A Genealogical History of Society

110 Pages·2018·1.269 MB·English

by  Miguel A. Cabrera (auth.)

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN SOCIOLOGY
Miguel A. Cabrera
A Genealogical
History of Society
123
SpringerBriefs in Sociology
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10410
Miguel A. Cabrera
A Genealogical History
of Society
123
Miguel A.Cabrera
Department ofHistory
University of LaLaguna
LaLaguna
Spain
ISSN 2212-6368 ISSN 2212-6376 (electronic)
SpringerBriefs inSociology
ISBN978-3-319-70436-4 ISBN978-3-319-70437-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70437-1
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Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 The Making of Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1 The Critique of Individualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Society as Civilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3 A New Theory of Human Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3 Society as Economic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.1 The Critique of Economic Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Society as Economic Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4 A Genealogical Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Epilogue: The Disenchantment of the Social.. .... .... .... ..... .... 97
Bibliography .. .... .... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 105
v
Chapter 1
Introduction
This book presents the outcomes of my research on the genesis and process of
formation of the modern concept of society. The object of that research was to
unravelthecausesandreconstructthecircumstancesthatgaverisetotheemergence
ofthisconcept,pavingthewayfromaspecificmomentforcertainpeopletobegin
thinking that such a thing as society existed. Given that the concept of society has
playedaprominentroleinthedevelopmentofhumanhistorysincethen,thesubject
is of pivotal interest and importance. During that time, the assumption that society
exists has heavily influenced the way many people have conceived of themselves,
behaved, and related to each other, as well as the kinds of institutions they have
created, the values and beliefs they have entertained and promoted, and the life
expectations they have tried tofulfil. Along with theconceptof theindividual, the
concept of society has, for more than a century, been one of the main organizing
factors of human existence, both personally and collectively. The influence of the
concept of society underlies, for instance, facts and events such as the creation of
the Socialist parties, the implementation of the Welfare State, and the outbreak of
theRussianandChineserevolutions.Andthesamecanbesaidoftheappearanceof
class identities and the notions of social rights and citizenship. It was also the
conceptofsocietywhichmadetheemergenceandformationoftheso-calledsocial
sciences conceivable and possible, providing them with their subject matter, and
definingthetermsoftheirtheoreticaldebates.Allofthesefacts,events,andnotions
are evidence of the deep impact the concept of society has had on the recent
development of human history.
But the interest and importance of investigating the gestation of the concept of
societyalsostemfromthefactthatithelpsusbetterunderstandandexplainsucha
historical development. By providing us with greater knowledge of the genesis of
the concept, this investigation helps us gauge the nature and scope of its influence
in the making of subjectivities, behaviours, and human institutions over the past
twocenturies.Researchhasmadeitclearthattheconceptdidnotmerelyappearto
name a phenomenon or entity (‘society’) which, though previously unnoticed,
really existed. Rather, it emerged as the result of an operation of resignification of
©TheAuthor(s)2018 1
M.A.Cabrera,AGenealogicalHistoryofSociety,SpringerBriefsinSociology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70437-1_1
2 1 Introduction
the human world triggered by the practical necessity to endow this world with a
new intelligibility. Therefore, this being the case (as it apparently was), it implies
that people who have acted under theinfluence ofthe concept of society havenot,
as is usually believed, been determined by their social conditions of existence.
Rather, what those people have done is to translate into action a certain form of
conceivingofhumanbeingsandtheirworldasembodiedbytheconceptofsociety
itself. And the same can be said of the analytical usage of the concept by the
so-calledsocialscientists.Inthiscasetoo,theentitytowhichtheconceptrefershas
noobjectiveexistenceandisonlyawayofobjectifyingcertainhumanphenomena.
Some of the theoretical and epistemological implications arising from my research
will be summarily explored in the Epilogue.1
The modern concept of society entails a well-defined set of assumptions on the
nature ofhuman beings, theorigin of human subjectivity and the causes of human
behaviour, the genesis of human relations and institutions, and historical change.
Thefirstandmostbasicoftheseassumptionsisthathumangroupingsarenotmere
additions or aggregates of individuals, but specific entities, qualitatively different
from their constituent parts. And, therefore, relations and interactions between
human beings constitute an autonomous domain, independent of the participants’
intentionality. It is a domain governed by its own rules, endowed with an intrinsic
causalmechanism,andwhoseconstitution,operation,andtransformationovertime
not only are not the outcome of the subject’s will and conscious action, but are
beyond the intentional control of the subjects themselves. Indeed, the concept of
society is explicitly defined in contrast to the concept of the individual and entails
the denial of the existence of human nature. Human beings are neither natural and
timeless subjects nor the bearers of intrinsic and unchanging attributes, whose
actions are driven by their innate inclinations and propensities. On the contrary,
human beings are social, historical, and changing subjects whose subjectivity and
identitydependonandaretheexpressionoftheirsocialcontext.Humanbeingsare
nopre-constituted agents,buttheembodiment oftheirsocialsetting, whereas their
actions are not the effect of their motivations and decisions, but of their social
dispositions. In sum, the concept of society implies the notion of social causality.
Thatis,theassumptionthathuman beings’subjectivityandbehaviourarecausally
determined by the real conditions of existence typical of each historical situation.
Themodernconceptofsocietythusentailstheassumptionthatthoseconditions
of existence constitute an objective realm, in the sense that they possess intrinsic
meanings, and that, by virtue of it, they have the power to project into and
1This book is part of a wider ongoing research project whose objective is to investigate and
analyzethehistoricalgenesis,epistemologicalnature,andpracticalimpactofthecharacteristically
modern conception of the human world. Here it deals with one of the components of such a
conception,theconceptofsocietyasanobjectivephenomenonorentity.Thisconcept,alongwith
thatofhumannature,hastakenan outstandingplace intheconstellation ofconcepts whichhas
providedthemodernworldwithontologicalandtheoreticalfoundations.Theanalysisofthisissue
seems to be an important endeavour today, as it can help us better understand and assess the
so-calledcrisisofModernitywitnessedinrecenttimes.
1 Introduction 3
determine human beings’ consciousness and meaningful actions. This objective
social reality is the causal foundation of subjects’ cultural dispositions and of the
relationsandinstitutionsestablishedbythem.Inthisview,thewaypeopleconceive
oftherealphenomenathatconstitutethehumanworld,themeaningstheyattribute
to such phenomena, and the way they react to them are all implicit in the phe-
nomena themselves. For the societalist paradigm, real phenomena are natural and
objectiveentities,asonlyonewayofinterpretingandreactingtothemcanbetaken
astherightone.Thisiswhywhensuchinterpretationsandreactionsdonotconcur
with the theoretically prescribed, they are deemed as a (ideologically) distorted
perception of reality or false consciousness.
Eitherasawholeorseparately,theseassumptionshavebeenaninescapablepart
of modern culture and are deeply embedded in our common sense. As already
pointed out, many people have identified themselves, acted, and experienced their
livingrealityonthebasisofthoseassumptions.Manyscholarshaveembracedthem
and used them as analytical tools to explain human behaviour and institutions and
historical change in their terms. These scholars have taken for granted that the
concept of society refers to an existing entity and that at a given moment, the
existenceofsocietywasdiscoveredastheresultofaclose,methodicalobservation
of the human world. This is, in fact, the story told by those who first came to
formulate the concept of society inthe early nineteenth century and began using it
intheirinquiriesandpoliticalproposals.Itisoftenaddedthatsuchadiscoverywas
prompted bythe rapid transformation ofEuropean societyfrom thelate eighteenth
century, in the wake of the crisis of the Old Regime, industrialization, and the
establishmentofthemarketeconomyandliberalpoliticalregimes,inparticularthe
regimethatemergedfromtheFrenchRevolution.Boththespeedanddepthofsuch
a transformation, as well as the emergence of a new and more complex type of
economic, social, and political relations, it is argued, would have led some con-
temporaries to scrutinize the human world more closely and to develop new and
more precise conceptual tools, in an attempt to grasp the nature and operation of
that world. One such new tool would have been the concept of society.
Things seem to have happened very differently, however. Research shows that
the concept of society was not the fruit of a scientific discovery, but of a
re-conceptualization of the human world triggered—and, at the same time, theo-
retically delimited—by the frustration of expectations with regard to the actual
outcomes of implementing the tenets of individualist classical liberalism. The
conceptofsocietydidnotarisefromacloseandmethodicalobservationofhuman
reality, but from a mutation in the way of conceiving of this reality caused by a
critical reaction against the individualist theoretical paradigm. That frustration of
expectationsnotonlyforcedthere-conceptualizationofsomehumanphenomena,it
alsosetouttheterms,limits,andscopeofsuchare-conceptualization.Theconcept
ofsocietydidnotariseoutofamereepistemologicalencounterwithreality,butof
a meaningful re-articulation of reality carried out by the previous category of
individual. The new concept of society is potentially implicit in the concept of the
individual and is prefigured by it, as it was possible to conceive of the former
because of the latter’s prior existence, which constituted its starting point. For the
4 1 Introduction
concept of society to be conceived of and to emerge, the prior existence of the
conceptoftheindividualisaprerequisiteandindispensablecondition.Thisiswhy,
despite being opposites, both concepts are theoretically interdependent and closely
linkedandimplyoneanother.Therefore,theconceptofsocietyhasnoscientificor
representationalorigin,butratheragenealogicalone.Itwasconceivedofasaresult
of the meaningful interaction between observed empirical reality and the inherited
concept of the individual.
Thattheconceptofsocietywaspotentiallyimplicitandprefiguredinthatofthe
individualdoesnotmeanthatateleologicalrelationshipexistsbetweenthetwoand
thatthelatterwasboundtogiverisetotheformer.Onthecontrary,theconnection
between thetwoconceptsishistoricallycontingent:themutationoftheconceptof
the individual into that of society was caused by a set of clearly identifiable phe-
nomena. Without the presence of these phenomena, such a conceptual transmuta-
tionwouldnothavehappened.Thus,thefactthattheconceptofsocietyarosefrom
the observation of socioeconomic, political, and cultural reality is an empirically
obviousfact.Whattriggeredthereflection,analysis,andtheoreticalrethinkingthat
ledtotheformulationoftheconceptofsocietywastheinterestandconcernforaset
of empirically observable phenomena. These were the object of observation of
thosewhofirstmadethatformulation,anditwaswiththepurposeofunderstanding
and explaining such phenomena that they formulated the concept of society, as it
appears explicitly and clearly in their writings and statements. Among the phe-
nomenathatprominentlycontributedtotheemergenceoftheconceptofsocietyare,
forinstance,theexistenceofpoliticalconflicts,thepersistenceofsocialinequalities
and poverty, and the economic situation of industrial workers.
But the existence of such real phenomena does not in any way explain the
theoretical conclusions at which the theorists of the social arrived. If these phe-
nomena were interpreted as they were and the theoretical conclusions reached, it
was because the observers started from certain assumptions concerning the human
worldandhistory.Iftheaforesaidrealphenomenaprovokedacriticalreactionand
gave rise to such a conceptual mutation, it was because they were faced, experi-
enced, and analyzed through categories such as human nature and historical pro-
gress. That is why such phenomena could appear as evidence or symptoms of the
practical failure of the individualist paradigm. If they appeared as evidence of
failure (which should be repaired), it is because they were compared with and
assessed according to a certain normative pattern of success (the ideal social order
implicitinandpromisedbytheindividualistparadigmitself).Thisisalsowhythat
failure was meant to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the theoretical premises of the
paradigm, leading to the conviction that they should be severely critiqued and
replaced by more accurate ones.
Theconvictionthatagapbetweentheoryandpracticaloutcomesexistedwasin
turn grounded by critical observers on two implicit assumptions. Firstly, that the
human world was susceptible of being known in the same manner as the natural
world. Secondly, that human history tended intrinsically towards a perfect and
superior type of social organization, devoid of conflicts and in which equality,
well-being,andideologicalconsensuswillprevail.Inlight ofthisassumption,that