A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

1040 Pages·2009·66.171 MB·English

by  Mark Tessler

A HISTORY OF THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
CONFLICT
INDIANA SERIES IN
MIDDLE EAST STUDIES
Mark Tessler, editor
A HISTORY OF THE
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
CONFLICT
SECOND EDITION
Mark Tessler
Indiana University Press
Bloomington and Indianapolis
To Pat, Joelle, Louise, and Sidney
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© 1994, 2.009 by Mark Tessler
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any
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© The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of
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of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.
Manufactured in the United States of America
The Library of Congress has cataloged the first edition as follows:
Tessler, Mark A.
A History of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict / Mark Tessler.
p. cm. — (Indiana series in Arab and Islamic studies)
Includes bibligraphical references and index.
ISBN 0-253-35848-5. — ISBN 0-253-20873-4 (pbk.)
i. Jewish-Arab relations—1917- 2. Israel-Arab conflicts.
I. Title. II. Series.
DSii9.7.T443 1994
956—dc2o 93-34049
ISBN-I3 978-0-253-35848-6. — ISBN-I3 978-0-253-22070-7 (pbk.)
3 4 56 15 14 13 12
Contents
LIST OF MAPS vi
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION vii
PREFACE xiv
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION XX
Part I Jews and Arabs before the Conflict: The Congruent
Origins of Modern Zionism and Arab Nationalism 1
1 Jewish History and the Emergence of Modern Political Zionism 7
2 Arab History and the Origins of Nationalism in the Arab World 69
Part II Emergence and History of the Conflict to 1948 123
3 The Conflict Takes Shape 127
4 The Dual Society in Mandatory Palestine 185
Part III Routinization of the Conflict, 1948–1967 269
5 The Palestinian Disaster and Basic Issues after 1948 273
6 Israel and the Arab States through June 1967 336
Part IV The Palestinian Dimension Reemerges:
From the June War through Camp David 399
7 Postwar Diplomacy and the Rise of the Palestine Resistance Movement 407
8 Israel, the Palestinians, and the Occupied Territories in the 1970s 465
Part V The High Price of Stalemate: Confrontations and
Futile Diplomacy in the 1980s 533
9 Violent Confrontations in the Early 1980s 535
10 Futile Diplomacy in the Mid-1980s 600
Part VI Efforts to Break the Stalemate: From the Intifada
through the Oslo Peace Process
677
11 The Intifada and Beyond 679
12 The Oslo Peace Process 755
Epilogue: The Post-Oslo Period 819
NOTES 849
BIBLIOGRAPHY 961
INDEX 995
Maps
I.I. Area of Israelite Control in the Twelfth Century BCE 9
1.2. Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1914 62
3.1. Arab World under the Ottomans on the Eve of World War I 160
3.2. Ottoman Administration: Syria and Palestine 161
3-3- Boundaries of Jewish National Home Proposed by Zionist
Organization, 1919 163
3-4- Palestine and Transjordan under the British Mandate, 1923 166
4.1. The Peel Commission Partition Plan, 1937 243
4.2. Jewish Land Ownership in Palestine, 1947 2-47
4-3- Proposals of United Nations Special Committee on Palestine,
*947 260
4-4- United Nations General Assembly Partition Plan, 1947 262
4-5- Israeli Borders and Armistice Lines, 1949 265
5.1. Jerusalem, 1949 321
6.1. The Sinai-Suez War, 1956 350
7.1. Israel and Occupied Territories, 1967 400
8.1. Israel-Egypt Disengagement of Forces Agreement, 1974 482
8.2. The Allon Plan 501
8.3. Jewish Settlements in the West Bank, 1982 521
9.1. The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, June 1982 575
IO.I. Arab and Jewish Population of the West Bank, 1988 672
10.2. Arab and Jewish Population of the Gaza Strip, 1988 ^73
12. 1. The 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II) 7^5
12.2. Jerusalem in the Late 19905 788
E.I. Israeli Separation Barrier and the West Bank 826
Preface to the Second Edition
Is there a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Was there ever one?
Can one be found in the future?
These questions usually lead to thoughts about the partition of historic
Palestine, meaning division of the territory in order to create one state for Jews
and another for Arabs. This "two-state solution" was proposed by a British
Commission of Inquiry as early as 1937, when Palestine was still under the
British Mandate. It was proposed again by the United Nations in 1947, six
months before Israel declared its independence in May of the following year.
Although partition is the solution to which the international community
has consistently returned, and the only one embraced, at least in principle, by
majorities both in Israel and among West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, other
formulae have been advanced over the years. After the war of June 1967, at-
tention focused on a "land-for-peace" formula. It called for Israel to return
territory captured in the war to its Arab neighbors and for the Arab world
to recognize Israel in return. Enshrined in United Nations Resolution 242,
the land-for-peace formula did not provide for a Palestinian state, although
some Israelis argued that Palestinians could realize their national aspirations
in Jordan. In support of their argument, these Israelis noted that Palestinians
constituted more than half of Jordan's population. Palestinians, for their part,
rejected the land-for-peace formula because it did not recognize their right to a
state in historic Palestine. They insisted that Jordan is not Palestine and pointed
out that Palestinians had only come to Jordan as refugees when Israel was es-
tablished or, in some cases, after the June 1967 war.
A different solution was put forward by the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion in the late 19605, and it gained currency in some international circles in
the years that followed. In contrast to the two-state solution and land-for-peace
formula, the PLO called for the establishment of a single non-denominational
state in which Jews and Palestinians would live together as equals. Advocates of
this "democratic secular state" proposal, sometimes described as a "one-state"
solution, declared that their vision recognized both Jewish and Arab rights in
Palestine. They also argued that the democratic character of the proposed state
would enable Jews and Palestinians to work together for the development of
their society. Israelis rejected this proposal, however. Demanding more than the
vii
viii I Preface to the Second Edition
right of Jews to live in a non-denominational state, they insisted on recognition
of Israel's right to exist as an independent Jewish and Zionist state.
The case for a two-state solution continued to be made during much of
this period, and by the mid-1980s, and especially following the outbreak of the
first intifada in December 1987, partition was again at the center of discourse
and debate. While there remained disagreement about specific issues, including
borders, security, Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, and Palestinian refugees, the
majority of Israelis and Palestinians, as well as much of the international com-
munity, embraced the idea that a Palestinian state should be established in all
or at least most of the West Bank and Gaza and that, with Palestinian national
aspirations thus fulfilled, this state would live in peace with the Jewish state
next door.
The first edition of this book traces the emergence of these and other pro-
posals, as well as the debates and allegations surrounding them and the rea-
sons that none brought sustained progress toward peace. Published in 1994,
it carried the narrative forward through September 1993, when Israel and the
PLO signed a "Declaration of Principles" promising mutual recognition and
establishing transitional arrangements leading to a two-state solution. Often
described as the Oslo Accord, since it resulted from secret negotiations that
took place in Norway, the Declaration of Principles fostered optimism that a
historic breakthrough might be achieved. Despite their doubts and a history
of distrust, a significant proportion of Israelis and Palestinians supported the
accord and expressed the hope that now, for the first time, there existed the
possibility of genuine progress toward peace.
This cautious optimism is reflected in the preface to the first edition, which
I hope will be read along with these new introductory comments. The earlier
preface also describes the point of view that informs this volume. First, the
book proceeds on the assumption that both Jews and Arabs have legitimate
political rights in Palestine; that the validity of these rights does not depend on
the absence of corresponding rights possessed by the other party to the conflict;
and that these rights are inalienable, meaning that they are not forfeited by
whatever misguided or even unethical actions might be taken by a community's
leaders. These normative positions define what might be called an "approach-
approach" perspective. Second, and consistent with this perspective, the book
seeks not only to present a balanced and accurate history of the Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict, it also strives to encourage a sympathetic understanding of the
parties involved. Informed by my years of study in both Israel and the Arab
world, I earlier described this approach as "objectivity without detachment."
The hope reflected in the earlier preface is only in part a reflection of the
historic moment at which the first edition of this book was completed. Although
encouraged by the Declaration of Principles and the optimism it spawned, it
also reflected a less situation-dependent conviction. As the perspective outlined
Preface to the Second Edition I ix
above suggests, I believe that one of the greatest obstacles to peace has been
each side's distrust of the other and, in particular, the fact that this distrust has
been fed by stereotypes, misconceptions, and propaganda that lead each side
to see its adversary as uninterested in, and unworthy of, genuine compromise.
The all-too-common tendency has been for Israelis and Palestinians and their
respective supporters to see one another as motivated not by legitimate aspira-
tions and an understandable response to their experience and circumstances
but, rather, by primordial and hence unchangeable impulses and even hatreds.
Some of the research I have done in recent years has been addressed to
these stereotypes and misconceptions. These include the allegation that Pales-
tinians and other Arabs will never accept Israel's right to exist, a charge fre-
quently made by some supporters of Israel, and the contention that Islam, by
its very nature, predisposes adherents toward hatred of the West, a rejection of
any accommodation with Israel, and a permissive attitude toward terrorism.
Much of this research is based on empirical and data-based analysis, as well as
frequent visits to the region; and all of it offers evidence that contradicts com-
mon stereotypes about Arab and Israeli intransigence and the inevitability of
conflict. I thus remain convinced that one of the biggest obstacles to peace, and
arguably the biggest obstacle of all, is psychological in character. Peace will be
possible if, and almost certainly only if, each side and its supporters reject the
view that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a struggle between good and evil,
accept the legitimacy of the other side's aspirations, and conclude from the his-
tory reported in this book that neither party has a monopoly on behavior that
is deserving either of respect or of condemnation. Only with such a view will
Israelis and Palestinians see any reason to make the difficult compromises and
sacrifices that are necessary for peace.
I must admit that events since the signing of the Declaration of Principles
pose a challenge to these convictions. The Declaration portended a psychologi-
cal breakthrough, and the Oslo peace process that followed offered a credible
path to a two-state solution. It seemed that the point of view described above
had been embraced by most Israelis and Palestinians, as well as many other
Arabs; and indeed, the years 1994 and 1995 were marked by a new spirit and
unprecedented cooperation. Nevertheless, as reported in the new material in
this book—chapter iz, which traces the rise and fall of the Oslo peace process,
and a long epilogue devoted to the post-Oslo period—Israelis and Palestinians
are today more distrustful of one another than ever and the prospect for peace
is correspondingly remote.
Since Israelis and Palestinians began the Oslo peace process not only with
hope but also with skepticism, if not outright distrust, many on both sides
regarded the opportunity provided by the Declaration of Principles as a test of
the other's seriousness. And each became increasingly convinced as the peace
process unfolded, often for understandable reasons, that its adversary was not