A HISTORY OF BRITISH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1939–1979: Industrial Relations in a Declining Economy

127 Pages·1996·76.434 MB·English

by  Chris Wrigley (editor)

SUB ee peal 7

A History of British
Industrial Relations,
1939-1979
Industrial Relations in a Declining Economy

Edited by

Chris Wrigley
Professor of Modern British History, University of Nottingham
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK ¢ Brookfield, US
sl c(S!r.rti‘isLCCC
© C.J. Wrigley 1996. Copyright of individual chapters remains with the contributors.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a Contents
retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

List of tables and figures Vi
Published by
List of contributors Viii
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
8 Lansdown Place
Cheltenham Introduction
Glos GL50 2HU Chris Wrigley
UK
Edward Elgar Publishing Company et 1 The Second World War and state intervention in industrial
Old Post Road a ee relations, 1939-45 £2
Brookfield ONIEDERS ACHS Chris Wrigley
Vermont 05036 7 ta
2 Labour and the law: the politics of British industrial relations,
US a STAA’ SS
i ¥ 1945-79 44
Patrick Maguire
® : C
3 Trade union development, 1945-79 62
Chris Wrigley
4 The management of labour 84
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Howard F. Gospel
History of British Industrial Relations. —
1939-79: Industrial Relations in a 5 Industrial relations and social welfare, 1945-79 107
Declining Economy Noel Whiteside
I. Wrigley, Chris 6 Strikes in postwar Britain 128
331.0941
David Gilbert
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
History of British industrial relations, 1939-1979 : industrial CASE STUDIES
relations in a declining economy / edited by Chris Wrigley.
p. cm.
7 Decasualization and disruption: industrial relations in the docks,
Includes index.
1945-79 165
1, Industrial relations —Great Britain—History— 20th century.
I. Wrigley, Chris. Jim Phillips
HD8391.H57 1996 8 The car industry, 1945-79: shop stewards and workplace unionism 186
331'.0941'0904—dc20 95-32813 Dave Lyddon
CIP 9 The road haulage industry, 1945-79: from statutory regulation to
ISBN 1 85278 892 5 contested terrain 212
Paul Smith

TyPrpiensteetd abnyd M abnotuonnd iTny pGerseeattt erBsr,i tai5n- 7 byE asBtifdidelleds RLoiamdi,t edL,o utGhu,i ldLfionrcdo lnasnhdi reK inLgN’s1 1 Ly7nAnJ , UK Index 235
r
Tables and figures Vii
FIGURES
6.1 Number of industrial disputes, 1935-90 130
6.2 Working days lost in industrial disputes, 1935-90 131
Tables and figures 6.3 Working days lost by region, 1903-38; by subregion, 1968-73 150
6.4 Regional distribution of major strikes, 1946-73 154

6.5 Working days lost by region, 1976-90 158

TABLES
1 Average annual percentage changes in output per head in British
manufacturing, 1964-86
2 Average annual percentage changes of manufacturing output per
head in seven industrial countries, 1960-88 10
1.1 Distribution of manpower, males 14-64, females 14-59, 1 July
1939-1 July 1946 13
1.2 Distribution of manpower in civil employment, males 14-64,
females 14-59, 1 July 1939-1 July 1945 14

1.3 Essential Work Orders (individual industries) 20
1.4 Undertakings scheduled and workers covered by Essential Work
Orders 21
1.5 Methods of settlement of disputes, 1940-44 and 1938 27
1.6 Causes of disputes, 1940-44 and 1938 28
1.7 Industrial disputes, 1940-44 29
3.1 Great Britain: male and female membership of trade unions,
1939-79 63
3:2 Membership and density of trade unions in Great Britain,

1945-80 64
3.3 Female membership and density of trade unions in Great Britain,
1945-80 65
3.4 Membership of trade unions in the United Kingdom, 1939-79 67
a) Trade unions affiliated to the TUC, 1945 and 1979 69
3.6 Finances of registered trade unions in Great Britain, 1945-70 71
6.1 Working days lost through strikes in selected countries, 1946-91 132
6.2 Industrial disputes, UK, 1935-90 134
6.3 Strikes and lock-outs by industrial classification, 1940-80:
number of disputes
138
6.4 Strikes and lock-outs by industrial classification, 1940-80:
aggregate duration
140
Vi
pe
Contributors Introduction

Chris Wrigley
David Gilbert is Lecturer in Geography at Royal Holloway, University of
London.
Howard F. Gospel is Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford and Rhodes lBartiet is1h9 50isn.d usTthrei alc ornetlraotvieonrss y hahvaes rbeeleant eda mtoa tbtrero ado f ismsuucehs ocf onetcroonvoemriscy spienrcfeo rmth-e
Lecturer in Management at the University of Oxford. ance as well as to particularly strike-prone sectors such as, at different times,
Dave Lyddon is Lecturer in Industrial Relations at Keele University. pthhee nmoomteonro n.c ar Mainndyu strcyl,a imsc oatlh-atm inBriintga in’asn d ectohen omdiocc ks.c ompTheitsi tiwvaesn esnso t waas nbeew-
Patrick Maguire is Principal Lecturer at the University of Brighton. Vinigc tohrairamne d pebryi odt he adnde,m anidndse edo,f leavbeonu r dhuardi nbge ent hea ireeadr liien r sipmeirliaord matnrnadeirt ioinna ltlhye
Jim Phillips is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Business History in okfn ocwonn cerasn tdheu riInngd ustthrei alt hreRee vodleuctaidoens. afWthera tt hew aGse neurnauls uaSlt riwkaes oft he1 92r6e.l atIinviet ialllayc,k
| Scotland at Glasgow University. in the 1930s, economic conditions were unfavourable to the unions until the
rearmament boom and, coal-mining apart, the strike levels were mostly low.
| Paul Smith is Lecturer in Industrial Relations at Keele University. The Conservative Party’s right wing had achieved most of its long-held

Noel Whiteside is Reader in Public Policy at the University of Bristol. legislative objectives with the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927,
which was not repealed until May 1946. The period of consensus and consul-
Chris Wrigley is Professor of Modern British History at the University of tthaet ionla tei n 1i9n4d0uss triwailt h matthet ertsr adoef uthnei onw arl eyaedaerrss,h ip1 94c0o-m4m5i,t tewads teo xttheen dAetdt leteh roguogvh-
Nottingham.
ernment (1945-51) and postwar reconstruction. By the early 1950s, such
cooperation was becoming fragile with the effects of the September 1949
devaluation of the pound, the beginning of the long boom in the international
economy and the defeat of the Labour government in the 1951 general
election. From 1953 there was an upward trend in the level of industrial
disputes and a return of official, industry-wide strikes.!
There was a markedly rising level of criticism of the trade unions by the
late 1950s and early 1960s. Some of this came in the form of hostile stereo-
types of trade union activists in films, television programmes and novels.”
Other criticism had firmer roots, though it was still partly impressionistic.
Some of this was expressed in numerous books which aimed to reveal the
underside of industrial Britain, primarily for a suburban middle-class reader-
ship, a somewhat similar market to that catered for by the earlier Victorian
and Edwardian accounts of exploring Darkest England. The trade unions also
featured as major culprits in widely read books which discussed what was
wrong with the country and which were published as people came to terms
viil
1
2 A history of British industrial relations, 1939-1979 Introduction 3
with the end of Empire and the loss of Great Power status.’ Overall the trade and to strengthen ‘Britain’s competitive position in world markets’. The
uanndi ongse newrearlel yp obrltirnakyeerde da s inb ldoeomdayn-dmiinngd eds hoanrdt -toebrsmt ruacdtivvaen,t agienfsl exfiobrl e thetoi r chmaenmg-e pwaerrtey:’ s ‘action programmes’ for the reform of management and trade unions
taking a wider or longer view.
PE Geena ae Conservatives lost office in 1964, according to opin- First, we will be transforming industrial relations by introducing a new Act
ion poll findings, more people felt that business had too much power rather covering the trade unions and employers’ associations.
than the trade unions. In 1963 the overall percentage of people critical of andS eclaobnodu,r wseo wtihlalt bmee nt urannidn g wothme enhe atc aonn droe star idcetciveen t prjaocbt icuensh abmyp ebroethd mbayn atghee mfeenarts
business was 70, whereas for the unions it was 63.5, though before 1964 and restrictions which belong to another age.
criticism of the trade unions was already stronger than that of business Third, we want to see better job prospects with greater security of incomes and
among women, the middle class and those under 35 (who would have little or pensions in the new high-wage low-cost economy.’
no recollection of the role of the unions during the 1940s or of the 1930s).4
For their part, the trade unions did little or nothing to counter the new Their manifesto provided a ‘blueprint’ for change, which included the estab-
upsurge in criticism of their activities. The authors of the main study of the lishment of a new Code of Good Industrial Relations Practice, making agree-
1959 general election noted, ‘In 1958 the TUC [Trades Union Congress] ments between employers and unions legally enforceable, establishing a reg-
spent almost three times as much on international activities as it did on istrar of trade unions and employers’ associations and ensuring that these
publicity and education in Britain — and very little of the money it did spend bodies’ ‘rules are fair and meet the interest of the public’, creating ‘a new
was directed to enlightening the three-quarters of the adult population who Industrial Court to deal with industrial disputes and claims for damages
are not trade union members’.° Disregard for wider public opinion may not against unjust dismissal’, the introduction of measures to deal with restrictive
have mattered unduly when trade unionism itself was not a major political labour practices and the ‘repeal of the Trade Disputes Act 1965 so as to help
issue. However in the 1964 general election the subject of industrial relations prevent intimidation’. In this Edward Heath and the Conservatives displayed
was put before the electorate by the Conservative Party. The Conservative many key elements of what was to be the 1971 Industrial Relations Act and
manifesto made three major points concerning the trade unions: reiterated their determination to deal with restrictive practices. Thus by the
mid-1960s the Conservative Party had moved towards regulating industrial
relations by statutory controls.
1. that government measures to maintain high levels of employment high-
In contrast, the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Asso-
lighted ‘the lack of justification in present conditions for many restrictive
ciations chaired by Lord Donovan (1965-8) proposed to strengthen the exist-
practices of labour’ and that the unions had ‘a vital responsibility to
ing voluntaryist system of industrial relations rather than to legislate.8 The
diminish such handicaps to Britain’s competitive strength’;
Donovan Commission had been set up at the prompting of Ray Gunter, the
2. that the Conservatives, if re-elected, would continue ‘to seek their co-
Minister of Labour. He hoped that it would recommend that the government
operation in matters of common interest and to work in partnership with
should intervene to deal with what ministers deemed to be unacceptable
them through NEDC [the National Economic Development Council]’;
and aspects of British industrial relations. It seems that many of Harold Wilson’s
3. that, if re-elected, the Conservatives would set up an inquiry into the law Cabinet felt in November 1967, at the time that the pound was devalued, that
relating to trade unions and employers’ associations, as recent decisions trade union legislation should be part of a post-devaluation economic pack-
in the courts had ‘thrown into prominence aspects of the law’ affecting age. Harold Wilson recalled that George Brown ‘wanted us to legislate on
them and there had been no such review since the start of the century.°® industrial relations, anticipating the report of the Donovan Commission. There
was no opposition in principle, except from Ray Gunter when it was put to
With the loss of office, the Conservatives immediately reappraised their him that same evening, and he was concerned simply with the practicability
policies towards industrial relations, along with other areas of domestic policy. and timing.’* Hence it is not surprising that, in 1969, after the publication of
This they began before the Wilson government set up a royal commission and the Donovan Report and with the incomes policy ending, Wilson and his
they did not await its findings before suggesting their own remedies. By the Secretary of State for Employment, Barbara Castle, made proposals which
time of the 1966 general election the improvement of industrial relations was went beyond the Donovan Commission’s voluntaryist recommendations. These
a major aspect of the Conservative programme to ‘get the economy straight’ proposals, published in the white paper entitled In Place of Strife, were
A history of British industrial relations, 1939-1979 Introduction 5
4
i‘nstuednddeend intod usdteraila l wiatcht ionB rittaaikne’ns be‘fsoprecei ala depqruoabtlee m’n egoint iaintdiuosnt rioarl Mireesluastsioinosn ofof mwaoiunl d feraetcuerievse ofl itttlhee obri ll now erceo opneort atnieogno tifabrloem. tThhe is trmadaed eu nicoenrtsa,i n ant hait mptohre taAnctt
tpheer iopdr obolfe m2’8. dTahyesy (guanvdee rt heth e wgoovrekrinnmge ntc otnhdei tipoonws er opteor oartdinegr be - ethee “l mveartyt ere ffwehcetniv e thieni r unrdefeursmali niton gr egmiustcehr uofn dtehre Athcet ’sA ctp rwoavsi sileognasl .'? and proved to be
pute), to order a ballot before a strike which it deemed to threaten the A major feature of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act was the expectation
economy or the national interest, and to ensure a settlement of an inter-union that trade unions and employers’ organizations would register under it. In so
dispute (with anyone not complying being penalized through attachment of doing such organizations were bound to conduct industrial relations accord-
earnings, not by imprisonment). Other aspects of In Place of Strife strength- ing to the government’s approved rules and procedures. In return there were
ened trade unionism. For the Labour movement’s left, as Eric Heffer, an advantages. For the trade union that registered these included that its mem-
articulate left-wing MP, wrote later, “There were about twenty-five proposals bers had a legal right to belong to it, its members were protected against
that were acceptable and three that were not.’ At the time he observed of the victimization for participating in a strike, its officials were protected against
three, the measures outlined above, that they ‘add up to a new type of personal liability for ‘unfair industrial practices’, the union was protected
interference by government in industrial relations ... In a sense, it is an against liability for inducing breaches of contract in trade disputes, the union
extension of the state intervention begun in the Prices and Incomes Act, and it could conclude an agency shop or approved closed shop agreement and the
is in line with the new concept of state control’.!° In the face of substantial union could avail itself of the means for enforcing recognition and requiring
Labour movement opposition and serious divisions within the Parliamentary information necessary for collective bargaining.’
Labour Party, the Wilson government backed down. The 1971 Act also created a new division of the High Court, the National
Though the Labour government withdrew these proposals, as Patrick Industrial Relations Court, to facilitate the operation of the Act. This was the
Maguire observes in Chapter 2, ‘the politics of labour legislation had been first time since the munitions tribunals of the First World War that those
considerably altered’. Both main political parties were taking the view that involved in industrial conflict or practices deemed bad could end up in a
industrial relations had a marked adverse effect on the economy and both special court. The Act also set up the Commission on Industrial Relations as a
were rejecting what Otto Kahn-Freund dubbed ‘the principle of collective statutory body to which the Secretary of State could refer industrial relations
laissez-faire’.!' In taking up this issue and proposing interventionist solu- matters of concern to the government.
tions, both parties were politicizing industrial relations to a greater extent Four other elements of the Industrial Relations Act deserve attention here.
than had been the case since the period of the General Strike in 1926. The As with Jn Pace of Strife, there was provision for the calling of a cooling-off
leadership of the Labour Party felt that it would lose out if it did not respond period where a strike was deemed likely to damage the economy, though in
to the Conservatives’ proposals. As for the Conservatives, it was an issue this Act the period was longer, up to 60, not 28 days, and the action was taken
which drew a favourable response from much of the electorate and they through the National Industrial Relations Court. There was also provision for
capitalized on anti-trade union feeling to the detriment of their main political ordering a ballot before a strike. The Act also carried out the Conservatives’
rival. policy of making collective agreements legally binding, though it did permit
The Conservative victory in the June 1970 general election was followed this to be waived if it was explicitly excluded when any agreement was
by the introduction of the Industrial Relations Bill into Parliament that negotiated. While the Act gave people the right to be members of a registered
December. Though this was a huge and complex bill, it could be introduced trade union, it also gave the right not to belong to a trade union (except in the
early into the new Parliament as its main features were those enunciated by few special cases, such as acting, where there could be approved closed
the Conservative Party in opposition. Edward Heath and his colleagues saw
shops). It banned pre-entry closed shops but allowed the setting up of agency
the proposals in the bill as the means of transforming British industrial shops where a majority of workers eligible to vote or two-thirds of those
relations by creating a legal framework within which trade unions and em- voting supported this being done.
ployers would have to act. However, in attempting to set up such a frame- In the 1945-79 period, the 1971 Industrial Relations Act was by far the
work, the government was determined to take a firm stance with the unions in most substantial attempt to transform British industrial relations. It brushed
order to underline how different it was from Harold Wilson’s vacillations aside much that had gone before. It repealed outright the major trade union
over In Place of Strife. As a result, when Robert Carr, the Secretary of State legislation of 1871, 1876, 1906 and 1965. It failed, not only because of the
for Employment, saw the TUC in mid-October 1970, he made it clear that the
strength of opposition to it and the volatile economic circumstances obtain-

I
6 A history of British industrial relations, 1939-1979 Introduction 7
ing when it came into 0 peration, but also because of confusion in ii ts larger ‘This is not a legally enforceable agreement’ (known in some trade union
a its more detailed objectives. Given the trade union movement's strong circles as a “TINA LEA’).
and successful opposition to Labour’s In Place of Strife, its response to When the Act was used in industrial disputes, the outcome was often
wider-ranging and stronger measures from a Conservative government was discouraging for the government. This was very much the case with a threat-
always likely to be hostile. Nevertheless, if the aim was to improve enehistzial ened rail strike in April 1972 over an 11 per cent pay claim. Maurice
relations, the government would have done well to heed The Economist s Macmillan, the Secretary of State for Employment, successfully applied to
advice to see the carrying of the bill as ‘a major public relations exercise as the National Industrial Relations Court for a cooling-off period of 14 days.
much as a parliamentary battle’.!4 For the Heath government the bill, and the After that the National Industrial Relations Court ordered a secret ballot. The
whole bill, was part of its ‘Action Not Words’ image. Moreover for Heath it result was that over 80 per cent of the railway workers who voted supported
was proof that he took substantial long-term measures rather than (as he saw their union in its demand for more than an 11 per cent pay increase. They
it) taking short-term cosmetic measures in the manner of Harold Wilson: a succeeded in gaining 13 per cent. This experience bore out the judgment of
deep-felt reaction, not unlike Gladstone’s distancing himself from Disraeli’s the Donovan Commission which had rejected introducing cooling-off periods
political style. followed by ballots as likely to do no more than strengthen the position of the
Such political aims were entangled with vague economic and more specific trade union leadership. More worrying still were the 1972 court cases involv-
industrial relations aims. The major target of the Act was strikes. In the ing dockers, which resulted in five shop stewards being sent to prison for
period before the bill was introduced into Parliament, Robert Carr com- contempt of the National Industrial Relations Court. The speedy release of
mented, ‘The plain fact is that Britain is up against a rapidly increasing ‘the Pentonville Five’ avoided the probability of a national one-day strike.!7
tendency to strike first and talk later, with all the unnecessary disruption, By the time of the February 1974 general election, Campbell Adamson, the
waste and hardship that entails.’ The Act was intended to reduce the number Director General of the Confederation of British Industry, was probably not
of strikes, both inter-union and unofficial. By creating the Sole Bargaining alone in the view that the Industrial Relations Act had embittered industrial
Agency, which gave in certain circumstances a registered trade union sole relations and that it should be repealed.!®
and legally enforceable negotiating rights, it was hoped to cut out many inter- Overall the Industrial Relations Act failed to achieve its objectives. Em-
union disputes and strikes over recognition. It was also expected that legally ployers did not use the Act to achieve better bargaining procedures, nor did
binding agreements would also strengthen centralized trade unionism by they insist that agreements be legally binding. The existence of the Act did
deterring shop stewards or other local activists from breaking them. Further- not reduce the loss of working days through strikes. Indeed its presence
more the Act included an intended remedy for strike-prone workplaces, as probably exacerbated matters, with the number lost doubling during the Act’s
these could be referred by employers, unions or the government to the Nat- existence over the previous period (though this was partly due to separate
ional Industrial Relations Court. The Commission on Industrial Relations problems in the coal industry). Nor did it assist in keeping levels of pay
would then seek to find a voluntary solution, but if that was not achieved a down, even though the Conservatives, like Labour, saw such a measure in
legally binding procedure could be imposed on the workplace.!5 part as an alternative to an incomes policy.”
However, for the Industrial Relations Act to be successful, it required both With the Labour governments of Harold Wilson (1974-6) and James
sides of industry to make use of it. In practice many employers were reluctant Callaghan (1976-9), there was a return to the voluntaryist approach to indus-
to take their employees to court or to operate other statutory provisions. The trial relations as extolled by the Donovan Report. The 1971 Act was repealed,
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) advised its members, ‘Resort by and with the Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts 1974 and 1976 there
employers to the legal processes in the Act may well be less effective than
was a return to the earlier legal framework (based on the 1875 and 1906 Acts)
good voluntary practices’. It added the comment, “Only on rare occasions plus clauses relating to ‘unfair dismissals’, closed shops and breach of com-
would you wish to invoke the remedies under the Act’ .!6 During the operation mercial and employment contracts while engaged in an industrial dispute.
of the Act only individuals and small employers turned to the National William McCarthy has observed of these two Acts, ‘the TUC appeared to
Industrial Relations Court, and then complaints were usually made about have obtained all it had demanded from the Donovan Commission without
otthheerr people’s employees, not their own. As for making agreements legally any observable strings’.”° More generally, the government’s ‘Social Contract’
binding, both private- and public-sector employers generally rejected this provided a range of industrial and social concessions in return for a degree of
possibility and readily inserted a clause into agreements which specified: wage restraint.
|
8 A history of British industrial relations, 1939-1979 Introduction 9
A major development in the strengthening of the voluntaryist eae gains in this period, compared with the Thatcher years, 1979-86. He has
oaft ioinn duasntdr iaAlr biretlraattiioonns Scearmvei cew it(hA CaA Sn)e.w tTrhiipsa rtigtree w bodouyt, otfh e TAUdCv isaonrdy , CBI Contcaillkis- darrgauwend otnh at thteh e Bhaingkh er of laEbnougrl anpdr’osd uctfiigvuirteys , ofa s ther ep1o9r7te9d- 86i n pTearbiloed w1.a s Medtucea ltfo
ipenxl pol1yi9mc7ie2tn,l ty wasPesrt otuoeppc etrtiaoo tnib neg A cfrtie ne 11f99r77o54m. mTaihnndie s tgaeatritinraeald c tsitioanntt eurtfooefrr ye nAcCep.Ao wSe Irt s offueesn redde ro e ctohinetc ilEAima- - iu‘ncl te tghimesa lralktaeiboton u rc too mmpacerotnkisetttri’ao.inn aunndi oen mpphoawseirs, ohni ghn umuenreimcpallo yamnedn tf,u nchteiiongahlt enfeldex ibpirloidt-y
tion and advice, published codes of practice and (until the Employment Act
r1e9c8o0g)n itciouolnd pernoscuerdeu ret.ra deT heun io1n9 75r ecEogmnpiltoioynm enbyt ePmrpoltoeycetriosn unAdcetr aa lsos tateusttoarby- Table ] Amvaenruafagcet uarninnuga,l 1p9er6c4e-n8t6a ge changes in output per head in British
lished the Central Arbitration Board (which was in a chain of ‘successors to
the Industrial Court, set up by 1919 legislation) and a certification officer (in UK Average of 7 major
place of the registrar under the 1971 Act).?} ah industrial countries
The 1974-9 period did see considerable legislation in the sphere of indus-
trial relations. Much of this extended workers’ rights. In addition the trade 1964-73 3.8 5.0
unions were consulted more at the highest levels of government, though their 1973-79 0.7 3.2
influence was not as great on major economic issues as many commentators 1979-86 3.6 2.8
believed then and later. While this ‘experiment in bargained corporatism’ was
significant, the general approach taken by the government during this period Source: The Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, August 1987, p. 336; reprinted in D. Metcalf,
“Water Notes Dry Up: The Impact of the Donovan Reform Proposals and Thatcherism at Work
was to strengthen voluntary mechanisms rather than to continue the on Labour Productivity in British Manufacturing Industry’, British Journal of Industrial Rela-
juridification of industrial relations which had been such a marked feature of tions, 27, (1989), 1-31
the Heath government.” While strengthening voluntary mechanisms did not
make matters worse, as had been the case with the 1971 Industrial Relations There certainly seems to have been a marked relative improvement in
Act, this approach did not lead in itself to a diminution of strikes or to very average annual percentage changes in output per head during the 1980s. This
marked aggregate rises in productivity. In the early 1960s there had been high was in itself good, though part of the improvement in the UK and USA, at a
hopes that substantial gains in productivity could be achieved by collective time when there was a steady deceleration in improvement in Japan and West
bargaining. It appeared that the way forward had been shown by management Germany, surely reflects a catching-up process in the first two. Table 2
at the Esso refinery at Fawley. There two productivity agreements were reproduces the Treasury figures of November 1989.
negotiated between 1959 and 1963 which abolished overtime, raised output, The impact of very effective competition from Japan and South East Asia
increased the return on capital equipment and gave the workforce a shorter shook up the attitudes of both managements and workforces in the 1980s —
working week and substantial increases in earnings. At the time one com- and not just in Britain. For instance, with motor cars (on which there is a case
mentator observed, “The central lesson of Fawley was that a powerful study in Chapter 8 of this volume) Japanese production methods were a
workforce can only be persuaded to give up its protective practices and adapt challenge to the US and German industries as well as to the British. As an
to new technologies if it is given alternative guarantees of security: and that American car worker put it in an ‘awareness workshop’, ‘I’m tired of hearing
can only be done through formal negotiations with the representatives at the about Japan. Let’s do it!’ In Britain car making was marked by relatively low
workplace’.?? The fame of the productivity bargaining at Fawley was rein- wages as well as low productivity. By the 1980s Europe-wide car companies
forced by a book by Allan Flanders and by the attention given to it by the could undercut the bargaining strength of their workforces as they could
Donovan Commission. However later research has suggested that even at switch, or threaten to switch, output elsewhere, the labour market was unfa-
Fawley itself the productivity outcome was less substantial than the Fawley vourable to strike action and it was very much a buyers’ market for the
legend gave cause to expect.4 finished vehicles.?° One of the lessons of comparisons between Japanese and
While there were large numbers of productivity agreements made during Western labour practice has been that emulation is not simple. The roots of
the 1960s and 1970s, the overall impact on productivity was not impressive. difference lie in the different cultures, yet lessons have had to be learnt in
Writers such as David Metcalf have been very dismissive of productivity order to compete.