1 Advances in Political Economy - Department of Political Science

414 Pages·2013·7.24 MB·English

Norman Schofi eld · Gonzalo Caballero · Daniel Kselman Editors KS
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Advances in Political Economy eh
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Institutions, Modelling and Empirical Analysis aie
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Th is book presents latest research in the fi eld of Political Economy, dealing with the sa
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integration of economics and politics and the way institutions aff ect social decisions. a Norman Schofi eld
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Th e focus is on innovative topics such as an institutional analysis based on case studies; le
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the infl uence of activists on political decisions; new techniques for analyzing elections, o
Gonzalo Caballero
involving game theory and empirical methods.
Daniel Kselman Editors
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Advances in
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Empirical Analysis
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Social Sciences / Political Science
ISBN 978-3-642-35238-6
9 783642 352386
Advances in Political Economy
PDF-OUTPUT
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Norman Schofield (cid:2) Gonzalo Caballero (cid:2)
Daniel Kselman
Editors
Advances in
Political Economy
Institutions, Modelling and
Empirical Analysis
Book ID: , Date: 2013-02-21, Proof No: 2, UNCORRECTED PROOF
Editors
Prof.NormanSchofield DanielKselman,PhD.
CenterinPoliticalEconomy CentrodeEstudiosAvanzados
WashingtonUniversityinSt.Louis enCienciasSociales
SaintLouis,MO,USA JuanMarchInstitute
Madrid,Spain
Assoc.Prof.GonzaloCaballero
FacultyofEconomics
UniversityofVigo
Vigo,Spain
ISBN978-3-642-35238-6 ISBN978-3-642-35239-3(eBook)
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35239-3
SpringerHeidelbergNewYorkDordrechtLondon
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Introduction
PoliticalEconomyisbothagrowingfieldandamovingtarget.Theconcept‘politi-
caleconomy’remainssomethingofanopensignifier,alternativelyusedtodescribe
amethodologicalapproachinpoliticalanalysis,groundedintheapplicationoffor-
mal and quantitative methods to the study of politics; or one of any number sub-
stantiveareasinthecontemporarysocialsciences.Ineconomics,newinstitutional
economics(Williamson1985,North1990)hasestablishedthefundamentalimpor-
tance of history- and polity-specific governance structures in sustaining economic
markets.Comparativeresearchhasinvestigatedtheeffectofdemocraticinstitutions
and processes on economic policy and outcomes, research given perhaps its most
comprehensivestatementinPerssonandTabellini(2000)andDrazen(2001),which
haveconstitutedtheso-called“macroeconomicsside”ofpoliticaleconomy(Merlo
2006). Development economists increasingly recognize that, absent sound gover-
nanceinstitutions,standardmacroeconomicprescriptionsforeconomicgrowthand
stabilityoftenfailtobearfruit(Rodrik2007).Economistshavealsorecentlyjoined
political scientists in examining the role of economic factors in explaining demo-
cratic transitions and the evolution of political regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson
2000,2006).DewanandShepsle(2008)haveemphasizedthatinrecentyearssome
of the best theoretical work on the political economy of political institutions and
processes has begun surfacing in the political science mainstream, and they con-
sider that this is a result of economists coming more firmly to the conclusion that
modelinggovernmentsandpoliticiansiscentraltotheirownenterprise.
Moving to political science, work on the modernization hypothesis, motivated
by the consistently high cross-national correlation between democratic consolida-
tion and economic development, has also recognized the role of economic factors
in determining the evolution of political regimes (Moore 1965; Przeworski et al.
2000).Furthermore,comparativepoliticalscienceinmanywaysbeateconomicsto
thepunchinrecognizingtherolethatpoliticalinstitutionsplayindeterminingthe
economic trajectories of developing and still industrializing economies (Haggard
and Kaufmann 1990). Economic class structures, and their embodiment in labor
unionsandprofessionalorganizations,haveoccupiedanimportantplaceincompar-
ativepoliticsresearchontheeconomicinstitutionsofadvancedindustrialsocieties
v
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vi Introduction
(HallandSoskice2001).Studiesofvoterbehaviorhaveidentifiedboththerolethat
conjuntural economic factors play in informing voter choice and the relationship
betweenvoters’professionalcontextandtheirpreferencesforredistribution.Asal-
readymentioned,thelabelpolitical-economyalsorefersmorelooselytotheappli-
cation of formal and game theoretic methods first developed by economists to the
studyofpoliticalphenomena,includinglegislativebargaining(Shepsle1979;Kre-
hbiel1998),governmentcoalitionformation(LaverandSchofield1990;Laverand
Shepsle 1996), and campaign position-taking (Cox 1987, 1990; Schofield 2006).
Inthissense,theeffectofeconomicshasbeenfeltmorestronglyincontemporary
politicalsciencethananyothersocialscience(Miller1997).
As evidenced by this brief, and necessarily incomplete, literature review, polit-
ical economy is a concept with fairly flexible boundaries, encompassing research
fromawidevarietyoffieldsandapproaches.Forexample,WeingastandWittman
(2008) viewed political economy as the methodology of economics applied to the
analysisofpoliticalbehaviorandinstitutions,buttheyassumedthatitisnotasin-
gle approach because it consists of a family of approaches. Previously, two views
hadbeendistinguishedinthenewpoliticaleconomy,andbothhavecontributedto
the advance of the understanding of modern political economy: on the one hand,
Hamiltonianpoliticaleconomyhasbeeninterestedineconomicpatternsandperfor-
mance, but it considers that political institutions and political choices are relevant
explaining factors; on the other hand, Madisonian political economy has assumed
that the economic approach is central in political analysis, quite apart from eco-
nomiccontent(Shepsle1999).Ratherthananexplicit“field”or“discipline”inand
of itself, the notion of political economy represents rather a growing awareness in
both political science and economics that their respective contributions to our un-
derstanding of society are intelligible only in mutual conversation. It is one thing
for scholars in both disciplines to recognize the interdependence of their subject
matters;itisanothertocreateprofessionalforainwhichpractitionersofthesetwo
disciplinescometogether.Thecurrentvolumeresultsfromthelatestinaseriesof
conferences designed to engender a closer collaboration between economists and
politicalscientists.Itscontributionsrepresentabroadspectrumofresearch,andits
contributorsadiversegroupofscholarsfromdiverseacademictraditionsinpolitical
economy.Nonetheless,asagroupweshareacommitmenttomutuallybeneficialin-
terdisciplinarycollaboration,suchithasbeenshowninpreviousefforts(Schofield
andCaballero2011).
TheseconferencestookplaceinAprilandMayof2012.Thefirstwasheldatthe
JuanMarchInstituteinMadrid,Spain,andwasentitledContemporaryApplications
oftheSpatialModel.EversinceDowns’seminalwork(1957),thespatialmodelhas
been a workhorse in formal political theory. While its core content addresses how
parties choose the relative extremism or moderation of campaign positions, its re-
sultshavealsobeenusedinstudiesofeconomicpolicyandredistribution(Meltzer
and Richard 1978; Persson and Tabellini 2000). The Madrid conference brought
together a group of leading scholars working on contemporary applications of the
spatialparadigm,includingtheoreticalcontributionsonspatialconsequencesofpri-
mary elections and the spatial consequences of vote buying; and empirical contri-
butions on the measurement of parties actual policy positions, the extent to which
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Introduction vii
voters accurately perceive such positions, and how these perceptions are moulded
byvoters’ideologicalpredispositions.
ThesecondconferencewasheldinBaiona,Spain,andsupportedbytheErenea
Research Group at the University of Vigo, and the Center in Political Economy
at Washington University in Saint Louis. This conference was in fact the second
installment of the International Conference on Political Economy and Institutions
(ICOPEAI); and like the first, which was held in June 2010, it brought together
politicalscientistsandeconomistsfrommanycountries.Thespatialmodelfeatured
prominentlyinBaionaaswell;buttothisagendawasaddedavarietyofpaperson
political transitions, democratic performance and human capital formation, social
networks,andnewinstitutionaleconomics,andvoting.
There was substantial overlap in the participants at both conferences, allowing
forafruitfulextendeddialoguethat,alongwithaninternalpeer-reviewprocess,has
improvedthecontentofthevolume’scontributions.
TheeditorsthanktheUniversityofVigo,theJuanMarchInstitute,andtheCen-
terinPoliticalEconomy,WashingtonUniversityinSaintLouisforthesupportthey
provided.Inaddition,anearlierversionofChap.4waspresentedattheconference
onthePoliticalEconomyofDemocraticInstitutions,organisedbyLaurettaFrederk-
ingattheUniversityofPortland,June2009.WethankLaurettaandtheUniversity
ofPortlandfororganisingthisearlierconference.
We have decided to structure the volume in three sections, each dealing with
a particular emphasis in political economic research: Institutions, Modelling, and
EmpiricalAnalysis.
Each chapter in this book went through a review process before publication.
These chapters deal with theoretical and empirical issues over the behavior of in-
stitutionsandtheoperationofdemocraticelections.
SaintLouis,USA NormanSchofield
Vigo,Spain GonzaloCaballero
Madrid,Spain DanielKselman
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Further Reading on Political Economy
Acemoglu D (2008) Oligarchic versus democratic societies. J Eur Econ Assoc
6:1–44
AcemogluD,RobinsonJ(2000)WhydidtheWestextendthefranchise?Growth,
inequalityanddemocracyinhistoricalperspective.QJEcon115:1167–1199
Acemoglu D, Robinson J (2006) Economic origins of dictatorship and democ-
racy.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge
AcemogluD,RobinsonJ(2012)Whynationsfail.Profile,NewYork
AcemogluD,JohnsonS,RobinsonJ(2001)Thecolonialoriginsofcomparative
development.AmEconRev91:1369–1401
AcemogluD,JohnsonS,RobinsonJ(2002)Reversaloffortune.QJEcon118:
1231–1294
AcemogluD,JohnsonS,RobinsonJ(2004)Institutionsasthefundamentalcause
oflongrungrowth.NBER,Washington
AcemogluD,JohnsonS,RobinsonJ(2005)TheriseofEurope:Atlantictrade,
institutionalchange,andeconomicgrowth.AmEconRev95:546–579
Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Robinson J, Yared P (2008) Income and democracy.
AmEconRev98:808–842
AcemogluD,JohnsonS,RobinsonJ,YaredP(2009)Reevaluatingthemodern-
izationhypothesis.JMonetEcon56:1043–1058
BoixC(2003)Democracyandredistribution.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cam-
bridge
BuchananJM,TullockG(1962)Thecalculusofconsent:logicalfoundationsof
constitutionaldemocracy.UniversityofMichiganPress,AnnArbor
BunceV,WolchikS(2010)Democracyandauthoritarianisminthepostcommu-
nistworld.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge
CoaseRH(1984)Thenewinstitutionaleconomics.JInstTheorEcon140:229–
231
ClarkG(2007)Afarewelltoalms.PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton
CollierP(2007)Thebottombillion.OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford
Cox GW (1987) Electoral equilibria under alternative voting institutions. Am J
PolitSci31:82–108
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