US Hypersonic Research and Development : the Rise and Fall of Dyna-Soar

268 Pages·2006·1.142 MB·English

by  Roy F Houchin

US Hypersonic Research and
Development
Series:Space Power and Politics
Series Editors:Everett C.Dolman and John Sheldon,both School of
Advanced Air and Space Studies,USAF Air,Maxwell,USA
TheSpace Power and Politicsseries will provide a forum where space pol-
icy and historical issues can be explored and examined in-depth. The series
will produce works that examine civil, commercial and military uses of
space and their implications for international politics, strategy and political
economy. This will include works on government and private space pro-
grams, technological developments, conflict and cooperation, security
issues and history.
Space Warfare:Strategy,Principles and Policy
John J.Klein
US Hypersonic Research & Development:The Rise and
Fall of Dyna-Soar,1944–1963
Roy F.Houchin II
The US Military and Outer Space:Perspectives,Plans,and
Programs
Peter L.Hays

Chinese Space Policy:A Study in Domestic and
International Politics
Roger Handberg and Zhen Li
The International Politics of Space:No Final Frontier
Michael Sheehan
US Hypersonic Research and
Development
The Rise and Fall of Dyna-Soar,
1944–1963
Roy F. Houchin II
First published 2006
by Routledge
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Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,an informa business
© 2006 Roy F.Houchin II
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Houchin,Roy F.
USHypersonic research and development:the rise and fall of Dyna-

Soar,1944–1963 / Roy F.Houchin II.
p.cm.– (Space power and politics)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-415-36281-4 (hardback:alk.paper) 1.X-20 (Space glider)
2.Aerodynamics,Hypersonic–Research–United States–History.
3.Astronautics,Military–Government policy–United States–History.
4.Space shuttles–United States–History.5.Aerospace planes–United
States–History.6.Space Weapons–Research–United States–History.
I.Title. II.Series.
TL789.8.U6X65 2006
629.132´306–dc22
2005035309
ISBN10:0-415-36281-4 (Print Edition)
ISBN13:978-0-415-36281-8
Acknowledgements
My wife, Terry, and my two children, Lee Ann and Roy III, gave me the love
and inspiration to complete this journey. My father’s patient guidance and
insightful wisdom transformed me along the way. My mother-in-law’s
encouragement was a wellspring of inspiration and a pillar of support.
I am grateful for the sponsorship of the Office of Air Force History;
specifically, Dr Richard H. Kohn and Dr Richard P. Hallion, the late
Colonel John F. Shiner and Colonel David A. Tretler (USAF, retired).
While at Auburn University, Dr W. David Lewis, Dr James R. Hansen
and Dr William F. Trimble provided mentorship and sustainment.
I wish to thank William E. Lamar, Colonel Albert H. Crews, Jr (USAF,
Retired) and Colonel William J. ‘Pete’ Knight (USAF, Retired), for their con-
tributions. Similarly, Colonel Phillip Meilinger (USAF, Retired), Colonel
Michael Wolfert (USAF, Retired) and Major Michael Terry (USAF, Retired)
freely shared their expertise.
Special thanks to Tom Lubbesmeyer, Boeing Historical Archives; Joe
Carver and Micky Russell, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell
AFB, AL; Clarence Geiger, Al Misenko and Lieutenant Colonal Laura
Romesburg, Aeronautical Systems Center, History Office, Wright Patterson
AFB, OH; and Roger M cCormick, Air Force Space and Missile Museum,
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL.
Dr Everett C. Dolman, my friend and colleague, deserves a grateful
thank you. His faith in my manuscript and encouragement over the years
made this book possible.
I thank God for my family and these friends. They deserve the credit; I’ll
accept the blame.
Roy F. Houchin II

Contents
Acknowledgements v
Introduction 1
1 Establishing a vision for the future: forecasting
potential enemy threats, 1944–1952 5
2 Pushing the state-of-the-art: justifying the need for
routine access to space, April 1952–May 1955 23
3 Continuing to push the state-of-the-art: the
gathering consensus on hypersonic flight,
May 1955–October 1957 47
4 The debate over manned military spaceflight:
the spaceflight revolution and Dyna-Soar,
October 1957–May 1959 77
5 Struggling to mainta in the manned military mission:
gaining the confidence of officials within the office
of the Secretary of Defense, June 1959–December 1960 114
6 Manned military space programs: interagency rivalry,
January 1961–June 1962 139
7 The Dyna-Soar cancellation 176
Conclusion: the legacy of Dyna-Soar 217
Endnotes 224
Bibliography 229
Index 253

Introduction
Secretary of defense Robert S. McNamara announced the cancellation of
Dyna-Soar on 10 December 1963.1 Two months later, before the Senate
Subcommittee on Department of Defense appropriations, the secretary
summarized his reasons for Dyna-Soar’s demise:
The X-20 [Dyna-Soar] was not contemplated as a weapon system or
even as a prototype of a weapon system … it was a narrowly defined
program, limited primarily to developing the techniques of controlled
reentry at a time when the broader question of ‘Do we need to operate
in near-earth orbit?’ has not yet been answered. ... I don’t think we
should start out on a billion dollar program until we lay down very
clearly what we will do with the product, if and when it proves success-
ful (US Congress 1964b: 171–5).2
Contrary to McNamara’s statement, Air Force leaders had specifically
defined DynaSoar’s role as a weapon system, and had long been charting its
potential for routine access to space within the context of their aerospace
doctrine. In the minds of these officials, it was designed to act as a strategic
deterrent by performing nuclear bombardment, interception, logistics mis-
sions, or by providing critical reconnaissance information from orbit in the
latter phase of the program (such missions were classified secrets at the
time). Accordingly, officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) denied the Air Force an opportunity to extend its airpower doctrine
hypersonically into space because they believed the program’s military
objectives were incompatible with the administration’s space policy, and
moreover, would duplicate the ability of existing national reconnaissance
satellites. When the US and the Soviet Union began negotiations to formally
limit the military use of space, having informally insured the mutual accept-
ance of satellite overflight, Dyna-Soar represented a threat to international
stability.
Ultimately, the Air Force lost DynaSoar, and the opportunity to inhabit
the ‘high ground’ of space, for these two primary reasons: the service’s doc-