A grunts eye view of Iraq

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Leadership and Logistical Failures Hurt Troops

Editor's Note: The following memo was sent from a senior NCO in the 3rd Infantry Division still serving in Iraq.
Certain details have been omitted to protect his identity.

From: A Concerned Soldier
To: Col. David H. Hackworth

Subj: Leadership Failures in Iraq

I am a senior enlisted soldier in the Army, and I have a few points of view I would like to discuss in this forum
with the intentions of confirming or alleviating some misnomers that I have seen communicated recently.

I would first like to both confirm and dispel some of the misunderstandings concerning logistics in Operation Iraq
Freedom. It is absolutely true that the logistical portion of the campaign was the biggest downfall both in plannin
and execution. The biggest travesty is, while there was an obvious miscalculation of what it would take to
support us on the battlefield, there was little to no evident planning for sustaining the soldiers upon completion o
the main war effort. Here are some prime examples that cannot be disputed by any twist of fact or camouflaging
by the "spin doctors" in public relations:

1. We crossed the line of departure [from Kuwait] and finished the missions in a pretty much "as is" state of
readiness with our vehicles. We did not receive a single piece of parts support for our vehicles during the entire
battle. If a vehicle went down we had to cross-level parts from a more seriously damaged or mission incapable
vehicle. We brought common replacement parts as part of our basic load configuration but they were limited due
to the amount of vehicles and the limited carrying space. Now the [supply] system is turned on, but with the
amount of soldiers in theatre and the subsequent amount of equipment that require repairs, not a single repair
part has made to our vehicles to date. (This system applies to the units that have received follow on missions to
places like Fallujah.)

2. The primary method of policing up broken equipment, on the battlefield and in enemy territory, was self-
recovery. This meant that if you did not have tow capability between vehicles, you had very little chance of being
moved forward to a maintenance control point, and you were forced to transfer personnel from one vehicle to
another and abandon the broken vehicle. When it was all said and done, my unit had abandoned around 12
vehicles and transferred the soldiers to others in very cramped riding conditions.

This did two things detrimental to combat effectiveness. It overcrowded the vehicles that we fought from, thus
reducing our ability to effectively defend or attack as warranted. It also provided a possibility of greater soldier
casualties if the vehicle took and RPG round or other significant attack. To our amazement, our people made it
to our objective, but others did not. I firmly believe that the conditions I just described contributed to the loss and
injury of soldiers on the battlefield.

3. During operations, it seemed impossible to maintain our necessary supplies of water and food. We all carried
five days of supply with us at LD with the intent of utilizing it only in an "emergency" situation. The problem being
that because our logistics lines were so poor, we had to break into them during the trip rather than in an
established emergency situation. One of the biggest reasons for this is the mismanagement of the haul assets
available for the support of the operation. The logisticians were forced to make a decision, haul food and water
on their limited hauling assets, or haul ammunition and parts. With the continuous "Go! Go! Go!" mentality of ou
movement to Baghdad, I guess it was more important to continue the fight.

4. We had a very elaborate plan of attack going into the operation. However, we failed to realize that the enemy
had a vote in how exactly we were going to conduct our operation and the changes to the plan that they could
affect. We, as we planned, would "take Baghdad in a matter of days" and were told that "There is no expected
contact for a significant piece of our movement." We were even told not to place a round into our weapons when
we LD'd because "We won't see the enemy for quite sometime." and "will have plenty of time to react." The inte
was that this would reduce the risks of a "negligent discharge or fratricide incidents." Well, we know what the

truth is: We received ambush and guerilla warfare tactics from almost the very beginning.

Don't get me wrong, all of our soldiers were very well trained and they reacted well to contact. We didn't lose
soldiers as a result of this oversight, but I wonder how many support or follow-on units made the same mistake
and weren't quite as well prepared?

5. The movement to the objectives was pure chaos. It was poorly orchestrated and executed. I was witness to
several vehicle accidents, where soldiers lost their lives, that were a direct result of the "Go! Go! Go!" mentality.
Units were getting separated by their inability to maintain convoy continuity due to the extremely dusty
conditions, better known as "brown out," and the sheer number of vehicles traveling the exact same path. I
cannot adequately put to words the absolute confusion caused by the movement north. The tanks and Bradleys
were not stopping for anything, and that very mentality caused several problems. Imagine having only soft-
skinned vehicles, small caliber firearms, overcrowded vehicles, no communications ability (except internal to
your immediate group), and hearing sporadic transmissions of ambushes and close contact firefights. That is
exactly what many units had to endure and it cost soldiers their lives. (I can think of a certain maintenance
support unit that made the news.)

6. Once the objectives were reached and seized, we established our operations within Baghdad and started the
humanitarian effort. The supply lines have yet to come into fruition and simplicities such as bottled water have
yet to make their appearance on a consistent basis. We have had no potable ice since our arrival. I have
personally been forced to buy ice from the Iraqis so that my soldiers were not drinking hot water day in and day
out. It is bad enough that they have been forced to drink water that tastes like it came straight from a swimming
pool (because of the sanitization process). Don't get me wrong - bottled water is showing up, but not with
anything that can be remotely considered consistent.

We are steadily providing bottled water to the citizens of Iraq though, and you can bet your next paycheck that
anyone who is of any rank that allows them to work on a brigade or higher level staff position hasn't had to drink
warm sanitized water lately. As a matter of fact, I have witnessed several "higher ups" in my particular unit with
private shower facilities, private porta-johns, and ice chests full of bottled water and potable ice in their
immediate work areas while their subordinates (meaning the soldiers) are struggling every day to get a cold
bottle of water. These very same senior soldiers are living in an air conditioned room while their soldiers are
trying, in vain, to keep mosquitoes from consuming them nightly, and using hoses from an Iraqi latrine stall to ge
water enough to maintain their hygienic needs.

7. 3ID, in particular, 2BCT is now conducting operations in Fallujah and its surrounding area to "rid that area of
Ba'ath Party loyalists and make the area safe for the citizens." Bullshit! We are conducting operations in Fallujah
to rid the United States of a political black eye that we have received in the world of public opinion. Now we hav
to control their citizens, they are the very same citizens that are throwing rocks at passing soldiers, ambushing
them, and sniping them. We are spending millions to provide fuel and propane and facilities to people that spit in
our direction the second the stop waving. We are patrolling their streets, executing raids, and checking
everywhere in an attempt to rid the community of those that are influencing the behavior of the masses. (All of
these operations are being conducted in vehicles that have not received any repair parts since our original LD)
have no idea if this is working, but I do know that we have provided these people with countless creature
comforts that are not being provided to the soldiers throughout the theater. Sure there are some soldiers that ar
receiving air conditioning, electricity, and bottled water with their hot meals. These soldiers are the exception to
the rule, not the rule. There are soldiers, to this day, that live in squalor.

I can only ask that these points be made available to everyone. I am sure that many have no idea about what
their husbands, sons, wives, and daughters - their soldiers - are going through or have gone through.

We have been America's war-fighters, we have liberated a country from conditions that are indescribable, and in
return we are being kept here and are living in conditions that we liberated the Iraqis from. How is it that the
people that fought and spilled blood on this soil against Iraqi forces are now given the responsibility of providing
them comfort and humanitarian aid?

There are many units here that were brought here specifically to replace us and no replacement is being

conducted. We have done our job and have done it well, we have fulfilled our obligation to this operation, but we
are still here and are still being mistreated and misled. When does it end? Do we continue to keep the liberators
of Iraq here so they can continue to lose soldiers periodically to snipers and ambushes? My unit has been here
since September and they have no light at the end of the tunnel. How many of my soldiers need to die before
they realize that we have hit a wall? We are ordered to stay and ordered to continue the mission, but at what
cost? Doesn't the soldier count for anything?

It is an absolute travesty that our leaders allow politics and public opinion to betray the heroes of this great
nation. I was once the greatest voice for the command and our leaders, now I am a defeated leader who is
forced to support without question and lie to my soldiers so that they can maintain a forced motivation. We have
been told to "suck it up, get through it, and execute." With leadership like that, what else can we do?