A Democratic Foreign Policy: Regaining American Influence Abroad

227 Pages·2020·2.253 MB·English

by  Richard Ned Lebow

A DEMOCRATIC
FOREIGN POLICY
Regaining
American Influence Abroad
Richard Ned Lebow
A Democratic Foreign Policy
“In A Democratic Foreign Policy, Ned Lebow develops the tragic view framework
to analyze how and why states behave. Drawing on the author’s half a century of
distinguished scholarship, this book offers an original contribution to foreign
policy literature. Lebow uses the idea of ‘credible commitment’ to formulate a
strategy for dealing with the central challenge posed by the rise of China. In so
doing Lebow effectively refutes the claim that power transitions inevitably lead
to conflict. A Democratic Foreign Policy will constitute a valuable part of the
debate over the next two years about what has gone wrong in twenty-first cen-
tury US foreign policy and what needs to be changed.”
—Fred Chernoff, Harvey Picker Professor of International Relations,
Colgate University, USA
“In this insightful book, Ned Lebow suggests a modification of the muscular,
hegemonic approach to foreign policy followed by both Republicans and
Democrats since the beginning of the Cold War. This macho approach has
led to frequent military actions, which often have not been in the country’s
best interest. Given today’s realities, the cure that Lebow suggests is a more
thoughtful, restrained, and affordable foreign policy more in line with
national needs and values, and less dependent on overwhelming economic
and military power. This is a discussion well worth having.”
—J.M. Houlahan, Foreign Service Officer (ret.)
“Those seeking a sensible alternative to an American foreign policy suffused with
triumphalism, unilateralism, and mercantilism need look no further. With his
customary wit, incisiveness, command of history, and appreciation of the tragic
element in politics, Ned Lebow provides a superb one.”
—Rajan Menon, Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of International
Relations, City University of New York, USA
Richard Ned Lebow
A Democratic
Foreign Policy
Regaining American Influence Abroad
Richard Ned Lebow
King’s College, London, UK
Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA
ISBN 978-3-030-21518-7 ISBN 978-3-030-21519-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21519-4
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To my recently discovered Beck-Solomon family
Preface
In 2020 the American people will elect a new president, and if common
sense and decency prevail it will be a Democrat. Donald Trump will
become history, although the damage he has inflicted on the country will
take a long time to undo. The Democratic Party has moved to the left,
that is, away from the center-right position of Hilary Clinton and the
party professionals. A president committed to change at home and
abroad—and we hope with a majority in both houses of Congress—will
have the kind of opportunities that were denied to Barack Obama.
Opportunities are not enough. A new president must have a vision of
what he or she wants to do and undo—a vision to which many senators,
representatives, and the electorate are receptive. This is readily achievable
in domestic affairs, where there is already much support for goals such as
racial equality, more equitable tax structures, better urban infrastructure,
more open access to citizenship, protection of national parks and monu-
ments, and serious efforts to address pollution and climate change.
It is a more difficult project in foreign affairs. With any luck, the Alt
Right, nativist nationalism, and mercantilist approaches to international
trade will return to the shadow world they inhabited before 2014. This
will leave the approach to foreign policy represented by what I call the
national security establishment free of any serious competitors. This
establishment reflects a near-consensus among the majority of people
involved in foreign policy in and out of government (the media, think
vii
viii Preface
tanks, and the academy) that America is a hegemonic power, has a global
responsibility for preserving the world’s territorial and economic order,
and that others welcome its dominant role. They also believe that power
confers hegemony and demands not only a dominant economy but mili-
tary spending at a level that guarantees American superiority and, with it,
the ability to intervene anywhere in the world. These beliefs are biparti-
san and have shaped the foreign and defense policies of Democratic and
Republican administrations since the early days of the Cold War and the
presidency of Harry S. Truman.
To be sure there are policy differences among those who subscribe to
this view of the world when it comes to specific policies. Most recently
they are divided on questions such as troop levels in Afghanistan, inter-
vention in Syria—favored by Hilary Clinton and opposed by Obama—
intervention by proxy in Yemen, and how closely the US should be asso-
ciated with Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of its leader-authorized assas-
sination of a dissident in their embassy in Istanbul. These are differences
in degree, not of kind, and are largely tactical. Nobody in the establish-
ment is suggesting that we consider deep cuts in the military budget,
undertake a total withdrawal from Afghanistan, or a fundamental reori-
entation of our long-standing and deep commitment to Saudi Arabia.
There are alternative foundations for foreign policy: Marxism and
libertarian- isolationism. They have no mainstream traction. Each has
some valid insights. Marxism errs in its unquestioning belief in the eco-
nomic determinants of policy of all kinds, but it is useful in highlighting
some of the connections between business and foreign policy. Libertarian-
isolationism is single-minded in its focus on terminating foreign commit-
ments, but properly maintains that military interventions have not
generally been in the country’s interest.
In this book I propose an alternative vision of foreign policy, one based
on a tragic understanding of life and politics. It is rooted in an under-
standing that the world is opaque, that we have at best limited ability to
control and manipulate it, and that our efforts to do so often backfire. It
further recognizes that conflict is inevitable because of clashing value sys-
tems and interests, but that too firm a commitment to these values and
interests and unwillingness to compromise and exercise restraint can only
intensify conflict. Tragedy also foregrounds the hubris of powerful actors
and how overreaching and overconfidence in family life, domestic poli-
Preface ix
tics, and the international arena can lead to catastrophe. It teaches us that
great powers are their own worst enemies. They act in ways to enhance
their power but undermine it.
A tragic understanding of life and politics provides an intellectual,
emotional, and psychological framework for thinking about politics. It
offers no insights into the day-to-day formulation of foreign policy. For
this we need some understanding of the national interest, and much of
my book is about how we can think intelligently about our interests. I am
clear at the outset that there is no such thing as the national interest.
There are multiple conceptions of the national interest because it or they
are reflections of our values and the projects to which we are committed.
These are all subjective in nature and often a matter of difference or con-
troversy within society. The national interest is political in nature just as
the struggle among competing formulation of the national interest for
audiences and primacy is a political process.
I use tragedy as a vantage point to critique the dominant understand-
ing of security and the means by which it is secured: emphasis on power
and especially military might, deterrence and compellence, American
control of international institutions, the search for special privileges, and
a reputation for being tough. I show just how questionable these mecha-
nisms are and how they are often counterproductive to American secu-
rity. I then step back and consider the national interest. What matters to
most Americans? What values do they cherish? To what projects do they
give rise or support? How can foreign policy best be made responsive to
them? I describe values widely shared by Americans but certainly claim
no right or authority to identify these values or how they should be real-
ized. I do believe that a careful elaboration of values and how they relate
to interests is a useful exercise and has the potential to stimulate mean-
ingful debate in lieu of the kinds of sound bites and point scoring that
now dominates political discussion.
My book draws on almost 60 years of scholarly research and 5 years of
government service. I was Professor of Strategy at the Naval and National
War Colleges and then the first scholar-in-residence at the Central
Intelligence Agency. Since the 1970s I have published extensively on for-
eign and defense policy and developed conceptual and empirical critiques
of coercive strategies of conflict management. Using case studies I have
x Preface
demonstrated how deterrence often provokes the kinds of challenges it is
intended to prevent.1 The brief opening of Soviet archives in the Gorbachev
era allowed me and coauthor Janice Gross Stein to document in detail from
both sides two critical Cold War crises: the Cuban missile crisis of 1963
and the October Middle East crisis of 1973.2 More recently I developed a
critique of hegemony with coauthor Simon Reich.3 We demonstrate that
the US has never been a hegemon, beyond its limited regional authority in
Central and Latin America, and argue that hegemony is not in anybody’s
interest. We show how authority for security and economic wellbeing is
becoming more diffused through international society and argue that it is
a good thing. Janice Stein and I have explored other strategies of conflict
management and resolution, most notably reassurance and diplomacy. In
2017, I wrote a book that nested this research in a holistic framework for
conflict management and resolution.4 In 2019, coauthor Feng Zhang and
I applied this framework to Sino-American relations to show how further
conflict might be prevented and current ones resolved or finessed.5
This book draws heavily on this earlier work. In some chapters I sum-
marize findings of this research because they are so central to my critique
of American foreign and defense policy. This part of the book rests on a
firm scientific and empirical foundation—in sharp contrast to so many
tomes on these subjects. The next part of the book—on the national
interests, threats we need to take seriously, and intelligent ways of
responding to them—rests on subjective judgments. The exception here
is the threat posed by climate change, which also reflects good science.
Science can inform our choices by telling us what is possible or likely, but
those choices are inevitably based on our values, as they should be. I am
very clear throughout when I am relying on or presenting scientific find-
ings and when you, the reader, are being asked to make subjective judg-
ments based on your values. In this connection I am very much hoping
that we share common values and that you will see the logic of connect-
ing them to the visions of foreign and defense policy that I offer.
London, UK Richard Ned Lebow
Cambridge, UK
NH, USA
Preface xi
Notes
1. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International
Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis,
Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
2. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
3. Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony! Power and
Influence in the Global System (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2014).
4. Richard Ned Lebow, Avoiding War, Making Peace (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017).
5. Feng Zhang and Richard Ned Lebow, Taming Sino-American Rivalry,
forthcoming.