US Strategies for Regional Security - The Stanley Foundation

161 Pages·2002·0.54 MB·English

by  The Stanley Foundation

US Strategies for Regional Security
Report of the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference
Edited by Michael Kraig and James Henderson
Convened at Airlie Conference Center, Warrenton, Virginia
October 25-27, 2001
Preface
trategy for Peace, the Stanley Foundation’s US foreign policy conference, annually
assembles a panel of experts from the public and private sectors to assess specific policy
Sissues and to recommend future direction.
The eighty-seven participants who met at Airlie Center were drawn together in four concurrent
round-table discussions to examine the current state of relations and recommend elements of a
strategy for peace.
All sessions were informal and off the record. In preparing this document following the confer-
ence, the rapporteurs tried to convey the areas of consensus and disagreement and the conclu-
sions of the discussion. It contains her or his interpretation of the proceeding and is not merely
a descriptive, chronological account.
The participants neither reviewed nor approved the reports. Therefore, it should not be assumed
that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions.
Production:
Amy Bakke, Loren Keller, Margo Schneider, and Eileen Schurk
Table of Contents
US Strategies for Regional Security
Introduction and Summary ................................................................................5
Europe
Security in a Europe “Whole and Free”: Staying the Course ................................10
Chair’s Report by Christopher J. Makins, The Atlantic Council
of the United States
Strategies for European Security ..............................................................................22
Klaus Becher, International Institute for Strategic Studies
Building a Euro-Atlantic Community: Europe and the States in 2010 ................27
Simon Serfaty, Center for Strategic & International Studies
Participant List for Europe Working Group Discussions ......................................36
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia
Making Headway on the Korean Peninsula..............................................................40
Chair’s Report by Andrew C. Scobell, Strategic Studies Institute,
US Army War College
The Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia Security: US Policy Options..............54
Samuel S. Kim, Columbia University
Korean Peninsula Security: A South Korean View of US Foreign Policy
and Defense Strategies ................................................................................................65
Chung-in Moon, Yonsei University
Participant List for Korean Peninsula Working Group Discussions ....................76
Middle East and Persian Gulf
Middle East Security in the Near and Long Term ..................................................80
Chair’s Report by Geoffrey Kemp, The Nixon Center
The United States and De Facto Nuclear Weapon States:
A Post-September 11 Perspective ..............................................................................88
Avner Cohen, University of Maryland School of Public Affairs
Marvin M. Miller, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Nuclear Temptations: The Middle East as a Case Study ......................................104
Ibrahim A. Karawan, The University of Utah
Participant List for Middle East Working Group Discussions ............................109
South Asia
After the Attacks: India-Pakistan Relations and US Policy Toward
the Subcontinent After September 11 ....................................................................112
Chair’s Report by Lee A. Feinstein, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Enduring Features in the South Asian Neighborhood:
PolicyOptions for the United States After September 11......................................123
James C. Clad, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service;
Cambridge Energy Research Associates
The South Asian Nuclear Conundrum: US Interests and Choices ......................133
Lewis A. Dunn, Science Applications International Corporation
Securing Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Complex....................................................144
David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security
Participant List for South Asia Working Group Discussions ..............................155
Opening Remarks ............................................................................................157
Richard H. Stanley, The Stanley Foundation
The Stanley Foundation Conference Staff ....................................................162
The Stanley Foundation ..................................................................................163
Introduction and Summary
By Michael Kraig and James Henderson
Program Officers, The Stanley Foundation
US Strategies for Regional Security
For the 2001 Strategy for Peace Conference, the Stanley Foundation invited US officials and
policy experts to consider US foreign policy and defense strategies for achieving regional secu-
rity in four major areas of the world: Europe; the Middle East and Persian Gulf; South Asia;
and within Northeast Asia, the Korean peninsula. Participants were asked to view the strategic,
economic, and political dynamics of individual regions in their entirety. For each separate work-
ing group, two to three participants were asked prior to the conference to author “thought-
pieces” or short policy briefs on US foreign policy options. These pieces served as a primer for
discussion and are reprinted in their entirety within this report. The chair of each working group
was then asked to write their own short reports synthesizing, analyzing, and summarizing both
the working group discussions and the commissioned briefs.
Working group discussions at Airlie House were informal and off the record. Therefore, the
primary policy recommendations listed at the beginning of each chair’s report in the follow-
ing sections of this publication should be viewed as the chair’s own interpretations of the
substance of discussions.
Why a Focus on Regions?
It may seem that the new realities of transnational terrorism and the global “war on terror”
require a purely global focus in conceptualizing US foreign and security policies over the long
term. Alternately, many experts might point to the necessity of shoring up US bilateral relations
with key potential allies, especially European allies and individual developing countries from
these four regions. Both the global and the bilateral points of view are necessary in any compre-
hensive assessment of US policy options. However, one only has to consider the international
events of the first post-Cold War decade to find compelling reasons not to abandon a broad
regional outlook as a necessary component of national security strategy:
• Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the ensuing humanitarian catastrophes were initially not treat-
ed as strategic interests for the United States. However, the potential for instability spreading
to regional neighbors threatened the values, political principles, and military credibility of the
North American Trade Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).
• Regional differences have repeatedly challenged the norms and goals of global nonprolifera-
tion regimes. The threat environments of the Middle East, South Asia, and the Korean penin-
sula have required supplementary strategies for preventing the spread of missiles and weapons
of mass destruction (WMD).
• The Persian Gulf region—particularly Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors—and the dis-
pute between Israel and Palestine constitute the two primary unresolved regional problems
that are fueling the Al Qaeda-related transnational terrorist cells in more than 60 countries
around the wo r l d .
Successful resolution of these diverse national security challenges will require that the United
States deal with the regional issues involved, align regional initiatives with global concerns and
regimes, and use US bilateral relations to leverage solutions. In this regard, sound regional secu-
rity frameworks can provide essential economic, political, and military foundations for making
global security initiatives workable.
The primary substantive focus of each separate working group, and the associated findings and
policy recommendations, are briefly outlined below. A more complete and detailed set of rec-
ommendations can be seen at the beginning of each chair’s report.
European Security
The attacks of September 11 have renewed the centrality of the Euro-Atlantic partnership
between the United States and Europe and made clear that threats to European security will
increasingly come from unstable states and regions bordering Europe. Special attention was
focused on the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Near East. Key findings and
recommendations were:
• The Euro-Atlantic partnership and transatlantic community are still central components of US
and regional security after September 11.
• Europe and the United States should work to further integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic
system, a goal now made easier by President Putin’s recent policies.
• The primary powers and responsibilities of the EU and NATO should not be confused with
each other, and membership should not be viewed as automatic. Neither the EU nor NATO is a
full-service institution.
• In the Balkans, the United States and its European allies have little choice but to carry on with
their present policies. Continued involvement by both the United States and the EU is critical
to future progress and stability in the region.
• Turkey remains simultaneously one of the principal bulwarks and one of the major policy
conundrums of European security. The problems of Turkey’s concerns about NATO-EU
arrangements for the EU Rapid Reaction Force and Cyprus’s membership in the EU need to
be resolved.
• The Caucasus will be increasingly important for European security. European countries should
pay greater attention to the region, including problems such as those faced by the government
of Georgia in Abkhasia.
• Economic and demographic pressures in the Mediterranean and Near East may increasingly
present European countries with security challenges at their borders and internally. The EU is
the proper institution for fashioning “soft security” measures to prevent the worst possible out-
comes from materializing.
Korean Peninsula Security and Northeast Asia
Special attention was given to the problems of the Korean peninsula within Northeast Asia
because it represents one of the few Cold War territorial and ideological divisions still operat-
ing. As such, it is a de facto obstacle to further progress toward a wider multilateral security
framework in East and Southeast Asia. Key findings and recommendations were:
• New forms of US engagement are needed to reduce the massive uncertainty about long-
term North Korean goals and intentions. A consistent US policy strategy for both Ko r e a
and for Northeast Asia is hampered by lack of US understanding about North Ko r e a n
intentions and goals.
• Coordination with South Korea remains critical. To reduce confusion, there should be an
explicit agreement confirming the division of labor on WMD issues, missile proliferation, and
conventional arms control talks.
• The United States should acknowledge the positive role that China and Russia, as interested
regional powers, could play in reducing tension on the Korean peninsula.
Middle East Security
Central concerns revolved around the future of the Israeli nuclear, chemical, and biological pro-
grams; US efforts to keep Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states committed to the war on ter-
ror; missile and WMD development trends for Syria, Iran, and Iraq; and US bilateral policies
toward both Iran and Iraq. Key findings and recommendations were:
• Avoid unilateral actions against Iraq unless firm evidence of connections to Al Qaeda
emerges. For now, leverage the new post-September 11 relationship with Russia to gain
approval for smart sanctions toward Iraq.
• Improve public relations in the Arab world and the Persian Gulf. Make every effort to better
understand Arab and Persian culture and society.
• Craft a consistent policy in the Middle East in regard to human rights and democracy.
• In the near term, avoid regional arms control and disarmament initiatives meant to alter
the status quo of Israeli nuclear opacity. In the long term, how eve r, the quest for reg i o n-
al stability will require the United States to work with Israel in changing the nuclear
status quo.
South Asia Security
For this region, the primary policy conundrum was on how to balance three competing US
security mandates: the need to win quickly and decisively the post-September 11 war in
Afghanistan; the need to ensure the security of South Asian nuclear stockpiles against terrorist
theft or diversion; and the broader, longer-term requirement of preventing operational nuclear
deployments and the further improvement of both countries’ nuclear and missile capabilities. In
turn, these linked concerns drew attention to the roots of the India-Pakistan rivalry: Kashmir.
Key findings and recommendations were:
• Recognize the fact that regional and nuclear issues in South Asia are inextricably linked. US
policy has suffered from an overemphasis on the nuclear issue. The United States must play a
discrete role in convincing both sides to commit themselves to a viable political process that
addresses the Kashmir dispute.
• To prevent accidental or unintended escalation to a nuclear war in South Asia, the United
States should share its own experiences (positive and negative) with nuclear safety and nuclear
command and control during the Cold War.
• To prevent the diversion of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists, the United States should
provide equipment that indirectly increases security of nuclear materials and arsenals.
• However, the guiding principle of all US aid and advice should be “Do no harm.” Washington
should withhold any technologies and components that would allow Pakistan and India to
“operationalize” nuclear weapons via deployment on missiles.
• India and Pakistan should define what they mean by a “credible minimum deterrent,” and the
United States should encourage them to define it at the lowest possible level.
• Promote cooperation on the global problem of proliferation. Expansion of high-tech commer-
cial trade could be an incentive for such cooperation.
Europe
Security in a Europe “Whole and Free”: Staying the Course
Chair’s Report by Christopher J. Makins, The Atlantic Council of the United States
Strategies for European Security
Klaus Becher, International Institute for Strategic Studies
Building a Euro-Atlantic Community: Europe and the States in 2010
Simon Serfaty, Center for Strategic & International Studies
Participant List for Europe Working Group Discussions
Security in a Europe “Whole and Free”: Staying the Course
Chair’s Report From the Europe Working Group
By Christopher J. Makins
President, The Atlantic Council of the United States
Chair’s Findings and Policy Recommendations
• The Euro-Atlantic Partnership—The European Union (EU) and Europe remain central to
US interests, and the transatlantic relationship remains central to European security.
• A Transatlantic Community—The community of values that was protected by the North
American Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Cold War and the community of interests built
within the EU after World War II should be transformed into a Euro-Atlantic community of
action in the face of the new threat of dehumanizing brutality presented by international terror-
ism linked to the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
• International Terrorism—The terrorist attacks of September 11 have created additional
space within which a more coherent European defense capability could greatly benefit US
interests, while diminishing European concerns that US preoccupations outside Europe would
work against the interests of European security. Furthermore, international terrorism has pro-
vided a golden opportunity and a clear incentive to construct a stronger and more united
transatlantic relationship, in particular on European security issues.
• Russia—NATO and the EU should seek to exploit the opportunity offered by President
Putin’s recent policies to make progress toward their goal of integrating Russia into the Euro-
Atlantic system. But in doing so they should not allow short-term convenience to compromise
their mid- or longer-term interests.
• NATO and EU Enlargement—NATO must not allow its further enlargement to be stalled or
overwhelmed by new candidacies. The enlargement processes of NATO and the EU should
move generally in step so that as they approach their ends, most EU members are NATO
members and vice versa.
• NATO, EU, and European Security—Neither the EU nor NATO is a full-service institution.
Rather they have complementary capabilities that should be useful in dealing with the chal-
lenges of the post-September 11 period. The EU is well equipped to respond to the demands
for “soft security” instruments along the European periphery; the United States, alone or
through NATO, is uniquely equipped to deal with “hard security” challenges. Habits of mili-
tary cooperation acquired through NATO remain critical and, from a political standpoint, oper-
ating through NATO could give important legitimacy to future US and allied military actions.