarem. Hamilton’s two Portuguese brigades continued the
line southward, Fonseca’s brigade at Mugem, Campbell’s at Salvaterra. Fane’s four regiments of
Portuguese cavalry, and the British 13th Light Dragoons, were strung out by squadrons along the
whole front from the neighbourhood of Abrantes to Almeirim, patrolling the river bank with unceasing
care[7].

On the 29th of November Hill was disabled by a severe attack of fever, and the control of all the

troops beyond the Tagus devolved on his senior brigadier, William Stewart. Wellington only allowed
this hard-fighting but somewhat too venturesome officer to retain his very responsible command for a
few weeks. Troubled by Stewart’s constant requests to be allowed to make offensive movements
against the French, which did not enter into his own plans[8], and dreading the consequences of his
enterprise, the Commander-in-Chief superseded him, by sending over Beresford to take the charge
of all the forces on the Alemtejo bank of the Tagus (December 30). He would have preferred to give
the duty to Hill, who had in the preceding summer carried out a similar task with complete success,
while he watched Reynier from Castello Branco[9]. But Hill’s fever lingered on for many weeks, and
when he was convalescent the medical men insisted that he must return to England for change of air.
This he did in February, and we miss his familiar name in the records of the Peninsular War for a
space of three months, till his reappearance at the front in May.

Beresford therefore began, with the New Year, to exercise a semi-independent command over

the detached force beyond the Tagus, which he was to retain for nearly six months. The experiment
of giving him this responsible duty was not altogether a happy one; and after his unsuccessful
operations in Estremadura, and his ill-fought victory at Albuera, Wellington withdrew him to other
duties in June, and once more handed over the troops south of the Tagus to the cautious yet capable
hands of Hill.

The main force, meanwhile, faced the front of Masséna’s army; Beresford’s detachment

observed its left flank along the Tagus. But this was not all; Wellington had also taken his precautions

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to cast around the rear of the irregular parallelogram held by the French a screen of light troops,
which effectually cut their communications with Spain, and restricted, though they could not altogether
hinder, their marauding raids in search of provisions. This screen was weakest beyond Abrantes, on
the line of the Zezere; but here the land was barren, and the enemy had little or nothing to gain by
plundering excursions. The Castello Branco country was only guarded by its own Ordenança levy,
which was trifling in force, as the whole ‘corregedoria’ from the Zezere to the Elga had only 40,000
souls, and it had sent its two militia regiments within the Lisbon lines. But, save in the small upland
plain about Castello Branco itself, there was practically neither population nor tillage. The less barren
and deserted mountain land between the Zezere and the Mondego was much more worth plundering,
and was protected by the militia brigade of John Wilson, who lay at Espinhal on the Thomar-
Coimbra road, with a force of four battalions, which ought to have numbered 3,000 men, but often
shrank down to 1,500. For the militiamen, unpaid and ill-fed, deserted freely during the winter
season, and as their homes lay far northward, by the Douro, it was not easy to gather them back to
their colours. But Wilson had always a sufficient nucleus about him to check any marauding party that
fell short of a regiment, and was a real restraint on the foragers of the 6th Corps, when they pushed
out from Ourem or Thomar to gather food. He was only once seriously engaged, when, on
December 23rd, General Marcognet, with two battalions and a cavalry regiment, came up against
him, drove him out of Espinhal after some skirmishing, and pushed a reconnaissance as far as the
Mondego, of which we shall hear in its due place.

Beyond Wilson to the west, the line of observation was taken up by Trant’s militia brigade, which

lay at Coimbra, to which town many of its fugitive inhabitants had by this time returned. He had a
larger force than Wilson—seven militia regiments, whose strength varied from day to day but seldom
fell below 3,000 men. With this irregular force he watched the line of the lower Mondego, keeping
pickets out some way to the south of the river, as far as Louriçal and Redinha. They were only once
driven in, when on Dec. 6th-8th one of Montbrun’s dragoon regiments pushed up the high road, and
verified the fact that all the passages of the lower Mondego, including the bridge of Coimbra, were
guarded.

The last link in the chain of detachments which Wellington had cast around the French was the

garrison of the sea-girt fortress of Peniche, half-way between Lisbon and the mouth of the Mondego.
It was held by the dépôts of several infantry regiments of the regular army, under General Blunt of the
Portuguese service, not by any single organized unit. But there were some 2,000 or 3,000 recruits,
more or less trained, in the place, and the enterprising Major Fenwick, whom Blunt had put in charge
of his outpost-line, kept large pickets out in the direction of Caldas and Obidos, which frequently
came in contact with the raiding parties of the 8th Corps, and did them much harm. Fenwick was
mortally wounded in action near Obidos on Dec. 4th[10], but the forward position of these outposts of
the Peniche garrison was maintained, and the French could never forage in the coast-land for a radius
of some fifteen miles around that fortress, though they moved as they pleased about Leiria and the
deserted abbeys of Batalha and Alcobaça. The Portuguese outposts at Caldas were in close and
regular touch with Anson’s cavalry pickets from São João de Ribiera on the Rio Mayor.

It will be seen therefore that the limited space in which Masséna’s army could seek its living was

a parallelogram, bounded by the Tagus on the south, the lower Zezere on the east, the Rio Mayor
and the Alcoa (the river of Alcobaça) on the west, and on the north by an irregular line drawn from
Leiria through Pombal to Cabaços near the Zezere. Outside these limits food could only be got by
large detachments, moving with all military precautions, and obliged to keep up a constant running
fight with the Portuguese militia. The profit from such expeditions, whose march was necessarily very
slow, was so small that Masséna sent out very few of them, since the peasantry got off with their
flocks into the hills, whenever the first skirmishing shots along the high road were heard. The
sustenance of the French was mainly obtained by harrying and re-harrying the area bounded by the
limits stated above, where they could work their will without meeting with any resistance. There was
very little change in the cantonments of Masséna’s army during the three months of their stay between
the Tagus and the Zezere. Of the 2nd Corps both divisions were in the Santarem fortifications,
holding the town and the banks of the Rio Mayor to the west of it. Close in touch with the 2nd Corps
came the 8th, with Clausel’s division in front line from Tremes to Alcanhede and Abrahão, and
Solignac’s in second line at Torres Novas, Pernes, and the adjacent villages. Both corps had their
cavalry brigades out in front of them, along the line of the Rio Mayor. Ney and the 6th Corps formed
the general reserve of the army, having Mermet’s division at Thomar (the Marshal’s head quarters),
and Marchand’s at Golegão near the Tagus; Loison’s, the third division of the corps, was detached
on the Zezere, guarding the bridge which had been established across that river at Punhete, and
watching the garrison of Abrantes. Its front post was at Montalvão beyond the Zezere, only five miles
from the Portuguese fortress; its remaining battalions were ranged along the river from Punhete as far
north as Dornes. Montbrun and the cavalry reserve (less certain squadrons lent to Loison), lay at
Chão-de-Maçans on the northern skirts of the plain of Thomar; they had one infantry regiment (lent
by Ney) to support them, at Cabaços, and their main duty was to watch and restrain Trant and
Wilson, with whose advanced posts they were always bickering.

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