THE MORALITY OF TRANSHUMANISM: ASSESSING HUMAN DIGNITY ARGUMENTS by Andrea Christy Palk Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Arts at Stellenbosch University Supervisor: Prof Anton A van Niekerk (cid:36)(cid:83)(cid:85)(cid:76)(cid:79) 2014 DECLARATION Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety, or in part, submitted it for obtaining any qualification. Date:.................................... Copyright © 2014 Stellenbosch University All rights reserved Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za ABSTRACT The transhumanist movement propounds the view that the evolution of humanity must be extricated from the contingencies of blind natural selection and actively directed by human beings themselves, utilising existing as well as nascent technologies, in order to radically enhance and thus transform individual human capabilities to levels which far surpass current capacities. Transhumanism has elicited vehement critique, however, due to the claim that the transformations it proposes will result in a new posthuman species; and thus, that its aims represent a violation of human dignity. In order to assess this claim it is necessary to firstly investigate the aims and values of the transhumanist movement, as well as the technological means through which it proposes these aims will be fulfilled. This task is the focus of the first half of this thesis. Secondly, the concept of dignity itself must be examined in order to ascertain its status as a means of critiquing transhumanism. The second half of this thesis therefore explicates the notion of dignity by tracing its historical interpretations and uses, as well as the way in which it has been employed to uphold human rights and to adjudicate bioethical dilemmas in the contemporary milieu. This investigation enables the assessment of the two most renowned dignity arguments, namely, the arguments of the bioconservative thinkers Leon Kass and Francis Fukuyama which have been lodged against transhumanism, as well as the counter-argument of the transhumanist Nick Bostrom. In light of this discussion, the conclusion is that the notion of dignity is plagued by irrevocable ambiguity, vagueness and inconsistencies, due to the presence of conflicting interpretations. These findings have implications for the concept’s efficacy to adjudicate the complex ethical conundrums posed, not only by transhumanism, but in the bioethics arena in general. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za ABSTRAK Die transhumanistiese beweging verteenwoordig die standpunt dat die evolusie van die mensdom losgemaak moet word van die toevallighede van blinde, natuurlike seleksie en aktief gerig moet word deur die mens self, deur van bestaande sowel as ontwikkelende tegnologieë gebruik te maak ten einde individuele menslike vermoëns radikaal te verbeter en dus te transformeer tot op vlakke wat huidige vermoëns ver oorskry. Transhumanisme het egter hewige kritiek ontlok weens die aanspraak dat die transformasies wat dit voorstel ‘n nuwe post-menslike spesie tot gevolg sal hê en dus dat die oogmerke daarvan ‘n skending van menswaardigheid verteenwoordig. Ten einde hierdie aanspraak te beoordeel, was dit eerstens nodig om die oogmerke en waardes van die transhumanistiese beweging te ondersoek, sowel as die tegnologiese middele wat voorgestel word as dit waardeur hierdie oogmerke verwesenlik sal word. Hierdie taak is onderneem in die eerste helfte van die tesis. Tweedens is die konsep van waardigheid self krities onder die loep geneem ten einde die status daarvan as ‘n middel om transhumanisme te kritiseer, te beoordeel. Die tweede helfte van hierdie tesis verhelder dus die idee van waardigheid deur die historiese interpretasies en gebruike daarvan na te gaan, sowel as die manier waarop dit aangewend is om menseregte te ondersteun en om dilemmas in die bioetiek in die hedendaagse milieu te bereg. Hierdie ondersoek maak die beoordeling van die drie mees bekende waardigheidsargumente wat teen transhumanisme gebring is, naamlik die argumente van die biokonserwatiewe denkers Leon Kass en Francis Fukuyama, sowel as die teenargument van die transhumanis Nick Bostrom, moontlik. Na aanleiding van hierdie bespreking is die gevolgtrekking van die skrywer dat die idee van menswaardigheid deurspek is met onvermydelike dubbelsinnigheid, vaagheid en teenstrydighede as gevolg van teenstrydige interpretasies. Hierdie bevindinge het implikasies vir die doeltreffendheid van die konsep om die komplekse etiese probleme wat gestel word, nie net deur transhumanisme nie, maar deur die bioetiek arena oor die algemeen, te beoordeel. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude and thanks to my supervisor and mentor, Professor Anton van Niekerk. His assistance and support, not only with this thesis, but with my studies in general, have been unwavering. I would also like to thank my parents and my partner for their steadfast love, patience and faith in my abilities. In addition, I am extremely grateful to the Harry Crossley Foundation for the generous bursary, awarded to me in 2012, which enabled me to study further. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za CONTENTS 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Overview 1 1.2 Research Aims 5 1.3 Thesis Structure 5 2 What is Transhumanism? 9 2.1 Introduction 9 2.2 Important Contextual Factors 10 2.2.1 Historical Context 10 i) Enlightenment Influence 10 ii) Early Twentieth Century Influences 13 iii) Later Twentieth Century Influences 14 iv) Key Players in Transhumanism 15 2.2.2 The Context of Enhancement in General 18 i) The Treatment/Enhancement Distinction 18 ii) Normal Species Functioning 19 iii) Problems with the Treatment/Enhancement Distinction 21 iv) Defining Enhancement 24 2.2.3 Situating Transhumanism in the Enhancement Debate 26 2.3 What is Transhumanism? 28 2.3.1 Initial Problems 28 2.3.2 Defining Transhumanism 29 2.4 Transhumanist Aims 31 2.4.1 The Improvement of the Human Condition 31 i) Healthspan 31 ii) Cognition 33 iii) Emotion 34 2.5 Transhumanist Values 36 2.5.1 Rationality 36 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za 2.5.2 Autonomy 37 2.6 Conclusion 37 3 The Genetic, Nano and Robotic Technologies of Transhumanism 40 3.1 Introduction 40 3.2 The Law of Accelerating Returns 42 3.2.1 Moore’s Law 43 3.2.2 Kurzweil’s Law of Acceleration 45 3.2.3 The Singularity 48 3.2.4 Superintelligence 50 3.3 Genetic, Nano and Robotic (GNR) Technologies 52 3.3.1 Genetic Technologies 52 i) Defining Terms 52 ii) Genetic Intervention 53 iii) The Human Genome Project (HGP) 54 iv) Stem Cell Research 56 v) Cloning 56 3.3.2 Nanotechnology 58 i) Background 58 ii) What is Nanotechnology? 60 iii) Nanobiotechnology 61 iv) Nanobiotechnology and Enhancement 63 v) Virtual Reality 64 vi) Nanobots and Biological Upgrading 66 3.3.3 Robotics/Artificial Intelligence (AI) 68 i) What is Artificial Intelligence (AI)? 69 ii) Current Developments in AI 70 iii) Uploading 72 3.4 Conclusion 75 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za 4 Human Dignity 77 4.1 Introduction 77 4.2 Historical Uses of the Concept of Dignity 79 4.2.1 Ancient Interpretations 80 4.2.2 Judeo-Christian Interpretations 82 4.2.3 Dignity in the Renaissance 84 4.2.4 Kantian Dignity 86 4.2.5 Dignity in the Long Nineteenth Century 89 4.2.6 Dignity in the Twentieth Century 91 i) Dignity in Post-World War Two Human Rights Instruments 92 ii) Dignity in Twentieth Century National Constitutions 93 4.3 Bioethics and Human Dignity 95 4.3.1 Dignity in Bioethics Instruments 95 4.3.2 The Utilisation of Notions of Dignity in Bioethics Instruments 97 4.3.3 The President’s Council for Bioethics 100 4.3.4 The Different Positions in Bioethics Regarding Dignity 101 i) Dignity Cannot be Defined and is Therefore Meaningless 101 ii) Dignity is Equivalent to Autonomy or Other Human Rights 104 iii) Dignity is the Foundation of Human Worth and Thus of Human Rights 105 4.4 Defining Dignity: Congruencies and Conflicts in Interpretations 107 4.4.1 Dignity as a Status (Human Dignity) vs Dignity as a Quality (Dignity) 109 4.4.2 Dignity as Inviolable vs Dignity as Violable 113 4.4.3 Dignity as Empowerment vs Dignity as Constraint 115 4.4.4 Collective Human Dignity vs Individual Human Dignity 118 4.5 Conclusion 120 5 Dignity Arguments For and Against Transhumanism 122 5.1 Introduction 122 5.2 Kass - Transhumanism as Dehumanisation: Human Dignity and Human Essence 124 5.2.1 Basic Position 124 5.2.2 Science and Technology 128 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za 5.2.3 How may Human Dignity be Violated? 130 5.2.4 Human Dignity and the Sanctity of Human Life 134 5.2.5 Two Interpretations of Dignity 136 5.2.6 Dignity, Life Extension and Immortality 141 5.2.7 Concluding Remarks 146 5.3 Fukuyama – Human Dignity and Human Nature 148 5.3.1 Basic Position 148 5.3.2 Human Nature as Species Typical Behaviour 150 5.3.3 Human Rights as Sourced in Human Nature 153 5.3.4 Human Dignity and Factor X 156 5.3.5 The Implications for Human Dignity of Altering Factor X 160 5.3.6 Concluding Remarks 163 5.4 Bostrom: Posthuman Dignity 164 5.4.1 Basic Position 164 5.4.2 The Question of Dignity 166 5.4.3 Concluding Remarks 169 5.5 Conclusion 170 6 Concluding Remarks 173 6.1 Implications for the Use of Dignity Arguments in Bioethics 173 6.2 The Morality of Transhumanism 177 7 Appendix – Brave New World: Contextual Information 179 8 Bibliography 180 Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za “The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity” (Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1997). “All other things have a limited and fixed nature prescribed and bounded by our laws. You, with no limit or no bound, may choose for yourself the limits and bounds of your nature. We have placed you at the world's centre so that you may survey everything else in the world. We have made you neither of heavenly nor of earthly stuff, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with free choice and dignity, you may fashion yourself into whatever form you choose” (Pico della Mirandola, 1486 in Brians et al., 1999).
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