A graduate course in Applied Cryptography

818 Pages·2017·25.408 MB·English

by  Dan Boneh, Victor Shoup

A Graduate Course in Applied Cryptography
Dan Boneh and Victor Shoup
Version 0.4, September 2017
Preface
Cryptography is an indispensable tool used to protect information in computing systems. It is
used everywhere and by billions of people worldwide on a daily basis. It is used to protect data at
rest and data in motion. Cryptographic systems are an integral part of standard protocols, most
notably the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, making it relatively easy to incorporate
strong encryption into a wide range of applications.
While extremely useful, cryptography is also highly brittle. The most secure cryptographic
system can be rendered completely insecure by a single specification or programming error. No
amount of unit testing will uncover a security vulnerability in a cryptosystem.
Instead, to argue that a cryptosystem is secure, we rely on mathematical modeling and proofs
to show that a particular system satisfies the security properties attributed to it. We often need to
introduce certain plausible assumptions to push our security arguments through.
This book is about exactly that: constructing practical cryptosystems for which we can argue
security under plausible assumptions. The book covers many constructions for di↵erent tasks in
cryptography. For each task we define a precise security goal that we aim to achieve and then
present constructions that achieve the required goal. To analyze the constructions, we develop a
unified framework for doing cryptographic proofs. A reader who masters this framework will be
capable of applying it to new constructions that may not be covered in the book.
Throughout the book we present many case studies to survey how deployed systems operate.
We describe common mistakes to avoid as well as attacks on real-world systems that illustrate the
importance of rigor in cryptography. We end every chapter with a fun application that applies the
ideas in the chapter in some unexpected way.
Intended audience and how to use this book
The book is intended to be self contained. Some supplementary material covering basic facts from
probability theory and algebra is provided in the appendices. The book is divided into three parts.
Part I develops symmetric encryption which explains how two parties, Alice and Bob, can
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securely exchange information when they have a shared key unknown to the attacker. We
discuss data confidentiality, data integrity, and the important concept of authenticated en-
cryption.
Part II develops the concepts of public-key encryption and digital signatures, which allow
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Alice and Bob to communicate securely, without having a pre-shared secret key.
Part III is about cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for user identification, key ex-
•
change, zero knowledge, and secure computation.
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A beginning reader can read though the book to learn how cryptographic systems work and
why they are secure. Every security theorem in the book is followed by a proof idea that explains
at a high level why the scheme is secure. On a first read one can skip over the detailed proofs
without losing continuity. A beginning reader may also skip over the mathematical details sections
that explore nuances of certain definitions.
An advanced reader may enjoy reading the detailed proofs to learn how to do proofs in cryptog-
raphy. At the end of every chapter you will find many exercises that explore additional aspects of
the material covered in the chapter. Some exercises rehearse what was learned, but many exercises
expand on the material and discuss topics not covered in the chapter.
Status of the book
The current draft contains part I and most of parts II and III. The remaining four chapters are
forthcoming. We hope you enjoy this write-up. Please send us comments and let us know if you
find typos or mistakes.
Citations: While the current draft is mostly complete, we still do not include citations and
references to the many works on which this book is based. Those will be coming soon and will be
presented in the Notes section at the end of every chapter.
Dan Boneh and Victor Shoup
September, 2017
iii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Historic ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Terminology used throughout the book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I Secret key cryptography 3
2 Encryption 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Shannon ciphers and perfect security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1 Definition of a Shannon cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2 Perfect security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.3 The bad news . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Computational ciphers and semantic security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.1 Definition of a computational cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 Definition of semantic security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.3 Connections to weaker notions of security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.4 Consequences of semantic security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.5 Bit guessing: an alternative characterization of semantic security . . . . . . 25
2.4 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.1 Negligible, super-poly, and poly-bounded functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.2 Computational ciphers: the formalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.3 E�cient adversaries and attack games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.4 Semantic security: the formalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 A fun application: anonymous routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.7 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Stream ciphers 45
3.1 Pseudo-random generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.1.1 Definition of a pseudo-random generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1.2 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Stream ciphers: encryption with a PRG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 Stream cipher limitations: attacks on the one time pad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.1 The two-time pad is insecure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
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3.3.2 The one-time pad is malleable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4 Composing PRGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.1 A parallel construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.2 A sequential construction: the Blum-Micali method . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.3 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 The next bit test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.6 Case study: the Salsa and ChaCha PRGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7 Case study: linear generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7.1 An example cryptanalysis: linear congruential generators . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7.2 The subset sum generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.8 Case study: cryptanalysis of the DVD encryption system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.9 Case study: cryptanalysis of the RC4 stream cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.9.1 Security of RC4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.10 Generating random bits in practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.11 A broader perspective: computational indistinguishability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.11.1 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.12 A fun application: coin flipping and commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.14 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4 Block ciphers 94
4.1 Block ciphers: basic definitions and properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.1.1 Some implications of security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.1.2 E�cient implementation of random permutations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.1.3 Strongly secure block ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.1.4 Using a block cipher directly for encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.1.5 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2 Constructing block ciphers in practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.2.1 Case study: DES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2.2 Exhaustive search on DES: the DES challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2.3 Strengthening ciphers against exhaustive search: the 3 construction . . . . 113
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4.2.4 Case study: AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.3 Sophisticated attacks on block ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.3.1 Algorithmic attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.3.2 Side-channel attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.3.3 Fault-injection attacks on AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.3.4 Quantum exhaustive search attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.4 Pseudo-random functions: basic definitions and properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.4.1 Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.4.2 E�cient implementation of random functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.4.3 When is a secure block cipher a secure PRF? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.4.4 Constructing PRGs from PRFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.4.5 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.5 Constructing block ciphers from PRFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.6 The tree construction: from PRGs to PRFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4.6.1 Variable length tree construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
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4.7 The ideal cipher model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.7.1 Formal definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.7.2 Exhaustive search in the ideal cipher model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.7.3 The Even-Mansour block cipher and the X construction . . . . . . . . . . 156
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4.7.4 Proof of the Even-Mansour and X theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
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4.8 Fun application: comparing information without revealing it . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.10 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5 Chosen Plaintext Attack 174
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5.2 Security against multi-key attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5.3 Semantic security against chosen plaintext attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
5.4 Building CPA secure ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5.4.1 A generic hybrid construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5.4.2 Randomized counter mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
5.4.3 CBC mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.4.4 Case study: CBC padding in TLS 1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
5.4.5 Concrete parameters and a comparison of counter and CBC modes . . . . . 196
5.5 Nonce-based encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
5.5.1 Nonce-based generic hybrid encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
5.5.2 Nonce-based Counter mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
5.5.3 Nonce-based CBC mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
5.6 A fun application: revocable broadcast encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
5.7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
5.8 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
6 Message integrity 212
6.1 Definition of a message authentication code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
6.1.1 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
6.2 MAC verification queries do not help the attacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
6.3 Constructing MACs from PRFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
6.4 Prefix-free PRFs for long messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
6.4.1 The CBC prefix-free secure PRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
6.4.2 The cascade prefix-free secure PRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
6.4.3 Extension attacks: CBC and cascade are insecure MACs . . . . . . . . . . . 227
6.5 From prefix-free secure PRF to fully secure PRF (method 1): encrypted PRF . . . 228
6.5.1 ECBC and NMAC: MACs for variable length inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
6.6 From prefix-free secure PRF to fully secure PRF (method 2): prefix-free encodings . 232
6.6.1 Prefix free encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
6.7 From prefix-free secure PRF to fully secure PRF (method 3): CMAC . . . . . . . . 233
6.8 Converting a block-wise PRF to bit-wise PRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
6.9 Case study: ANSI CBC-MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
6.10 Case study: CMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
6.11 PMAC: a parallel MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
6.12 A fun application: searching on encrypted data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
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6.13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
6.14 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
7 Message integrity from universal hashing 248
7.1 Universal hash functions (UHFs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
7.1.1 Multi-query UHFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
7.1.2 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
7.2 Constructing UHFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
7.2.1 Construction 1: UHFs using polynomials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
7.2.2 Construction 2: CBC and cascade are computational UHFs . . . . . . . . . 254
7.2.3 Construction 3: a parallel UHF from a small PRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
7.3 PRF(UHF) composition: constructing MACs using UHFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
7.3.1 Using PRF(UHF) composition: ECBC and NMAC security . . . . . . . . . 261
7.3.2 Using PRF(UHF) composition with polynomial UHFs . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
7.3.3 Using PRF(UHF) composition: PMAC security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
0
7.4 The Carter-Wegman MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
7.4.1 Using Carter-Wegman with polynomial UHFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
7.5 Nonce-based MACs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
7.5.1 Secure nonce-based MACs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
7.6 Unconditionally secure one-time MACs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
7.6.1 Pairwise unpredictable functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
7.6.2 Building unpredictable functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
7.6.3 From PUFs to unconditionally secure one-time MACs . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
7.7 A fun application: timing attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
7.8 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
7.9 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
8 Message integrity from collision resistant hashing 283
8.1 Definition of collision resistant hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
8.1.1 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
8.2 Building a MAC for large messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
8.3 Birthday attacks on collision resistant hash functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
8.4 The Merkle-Damg˚ard paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
8.4.1 Joux’s attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
8.5 Building Compression Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
8.5.1 A simple but ine�cient compression function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
8.5.2 Davies-Meyer compression functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
8.5.3 Collision resistance of Davies-Meyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
8.6 Case study: SHA256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
8.6.1 Other Merkle-Damg˚ard hash functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
8.7 Case study: HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
8.7.1 Security of two-key nest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
8.7.2 The HMAC standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
8.7.3 Davies-Meyer is a secure PRF in the ideal cipher model . . . . . . . . . . . 306
8.8 The Sponge Construction and SHA3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
8.8.1 The sponge construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
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8.8.2 Case study: SHA3, SHAKE256, and SHAKE512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
8.9 Merkle trees: proving properties of a hashed sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
8.9.1 Authenticated data structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
8.10 Key derivation and the random oracle model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
8.10.1 The key derivation problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
8.10.2 Random oracles: a useful heuristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
8.10.3 Random oracles: safe modes of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
8.10.4 The leftover hash lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
8.10.5 Case study: HKDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
8.11 Security without collision resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
8.11.1 Second preimage resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
8.11.2 Randomized hash functions: target collision resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
8.11.3 TCR from 2nd-preimage resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
8.11.4 Using target collision resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
8.12 A fun application: an e�cient commitment scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
8.13 Another fun application: proofs of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
8.14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
8.15 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
9 Authenticated Encryption 347
9.1 Authenticated encryption: definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
9.1.1 One-time authenticated encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
9.2 Implications of authenticated encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
9.2.1 Chosen ciphertext attacks: a motivating example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
9.2.2 Chosen ciphertext attacks: definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
9.2.3 Authenticated encryption implies chosen ciphertext security . . . . . . . . . 353
9.3 Encryption as an abstract interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
9.4 Authenticated encryption ciphers from generic composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
9.4.1 Encrypt-then-MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
9.4.2 MAC-then-encrypt is not generally secure: padding oracle attacks on SSL . 359
9.4.3 More padding oracle attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
9.4.4 Secure instances of MAC-then-encrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
9.4.5 Encrypt-then-MAC or MAC-then-encrypt? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
9.5 Nonce-based authenticated encryption with associated data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
9.6 One more variation: CCA-secure ciphers with associated data . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
9.7 Case study: Galois counter mode (GCM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
9.8 Case study: the TLS 1.3 record protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
9.9 Case study: an attack on non-atomic decryption in SSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
9.10 Case study: 802.11b WEP, a badly broken system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
9.11 Case study: IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
9.12 A fun application: private information retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
9.13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
9.14 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
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II Public key cryptography 393
10 Public key tools 394
10.1 A toy problem: anonymous key exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
10.2 One-way trapdoor functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
10.2.1 Key exchange using a one-way trapdoor function scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 396
10.2.2 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
10.3 A trapdoor permutation scheme based on RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
10.3.1 Key exchange based on the RSA assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
10.3.2 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
10.4 Di�e-Hellman key exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
10.4.1 The key exchange protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
10.4.2 Security of Di�e-Hellman key exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
10.5 Discrete logarithm and related assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
10.5.1 Random self-reducibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
10.5.2 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
10.6 Collision resistant hash functions from number-theoretic primitives. . . . . . . . . . 409
10.6.1 Collision resistance based on DL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
10.6.2 Collision resistance based on RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
10.7 Attacks on the anonymous Di�e-Hellman protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
10.8 Merkle puzzles: a partial solution to key exchange using block ciphers . . . . . . . . 413
10.9 Fun application: Pedersen commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
10.10 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
10.11 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
11 Public key encryption 424
11.1 Two further example applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
11.1.1 Sharing encrypted files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
11.1.2 Key escrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
11.2 Basic definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
11.2.1 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
11.3 Implications of semantic security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
11.3.1 The need for randomized encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
11.3.2 Semantic security against chosen plaintext attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
11.4 Encryption based on a trapdoor function scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
11.4.1 Instantiating with RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
TDF
E
11.5 ElGamal encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
11.5.1 Semantic security of ElGamal in the random oracle model . . . . . . . . . . 436
11.5.2 Semantic security of ElGamal without random oracles . . . . . . . . . . . . 438
11.6 Threshold decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
11.6.1 Shamir’s secret sharing scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
11.6.2 ElGamal threshold decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
11.7 Fun application: oblivious transfer from DDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
11.8 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
11.9 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
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12 Chosen ciphertext secure public key encryption 456
12.1 Basic definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456
12.2 Understanding CCA security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
12.2.1 CCA security and ciphertext malleability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
12.2.2 CCA security vs authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
12.2.3 CCA security and key escrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
12.2.4 Encryption as an abstract interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
12.3 CCA-secure encryption from trapdoor function schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
12.3.1 Instantiating with RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
ET0DF
12.4 CCA-secure ElGamal encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
12.5 CCA security from DDH without random oracles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
12.5.1 Universal projective hash functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
12.5.2 Universal projective hash functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
2
12.5.3 The scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
CS
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12.6 CCA security via a generic transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
12.6.1 A generic instantiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
12.6.2 A concrete instantiation with ElGamal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
12.7 CCA-secure public-key encryption with associated data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
12.8 Case study: PKCS1, OAEP, OAEP+, and SAEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
12.8.1 Padding schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
12.8.2 PKCS1 padding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
12.8.3 Bleichenbacher’s attack on the RSA-PKCS1 encryption scheme . . . . . . . 494
12.8.4 Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
12.8.5 OAEP+ and SAEP+. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
12.9 Fun application: sealed bid auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
12.10 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
12.11 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
13 Digital signatures 513
13.1 Definition of a digital signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
13.1.1 Secure signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
13.1.2 Mathematical details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
13.2 Extending the message space with collision resistant hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
13.2.1 Extending the message space using TCR functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520
13.3 Signatures from trapdoor permutations: the full domain hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
13.3.1 Signatures based on the RSA trapdoor permutation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522
13.4 Security analysis of full domain hash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
13.4.1 Repeated one-way functions: a useful lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
13.4.2 Proofs of Theorems 13.3 and 13.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529
13.5 An RSA-based signature scheme with tighter security proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530
13.6 Case study: PKCS1 signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532
13.6.1 Bleichenbacher’s attack on PKCS1 signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
13.7 Signcryption: combining signatures and encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535
13.7.1 Secure signcryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
13.7.2 Signcryption as an abstract interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
13.7.3 Constructions: encrypt-then-sign and sign-then-encrypt . . . . . . . . . . . 542
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