A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972 PDF
Preview A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972
A Cold War Turning Point COLD WAR A TURNING POINT NIXON AND CHINA, 1969–1972 CHRIS TUDDA louisiana state university press baton rouge Published by Louisiana State University Press Copyright © 2012 by Louisiana State University Press All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America LSU Press Paperback Original First printing designer: Michelle A. Neustrom typeface: Chaparral Pro printer andbinder: McNaughton & Gunn, Inc. library of congress cataloging-in-publication data Tudda, Chris, 1965– A Cold War turning point : Nixon and China, 1969–1972 / Chris Tudda. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8071-4289-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-8071-4290-5 (pdf) — ISBN 978-0- 8071-4291-2 (epub) — ISBN 978-0-8071-4292-9 (mobi) 1. United States—Foreign relations—China. 2. China—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—1969–1974. 4. Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913–1994. 5. Cold war—Diplomatic history. I. Title. E183.8.C6T84 2012 973.924—dc23 2011039038 Note: The views presented here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government. The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. (cid:1)(cid:1) Contents preface vii acknowledgments xv list of abbreviations xvii 1 Nixon Pushes Rapprochement 1 2 A New Mood in Beijing 14 3 Tentative Steps and the Warsaw Channel 33 4 The Post-Cambodia Chill and the Pakistani Channel 54 5 Kissinger’s Secret Trip to Beijing 79 6 Reassuring Allies and Pursuing the Moscow Summit 104 7 Chinese at the UN and Kissinger’s Second Visit to Beijing 120 8 Sino-U.S. Rapprochement and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis 144 9 Homestretch to the Beijing Summit 169 10 The Beijing Summit 182 11 Conclusion 202 notes 211 bibliography 257 index 265 Illustrations follow page 78 v Preface I t was late afternoon on November 10, 1971, and for the first time in months, the thirty-seventh president of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, enjoyed a rare day relatively free from the stresses of the presi- dency. Instead of having to cope with the latest international or domestic crisis, he had spent the early afternoon talking to singer Pat Boone and his family about the history of the White House, the Grand Old Opry and coun- try music, and other mundane subjects. Having sat through a series of pro forma meetings about his schedule, about Secretary of State William Rogers’s upcoming trip to Latin America, and with his economic team, Nixon suddenly found himself alone in the Oval Office with his congressional liaison, Clark MacGregor, and Senator Carl T. Curtis (R-Nebraska). After a relaxed discus- sion about college football, Nixon launched into a long soliloquy about the challenges and opportunities the nation faced. Nixon explained the importance of the breakthroughs his administration had engineered in U.S. foreign policy, in particular his pursuit of rapproche- ment with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and détente with the Soviet Union. Calling himself a “pragmatist,” he deliberately downplayed the expec- tations of his forthcoming trips to Beijing and Moscow. The announcements, he said, would likely be more memorable than the trips themselves, because “the real work remains to be done.” From a public relations standpoint, the pictures of Nixon meeting the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on their home turf would automatically make the visits “historic.” But the true test of the summits, he contended, would be “the extent to which they will alleviate ten- sions between the major powers” and “reduce the chance for confrontations in the future.” He had decided to talk directly with his enemies, he explained, not for photo opportunities, but because the Vietnam War had tested America’s will vii viii preface to remain active in international affairs. The United States had reluctantly undertaken “the burdens of world leadership” after the horrors of World War II showed that it could not remain aloof from foreign affairs. Now, the com- bination of engaging in the cold war around the world and the hot war in Indochina had sapped the American people of their willingness to remain involved in international affairs. Overseas involvement, he contended, had become even more important. The Beijing summit could affect not only “the next generation” but “the next century.” China, Nixon contended, was “des- tined to be a super military power if it wants to be because of the capability of the Chinese people.” “No one sitting in this office” could miss this chance to prevent a future confrontation with the PRC. Nevertheless, he assured his guests that he harbored few illusions about the “cosmetics” of summit meetings. Each side recognized that China must emerge from its self-imposed isolation, while the United States must resist the temptation to return to isolation. Indeed, he foresaw a “situation of deadly peril hanging over the world” that the largest communist nation and the largest free nation had a duty to prevent. “We may not like each other” or agree on politics or ideology, but “I do believe there are significant areas where mutual self-interest, the strongest being the interest in survival and avoiding national suicide,” would allow them to “find areas of agreement.” In terms he knew his fellow football fans could understand, he said, “I called the signals myself.” While he conceded that he had received “very good advice,” the summit represented the culmination of a long-term goal he had set since he wrote a major piece in the journal Foreign Affairs in 1967 that called for U.S.-PRC rapprochement. Anyone who accused him of engineering an election gimmick did not understand that major policy changes on both sides did not occur overnight. Indeed, neither country had been ready until now. His long history of meeting with communist leaders such as former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Ceausescu, and Yugo- slavian President Josip Broz Tito had prepared him well to meet the Chinese. In a nutshell, this conversation summarized Nixon’s worldview. A prac- titioner of realpolitik, or realism, which can best be described as the prac- tice of valuing national security interests rather than political ideology, the president pursued a new relationship with the PRC because he truly believed that U.S.-Sino rapprochement would help stabilize the international politi- cal arena. He was not, however, the only one who “called the signals.” His national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, an early skeptic of the value of a preface ix rapprochement with China who had initially only wanted to develop a simi- lar relationship with the Soviet Union, became a strong convert to the idea. Meanwhile, Secretary of State William Rogers and his team of Asian special- ists promoted rapprochement with equal vigor. This study examines the history of U.S.-Chinese rapprochement during Nixon’s first presidential term. Using recently released documentary evidence from U.S. and international archives, including, for the first time in the his- toriography of the rapprochement, extensive use of the White House tapes, I explain how the president and his national security team—unlike his four predecessors—and the PRC government boldly moved along parallel lines to forge a new relationship that fundamentally altered the cold war. The writing of the international history of the cold war has proven to be a boon for the study of U.S. diplomatic history, not only because it has com- pelled historians to seek out other, more fresh, sources, but also because those sources themselves provide a fuller perspective on U.S. decision-making. This is particularly true when one examines the diplomacy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. The tapes are an important, and yet until now, heretofore unused, source for historians who have examined the Nixon-Mao rapprochement. Currently only one historian, Margaret MacMillan, has examined this topic in full, while other scholars have devoted only a few chapters to this time period in their larger studies of U.S.-Chinese relations during the cold war. None of these scholars have used the tapes even though they have been publicly available at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, for a number of years. The tapes are an important source both methodologically and historiographi- cally, for many of the raw tapes that I have transcribed for this book show that Nixon and his advisors engaged in thoughtful, often brilliant discussions about geopolitics and the intentions and capabilities of their allies and adver- saries. Other tapes, however, show the drawbacks of thinking three or four steps down the road or trying to predict the effect of White House decisions on other nations. In some instances, Kissinger in particular incorrectly ana- lyzed the motives of allies and adversaries alike. Most important, the tapes demonstrate that other issues and crises such as the fight to keep Taiwan in the UN, the Indo-Pakistani war, U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the Nixon administration’s policy of détente impacted rapprochement with China.
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