Theories of International Relations and the Private Security Analyst

273 Pages·2017·2.33 MB·English

Theories of International Relations and the Private Security
Analyst: The Scope and Limits of Theoretically Informed
Analysis

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Leicester

by

Jean Michel Perois MA
Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Leicester

2017
Abstract

This thesis addresses a significant yet relatively neglected problem: the inadequacy of
risk assessment methods of analysis currently available to security analysts and
practitioners serving customers operating in challenging and volatile environments. It
also challenges the idea shared by many analysts that theories of International Relations
(IR) are irrelevant to the production of security analyses. Towards this end, this thesis
begins by exploring the relationship between existing forecasting techniques and theories
of IR. It then evaluates the extent to which their use has the potential to expand the
analytical capabilities of private security analysts serving corporate customers in such
contexts. In considering the possibilities and limitations of IR approaches the thesis finds
that Realism alone cannot provide a valid framework to improve private security analysts’
skills, but argues that there are definite advantages to combining this with Constructivism
complemented by cultural analysis. These three theoretical components constitute the
backbone of an innovative approach to security analysis herein termed Reflexive Cultural
Realism; a theory of security designed to explain politically-driven security events in
particular social and cultural contexts whilst allowing for forecasting based on an original
way of building scenarios. This theory is applied through a specific reading grid (via a 7-
step method) at all levels of political activity, from the global to the domestic. Two
detailed case studies are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Reflexive
Cultural Realism approach. These case studies, located in two of the GCC countries,
consider security situations analysts are traditionally confronted with in their daily
activities, and demonstrate the utility of the approach in facilitating practical answers to
corporate questions. The thesis concludes that the Reflexive Cultural Realism approach,
by combining an innovative theoretical framework with a robust application method, is
able to satisfy the demands of corporate customers by improving significantly the
analytical and forecasting skills of the analysts serving them.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the persons who supported and helped in this research, the analysts
who attended the interviews, those who exchanged numerous emails after the interviews,
particularly Dave Hartwell and Yves Trotignon. Much appreciation also goes to these
persons who authorised and organised the interviews with the analysts placed under their
authority:
o Ali Siali, Middle East Business Development Manager at IHS Jane's,
o Pannie Peters, then Associate Director at Control Risks,
o Bruno Delamotte, Chairman and CEO of Risk&Co.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................................ 2
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................................... 3
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................................... 4
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................................. 4
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................. 5
Chapter 1 .................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................. 6
Chapter 2 ..................................................................................................................................................................31
Research Design ....................................................................................................................................................31
Chapter 3 ..................................................................................................................................................................47
From analysis to forecast: Introduction to forecasting principles and techniques .................47
Chapter 4 ..................................................................................................................................................................87
Security at the core of the theoretical perspective ................................................................................87
Chapter 5: .............................................................................................................................................................. 114
Reflexive Cultural Realism as a theoretical approach ....................................................................... 114
Chapter 6 ............................................................................................................................................................... 141
The RCR methodology: a 7-step approach.............................................................................................. 141
Chapter 7 ............................................................................................................................................................... 166
Developing the Reflexive Cultural Realism method in context: .................................................... 166
Reflexive Case Study One: Saudi Arabia and the Sawari II project (2004) ............................... 166
Chapter 8 ............................................................................................................................................................... 200
Developing the Reflexive Cultural Realism method in context: .................................................... 200
Reflexive Case Study Two: Pipeline security in Qatar (2005-9) ................................................... 200
Chapter 9 ............................................................................................................................................................... 230
Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................................... 230
References ............................................................................................................................................................. 246
Appendix 1 ............................................................................................................................................................ 268
Appendix 2 ............................................................................................................................................................ 269
Appendix 3 ............................................................................................................................................................ 272

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Armstrong's 6-stage forecasting process .................................................................... 64
Figure 2: The intellectual approach to security analysis ....................................................... 116
Figure 3: The Sawari II timeline: 1994-2016 ........................................................................... 172
Figure 4: Security incidents in KSA 2003-4 ............................................................................. 190
Figure 5: Dolphin Energy regional pipeline network............................................................. 201
Figure 6: The Dolphin Energy project timeline ....................................................................... 208

List of Tables

Table 1: List of recorded security incidents in KSA in 2003 and 2004............................ 189
Table 2: List of participants to semi-structured interviews .................................................. 268

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List of Abbreviations

ADWEC Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company
AIC Advanced Industrial Countries
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable
API American Petroleum Institute
AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
ASIS American Society of Industrial Security
BDM Bueno de Mesquita
CPP Certified Protection Professional
CRG Control Risks (Group)
DCN Direction des Constructions Navales
DGA Direction Générale de l’Armement
DGSE Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure
DUSUP Dubai Supply Authority
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
FDI Foreign Direct Investments
FP Foreign Policy
FPA Foreign Policy Analysis
FPDM Foreign Policy Decision Making
FPE Foreign Policy Executive
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
IHS IHS Jane’s 360
IIF International Institute of Forecasters
IJV International Joint Venture
IR International Relations
IRIS Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques
KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
MNC Multi National Corporation
MOD Ministry of Defence
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OOC Oman Oil Company
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCI Professional Certified Investigator
PSP Physical Security Professional
QP Qatar Petroleum
RCR Reflexive Cultural Realism
Société Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production, le
SONATRACH Transport, la Transformation, et la Commercialisation des
Hydrocarbures (Algeria)
UAE United Arab Emirates
US United States
VNSA Violent Non State Actors
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Twelve years ago, I was offered a position as a security consultant for a large French
company which maintained stealth frigates sold by the French government to the Saudi
navy in the military port of Jeddah, on the Red Sea. Deployed as the leader of a duo of
security consultants, part of my brief was to forecast what would happen to the Saudi-
French maintenance contract should King Fahd meet an earlier than expected demise.
Although rapidly convinced by my observations and readings that no major changes
would occur, and that prince (soon to become king) Abdullah had the situation well in
hand, I realised that I did not have the necessary tools to convey my beliefs to my senior
management. I had no real method to rely upon, no understanding of the motives behind
political actions, no cultural familiarity with the Arab world and no serious knowledge of
modern international relations1. I was not a trained analyst, simply a security practitioner,
but I developed an interest, almost a fascination, for international affairs whose origins
lie in this long past, but not forgotten, immense intellectual frustration.
I have since fulfilled several roles in the corporate security industry, mainly in the Middle
East where I still live and work. I have become a specialist in the area of security risk
assessments (risk assessments developed for plant, facilities, headquarters, etc.) and have
been faced time and again with the same demands; forecasting undesired security events,
anticipating unexpected situations, preparing evacuation plans while recommending
responsible mitigation measures to ensure the security of expatriate personnel deployed
abroad.
To do this, I use existing methods. Risk and threat analysis methods are numerous in the
industrial world. The American Petroleum Industry (API 780 methodology, 2013) is the
one I use on a daily basis, but others exist authored by Biringer, Vellani, Garcia, and many

1 Although I graduated in 1979 from the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales de Paris, but this was of
no help whatsoever.
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other risk assessment authorities. Yet, these methods are oriented towards a process and
as such fail to convince me. In spite of delivering a methodical and well-structured
progression, they base their approach on judgement calls presented, thanks to the power
of arithmetic, as scientific truths, while they are simply guesstimates. How do these
methods measure the threats? Essentially, they project past constituents of a threat into
the future. They usually define the threat (threat-as-agent) by listing events under
headings such as intention, motivation and capabilities, a triangle inspired from the crime
triangle. These headings suggest that intention and motivation are obvious and that
capabilities are a logical inference from the seizure of weapons, explosives and terrorist
paraphernalia discovered by the police. This is what analysts I have interviewed call the
context. This may be acceptable in professional circles, but I maintain that expressing
concepts such as intention and motivation without at least some sort of theoretical
background weakens the power of the practitioners’ conclusions. This is where the gap
in understanding and in the existing literature is. As Bonnett highlights:
Facts do not speak for themselves. They need to be analysed, explained and provided with a
context. Otherwise, they are quite, literally meaningless. (Bonnett 2011: 4)
What is said of the facts can also be said of the context. Context needs to be explained
and understood and this can only be done with the help of a theoretical background.
1. Threats, vulnerability and risk and the contribution of IR theories.
For the security analyst, the purpose of any analysis, in the public or private sector, is to
expose and understand threats. In the industrial world, it can be threats to projects, threats
to assets and threats to people. These threats, when measured against the vulnerability of
the asset, point toward risks. These risks in turn can be defined as the level of uncertainty
to achieve objectives. They are often expressed in terms of a ratio between the
consequences of an event and the likelihood of its occurrence.
In the private sector, risk is defined by the possibility of threats materialising to prevent
the development of the project. Threats, in turn, are defined by the API 780 methodology2

2Security Risk Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries, ANSI/API
Standard 780, First Edition, May 2013.
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as ‘any indication, circumstance or event with the potential to cause the loss of, or damage
to an asset. Threat can also be defined as the intention and capability of an adversary to
undertake actions that would be detrimental to critical assets’ (API 780 2013: X). Let us
substitute critical assets with ‘project’ and we have a fair indication of what the
expectations of the corporate customer can be as well as a sound professional objective
for the private security analyst.
The threats between the public and the private sector differ. Threats in the private sector
include actions such as embezzlement, fraud, theft, sabotage and vandalism, to name a
few, all crimes that hardly connect with politics. For these crimes, the corporate sector
hardly needs the services of a security analyst. It is when these threats connect with
politics and its implications, in places perceived as volatile and fraught with dangers, that
the contribution of the private security analyst becomes invaluable.
It is therefore only a portion of the threat that links the analyst and the corporate customer.
These are what the security practitioner calls the low frequency-high consequences type
of events. The corporate security customer wants to know how politically motivated
actions can have an impact on their industrial setup. Threats (threats-as-action) motivated
by a political purpose to projects will come from groups opposing them from a political
perspective. These groups (threats-as-agents) will lead their opposition campaigns
through actions, which make sense only when understood as the result of political
decisions modelled by social constructs, which in turn have become normative
behaviours and can be analysed and reconstructed by the analyst for the benefit of their
client.
Opposition groups (tribal, clannish or simply of interest) exist to defend, represent or
promote the interest of their members, and as such, their behaviour is political. Principles
of IR theories do apply to them, at least to some extent. To say that the Kurdish question
is an IR problem is an acceptable assertion, but approaching it only from an IR perspective
while ignoring domestic politics (of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran which harbour their
populations) would be misleading because it is incomplete.

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Threats (as-actions) may take different forms according to the nature of the project, but
how these threats could develop and could materialise and under which circumstances is
certainly of the utmost importance to the customer. The ‘why’ answer cannot be explained
outside of a political framework, which now becomes the background reference for the
security analyst.
In the world of corporate security, risk assessment is the first step of any project study. A
risk assessment normally comprises five stages: (1) a characterisation of the target (2) a
threat assessment (3) a vulnerability assessment (4) a risk evaluation and (5) a risk
treatment plan.
Of all these stages, the most delicate and the most determinant is, again, the threat
assessment. Why? Because threats and vulnerability determine risk and risk is what the
corporate customer wants to understand.
This is a stage where the security consultant must evaluate the plausible threats according
to a mix of past incidents, current trends, plausible attacks and often their own experience
and background. But, because threat assessments are usually performed without the
revealing background of a theory, and because a historical approach will rather discuss
the events, the ‘how-it-occurred’ rather than the reasons behind the events (the ‘why-it-
happened’) they often look like a military debrief and do not fulfil their explanatory role
the Thucydides way3.
The mission in Jeddah pushed me towards international policy studies; and I took up
studies at post-graduate level to help me conceptualise what I felt intuitively would be
the response to a quest.
Working on my master’s thesis convinced me that Realist principles were directly
applicable to regions of intense political and power rivalry. Influence and power, in such
places, were perceived as zero-sum games, making political actions relatively easy to
anticipate (predictable), at least in theory. Soft and hard powers, coupled with balancing
strategies, were used in a complementary manner to ensure the existence and security of

3 Chapter 1 Book 1 of the History of the Peloponnesian war is a remarkable explanation of the political
reasons behind this war.
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