The Structure of Appearance

344 Pages·1977·42.96 MB·English

by  Nelson Goodman

BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
VOLUME LIII
THE STRUCTURE OF APPEARANCE
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
MONOGRAPHS ON EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE,
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND OF KNOWLEDGE,
AND ON THE MATHEMA TICAL METHODS OF
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
Managing Editor:
JAAKKO HINTIKKA,Academy of Finland and Stanford University
Editors:
ROBERT S. COHEN,Boston University
DONALD DAVIDSON, University of Chicago
GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden
WESLEY C. SALMON, University ofA rizona
VOLUME 107
BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
EDITED BY ROBERT S. COHEN AND MARX W. WARTOFSKY
VOLUME LIII
NELSON GOODMAN
THE STRUCTURE OF
APPEARANCE
Third Edition
with an Introduction by
GEOFFREY HELLMAN
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
DORDRECHT-HOLLAND / BOSTON-U.S.A.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Goodman, Nelson.
The structure of appearance.
(Boston studies in the philosophy of science; v. 53)
(Synthese Library; v. 107)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Phenomenology. 2. Structuralism. 3. System theory. 4.
Science-Philosophy. I. Title. II. Series.
Q174.B67 vol. 53 [B829.5) SOls [142'.7) 77-24191
ISBN-13: 978-90-277-0774-1 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-1184-6
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-1184-6
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All Rights Reserved
Copyright © 1951 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Second Edition copyright © 1966 by the Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.
Third edition with the Introduction by Geoffrey Hellman
copyright © 1977 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 3rd edition 1977
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any informational storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner
To my father
HENRY L. GOODMAN
1874-1941

EDITORIAL PREFACE
With this third edition of Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appear
ance, we are pleased to make available once more one of the most in
fluential and important works in the philosophy of our times. Professor
Geoffrey Hellman's introduction gives a sustained analysis and appreciation
of the major themes and the thrust of the book, as well as an account of the
ways in which many of Goodman's problems and projects have been picked
up and developed by others. Hellman also suggests how The Structure of
Appearance introduces issues which Goodman later continues in his essays
and in the Languages of Art. There remains the task of understanding Good
man's project as a whole; to see the deep continuities of his thought, as it
ranges from logic to epistemology, to science and art; to see it therefore as
a complex yet coherent theory of human cognition and practice. What we
can only hope to suggest, in this note, is the b.road Significance of Goodman's
apparently technical work for philosophers, scientists and humanists.
One may say of Nelson Goodman that his bite is worse than his bark.
Behind what appears as a cool and methodical analysis of the conditions of
the construction of systems, there lurks a radical and disturbing thesis: that
the world is, in itself, no more one way than another, nor are we. It depends
on the ways in which we take it, and on what we do. What we do, as human
beings, is talk and think, make, act and interact. In effect, we construct our
worlds by construing them, this way or that. The conditions on the construc
tion of symbol systems are, by extension and interpretation, conditions on
our construction of worlds, and of ourselves as part of the ways 'the world' is.
It would be impertinent and impetuous to impose on Goodman any grand
philosophical programs. He is the model of deflationary analysis, both in his
methodological nominalism and in his ontological relativism. Yet the Good
manian bite is infectious, and suggests a much broader program than it is his
style to admit. One form of rabid Goodmania would suggest a sort of dynamic
and pluralistic Kantianism, in which a prioris are as plentiful as blackberries.
Serious choices among them, however, are not. As Poincare once put it,
though, "Conventions, yes - arbitrary, no" 1. The empirical - one may say,
objective - pull of Goodman's constructionism is that, historically and cul-
Science and Hypotheses, in The Foundations of Science (New York, 1929), p. 106.
I
VIII EDITORIAL PREFACE
turally speaking, we have chosen certain crucial constructions as more
canonical than others. Goodman's argument is that it is open to us to discover,
choose, invent others, because the constraints we imagine to be imposed on
our choices are open to revision. By us.
Center for the Philosophy and History ofS cience, ROBERT S. COHEN
Boston University MARX W. WAR TOFSKY
May 1977
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EDITORIAL PREFACE VII
FOREWORD TO THIS EDITION XIII
FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION XV
FOREWORD TO THE FIRST EDITION XVII
INTRODUCTION BY GEOFFREY HELLMAN XIX
ORIGINAL INTRODUCTION XLIX
PART ONE / ON THE THEORY OF SYSTEMS
I. Constructional Definition
1. Extensional Identity 3
2. Substitution Criteria 7
3. Extensional Isomorphism 10
4. Consequences of Isomorphism as a Criterion 17
5. On Systems of Predicates of Individuals 22
II. The General Apparatus
1. General Apparatus and Special Basis 24
2. The Question of Classes 24
3. Nominalism 26
4. The Calculus of Individuals 33
5. The Calculus in Systems 40
III. lIxtralogicalllases
1. The Nature of Primitive Terms 45
2. The Choice of Basis 46
3. Simplicity 47
4. Reflexitivity and Complexity 54
5. Transitivity, Self-completeness, and Complexity 60
6. Symmetry and Complexity 63
7. Final Formulae for Primary Complexity 68
8. Secondary Complexity 75