31 January 2017 Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA REPORT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY

49 Pages·2017·0.72 MB·English

by  Neema Nicholaus Chusi

AFRICAN UNION UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia P. O. Box 3243 Telephone: [phone] Fax: [phone]
Website: www.au.int

ASSEMBLY OF THE UNION
Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session
30 - 31 January 2017
Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA

Assembly/AU/6(XXVIII)Rev.1
Original: English/French

REPORT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
ON ITS ACTIVITIES AND THE STATE OF PEACE
AND SECURITY IN AFRICA
Assembly/AU/6(XXVIII)Rev.1
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REPORT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL ON ITS ACTIVITIES AND
THE STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present Report of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union
(AU) on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa is submitted to the
Assembly of the AU pursuant to Article 7(q) of its Protocol. The Report covers the period
from the 27th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU, held from 17 to 18 July 2016,
in Kigali, Rwanda, to the 28th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union to take
place from 30 to 31 January 2017. The report covers the activities carried out by the
PSC during the period under review and state of peace and security on the continent
with respect to conflict and crisis situations, as well as an overview of the status of the
implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Furthermore, the
African Union Master Roadmap on Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year
2020 is attached to this report. The Roadmap was developed by the PSC in an effort to
trigger a systematic and monitored implementation of the 50th Anniversary Solemn
Declaration adopted on 26 May 2013, in particular on Silencing the Guns in Africa by
2020, among others.

2. At this outset, it should be noted that the PSC comprises fifteen (15) members
with equal rights, in line with Article 5 (1) of its Protocol. The current membership of the
PSC includes Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Congo*, Egypt*, Kenya*, Niger,
Nigeria*, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, Uganda and Zambia*1. In
conformity with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure of the PSC, the PSC members have
rotated the chair of the PSC on monthly basis following the English alphabetical order of
their names. During the period under review, Congo, Egypt, Kenya, Niger, and Sierra
Leone chaired the PSC.

II. ACTIVITIES OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN
UNION

a) Monthly activities of the PSC

3. During the reporting period, the PSC remained seized with the conflict and crisis
situations in the continent, as well as thematic issues related to the promotion of peace,
security and stability in Africa. In this context, the PSC held various meetings on
conflict/crisis situations, such as those in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali/Sahel,
Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. The PSC also held meetings on thematic issues
such as terrorism and violent extremism, early warning and conflict prevention, post-
conflict reconstruction and development, silencing the guns by 2020, Peace Fund,
cybersecurity in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa, AU-UN

1 * Denotes PSC Members with a three-year term mandate
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Partnership, refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), elections in Africa, as
well as women and children in conflict situations in Africa.

4. The PSC also held consultative meetings with similar organs and/or bodies, in
accordance with Article 17 of its Protocol. On 24 October 2016, the PSC held its 2nd joint
retreat, followed by its 9th annual joint consultative meeting with the European Union
(EU) Political and Security Committee (PSC) on 25 October 2016, in Brussels, Belgium.
The PSC also held consultative meetings, with the United Nations Peacebuilding
Commission (UNPBC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), on 18
and 19 October 2016, respectively.

5. The PSC also held its 626th meeting at the level of Heads of State and
Government, on 19 September 2016, in which the situation in South Sudan was
discussed. From 28 to 31 October 2016, the PSC undertook a field visit to South Sudan,
to gather first-hand information on the situation in that country in order to scale up its
contribution to the efforts to resolve the crisis in the country.

6. The PSC, held a Retreat on Practical Steps to Silence the Guns by 2020, from 7
to 9 November 2016, in Lusaka, Zambia. As already indicated, the Retreat developed
the African Union Master Roadmap on Silencing the Guns by 2020. The Master
Roadmap is a guideline for Africa as an implementation mechanism of the 50th
Anniversary Solemn Declaration, in particular on Silencing the Guns by 2020. In this
regard, the Assembly may wish to endorse the Roadmap as a guideline for Africa’s
efforts of silencing the guns by year 2020.

7. As per the practice of the PSC, chairpersons of the PSC of different months have
represented the PSC on different activities of the AU, especially in meetings dealing with
peace and security issues in Africa. The PSC Chairperson for October 2016 represented
the PSC at the 4th Parliament of the Pan-African Parliament, held in Sham El Sheikh,
Egypt on 12 October 2016, which addressed peace and security challenges in Africa.
Furthermore, the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of December 2016,
accompanied by five representatives of the five regions of the AU, represented the PSC
at the 4th High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, from 17 to 19 December
2016 in Oran, Algeria, on assisting the three African Members in carrying out their role in
the UN Security Council.

b) State of Peace and Security in Africa: Conflict and Crisis Situations

i. The Gambia

8. During the period under review, The Gambia held presidential elections on 1
December 2016. On 2 December 2016, following the results as officially announced by
the National Electoral Commission, the then sitting President, Yahya Jammeh,
conceded defeat and congratulated the winner, Adama Barrow, the opposition coalition
candidate. On 9 December 2016, President Jammeh changed his mind and rejected the
final results of the election as had been announced by the National Electoral
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Commission, on grounds of lack of transparency and international interference in the
country’s affairs.

9. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as well as the AU
and the larger international community, condemned the rejection of the election outcome
by President Jammeh on 9 December 2016 and strongly underlined the imperative need
to respect the will of the Gambian people, as expressed on 1 December 2016, and
called upon President Jammeh to ensure a peaceful and smooth transfer of power to the
President-Elect, Adama Barrow. On 10 December 2016, the ECOWAS High-Level
delegation of Heads of States, led by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia, visited
Banjul and met with President Jammeh and the President-Elect, Barrow, as well as
other relevant stakeholders with a view to ensuring a smooth transfer of power to the
President-Elect. On 17 December 2016, the ECOWAS Authority Summit decided to use
all the necessary means to ensure the respect of the will of the people of The Gambia.
On 13 January 2017, an ECOWAS High-Level delegation, including the representative
of the AU, undertook a second visit to Banjul to further engage President Yahya
Jammeh on the imperative of the peaceful and smooth transfer of power, on 19 January
2017, as provided for in the Gambian Constitution. The Delegation did not get any
commitment from the outgoing President to hand over power on 19 January 2017.

10. On its part, the PSC met on 6 and 12 December 2016 and on 13 and 20 January
2017, to consider the post-election situation in The Gambia. At its meeting of 6
December 2016, the PSC congratulated President Jammeh for having conceded defeat
and congratulated the winner, Adama Barrow. On 12 December 2016, at its 644th
meeting, the PSC strongly rejected the rejection of 9 December 2016 by President
Jammeh and called upon the Government of The Gambia and all stakeholders to work
together towards the peaceful and smooth transfer of power to the President-Elect.

11. In all its meetings, the PSC underlined the inviolable nature of the outcome of the
presidential election of 1 December 2016 and insisted on the peaceful hand over of
power to the winner of the 1 December 2016 presidential election, Adama Barrow.
Furthermore, the PSC expressed its full support to the ECOWAS efforts to resolve the
post-election crisis in The Gambia.

12. On 19 January 2017, Adama Barrow, was sworn in as the President of The
Gambia at the Gambian Embassy in Dakar, Senegal. On 20 January 2017, the PSC
met, again, and recognised H.E. Adama Barrow as the President of The Gambia. It is
also to be recalled that the UN Security Council, in its resolution 2337 adopted on 19
January 2017, recognized Adama Barrow as the President of The Gambia.

13. Between 19 and 20 January 2017, a number of initiatives have been taken by
ECOWAS members and other African countries, to persuade Jammeh to peaceful hand
over power to Adama Barrow. Finally, on 20 January 2017, following the visit of
Presidents Mohamed Abdel Aziz of Mauritania and Alpha Konde of Guinea, former
President Jammeh official announced that he was stepping down. The next day, 21
January 2017, Jammeh left The Gambia.
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14. The Assembly may wish to congratulate and welcome the President of The
Gambia, H.E. Adama Barrow. The Assembly may also wish to congratulate ECOWAS
for its efforts towards finding a peaceful solution in The Gambia, that respect the will of
the people of the country and preserves AU and ECOWAS instruments on democracy,
elections and governance. The Assembly may wish to express its gratitude to
Presidents Mohamed Abdel Aziz of Mauritania and Alpha Konde of Guinea for their
decisive role in convincing former President Jammeh to hand over power. The Assembly
may wish to call upon all AU Member States, as well as the international community at
large, to extend support to The Gambia, with a view to assist the new authority in their
efforts towards consolidating peace, security and stability, as well as healing and
reconciliation process, that will lead the country to rebuild its economy.

ii. South Sudan

15. During the period under review, South Sudan has remained a major continental
concern. The implementation process of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict
in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCRSS) of August 2015 continues to face challenges,
especially following the departure of former First-Vice President, Dr. Reik Machar,
Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM-IO) in July 2016.
The appointment of his replacement General Taban Deng Gia, has raised some
political, as well as technical questions, relating to the implementation of the ARCRSS. It
should be noted that the SPLM-IO has held meetings to reorganize itself politically and
militarily, following the defections of some of its leaders. The events of 8 July 2016, with
the outbreak of fighting in Juba, has opened the risk of the spreading of clashes to the
Equatoria region and other parts of the country. Consequently, the security situation
continues to be tense and unpredictable. A marked impact of this situation is the
deterioration of humanitarian conditions, including increase in the number of IDPs and
refugees, as well as hunger. Following several consultations between the UN and the
South Sudanese, in September 2016 the Transitional Government of National Unity
(TGoNU), accepted the deployment of the Regional Protection Force (RPF) to protect
civilians, in line with the decision taken by IGAD and supported by both the PSC and UN
Security Council. However, in January 2017, the South Sudan Minister of Defence, Kuol
Manyang Juuk, announced that it was no longer necessary to deploy the RPF, as the
situation on the ground had improved.

16. As part of the sustained AU efforts to find a solution, the Commissioner for Peace
and Security, Ambassador Smaïl Chergui, and subsequently, the PSC, visited South
Sudan in October 2016, to undertake consultations with the TGoNU and other key South
Sudanese stakeholders on the challenges facing the country. The AU High
Representative for South Sudan, former President Alpha Konare, also followed up,
undertaking consultations in South Sudan and some regional countries, in November
2016. The IGAD Summit of December 2016 underlined the necessity of sustained
engagements in South Sudan to find a solution. Reports of growing ethnic tensions and
their possible consequences, as discussed during the IGAD Summit, remain a major
concern. Meanwhile, the AU Commission is working to implement the PSC holistic
approach consisting of healing, reconciliation and accountability. The AU High
Representative for South Sudan, President Konare, will lead the delegation comprising
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Peace and Security Department, Department of Political Affairs and Legal Counsel to
this effect. In December 2016, President Salva Kiir Mayardit, announced the launch of a
National Dialogue, while asking for forgiveness for the wrongs committed in the past.
Furthermore, the President stated that the National Dialogue was going to be
implemented within the context of the ARCRSS. Meanwhile, the Joint Evaluation and
Monitoring Commission (JMEC) continues to convene the South Sudan parties, as well
as the international community, to assist in the implementation of the ARCRSS.

17. The Assembly may wish to call upon the South Sudanese stakeholders to re-
affirm their commitment to the full implementation of the Agreement of August 2015, and
call upon all stakeholders to contribute towards healing and reconciliation efforts in
South Sudan, especially given the rise of ethnic tensions. The Assembly may urge the
need to ensure that the National Dialogue is an all-inclusive process that helps with the
reconciliation and healing of the nation. The Assembly may further call on all AU
Member States to continue to support the efforts of the AU High Representative, former
President Konare, as well as those of the JMEC, led by former President Festus Mogae,
to sustain political dialogue in order to de-escalate tensions in South Sudan. The
Assembly may urge the TGoNU, working with the UN, to accelerate the process of
deploying the RPF, due to the fact that the security situation in South Sudan remains
unpredictable, hence putting the safety of civilians at risk. The Assembly may also wish
to urgently call for sustained political and financial support for the JMEC, in order to
facilitate the implementation of the ARCRSS.

iii. Somalia

18. During period under review, Somalia has continued to make significant progress
in the process of building its federal system and in implementing its electoral processes,
in line with the 2020 Somali Political Roadmap. Despite the repeated postponements
due to the then pending issues and threats by Al-Shaabab, the electoral process, which
started in October 2016, has achieved remarkable milestones, particularly the
establishment of the Bicameral Assembly, which is expected to elect a new President in
January 2017. The overall security situation remains relatively calm, despite recurrent Al
Shabaab asymmetric attacks. The African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces,
together with the Somali National Security Forces, continue to recover, pacify and
consolidate large swathes of territory previously controlled by Al Shabaab. Furthermore,
the humanitarian situation in the country has remained extremely challenging due to
prolonged drought, fresh displacements of the population and arrival of returnees. It is
worth noting that, the progress made by Somalia is threatened, among others, by limited
national and grass-roots reconciliation efforts and intermittent inter-and intra-
clan/regional administration conflicts.

19. In spite of its major achievements in Somalia, AMISOM has and continues to face
limitations in carrying out major offensive operations to flush out Al Shabaab militants
from their main bases and strongholds, especially in the Juba River Valley and the North
Eastern Coastline of Somalia, in order to extend the authority of the Federal
Government of Somalia (FGS). The limitations are linked to three factors. First, is the
lack of adequate force strength required to simultaneously hold the areas already
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captured and the force to launch the offensive. Additionally, there is a persistent
defection by some members of the Somali National Army (SNA). In this regard, the PSC
at its 648th meeting held on 16 January 2017, decided to request the United Nations
Security Council to authorize an AMISOM Troop total of 4,500 for a non-renewable
period of six (6) months. Secondly, is the lack of the requisite force multipliers and
enablers, as to date, only three helicopters, out of those pledged by Kenya, Ethiopia and
Uganda, have been acquired from the Government of Kenya, and lastly, is the lack of
requisite logistics support for the forces earmarked for the operations. An additional
major problem for AMISOM is the sanctions that were imposed by the EU on the
Government of Burundi, which has blocked the established process of effecting payment
of troop allowances to the Burundian troop in AMISOM.The Commissioner for Peace
and Security, Amb. Smaïl Chergui, during his visit to Bujumbura on 18-19 January 2017,
has successfully negotiated a solution, which respects the sovereignty of Burundi and
allows for the payment of its troops in AMISOM without any discrimination. Hence, the
Government of Burundi has signed the MoU and declared that it will no longer withdraw
its troops from AMISOM.

20. AMISOM also faces a challenge regarding the payment of troops following the
reduction of 20% of the EU contribution to AMISOM on allowances. This development
eroded the morale of the AMISOM troops. In order to rectify this anomaly, the PSC has
repeatedly requested the UN Security Council for the use of UN assessed contributions
in support of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs), particularly the AMISOM.

21. The Assembly may wish to call upon all AU Member States and the international
community to continue to provide political, financial and logistical support to Somalia and
AMISOM, given that the country has reached the critical period marked by the electoral
process, the imperative of full stabilization of the country and the challenge of sustained
socio-economic delivery to satisfy the needs of the population. The Assembly may wish
to call for continued mobilization of international support to address the humanitarian
situation in the country. The Assembly may also wish to appeal to the UN Security
Council for the use of UN assessed contributions in support of the AU-led PSOs, in
particular the AMISOM.

iv. Democratic Republic of Congo

22. The political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), during the
period under review, was marked by deep political divisions over the issue related to the
date of the presidential and legislative elections. The demonstrations organized on 19
and 20 September 2016 by the political opposition, regrouped as the "Rassemblement",
led by Mr. Etienne Tshisekedi, degenerated into violent confrontations, leading to many
deaths and dozens injured, particularly in Kinshasa. The National Independent Electoral
Commission (CENI), which had informed of difficulties that it was facing in its efforts to
organize the elections within the constitutional deadlines, was finally authorized by the
ruling of the Constitutional Court, on 17 October 2016, to postpone the elections. It was
in this context that the stakeholders in the Inclusive National Political Dialogue, with the
facilitation of Mr. Edem Kodjo, on behalf of the AU, and in presence of the
Commissioner for Peace and Security, Amb. Smaïl Chergui, signed on 18 October
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2016, in Kinshasa, a ’Political Agreement for the Organization of Peaceful, Credible and
Free and Fair Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly the
presidential elections, by the end of April 2018’. The Agreement provides for a two-year
transition and the reorganization of the Government to be led by a Prime Minister from
the opposition. The other Congolese political and social actors, which refused to
participate in the Dialogue and formed a new political platform, "Le Rassemblement",
rejected the 18 October 2016 Agreement and decided to continue with their peaceful
demonstrations.

23. Eager to maintain dialogue in the country, President Joseph Kabila requested the
Congolese National Episcopal Conference (CENCO-Catholic Church) to continue
consultation with the members of the “Rassemblement”. The negotiations conducted by
the CENCO, led to an Agreement on 31 December 2016, which provides for, among
others, a Prime Minister from the Rassemblement, establishment of a National
Transition Follow-up Committee, organization of the presidential, national, local and
legislative elections by December 2017 at the latest; ending prosecutions and the
release of political prisoners. It should be noted that, the electoral process still face
financial and logistical challenges which need to be addressed during the transition
period, to allow the smooth organization of the elections.

24. Indeed, the current political tensions related to election issues seem to have
defused down. However, insecurity continues to prevail in the provinces of the eastern
part of the DRC, particularly in the Beni region, where several armed groups operate
and massacres are frequently committed against civilians. The Congolese Armed
Forces, supported by MONUSCO forces, continue their military operations to neutralize
the combatants of the various armed groups.

25. The Assembly may wish to welcome the Agreements signed on 18 October 2016,
as well as the Agreement signed later on 31 December 2016. In this context, the
Assembly may wish to encourage the various Congolese political and social actors to
work towards their effective implementation of the Agreements. The Assembly may also
wish to commend the role played by President Sassou N’Guesso, of the Republic of
Congo, in facilitation of the peace talks among the Congolese stakeholders. The
Assembly may further appeal to the stakeholders and Guarantors of the Peace, Security
and Cooperation Framework for DRC and the Region signed on 24 February 2013, in
Addis Ababa, to take the necessary measures and redouble their efforts to ensure the
effective implementation of all aspects of the Framework Agreement and more
specifically to neutralize the combatants of armed groups operating in Eastern DRC.
The Assembly may wish to appeal to the AU Member States and the international
community at large, to continue providing financial and logistic support to the
Government of the DRC, for the smooth organization of elections in the country.

v. Libya

26. During the period under review, the security and humanitarian situation in Libya
continued to deteriorate, while at the same time, the political divisions between the
Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the House of
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Representatives (HoR) have escalated. The efforts of the AU and the larger international
community have focused on trying to bring the members of the two institutions to agree
on full implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement of December 2015. Such
implementation should include the submission by the Presidency Council of an inclusive
new list of cabinet members, and for the HoR to endorse such a list, once it is submitted.
The security situation in the country remains of grave concern, as independent militias
under different commands, continue to challenge the legitimacy of the GNA and its Joint
Forces. The prevailing insecurity impacts on the humanitarian and the overall socio-
economic situation in the country. The AU High Representative for Libya, former
President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, has continued his consultations with the relevant
Libyan and international stakeholders on how to get a breakthrough in this crisis. On
their part, the neighbouring countries of Libya have also intensified their efforts to assist
in the stabilization of the situation in the country, and have convened their ninth and
tenth ministerial meetings, in Niamey, Niger, and Cairo, Egypt, on 19 October 2016 and
21 January 2017, respectively. This is a mechanism established by the neighbouring
countries to follow up on developments in Libya. The AU High Level Committee on
Libya, with the participation of the neighbouring countries, also convened in Addis
Ababa, at the level of Heads of State and Government, on 8 November 2016. This
meeting recommended to the forthcoming Summit of the AU, to include the
neighbouring countries of Libya as full members of the Committee. Subsequently, the
Chair of the AU High Level Committee on Libya, President Sassou N’Guesso of Congo,
convened a follow-up meeting, in Brazzaville, on 27 January 2017. Both meetings of the
AU High Level Committee considered the evolving situation in Libya and related
international efforts, as well as developing an AU Roadmap for the resolution of the
conflict in Libya.

27. In this regard, the Assembly may wish to reiterate the need for the convening of a
meeting of Libyan stakeholders to address the issue of national reconciliation, in
accordance with the Kigali Assembly decision of 2016, and request the Commission to
finalise necessary modalities for the organisation of this meeting. The Assembly may
wish to endorse the decision of the AU High Level Committee and decide to expand the
Committee by including in its membership the neighbouring countries of Libya.

vi. Mali/Sahel

28. During the period under review, the situation in Mali, and the Sahel in general
continued to mobilize the efforts of the Malian stakeholders and the Commission. In
Mali, the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali
continued despite the many challenges faced in the process. The Government has
taken a number of measures, particularly with regard to the establishment of the interim
authorities in the territorial communities of the northern part of the country. Local
elections were organized on 20 November 2016, wherever the security conditions
permitted. At the same time, it should be noted that, at the time of finalizing this report,
preparations were still underway for the establishment of interim authorities in the
northern regions of the country. However, this political process faces many challenges in
some areas in the North. The divergences and the logic of disparities of the Movements
still play a major obstacle for the political process.
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29. Regarding the security, the period under consideration was marked by the
continuation of complex terrorist attacks targeting civilians, Malian Armed Forces, troops
and convoys of MINUSMA and the French force Barkhane. Furthermore, concern was
also expressed about the continuing trend of the expansion of terrorist violence towards
the central regions of Mali. The second half of the year was also marked by the efforts
made by MINUSMA to implement its new mandate as contained in resolution 2295
(2016), adopted by the United Nations Security Council, on 29 June 2016. This
Resolution gives the Mission a more robust posture in the face of the asymmetric threats
and increases of strength in its uniformed personnel. As for the security and defence
aspects of the Agreement, there has been notable progress, albeit still insufficient, in the
establishment of the DDR programme and the Joint Operational Mechanism (JOM), with
the establishment of the first mixed unit for Joint Patrols in Gao. On 18 January 2017, in
a military camp in Gao, Mali experienced the deadliest terrorist attack on its soil. More
than 80 lives of Malian soldiers and combatants from the Signatory Movements of the
Agreement were lost. It is worth noting that, in the face of the terrorist threats in Mali and
the Sahel, the AU continued its efforts to mobilize the regional efforts, within the
framework of the Nouakchott Process. Thus, from 22 July to 3 August 2016, a Technical
Assessment Mission (TAM) visited Mali, as part of the implementation of the decisions of
the Nouakchott Process Summit of 18 December 2014, as well as the Conclusions of
the First meeting of the Ministers of Defence, held in Bamako, on 4 September 2015.
The aim was to identify ways and means of enhancing security cooperation in the fight
against terrorism and transnational crime, including through the establishment of an
Intervention Force to support MINUSMA in its stabilization efforts. At the time of
finalizing this report, the Commission was undertaking consultations with Nouakchott
Process countries to convene a ministerial meeting that will consider the report of the
TAM, as well as the required documents with regard to the establishment of the
Intervention Force.

30. The Assembly may wish to reiterate its support for the full implementation of the
Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and urge the Malian parties to redouble
their efforts to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement. The Assembly reaffirms
its condemnation of the terrorist attack in Gao, Mali, on 18 January 2017, against a
Camp hosting members of the Malian Armed Forces and armed movements, signatories
of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, issuing from the Algiers Process,
which caused dozens of deaths and injuries among those elements grouped in order to
carry out Joint Patrols within the framework of the Joint Operational Mechanism
provided for in the Agreement. The Assembly may also wish to reaffirm the importance
of the Nouakchott Process within the framework of the AU Sahel Strategy and
encourage the countries of the Process, with the support of the Commission, to ensure
the regular execution of its activities, including the expeditious convening of the
ministerial meeting to consider the findings of the Assessment Mission to Northern Mali.

vii. Sudan/Darfur
31. During the period under review, Sudan held a National Dialogue, which
commenced in October 2015 and concluded on 10 October 2016, in Khartoum, with the
signing of a “National Document”, which drew elements from the reports of the six