War, Coups, and Terror: Pakistan’s Army in Years of Turmoil

338 Pages·2016·2.89 MB·English

by  Brian Cloughley

First published in Great Britain in 2008 by
PEN & SWORD MILITARY
an imprint of
Pen & Sword Books Ltd
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Copyright © Brian Cloughley, 2008
9781783460915

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Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Introduction
Chapter 1 - Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Chapter 2 - The Years of Zia
Chapter 3 - Democracy Again
Chapter 4 - Karamat, Kargil, Chaos
Chapter 5 - The Coup, the Borders and the Army’s
Capabilities
Chapter 6 - How the Army Looks After its Own
Chapter 7 - The Modern Army and its Challenges
Chapter 8 - Terrorism and Tribes
Index
Introduction
Pakistan is a complicated country inhabited by a diverse people
whose cultural divisions are acute. A tribesman from the North-
West Frontier Province would feel as foreign in the house of a
Punjabi as he would in that of a Portuguese or a Pole, even had
they identical status in their respective social hierarchies. In
they identical status in their respective social hierarchies. In
language, habits and tradition they have nothing in common.
Notwithstanding the practice of a common religion, there are
wide differences in its interpretation, given the proclivity of
some citizens, notably but far from exclusively the tribals, for
the intricacies of sharia, religious law, which is often
selectively interpreted by some spiritual leaders from motives
of self-interest.
There are four entirely dissimilar provinces, plus the
geographical anomalies of the federally controlled regions of
Pakistan-administered Kashmir (still in dispute with India) and
the Northern Territories, and the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) abutting Afghanistan, where since 2003 there has
been grave instability, developing into insurrection.
Before 1971 Pakistan had an Eastern Wing, the land that is
now Bangladesh. Political and economic mishandling of the
East by the former West Pakistan caused deep dissatisfaction
and growth of nationalist feeling among the almost entirely
Bengali population, regarded as inferior by most of West
Wing’s Punjabis who were the majority of administrators.
Matters came to a head following elections in 1970 in which
East Pakistan’s Awami League won a majority, entitling it to
form a government. This was objected to by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,
the West’s most prominent politician and leader of the Pakistan
People’s Party, who refused to recognize the election results.
Unrest in the East was suppressed in a brutal pogrom by the
army, and there was open support by India for a growing
insurrection.
The Indian invasion of the East Wing, to assist those
regarded by West Pakistan as rebels, resulted in defeat of
Pakistan’s 80,000-strong army by an Indian force of over three
times its size. The effects on the citizens of what remained of
the country were immense.
Our story begins at this point, in December 1971, when the
Army of Pakistan was shocked to the point of despair by defeat
in battle.
The army gradually recovered from its humiliation. The country
was ostensibly returned to democracy by Z.A. Bhutto, but there
were disquieting facets to his exercise of power. Creation of
the Federal Security Force, a body of 14,000 armed men that
answered only to Bhutto, was hardly in accord with
parliamentary democracy. Nor was his imposition of martial
law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore in 1977. In the last-
named city three brigadiers showed great courage in refusing
to have their troops put down riots, as this would almost
certainly have involved killing civilians which they were not
prepared to do. The army’s chief, General Zia ul Haq, decided
to take over the country and conducted a bloodless coup in
July.
All Pakistan’s army coups have been bloodless, successful
and popular – but popular only for a while. The trouble is that
military people are usually quite good at running large
organizations, even civilian ones, but generally (if one may use
that word) fail to understand politics and government, and the
give-and-take so necessary in that esoteric world. It is said that
following the first of the Duke of Wellington’s cabinet meetings
as Prime Minister, he complained about it having been ‘An
extraordinary affair. I gave them their orders and they wanted
to stay and discuss them.’ And even General Eisenhower,
arguably the most successful world leader who exchanged
uniform for plain clothes, distrusted, disliked and warned
against what he called, at the end of his Presidency, the
‘military-industrial complex’ whose corrosive influence, with
remarkable farsightedness, he saw as a threat to true
democracy. But both Wellington and Eisenhower, for all their
military background and irritation at those outside their
control, were successful and highly regarded, elected, civilian
leaders. They were subjected to checks and balances which,
even in Wellington’s time, were effective controls on those who
had been accustomed to instant and unquestioning obedience.
In Pakistan, however, none of the soldiers who have led the