A History of Philosophy by Frederick Copleston, S.J. A HISTORY VOLUME I: GREECE AND ROME From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus OF VOLUME II: MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY From Augustine to Duns Scotus VOLUME III: LATE MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY Ockham, Francis Bacon, and the Beginning of the Modern World VOLUME IV: MODERN PHILOSOPHY From Descartes to Leibniz VOLUME V: MODERN PHILOSOPHY The British Philosophers from Hobbes to Hume VOLUME VI: MODERN PHILOSOPHY From the French Enlightenment to Kant "VOLUME VII: MODERN PHILOSOPHY From the Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche "VOLUME VIII: MODERN PHILOSOPHY Empiricism, Idealism, and Pragmatism in Britain and America "VOLUME IX: MODERN PHILOSOPHY From the French Revolution to Sartre, Camus, and Levi-Strauss "Available March 1994 A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME IV Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Leibniz Frederick Copleston, S.J. IMAGE BOOKS DOUBLEDAY New York London Toronto Sydney Auckland CONTENTS Prill PREFACE xi AN IMAGE BOOK I. INTRODUCTION 1 PUBLISHED BY DOUBLEDAY Continuity and novelty: the early phase of modem philosophy in its relation to mediaeval and Renaissance thought-Continental a division of Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. rationalism: its nature, its relation to scepticism and to neo 1540 Broadway, New York, New York 10036 Stoicism, its development-British empiricism: its nature and its development-The seventeenth century-The eighteenth cen tury-Political philosophy-The rise of the philosophy of IMAGE, DOUBLEDAY, and the portrayal of a deer drinking from a stream are history-Immanuel Kant. trademarks of Double~ay, a division of Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. II. DESCARTES (I) First Image Books edition of Volume IV of The History of Philosophy published Life and works-Descartes' aim-His idea of method-The theory of innate ideas-Methodic doubt. 1963 by special arrangement with The Newman Press and Burns & Oates, Ltd. This Image edition published January 1994. III. DESCARTES (2) Cogito, "go sum-Thinking and the thinker-The criterion of truth-The existence of God-The accusation of a vicious De Licentia Superioru.m Ordinis: J. D. Boyle, S.J., Praep. Provo Angliae circle-The explanation of error-The certainty of mathematics -The ontolOgIcal argument for God's existence. Nihil Obstat: J. L. Russell, S.J., Censor Deputatus Imprimatur: Franciscus, Archiepiscopus Birmingamiensis Birmingamiae die IV. DESCARTES (3) u6 25 Julii 1957 The existence of bodies-Substances and their principal attri butes-The relation between mind and body. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data V. DESCARTES (4) 124 Copleston, Frederick Charles. The qualities of bodies-Descartes and the dogma of transub A history of philosophy. stantiation-Space and place-Motion-Duration and time- The origin of motion-The laws of motion-The divine activity Includes bibliographical references and indexes. in the world-Living bodies. Contents: V. 1. Greece and Rome-[etc.]- V. 4. From Descartes to Leibniz-v. 5. The British VI. DESCARTES (5) 139 philosophers from Hobbes to Hume-v. 6. From the Man's awareness of freedom-Freedom and God-Provisional French Enlightenment to Kant. ethics and moral science-The passions and their control-The 1. Philosophy-History. I. Title. nature of the good-Comments on Descartes' ethical ideas B72.C62 1993 190 92-34997 General remarks about Descartes. ISBN 0-385-47041-X VII. PASCAL • 153 Volume IV copyright © 1960 by Frederick Copleston Life and spirit of Pascal-The geometrical method, its scope and limits-'The heart'-Pascal's method in apologetics-The All Rights Reserved wretchedness and the greatness of man-The wager-argument Pascal as a philosopher. PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 VIII. CARTESIANISM: • 174 The spread of Cartesianism-Geullncx and the problem of interaction. vii CONTENTS CONTENTS VIII IX Chapter Page Chapter IX. MALEBRANCHE 180 XVIII. LEIBNIZ (4) Life and writings-The senses, the imagination, the understand The ontological argument-The argument to God's existence ing; avoidance of error and attainment of truth-God as the from eternal truths-The argument from truths of fact-The only true cause-Human liberty-The vision of eternal truths argument from the pre-established harmony-The problem of in God-Empirical knowledge of the soul-Knowledge of other evil-Progress and history. minds and of the existence of bodies-God's existence and attributcs-Malebranche in relation to Spinoza, Descartes and Berkeley-The influence of Malebranche. ApPENDIX: A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY 333 X. SPINOZA (I) 205 INDEX 347 Life-Works-The geometrical method-The influence of other philosophies on Spinoza's thought-Interpretations of Spinoza's philosophy. XI. SPINOZA (2) 214 Substance and its attributes-Infinite modes-The production of finite modes-Mind and body-The elimination of final causality. XII. SPINOZA (3) 230 Spinoza's levels or degrees of knowledge-Confused experience; universal ideas; falsity-Scientific knowledge-Intuitive know ledge. XIII. SPINOZA (4) Spinoza's intention in his account of human emotions and con duct-The eonatus; pleasure and pain-The derived emotions Passive and active emotions-Servitude and freedom-The intellectual love of God-The 'eternity' of the human mind-An inconsistency in Spinoza's ethics. XIV. SPINOZA (5) Natural right-The foundation of political society-Sovereignty and government-Relations between States-Freedom and toleration-Spinoza's influence and different estimates of his philosophy. XV. LEIBNIZ (I) Life-The De al't, combinatoria and the idea of harmony Writings-Different interpretations of Leibniz's thought. XVI. LEIBNIZ (2) 273 The distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact Truths of reason or necessary propositions-Truths of fact or contingent proposi tions-The principle of perfection-Su bstance -The identity of indiscernibles-The law of continuity-The 'panlogism' of Leibniz. XVII. LEIBNIZ (3) 295 Simple substances or monads-Entelechies and prime matter Extension-Body and corporeal substance-Space and time The pre-established harmony-Perception and appetite-Soul and body-Innate ideas. PREFACE AT the end of Volume III of this History of Philosophy I expressed the hope of covering the period from Descartes up to and including Kant in the fourth volume. I meant, of course, that I hoped to discuss the whole of this part of modem philosophy in one book. This hope, however, has not been fulfilled. I have found myself compelled to devote three books to the period in question. And for the sake of convenience I have made each of these three books a separate volume. Volume IV, Descartes to Leibniz, deals with the great rationalist systems of philosophy on the Continent in the pre-Kantian period. In Volume V, Hobbes to Hume, I discuss the development of British philosophy from Hobbes up to and includ ing the Scottish philosophy of common sense. In Volume VI, Wolff to Kant, I shall treat of the French Enlightenment and of Rousseau, of the German Enlightenment, of the rise of the philosophy of history from Vico to Herder, and finally of the system of Immanuel Kant. The title, Wolff to Kant, is certainly not ideal; but in view of the fact that in his pre-critical days Kant stood in the Wolffian tradition there is at least something to be said in its favour, whereas a title such as Voltaire to Kant would be extremely odd. As in former volumes, I have divided the matter according to philosophers rather than by following out the development of first one and then another philosophical problem. Furthermore, I have treated some philosophers at considerable length. And though I think that division of the matter according to philo sophers is the most convenient division for the readers whom I have principally in mind, this method certainly has its dis advantages. Faced by a number of different thinkers and by more or less detailed descriptions of their ideas, the reader may fail to grasp the general picture. Further, though I think that the old division into continental rationalism and British empiricism is justified, provided that a number of qualifications are added, a rigid adherence to this scheme is apt to give the impression that continental philosophy and British philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries moved on two sets of parallel straight lines, each developing in entire independence of the other. And this is an erroneous impression. Descartes exercised a modest xi PREFACE XII PREFACE XIII influence on British thought; Berkeley was influenced by Malc a volume such as the present. In the chapters on Descartes, for branche; Spinoza's political ideas owed something to Hobbes; and example, I have indeed cited the volume and page of the Adam the philosophy of Locke, who wrote in the seventeenth century, Tannery edition; but I have also given references, where feasible, exercised a great influence on the thought of the French Enlighten according to chapter and section or part and section of the work in ment in the eighteenth century. question. The number of people who have easy access to the As a partial remedy for the disadvantages attending the method Adam-Tannery edition is extremely limited, just as few people of division which I have chosen I decided to write an introductory possess the recent splendid critical edition of Berkeley. But cheap chapter designed to give the reader a general picture of the editions of the more important writings of the leading philosophers philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It thus are easily obtainable; and in my opinion references should be covers the matter discussed in Volumes IV, V and VI, which, as given with a view to the convenience of students who possess such I have said, I originally hoped to deal with in one volume. I have, editions rather than to that of the few who possess or have access of course, placed this introduction at the beginning of Volume IV; to the recognized critical editions. and there will therefore be no introductory chapters in Volumes V and VI. A descriptive introduction of this sort inevitably involves a good deal of repetition. That is to say, ideas which are discussed in later chapters at greater length and in more detail are roughly outlined in the introduction. None the less, I con sider that the advantages to be gained by including a general descriptive introduction greatly outweigh the accompanying disadvantages. At the end of each of the three previous volumes I have added a 'Concluding Review'. But just as the introduction covers the matter dealt with in Volumes IV, V and VI, so will the Concluding Review. It will therefore be placed at the end of Volume VI, that is, after the exposition of Kant's philosophy. In the course of this Concluding Review I propose to discuss, not only from an his torical but also from a more philosophical point of view, the nature, importance and value of the various styles of philosophiz ing of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I think that it is better to reserve such discussion until after the historical exposition of the thought of the period than to interrupt this exposition with general philosophical reflections. Finally a word about references. References such as 'Vol. II, ch. XL' or 'See vol. III, pp. 322-4' refer to this History of Philosophy. As for references to the writings of the philosophers with whom I deal, I have tried to give these in a form which will be of use to the student who wishes to look them up. Some historians and expositors have the practice of giving references according to volume and page of the recognized critical edition, when such exists, of the writings of the philosopher in question. But I am doubtful of the wisdom of adhering exclusively to this practice in CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Continuity and novelty: the early phase of modern PhilosoPhy in its relation to mediaeval and Renaissance thought-Con tinental rationalism: its nature, its relation to scepticism and to neo-Stoicism, its developme1u-British empiricism: its nature and its development-The seventeenth centur:;I-The eighteenth century-Political philosophy-The rise of the Philosophy 0/ history-Immanuel Kant. I. MODERN philosophy is generally said to have begun with Descartes (1596-1650) or with Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in England and with Descartes in France. It is not perhaps im mediately evident with what justification the term 'modern' is applied to the thought of the seventeenth century. But its use clearly implies that there is a break between mediaeval and post mediaeval philosophy and that each possesses important charac teristics which the other does not possess. And the seventeenth century philosophers were certainly convinced that there was a sharp division between the old philosophical traditions and what they themselves were trying to do. Men like Francis Bacon and Descartes were thoroughly persuaded that they were making a new start. If for a long time the views of Renaissance and post-Renaissance philosophers were accepted at their face value, this was partly due to a conviction that in the Middle Ages there was really nothing which merited the name of philosophy. The flame of independent and creative philosophical reflection which had burned so brightly in ancient Greece was practically extinguished until it was revived at the Renaissance and rose in splendour in the seventeenth century. But when at last more attention came to be paid to mediaeval philosophy, it was seen that this view was exaggerated. And some writers emphasized the continuity between mediaeval and post mediaeval thought. That phenomena of continuity can be ob served in the political and social spheres is obvious enough. The patterns of society and of political organization in the seventeenth century clearly did not spring into being without any historical I 2 A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY-IV INTRODUCTION 3 antecedents. We can observe, for instance, the gradual forma between mediaeval and post-mediaeval philosophy has been said, tion of the various national States, the emergence of the great it remains true that there were considerable differences between monarchies and the growth of the middle class. Even in the field them. For the matter of that, though Descartes was undoubtedly of science the discontinuity is not quite so great as was once influenced by Scholastic ways of thought, he himself pointed out supposed. Recent research has shown the existence of a limited that the use of terms taken from Scholastic philosophy did not interest in empirical science within the mediaeval period itself. necessarily mean that the terms were being used in the same And attention was drawn in the third volume of this History! senses in which they had been used by the Scholastics. And to the wider implications of the impetus theory of motion as though Locke was influenced in his theory of natural law by presented by certain fourteenth-century physicists. Similarly, a Hooker,l who had himself been influenced by mediaeval thought, certain continuity can be observed within the philosophical sphere. the Lockean idea of natural law is not precisely the same as that We can see philosophy in the Middle Ages gradually winning of St. Thomas Aquinas. recognition as a separate branch of study. And we can see lines of We can, of course, become the slaves of words or labels. That thought emerging which anticipate later philosophical develop is to say, because we divide history into periods, we may tend to ments. For example, the characteristic philosophical movement lose sight of continuity and of gradual transitions, especially when of the fourteenth century, generally known as the nominalist we are looking at historical events from a great distance in time. movement,2 anticipated later empiricism in several important But this does not mean that it is altogether improper to speak of respects. Again, the speCUlative philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa,3 historical periods or that no major changes take place. with its anticipations of some theses of Leibniz, forms a link And if the general cultural situation of the post-Renaissance between mediaeval, Renaissance and pre-Kantian modern thought. world was in important respects different from that of the Again, scholars have shown that thinkers such as Francis Bacon, mediaeval world, it is only natural that the changes should have Descartes and Locke were subject to the influence of the past to been reflected in philosophic thought. At the same time, just as a greater degree than they themselves realized. changes in the social and political spheres, even when they seem This emphasis on continuity was doubtless needed as a correc to have been more or less abrupt, presupposed an already existing tive to a too facile acceptance of the claims to novelty advanced by situation out of which they developed, so also new attitudes and Renaissance and seventeenth-century philosophers. It expresses aims and ways of thought in the field of philosophy presupposed an understanding of the fact that there was such a thing as an already existing situation with which they were in some degree mediaeval philosophy and a recognition of its position as an linked. In other words, we are not faced with a simple choice integral part of European philosophy in general. At the same time, between two sharply contrasted alternatives, the assertion of dis if discontinuity can be over-emphasized, so can continuity. 11 we continuity and the assertion of continuity. Both elements have compare the patterns of social and political life in the thirteenth to be taken into account. There are change and novelty; but and seventeenth centuries, obvious differences in the structure of change is not creation out of nothing. society at once strike the eye. Again, though the historical factors The situation, therefore, seems to be this. The old emp'lasis on which contributed to the occurrence of the Reformation can be discontinuity was largely due to failure to recognize that there traced, the Reformation was none the less in some sense an was in the Middle Ages any philosophy worthy of the name. explosion, shattering the religious unity of mediaeval Christendom. Subsequent recognition of the existence and importance of And even though the seeds of later science can be discovered in mediaeval philosophy produced an emphasis on continuity. But the intellectual soil of mediaeval Europe, the results of research we now see that what is required is an attempt to illustrate both have not been such as to necessitate any substantial change of the elements of continuity and the peculiar characteristics of view about the importance of Renaissance science. Similarly, different periods. And what is true in regard to our consideration when all that can legitimately be said to illustrate the continuity of different periods is true also, of course, in regard to different lpp. 165-7· I Vol. Ill, chs. III-IX. • Vol. III, ch. XV. 1 See vol. III, pp. 322-4. 4 A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY- IV INTRODUCTION 5 individual thinkers. Historians are beset by the temptation to of the emergence of philosophy from the confines of the Schools. depict the thought of one period as simply a preparatory stage The mediaeval philosophers were for the most part university for the thought of the next period, and the system of one thinker professors, engaged in teaching. They wrote commentaries on the as no more than a stepping-stone to the system of another thinker. standard texts in use at the universities, and they wrote in the The temptation is, indeed, inevitable; for the historian con language of the learned, academic world. The modem philosophers templates a temporal succession of events, not an eternal and in the pre-Kantian period, on the contrary, were in the majority immutable reality. Moreover, there is an obvious sense in which of cases unconnected with the work of academic teaching. mediaeval thought prepared the way for post-mediaeval thought; Descartes was never a university professor. Nor was Spinoza, and there is plenty of ground for looking on Berkeley'S philosophy though he received an invitation to Heidelberg. And Leibniz was as a stepping-stone between the philosophies of Locke and Hume. very much a man of affairs who refused a professorship because But if one succumbs entirely to this temptation, one misses a he had quite another kind of life in view. In England Locke held great deal. Berkeley's philosophy is much more than a mere stage minor posts in the service of the State; Berkeley was a bishop; in the development of empiricism from Locke to Hume; and and though Hume attempted to secure a university chair, he did mediaeval thought has its own characteristics. not succeed in doing so. As for the French philosophers of Among the easily discernible differences between medIaeval and the eighteenth century, such as Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau, post-mediaeval philosophy there is a striking difference in forms they were obviously men of letters with philosophical interests. of literary expression. For one thing, whereas the mediaevals Philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a wrote in Latin, in the post-mediaeval period we find an increasing matter of common interest and concern among the educated and use of the vernacular. It would not, indeed, be true to say that no cultured classes; and it is only natural that the use of the vernac use was made of Latin in the pre-Kantian modem period. Both ular should have replaced the use of Latin in writings designed Francis Bacon and Descartes wrote in Latin as well as in the for a wide public. As Hegel remarks, it is only when we come to vernacular. So too did Hobbes. And Spinoza composed his works Kant that we find philosophy becoming so technical and abstruse in Latin. But Locke wrote in English, and in the eighteenth that it could no longer be considered to belong to the general century we find a common use of the vernacular. Hume wrote in education of a cultured man. And by that time the use of Latin English, Voltaire and Rousseau in French, Kant in German. For had, of course, practically died out. another thing, whereas the mediaevals were much given to the In other words, the original and creative philosophy of the early practice of writing commentaries on certain standard works, the modern period developed outside the universities. It was the post-mediaeval philosophers, whether they wrote in Latin or in creation of fresh and original minds, not of traditionalists. And the vernacular, composed original treatises in which the com this is one reason, of course, why philosophical writing took the mentary-form was abandoned. I do not mean to imply that the form of independent treatises, not of commentaries. For the mediaevals wrote only commentaries; for this would be quite writers were concerned with developing their own ideas, free from untrue. At the same time commentaries on the Sentences of Peter regard for the great names of the past and for the opinions of Lombard 1 and on the works of Aristotle and others were charac Greek and mediaeval thinkers. teristic features of mediaeval philosophical composition, whereas To say, however, that in the pre-Kantian period of modern when we think of the writings of seventeenth-century philosophers philosophy the vernacular came to be employed in place of Latin, we think of free treatises, not of commentaries. that independent treatises were written rather than commentaries, The growing use of the vernacular in philosophical writing and that the leading philosophers of the period were not university accompanied, of course, its growing use in other literary fields. professors, does not do very much to elucidate the intrinsic differ And we can associate this with general cultural, political and social ences between mediaeval and post-mediaeval philosophy. And an changes and developments. But we can also see in it a symptom attempt must be made to indicate briefly some of these differences. 1 See vol. II, p. 168. It is often said that modern philosophy is autonomous, the