Where the State is not strong enough Robinson PhD

309 Pages·2012·1.66 MB·English

CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

COLIN ROBINSON

WHERE THE STATE IS NOT STRONG ENOUGH:
WHAT CAN ARMY RECONSTRUCTION TELL US ABOUT CHANGE
NECESSARY TO THE OECD DAC SSR PRINCIPLES?

CRANFIELD DEFENCE AND SECURITY
PhD CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

CRANFIELD DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Department of Management and Security

PhD Thesis

2011

Colin Robinson

Where The State Is Not Strong Enough:
What can Army Reconstruction tell us about change necessary to the OECD DAC
SSR Principles?

Supervisor: Dr Ann Fitz-Gerald

November 2011

© Cranfield University 2011. All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be
reproduced without the written permission of the copyright owner.

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Abstract

Post-conflict army reconstruction is an important element of security sector reform
(SSR), tracing its origins to at least 1980, before the SSR concept itself was
formulated. Reconstruction of security forces is an important element in wider post-
conflict reconstruction, and for political reasons, an army has almost always deemed
necessary.
Since 1998, SSR itself has been increasingly conceptualized, with principles for SSR
having been laid down by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) since 2004. Yet SSR faces a host of philosophical and
practical problems, perhaps the greatest being the gap between theory and practice
(Chanaa's 'conceptual-contextual divide'). To make SSR efforts more successful, the
underlying principles need to be revised and amended. Post-conflict army
reconstruction experience since 1980, and associated academic study, military
doctrine, and work by international organizations (particularly the OECD) can
provide a basis for such revision. This thesis aims to survey post-conflict army
reconstruction activities since 1980, draw overall lessons from that review and field
study in Liberia, and propose amendments to the SSR principles on that basis.

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Acknowledgements
Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan

A large number of people have greatly assisted me in this endeavour, but first among
them is my supervisor, Dr Ann Fitz-Gerald. Without Ann’s patience, persistence,
imagination, intellect, and intellectual rigour, this thesis would not be of anything like
the standard it is. She has repeatedly urged me to go beyond the easy approaches to
questions, for which encouragement I am very grateful.

Perhaps next in my praise, overall for the PhD, is Chris Lang and her team at Land
Mine Action in Monrovia, Liberia. Their support and assistance made the fieldwork
possible. Possibly next among the Lane Mine Action team to thank is Mr. Kollie,
director of transport for LMA, and his drivers. Without the transportation support I
received from LMA, far less would have been achieved.

At Shrivenham I should thank Mike Dunn, Trevor Taylor, Martin Rupiya, Dennis
Blease, Sylvie Jackson, Gordon Hughes, Teri McConville, Laura Cleary, Caroline
Sweeting, Carol Gay, and the enduring dedication of the library staffs at DCMT and
the Joint Services Command and Staff College.

A large number of army officers in several countries have greatly assisted with this
thesis. Among them were Lieutenant General Daniel Opande, Major General Suraj
Abdurrahman, Major General Adrian Foster, Major General Tim Toyne-Sewell (retd)
late KOSB, Brigadier Tim Allen, Brigadier Kellie Conteh, Colonel Bruce Boevers
(retd), Colonel Roger McElwain, Lt Col ‘Sticky’ Whitchurch, a number of other
British Army officers, officers of the Royal Canadian Engineers, Major Terry
McDonald, and Major Euge Whakahoehoe & Sharon.

Within the restrictions placed upon them by their government, U.S. personnel in
Monrovia and elsewhere were extremely helpful. Susan McCarty, Colonel Al
Rumphrey, other members of the Office of Security Cooperation, and Steven Koutsis,
Political Counsellor, all have my sincere thanks. At UNMIL, Chris Rampe was the
serving SRSG’s SSR Advisor. Without his suggestions, I would have been unable to
conduct interviews within the Ministry of National Defence. Mr. Rampe has since
died, while posted in the Sudan; the SSR community and the countries in which he
worked, I believe, owes him a great debt. Rob Deere was the former SSR Advisor to
the SRSG and was extremely helpful. Patrick Coker helped me to understand a
number of points.

Thomas Dempsey and Magnus Jorgel were extremely helpful, clarifying a number of
issues.

The single most helpful Liberian official was Senator Blamoh Nelson of Grand Kru
County. Senator Nelson was extremely helpful with recollections and documents, and
suggested pointers as to where I might find others. National Security Advisor H.
Boima Fahnbulleh granted me an interview, for which I was very grateful. I was
thankful to be granted interviews by a number of Senators and Congressmen also.

At Victoria University during the write up phase in New Zealand, Dr Deb Laurs,
Justin Cargill at the Library, and Rebecca Kocks all deserve special mention. In the
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final few months in New York, I-House was an amazingly rich environment to reside
in.

Finally, it is impossible really to put into words what I owe my parents. They have
always been incredibly supportive.

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Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction..................................................................................................8
Chapter 2: The SSR Literature.....................................................................................23
Introduction .................................................................................................................23
The Evolution of SSR and its linkages to Post-Conflict Army Reconstruction..........25
Definition.....................................................................................................................26
Origins..........................................................................................................................28
Critiques of Security Sector Reform ...........................................................................38
Absence/Severe Weakness of the State.......................................................................40
Difficulty of transforming neopatrimonial government institutions ...........................45
Local Ownership..........................................................................................................49
Sectoral versus strategic transformation priorities.......................................................51
Short-Term Stabilization versus Longer-Term Governance .......................................55
Security Sector Management.......................................................................................58
Summarizing the SSR Critiques..................................................................................64
Chapter 3: Army Reconstruction Literature Review...................................................68
Existing Army Reconstruction Guidance ..................................................................68
Broad Policy Guidance................................................................................................69
Broad Overall Guidance for Defence Sector Reconstruction......................................70
The DDR Experience ..................................................................................................77
Doctrine for Reconstructing Armies............................................................................80
Conclusions..................................................................................................................87
Chapter 4: Methodology..............................................................................................92
The State of the Literature ..........................................................................................93
Social Science Research Fundamentals ......................................................................98
Quantitative and Qualitative Research Strategies......................................................103
Choosing the appropriate qualitative theoretical perspective....................................105
Phenomenological Research Methods ......................................................................108
Research Design.........................................................................................................115
Qualitative Indicators: Utility and Limitations..........................................................120
Identifying Cross-Case Processes and Issues............................................................126
Applying the Field Experience Test..........................................................................128
Risk Analysis and Limitations ..................................................................................130
Analysis of Data.........................................................................................................132
Ethical Issues ............................................................................................................135
Summary ...................................................................................................................139
Chapter 5: Lessons derived from Army Reconstruction Experience.........................141
Armies rebuilt by ‘Military merger’..........................................................................146
Political-Economic Factors in Military Merger Cases...............................................148
Capability Enhancement in ‘Military Merger’ cases.................................................153
Applicability of SSR principles to the military merger model..................................166
Armies rebuilt by the ‘ Institutionalization’ method..................................................171
Political-Economic Factors in Institutionalization cases...........................................171
Capability Enhancement in Institutionalization Cases..............................................173
Applicability of SSR Principles to Institutionalization Cases...................................178
Single state forces......................................................................................................180
Political-Economic Factors influencing Single State Forces.....................................181
Capability Enhancement in Single State Forces........................................................184
Applicability of SSR principles to single state forces...............................................199
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Conclusions ...............................................................................................................207
Chapter 6: The Liberian Army Reconstruction Process............................................215
Political-Economic Factors shaping the Current Force.............................................217
Postwar Army Capability Enhancement in Liberia...................................................226
Assessing Force Capability .......................................................................................238
Adherence to SSR Principles ....................................................................................241
People Centred and Locally Owned .........................................................................241
Democratic Norms, Human Rights Principles, and the Rule of Law........................245
Addressing Diverse Security Challenges through integrated policy.........................247
Greater Civilian Oversight and Involvement.............................................................252
Transparency and Accountability..............................................................................255
Enhancing Institutional and Human Capacity...........................................................257
Conclusions ...............................................................................................................269
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations........................................................273
Summary of Dissertation Research............................................................................273
Comparing Adherence to SSR Principles .................................................................284
Conclusions: Reconsidering the SSR Principles .......................................................290
Recommendations......................................................................................................299
Annex A: Model Army Reconstruction Framework.................................................301
Preparatory Considerations........................................................................................308
Assessment and Design Phase...................................................................................312
Army Reconstruction Process....................................................................................314
Conclusions................................................................................................................316
Annex B: Key Interviewees.......................................................................................318
Bibliography..............................................................................................................319
Chapter 1: Introduction

When the colonial powers withdrew from their former possessions in the 1950s and
1960s, the developing polities they left were almost invariably much weaker than the
imperial homelands. Efforts to achieve development were hampered by lack of
security provision, among many other factors. The monopoly of violence, the critical
attribute of the modern state, was incomplete at best, and, beyond the capital cities,
often left in the hands of chiefs and community leaders.1 Yet because of agreements
to respect what was incomplete sovereignty, notably the Organization of African
Unity’s 1964 Cairo decision to accept existing African colonial boundaries, and the
freezing effect that Cold War alignments imposed upon interstate relations, world
powers treated the new developing countries as states formally equal to their own.2

In the early 1990s the increasing prominence of internal conflicts with international
implications prompted a rise in efforts to halt such wars. Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Somalia, and Rwanda became perhaps the most widely known examples. To ensure
that the peace created by such interventions can make long-lasting development
possible, it was and is vital that security be maintained. Physical security is required
to allow development work to take place. Africa and Asia continue to be torn by
internal conflicts, many eventually attended by the presence of international
intervention forces.3 While they are in place, they often effectively act as the
country’s defence force as well as dampening internal conflicts.4 International
interventions only usually last for a few years (eg. the UN Mission in Somalia, with
the current UN Congo mission being a rare exception).5

1 Louise Andersen, Bjørn Møller, and Finn Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People? :
Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007), 9.
2 J.N.C. Hill, "Challenging the Failed State Thesis: IMF and World Bank Intervention and the
Algerian Civil War," Civil Wars 11, no. 1 (2009): 40-41.
3
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2009, (SIPRI, Oxford
University Press), 2009, 71-72.
4 The clearest examples of intervention forces acting as exterior defence forces are in Kosovo
against Serbia and in East Timor, with INTERFET poised against Indonesia.
5 Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, The quest for viable peace :
international intervention and strategies for conflict transformation (Washington, D.C. Arlington, Va.:
United States Institute of Peace Press ; Association of the United States Army, 2005), 38.
Domestic political factors on the part of troop contributors, as well as UN reluctance
to stay, dictate that intervention forces can only stay for a certain time. In any case,
matching developed-state ideas on the appropriate reach of a state’s security apparatus
with the contested reality of the developing world often means that as the intervention
force withdraws, its task is almost always deemed incomplete.

Mainstream developed-state ideas however sometimes need their assumptions
challenged. Efforts to improve security provision can form part of the larger liberal
peace project. The liberal peace has five main components: democraticisation, the
rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neo-liberal development.6
Richmond argues that there is a weak consensus between the UN, major states and
donors, agencies, and NGOs that all international intervention should incorporate key
elements of the liberal peace.7 The liberal peace idea contains numerous positive
elements, but these elements should not be put into practice without being aware of
the direction, scope, and implications of the entire concept. Perhaps even more
important than this is the acknowledgement that intervention is an external, rather
than homegrown, process. Therefore interveners may be more interested in their own
aims rather than always being primarily focused on the well-being of the host state.

Mainstream thinking on intervention in internal conflict deems the reestablishment of
public order necessary to establish effective control of the means of violence.8
Therefore, a transition of security responsibility to indigenous forces is considered
necessary. Almost invariably it is deemed necessary to have both armed forces and
policing organisations. While police forces, potentially including a gendarmerie or
border guard, fulfill the main internal security requirement, armed forces are
necessary to defeat external threats or sustained internal armed insurrection.

However, armies in the developing world appear to face a diminishing level of threat
from other states’ armed forces. An examination of major armed conflicts shows that

6 Oliver P. Richmond, 'The problems of peace: understanding the liberal peace,' Conflict,
Security and Development, 6:3 (October 2006), 292.
7 Ibid.
8 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars : Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1999), 10.
few since 1990 are caused by one state confronting another. One of the exceptions,
Ethiopia-Eritrea, has its origins in previous internal conflict within Ethiopia’s
previous boundaries. While they retain their previous orientation towards defence of
national borders, armed forces in the developing world today seem much more likely
to be used within their nation’s boundaries. This is partially because the colonial
system in Africa forged a state system with the utmost respect for boundaries. States
are often weak, and only able to claim sovereignty over distant hinterlands because no
other state can challenge their rule.9 State armed forces engage each other less
because European colonial customary practice, reinforced by post-independence
agreements, has meant that few states attempt to challenge another’s territorial
integrity by force. In many cases, armed forces are used against internal unrest or
insurrection. This has external involvement in many cases. Examples include the
Taliban, which span Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Forces démocratiques de libération
du Rwanda (FDLR), whose leadership opposes the current Rwandan government
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (henceforth ‘the Congo’), and invasions
of exiles, such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Whether threats are internal or external, armed state land forces – armies - are almost
always required, as navies and air forces cannot effectively hold ground. Only a single
post-conflict country, Haiti, elected to dissolve its armed forces completely, mirroring
what might be identified as a Caribbean trend, following Costa Rica10 and Panama.
Even in countries without formal armies, armed state land forces can evolve. The
militarization of the Costa Rica Civil Guard is a good example.11

The signing of the peace accord effectively initiates the post-conflict period. Ideally
armed disturbances will taper off while political and practical space for development
activities will grow. Reconstruction of an army is among these activities. However, it
is again necessary here to emphasize the assumptions on which peace accords are

9 Jeffrey Herbst (2000) quoted in Jonathan Di John, ‘Conceptualising the Causes and
Consequences of Failed States,’ Crisis States Research Centre/LSE, January 2008, 30.
10 Donald E. Schulz, Haiti: Will Things Fall Apart?, Parameters, Winter 1997-98, pp. 73-91,
accessed online at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/97winter/schulz.htm, November 26,
2008. See also Eirin Mobekk, International Involvement in Restructuring and Creating Security Forces:
The Case of Haiti, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 12, No.3, Autumn 2001.
11 Julio Montes, ‘The Costa Rican Defence Forces,’ Jane’s Intelligence Review, November
1994, 525.